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IS PROPERLY WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
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THE 1966 CONTRACT ENTERED BETWEEN
ELSIE AND HER TWO SONS, CLOYD AND
MARK, HAS REMAINED A VALID CONTRACT
FROM ITS EXECUTION TO THE PRESENT
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At no time did Elsie Brinkerhoff
give her two sons notice that she
considered them to be in default
of their obligations under the
contract
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Utah law requires that a seller
allow a reasonable period of time
for buyers to cure their breach
prior to enforcing the forfeiture
clause provisions of installment
land sales contracts

16

Elsie Brinkerhoff as seller under
the 1966 contract waived her right
to demand strict compliance with
the contract's installment payment
terms without giving prior notice
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There is no indication that the
parties to the 1966 contract ever
intended to abandon all of thei
rights and obligations thereunder
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At this time, all remaining parties
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the contract continue on full force
and effect. Reaching a contrary
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conclusion will frustrate the purpose
of the contract and deny all parties
the benef it thereto
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ABOUT 1970 ON WAS A MATTER CLEARLY
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REVERSIBLE ERROR
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ASSUMING THE
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APPLICATION TO THIS CASE

30

ABSENT ALL OTHER FINDINGS AND
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ALL
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SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING
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STATEMEUT OF ISSOBS PRESENTED OH APPEAL
I

1.

Was the trial

court correct

in upholding a

contract

entered between Elsie Brinkerhoff and her two sons, Cloyd and
Mark, in 1966?
2.

<

Was there any indication that Elsie Brinkerhoff complied

with the terms of the contract or the law in giving notice of
default of the 1966 contract or her intent to discover the same?
3.

Did

Elsie

Brinkerhoff

allow

her

two

sons

or

<

their

successors in interest any period of time to cure any alleged
\

default under the 1966 contract?
4.

Is there any indication that the parties to the 1966

contract intended to abandon the same and treat all contractual
rights and obligations as a nullity having no effect whatsoever?
5.

i

Has the trial court operated within the bounds of equity

in reaching a conclusion that the 1966 contract should remain in
full force and effect in accordance with the current desires of

(

the parties thereto?
6.
terms

Did Elsie Brinkerhoff waive strict compliance with the
of

the 1966

contract

relating

to

Plaintiffs1

payment

i

obligations?
7.

Was

the

trial

court1 s

determination

that

Elsie

Brinkerhoff was incompetent as to legal affairs from about 1970 a

I

matter lying outside the court's competence so as to constitute
reversible error?
8.

Was the trial court operating within the bounds of law

and equity

when assuming the responsibility

of protecting the

interests of Elsie Brinkerhoff during the trial?

i

9.
Elsie

Absent any

Brinkerhoff

finding of
failed

to

incompetence, is the fact that
understand

the

nature

of

deeds

executed transferring title after 1970, sufficient to invalidate
such deeds?
10.

Is the "perfect tender" rule appropriate to this case?

11.

The trial court specifically

found that all contracts

entered by Elsie Brinkerhoff following 1970 were the result of
undue

influence.

Absent

all

other

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law, is this finding sufficient on its own to
support the trial court's holding?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 21, 1982, Respondent

Mont

R. Anderson, Personal

Representative of the Estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff filed suit on
the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Kane County, Civil
No. 1826, seeking to clarify title to property
County, Utah.
On

July

located in Kane

(R.l)
16,

1982,

Appellants

along

with

Charles

A.

Brinkerhoff, Betty B. Esplin, and Darlos T. Brinkerhoff answered
Respondent Anderson's Complaint.
these

parties

counterclaimed

(R.16)

against

By the same instrument,
Respondent

Anderson

and

crossclaimed against fellow defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

On

September 7, 1982, an Amended Counterclaim and Crossclaim was
filed.

(R.65)

On September 13, 1982, a Notice of Dismissal as to Defendants
Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin was filed (R.74) followed
by the filing of a Withdrawal of Attorney for the same parties on
December 6, 1982.

(R.78)
-2-

On

February

22, 1983, a Second

Amended

Counterclaim

and

Crossclaim was filed on behalf of all remaining defendants against
co-defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

(R.88)

On September 23, 1983, a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for
Elsie Brinkerhoff

was

filed

by Appellants'

attorney

Chamberlain, at the request of Elsie Brinkerhoff.

Hans. Q.

(R.334, Exhibit

P-ll)
Mark

J.

Brinkerhoff

answered

Appellants1

Second

Counterclaim and Crossclaims on September 27, 1983.

Amended

(R. 341). By

order of the Court, dated December 2, 1983, Respondent Anderson
was allowed to file a Second Amended Complaint with substitution
of parties whereby defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff and heretofore
unnamed party Lena Brinkerhoff were made Plaintiffs in the action.
(R.350 and R. 351)

<

On September 13, 1984, Plaintiffs placed on file a Notice to
Appoint

Counsel

directed

October

1, 1984, all

to

Elsie Brinkerhoff

(R.388) and on

remaining co-defendants, through Hans Q.

<

Chamberlain, who previously represented Elsie Brinkerhoff, filed a
Crossclaim

against

Elsie

Brinkerhoff.

On

this

same

date

co-defendants filed a Notice to Appoint Successor Attorney, also
directed to Elsie Brinkerhoff.

i

(R.400)

By stipulation recorded September 11, 1984, Elsie Brinkerhoff
stated that she recognized the original contract as still in force

<

and that her actions in attempting to convey property covered
thereby at a subsequent date were repudiated.
On

February

19, 1985,

(R.403)

Elsie Brinkerhoff,

acting

through

attorney Willard R. Bishop, answered the Crossclaim which had been
filed against her.

(R. 421)

<

On

February

21, 1985,

a

Pretrial

Order

was

recorded

and

signed by Willard R. Bishop on behalf of Plaintiffs and Defendant
Elsie

Brinkerhoff

and

by

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain

on

Defendants Adair, Goulding and Warren Brinkerhoff.

behalf

of

(R.428)

The case was tried before the Honorable Judge Don V. Tibbsf
sitting without jury on February 22, 1985f and a Transcript of the
proceedings was obtained.

On February 20, 1986, the trial court

entered its First Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(R.629) as well as its First Amended Judgment and Decree Quieting
Title (R.652) on behalf of Plaintiffs upholding the 1966 contract
and

requiring

interest.

Plaintiffs

to

make

up

past

due

payments

with

The First Amended Judgment also voided all documents

signed by Elsie Brinkerhoff from 1970 forward, declaring all such
documents the result of undue influence, among other things.

mtmmoxMWti
Plaintiff,
of

the

Mont R. Anderson,

estate

Brinkerhoff.

of

Cloyd H.

Brinkerhoff,

E l s i e Brinkerhoff
Brinkerhoff

Brinkerhoff,

representative

known as

Mark J. Brinkerhoff

and t h e brother-in-law of Lena
is

Golda B.

the

Mother

of

"Tine"

Lena Brinkerhoff.

was married t o Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff

of h i s death in October of 1979•

Elsie

also

He i s t h e son-in-law of P l a i n t i f f

Lena Brinkerhoff

of

i s t h e personal

at the time
i s the son
Brinkerhoff.

Mark

Brinkerhoff,

Cloyd

Adair, Warren ("link")

Brinkerhoff,

Arlene

B. Goulding, Charles Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.
The

real

property

c o n s i s t s of 1,956.17
farm land.

which

is

the

subject

of

this

action

acres of grazing ground and 18.01 acres of

The property

i s l o c a t e d north and e a s t of Glendale,
-4-

Kane County, Utah.
estate

of

death.

Merle

All of the subject property passed through the
Brinkerhoff

The Brinkerhoff

to

Elsie

property

Brinkerhoff

also

consists

upon
of

Merle's

some

water

r i g h t s i n the Arizona S t r i p area and a d d i t i o n a l grazing and water
rights.
For . sometime f o l l o w i n g
had been taking care of
thereon.
Elsie's

(Tr.

67)

other

father's

the property

death Cloyd and Mark

and t h e l i v e s t o c k

During t h i s period i t

children

ranching o p p o r t u n i t i e s
sell

their

were not
present

located

became apparent

interested

that

i n t h e farming

and

by the land and an agreement

to

the land was e s t a b l i s h e d whereby Cloyd and Mark agreed

to

purchase the land from t h e i r mother.

In 1966, t h i s agreement was

formalized by a contract prepared by Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at
Law, who resided i n R i c h f i e l d , Utah.

(Exhibit P - l , P-2)

<

The contract provided t h a t Cloyd and Mark, as buyers, were t o
pay

$53,388.00

property

which

as

consideration

is

the

subject

payment were o u t l i n e d a s f o l l o w s :
Elsie

$2,000

each year

November 1 , 1964;

(2)

for

for
of

the

this

purchase
action.

of

the

real

The terms of

<

(1) Mark and Cloyd were t o pay

the r e s t of her l i f e

retroactive

to

r e c e i p t of payments for 1964 and 1965 was

\

acknowledged; (3) a l l i n t e r e s t on the p r i n c i p a l balance was waived
i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n for

the agreement t o pay the y e a r l y

installment

with E l s i e ' s death r e g a r d l e s s of the t o t a l amount paid; and (4) i f
the t o t a l

recited principal

two-sevenths of

the

<

was not paid prior to E l s i e ' s death,

remaining portion was t o
equally

between

be paid i n annual

installments

divided

Warren

and

Charley

Brinkerhoff.

The contract a l s o provided for the establishment of

i

-5<

an escrow
P-l,

along with

instructions

pertinent

thereto.

(Exhibits

P-2)
The

default

important.

provisions

of

These p r o v i s i o n s

redelivery

to

her

of

all

the

give

contract

Elsie

escrowed

are

particularly

the option to demand a

documents

in

the

event

of

d e f a u l t in the payment of principal and i n t e r e s t or any other term
following

a

30-day

payments of
commence

remedy

principal

the

period.

All

and i n t e r e s t

30-day

period.

defaults

other

required s p e c i f i c

Once

the

demand

than

notice

to

made

for

was

r e d e l i v e r y of escrowed documents f Mark and Cloyd would be required
to

peaceably

surrender

the premises,

without further p r o c e s s .
Prom

the

time

the

allowing E l s i e to

(Exhibits P - l ,

P-2)

contract

executed

was

primarily as a formality by a l l p a r t i e s .
the agreement

it

re-enter

was

treated

Prior to the s i g n i n g of

Mark and Cloyd had been in p o s s e s s i o n of the land

and were taking care of t h e i r mother f s needs.

(Tr. 67)

This same

pattern of behavior continued f o l l o w i n g execution of the w r i t t e n
document.
followed.
were

made

outlined.
bills,

The p r e c i s e
All
to

terms of

the

contract

were never

fully

documents were not placed in escrow and payments
Elsie

(Tr. 68-69)

in

a manner

other

than

that

specifically

Such payments were made by paying E l s i e ' s

g i v i n g her money d i r e c t l y

or by d e p o s i t i n g money d i r e c t l y

into her checking account rather than i n t o escrow.

(Exhibit D-22)

All

(TR 3 0 3 : 4 - 2 5 ;

these

304:1-14;

procedures
327:8-13;

were

acceptable

328:1-25;

411-412)

-6-

to

337:1-18;

Elsie.

349:12-19;

367:12-25;

The

trial

court

reached

a

conclusion

that

some

of

the

payments made to Elsie in the above described manner constituted
payments on the contract while others were in the nature of gifts
and support which sons would normally provide to their widowed
mother. (Tr. 536, P of P 9 and 10)
determined

to

be less

than

Though actual payments were

required

under

the terms of

the

contract, the court specifically found that at no time did Elsie
ever declare herself dissatisfied with the performance, nor did
she declare the contract in default or attempt to terminate the
contract.

(R. 537, F of P 11)

The court specifically found that

the 1966 contract was still in force, despite some delinquencies

(

in payment.
Beginning in about 1971, Elsie Brinkerhoff executed a number
of documents bearing on this case.
affidavit

declaring

her

intention

In 1971, Elsie signed an
to

defend

the

ownership to the subject property in Mark and Cloyd.
P-3)

In

1977,

a

receipt

for

$23,000

was

signed

rights

{

of

(Exhibit
by

Elsie

<

recognizing payments received from Mark and Cloyd in the contract.
(Exhibit P-4)

Elsie continued to recognize the receipt of that

amount up to and including the time of trial, and was satisfied
with how things were handled.

<

(TR 303:4-25; 304:1-14; 327:8-13;

328; 327:10-18; 349:12-19; 367:12-25; 411-412; 338:21-25; 339)
In 197 9, a joint tenancy deed was prepared by Brad Adair

i

(Elsie's grandson and a son to Defendant Golda Adair) and signed
by Elsie Brinkerhoff.

(TR. 439)

The deed purportedly transferred

title from Elsie to Elsie, Cloyd and Mark as joint tenants with
full rights of survivorship.
-7-

(Exhibit D-5)

The deed did not

<

conform to the contract, was not properly notarized, and was never
delivered or accepted.
has

not

been

(TR 76-79, 440)

clearly

established.

Brad

concerning origin was not allowed.
439:1-9)

The origin of this deed
Adair's

"evidence"

(TR 436:17-23; 438:22-25;

Neither Elsie nor Mark have any recollection whatsoever

of the deed's inception or the events attending its execution.
(TR. 73, 295-307)
In 1979 Cloyd Brinkerhoff died and his property passed into
his estate which is being administrated by Mont R. Anderson.

Mr.

Anderson

the

filed

the original

Complaint

seeking

ownership of the real estate in question.
Prior

to filing this suit, after

purportedly

to

clarify

(Exhibit P-12; R.l)
the 1979 deed surfaced

changing title in the subject

property to a joint

tenancy, Defendants (excluding Elsie) caused a warranty deed to be
prepared which would transfer Elsie's purported interest in the
property to Arlene Goulding, Charles Brinkerhoff, Betty Esplin,
Warren Brinkerhoff, and Golda Adair in equal portions.
D-6; TR. 307)

(Exhibit

Elsie's signature was obtained on the document even

though the document was never read to her, she did not understand
it,

never

appeared

consideration,
counsel.

before

a

notary,

and she was never

advised

was
to

never
seek

paid

any

independent

(TR. 307-310)

The original suit was filed against Elsie and each of her
children

specifically

mentioned

in

the

immediately

preceding

paragraph, as.well as Mark Brinkerhoff.
Hans Q. Chamberlain, was initially contacted personally by
Golda, Warren, Arlene, Charles and Betty and was asked to serve as
-8-

counsel.

On August 13th, 1983, Elsie indicated t h a t she did not

want to

remain a

party

to

the

action

and requested

that

a t t o r n e y , Hans Q. Chamberlain, withdraw, which he did.
P-ll).

Elsie Brinkerhoff

thereafter

her

(Exhibit

remained unrepresented u n t i l

Willard R. Bishop, a t her w r i t t e n request, entered an appearance
on her behalf on February 14, 1985.

(Exhibits P-40, P-41; R.421)

Therefore, a t the beginning of the t r i a l , Willard R. Bishop
represented Mont R. Anderson, Lena,
course of the t r i a l ,

Elsie and Mark.

During the

because Elsie could not remember asking Mr.

Bishop t o represent h e r , the court decided t h a t in the i n t e r e s t of
j u d i c i a l economy i t would look a f t e r E l s i e ' s i n t e r e s t s and appoint
counsel

only

if

her

interests

were being abused.

(TR.

-

347)

Hans Q. Chamberlain, who formerly represented E l s i e , continued t h e
l e g a l action against her.
When t h e t r i a l
Elsie,

Plaintiffs

R.663,

and R.670,

\

court determined t h a t $50,655.11 was owed t o
promptly paid t h a t amount,

in f u l l .

Notice of Payments, Notice of

Final

(R.611,
Payment,

i

Receipt of Funds and I n i t i a l Inventory)

mmm
gPtBE-JE
M

<

* i i r.in m* am mm

I I I JUDGMENT OP THE TRIAL COURT I S PROPERLY
WITHIM TIE BOOBS OP THE LAW AMD HAS ACHIEVED
EQUITABLE RESULTS IH DISTRIBUTING THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
i

All

of

above-entitled

the

facts

action

and

indicate

circumstances
that

the

trial

surrounding
court's

the
First

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and F i r s t Amended
<

Judgment have achieved r e s u l t s which are c l e a r l y within t h e powers
-9i

of the Court, are in the best interests of all parties, and should
not be overturned on appeal.
In matters requiring the trial court to exercise its powers
of equity, such as specific performance of contractual obligations
in the present case, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that great
deference

should

be accorded the trial

court.

In Tanner^ vs..

BaP-dsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980), a case substantially similar
Kiflirt•iiaiid. i *m* * u> mi* '

'

«*

to the present, the high court stated:
As is so often true in such controversies,
there is sharp conflict in the evidence as to
material and controlling facts. Notwithstanding the correctness of Defendants1 urgence
that this Court may review the evidence
because it is a case in equity, it is our
well-established
rule
that
due to the
prerogatives and advantaged position of the
trial judge, we indulge considerable deference
to his findings.
Where evidence is in
dispute, we assume that he believed that which
is favorable to his findings, and we do not
disturb them unless it clearly preponderates
to the contrary.
Id. at 346.
Appellants1 statement of factss does not comply with this
rule and is really an argument by them, not the facts as found by
the trial court or as they support the lower court's findings and
rulings.
Furthermore,
powers

of

equity

Utah

law

whenever

grants
the

a
same

preference
come

into

to

the

conflict

i n c o n s i s t e n t provisions in t h e common law:
Whenever t h e r e i s any variance between t h e
r u l e s of equity and t h e r u l e s of common law in
reference to the same matter the r u l e s of
equity s h a l l p r e v a i l .
Utah Code Annotated, 68-3-2 (1953, as amended).
-10-

court's
with

In the present case Plaintiffs have successfully sought to
reassure their position under a contract entered in 1966 between a
mother and her two sons.
to

provide

for

the

The original purpose of the contract was

material

well-being

throughout the remaining days of her life.

of

Elsie Brinkerhoff

All parties to this

action were aware of the initial arrangements and for many years
expressed no dissatisfaction with the manner in which business was
transacted between Elsie and her two sons.

At no time under the

1966 contract has Elsie ever wanted for the necessities or desires
of her life.

In fact, to this very day Elsie continues to express

her desire that the contract remain in force, a position entirely
consistent with the trial court's Judgment and the desires of all
parties to the original contract.

(TR 295-307; 359:9-15; Exhibits

P-ll and P-40)

<

Any conclusion other than that reached by the trial court
would frustrate the intent of the parties and work an injustice
upon Elsie Brinkerhoff, as well as Plaintiffs, in this action.

<

Plaintiffs stood ready to fully perform the obligations placed
upon them by the trial court in making up any deficits in their
performance, and paid the full amount found due by the Court.

<

(R.611, R.670; Notice of Payment; Receipt of Funds and Initial
Inventory,

and

R.663,

144:6-17)

In fact,

Notice

of

Pinal

Payment

TR

126:7-10;

Plaintiffs have paid the entire remaining

<

unpaid balance, as found by the Court, into trust for Elsie as
ordered by the Court in order to assure that she is well provided
for during the remaining days of her life.

<

-11i

Defendants, on the other handr seek to abrogate all of the
rights and interest Elsie has to receive payment under the 1966
contract and substitute their own 1981 agreements.

The result of

such actions would have the effect of leaving Elsie without the
funds

to which

she

is entitled

and

has

received

contract, which funds are hers. As a replacement

under

the

Defendants

propose to pay a lesser amount over a period extending the rest of
Elsie's natural life.

Defendants would then become the owners of

land which they have never used or worked in recent years and for
which they had no interest or concern at the time of the original
1966

agreement.

All

such arrangements would be made to the

distinct and unconscionable disadvantage of the Plaintiffs and
Elsie Brinkerhoff.
The remainder of this brief will indicate that on the facts
and on the merits of the law the trial court achieved a just and
equitable result which is clearly within the recognized limits of
its jurisdiction.

THE 1966 CONTRACT ENTERED BETWBEH ELSIE AID
•BR H O SQIS, CLOTD AMD HARK, HAS REMAINED A
VALID CONTRACT PROM ITS EXECUTION TO Til
PRESENT.
The trial court specifically found that the contract entered
between Elsie Brinkerhoff and her two sons, Mark and Cloyd, was
the result of arms' length bargaining conducted with the advice
of counsel by fully competent parties.

(R. 629, P. of P. No. 4 ) .

Furthermore, Appellants make no claim and present no evidence to
the contrary.

In fact, all parties to the contract continue to
-12-

recognize its validity and existence.

Appellants, non-parties to

the contract, are the only ones who fail to recognize the binding
nature of the contract's provisions.
The facts and evidence presented at trial have given no
indication that Elsie, as seller of the subject property, acted
in any manner, either under the contract or by law, which would
operate

to

terminate

the

contract.

The

contractual

terms

pertaining to default and termination are as follows:
In the event of a default in the payment of
any installment of principal or interest and
in the event of a default in any other term or
condition herein and in the event notice of a
default other than for payment of principal
and interest shall be given to buyers by the
seller and a subsequent failure to remedy the
same shall continue for a period of thirty
(30) days, then the seller may at her option
demand a redelivery to her of all of the
escrowed documents...
(Exhibits P-l, P-2)
These

provisions,

circumstances

under

while

which

somewhat

notice

will

ambiguous
be

as

required,

to

the

clearly

demonstrate that action is required on the part of the seller
before the contract will be considered in default.

Whether notice

is required or not, seller must exercise her option to "demand a
redelivery

to her

of

all

of

the escrowed

documents," as an

indication that she considered the buyers to be in default.

At no

time has Elsie Brinkerhoff ever made such a demand, or anything
akin thereto, upon Mark or Cloyd.

(TR 295-307; R.633, F. of F.

11)
The contract also provides for alternative remedies such as
reducing the agreement to judgment or foreclosing as a mortgage.
-13-

All of these a l t e r n a t i v e s require d e f i n i t e action on the p a r t of
the s e l l e r prior to any action buy s e l l e r .

(Exhibits P - l , F-2)

F o r f e i t u r e s under installment land s a l e s c o n t r a c t s have long
been disfavored under the law.
t h a t affirmative
option.

action

The Utah Supreme Court has held

i s required t o exercise

the

forfeiture

Fuhrlman ,y,..JB.i8Sanger, 375 P.2d 27 (Utah 1962); see a l s o ,

£&M££' supra a t 346; and BftM«L.y* ,flAfcLBfc*n«?ff * 545 P.2d 1152,
1154 (Utah 1976).
the c o n t r a c t ,

Elsie never did take any action t o terminate

and in f a c t ,

has always recognized i t s

validity.

(Exhibits P - l l , P-40; TR 359:9-15; 295-307; 367:12-25)

A. AL„*M>,, t.fas,. .M.iaflLfci ,B,t;^ateri>p,£g- ..aiafe-har
k¥,<L M9I\fL JfiUflfL 1ML..&^
M
^ „ ^ a u ^ t , , , ^ tft£iA abiia^Aaas mA^jLJk^s
The

facts

performance

and

under

circumstances

the

1966

surrounding

contract

clearly

execution

and

demonstrate

the

importance and necessity of requiring notice prior to declaring
default.

The written contract

in this instance was the mere

formalization of a relationship that had existed since the death
of Merle Brinkerhoff, Elsie1s husband, two years earlier.

Since

that time Mark and Cloyd had been in possession of the real
property and were in the process of farming the land and grazing
sheep thereon.

In addition, the two sons were caring for their

mother's needs by seeing that her bills were paid, as well as
making annual payments of $2,000.00.

(TR 64-68; Exhibits P-l,

P-2)
When

the

contract

was

executed,

operation was altered very little.
-14-

the

parties1

mode

of

It is true that documents were

signed

with

history

all

the

surrounding

specificities
the

execution

enumerated
clearly

above,

indicates

parties had no intention of demanding exact compliance.
years

thereafter,

even

to

the

present

day,

continued to care for their mother's needs.

Mark

but

the

that

the

For many
and

Cloyd

Elsie was never

dissatisfied with their performance and never requested anything
from her boys that was not forthcoming.

(TR 295-307)

These facts demonstrate that none of the parties to the 1966
contract believed that Mark and Cloyd were in default.

Without

notice it would have been impossible to know at what point Elsie
considered her sons to be in default of their obligations, or, if
they were, what remedy she might choose.

(

In a case with facts

very similar to the present the Utah Supreme Court has exacted a
requirement that notice be given.
681

In Harris y.A Svkes, 624 P.2d

{

(Utah 1981) , the Plaintiff had made a down payment on the

purchase

price of certain real

property,

but the monthly and

periodic payments were made sporadically, and in amounts different
than called for by the contract.

{

Nevertheless, the Court required

the defendant to supply notice of default prior to reselling the
same property to a third party.

,

In the present case, a long history of accepting payments
other than those specifically
evidence.

This Court

required by the contract was in

should reach a conclusion which

is in

.

accordance with reason and the JiQKjrls case noted above by finding
that the 1966. contract is still in effect and that termination
requires that the buyers be given notice and an opportunity to
cure their default prior to suffering an unjust forfeiture.

^

As

-15i

shown by the record, when given an amount due by the trial court,
it was forthwith paid in full.
It

is

evident

that

the

contract

itself

anticipates

the

necessity of notice under circumstances where the buyers would not
have knowledge of their default, or of any remedy chosen by the
seller.
other

The contract

than

payment

of

specifies that default
principal

and

interest

for

circumstances

requires

notice.

These provisions allow the buyers to respond prior to incurring
forfeiture.

Mark and Cloyd Brinkerhoff

or their successors in

interest should be granted no less opportunity.

B.
Utafe, Jaw„fF,^flVif<&• A h f l V A . m U M flUftY, *
^ ^ M ^ I ^ ^ . U . Q l Q f J i K , M ..toLf,,, t £„. c ^L e

M8A,*;.,to.eflsft,, griftr. . ^ . g t f py,gApa.^hijl|iitfftf
&AW,.JK,CTifliPJ^
contracts*
As noted above,

Utah law

skP^

lM±»M)t£§
is

clearly

hostile

f o r f e i t u r e under installment land s a l e s c o n t r a c t s .
reached t h i s conclusion despite s p e c i f i c

to

allowing

The Court has

contractual

provisions

c a l l i n g for f o r f e i t u r e and t r e a t i n g a l l e a r l i e r payments as
l i q u i d a t e d damages.
M l J^JtiW^UL^hikm figtft- * 5 *7 P.2d 1108
(Utah 1977) .
In order to avoid the harsh results of forfeiture, sellers
are required to allow a reasonable time in which buyers can cure
their defaults:
It can be seen that the provisions of the
contract, designed to terminate contractual
relations, are not •elf-executing.
They
require some affirmative act on the part of
the
seller.
Therefore,
the
contractual
relations between seller and buyer are in
existence until such time as the seller
chooses to notify the defaulting buyer of its
election to proceed under one, or all, of its
options.
In so doing, seller must give the
-16-

flftfiaulAlM,..,laiyftr ..a ..reasonable ..time, ^within
™gft *V-Siifft--. tfre_<lefanl t , ^ .Without.^ t h i s

aatoppg-,^ft .tefigatuna fraraf ygMU-ja9.L.-to9y
MM^.tS. . ifo,
-ife. muld.,....not^Ixavs .sextain
ta2Vlftqgft .hU..fcpnanqg„.KajEL..at.. aa ^ n d A _ H e . ^ a l d
*ttimg...t;hc^eller^may ...have waived, .fejEaalt, or

would e l e c t t o enforce the contract rather
than f o r f e i t i t ; or he could assume he would
be permitted t o perform.
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
Hansen, supra at 1154. The Court has held t h i s r u l e " e s p e c i a l l y
a p p l i c a b l e " i n c a s e s where the d e f a u l t has been overlooked for
substantial

periods of time.

LamPOt v.< Byjen, 508 P.2d 532, 534

(Utah 1973) .

In the present case it has never been shown that seller was
dissatisfied with buyers performance under the contract.

For this

reason no notice and no period for cure has ever been accorded
buyers under the contract.

To enforce the forfeiture provisions

would work a double injustice.

Buyers would lose the land and

seller would lose the funds which she has received.

All of this

would

concern for

be accomplished

under

Appellants'

supposed

Elsie's well-being.

<

<

c. amisjaLntetiiPtt.,m , jal Ur., m^i. jfcton JAEfi
pmteA^nXitix^Mi
rijta
.t^^gma^.ftr^
ffl9jj,BJiliitt9f „ • ¥,*,yL. n^^ M ,pattapi t a ,JjMLtaU»fflt
fiftYimt .^Kl&,Ji^kO^,

^\lW^XLl>M..mtiLf£-

The contract doctrine of waiver has been defined
following manner:
tTlhe voluntary and intentional relinquishment
of a known right [which] may be either express
or implied.
Waiver can be implied from
conduct such as making payments for or
accepting performance which does not meet
contract requirements; waiver can also be
expressed verbally or in writing.
Express
waiverr when supported by reliance thereon,
excuses
non-performance
of the waived
condition.
Udevco, Inc. v. Wagner, 678 P.2d 679, 682 (Nev. 1984).

in the

i

(

i

The
waived

evidence

strict

contract.

clearly

compliance

demonstrates

that

with the payment

Elsie

Brinkerhoff

terms under

the 1966

Elsie never demanded, nor expected, more from her boys

than that which was immediately

forthcoming.

Her desires were

simply that some of her bills be paid and money be given when she
found herself in need.

Indeed on some occasions when funds were

tendered, Elsie rejected them along with a declaration that there
was no need.

Such declarations may rise to the level of express

waiver, but at the very least Elsie's conduct impliedly waived the
necessity

of

complying

with

strict

payment

requirements.

(TR 295-307)
The

only

way

Elsie's waiver

could

be overcome and

strict

compliance demanded is through notice of her intention to do the
same.

Such

considering

a

requirement

forfeiture

under

is

readily

installment

understood
land

in

sales

cases

contract

provisions.
Most litigation in this area concerns itself
with failure to make timely payments under a
land contract...In order to establish a prima
facie case of waiver, the vendee must show
that the vendor has condoned or assented to
previous defaults and has not given notice of
his intention to insist on strict compliance
in the future.

toa^flynE•
197 8 ) .

jfrtfwfo,..-inst s^Jtefrr,,,.JAB**

577

p 2d

-

645

'

65

° (w y°-

Furthermore, because forfeitures are not favored under the

law it has been held that "slight evidence" of the intention to
relinquish a right is sufficient to warrant the finding of waiver.
Id. at 650.

-18-

In the present case the evidence i s overwhelmingly in favor
of

finding

a waiver.

Therefore,

the 1966

contract

should

be

upheld and t h e judgment of the t r i a l court s u s t a i n e d .
D

: JhiLt, l*>MuMte&%\<>ii AML^hfi.jaMUfs.t,?
2L1MU jfif^%Kam^RliUMUon¥ ,fchram<3lti;Appellants contend that Elsie Brinkerhoff and her two sons,
Mark and Cloydf

had abandoned their 1966 contract at the time

Elsie signed later documents transferring a partial interest in
the subject property to them.

The contention is, nevertheless,

unfounded in the facts and under the law.
The term "abandonment" in the sense involved
here means the intentional relinquishment of
one's rights in the contract; and in order to
nullify such rights, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing of such abandonment. Where
there is dispute as to whether this has
occurred, it is usually a question of fact, to
be determined from the circumstances of the
particular case, which include not only
nonperformance, but also expressions of intent
and other actions of the parties.
T,iff^D^QgM ^A.^l aftfliA.,, Jfafei- L,., X J L J H U U B M , 544 P. 2d 481, 484 (Utah
1975). Furthermore, on questions of abandonment reversal should
not be granted unless the evidence "clearly preponderates" against
the findings.
While

it

Id. at 484.
is

true

{

(

<

that

the

Supreme

Court

in Timpano go s

Highland* found the contract had been abandoned, it is also true
that the facts in the present case are clearly distinguishable. In

*

TlBPanggoj Highlands buyers had been making sporadic payments on
their land purchase when seller leased the same property for a ten
year period to a third party.
abandonment

of

the

The Court upheld the decision for

contract.

Timpanogps

.Highland*

*

is

-19i

distinguishable in that buyers had never entered into possession
or

used

the

property

in any

way,

other

than with

permission, nor did they pay the taxes thereon.
parties

had

failure

to make

which

is

been

true

in

continual

adequate
under

the

present

under

Furthermore, the

concerning

buyerfs

the contract,

none of

negotiations

payments

Plaintiffs'

case.

Here,

as

soon

as

Appellants' claims were discovered, suit was filed.
The Utah Court has also defined abandonment as the voluntary
relinquishment of a "right to a benefit" due from another. PitCher
y,, Lautitz.en, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah 1967).
there

is

no

indication

that

any

of

the

In the present case
parties

intended

pretended to give up their rights under the 1966 contract.

or

Mark

and Cloyd remained continually in possession of the land, used the
same

for

their

grazing

and

farming

applicable taxes on a yearly basis.
that she expected

operation,

and

paid

the

Elsie has stated consistently

"her boys" to take care of her by paying her

bills and seeing that she had the money she needed. Indeed, even
one of the Appellants, Golda B. Adair, expected Mark to continue
making payments on his portion of the land.

(Tr. 265) Such an

obligation could have only arisen under the 1966 contract.
Appellants assert that Mark or Cloyd had persuaded Elsie to
issue the 1979 Warranty Deed, transferring Elsie's interest in the
land to a joint tenancy, as proof of abandonment.

The evidence

that such a persuasion occurred was minimal, at best, in that it
is "supported" solely by the testimony of one individual, which
testimony was not admitted because it was in contravention of a
timely objection based on hearsay rules.
•20-

(TR. 434; 435, 437, 438

and 439)

Furthermore, the trial court apparently chose not to

believe such information or found it unnecessary in deciding the
case.

Whatever

the

case may

be, Appellants

have failed to

demonstrate that the facts clearly preponderate against the trial
court's

findings

and,

therefore,

reversal

on

the

issue

of

abandonment is entirely inappropriate.
E.
/LVkMS,,,^
Iftfi••• Iftft6 • .fiftP,ttM,qt^

teRLCftinttfttn.^ft,

,.9ttftyMfifr

spoUpiitt-Pft, MA .,ten9ft.„MflMntte9^» • RfigbA^aTf
fiftnfcK^a-,gp.rLCl.H8A.QJL-y.Ul.lxaaArAte the purpoie
gf-i,Atift.„• gQJ&Sftfift,. , a ? A , ^ m , ,qlL.JBftLtltf»,Bg
teRSfcife.^hmEPAll parties to the 1966 contract or their successors in
interest desire that the instrument be maintained and the benefits
be realized.

Mark Brinkerhoff

and Mont R. Anderson,

Representative for the Estate of Cloyd Brinkerhoff,
specific

performance

of

the

her

contract.
desire

Elsie

to

uphold

Personal

have sought

Brinkerhoff
the

has

continually

repeated

contract's

provisions.

She has stated, "I had no idea of ever breaking that

contract, 11 and in response to the direct question by the court as
to whether she wanted the contract in existence she added, "Yes, I
d i d . . . I wjint that money to l i v e on.
live

on."

reaffirmed

(TR.
the

300

and 367).

contract.

362-363; 295-307)

That's a l l I would have to
At every

(Exhibits

P-ll,

opportunity,

P-40; TR 318:11-17;

Even Appellants would expect Mark to continue

making payments under obligations which could have only
from the 1966 contract.
A

decision

consideration

by

Elsie

which

arisen

(TR. 265).
would

reversing

the
-21-

abrogate

the

trial

court's

contract
Judgment

under
will

i

frustrate the document's original purpose:
Elsie

Brinkerhoff

will

have

remainder of her earthly

the

life.

the assurance that

support

she

needs

for

the

It is hard to understand how

Appellants can claim to have only their mother's best interests at
heart when the result of their actions would deprive her of the
same level of support to which is rightfully due.

Even ignoring

the amount the court has awarded in back payments and interest,
the Appellants' offer of support would amount to $200 a year less
than that to which Elsie is entitled under the contract.

For this

reason, the Plaintiffs respectfully implore the Court to recognize
the just and equitable decision of the trial court and refuse to
reverse on appeal.
I V i f i f l A • wTVTUT

TIE DETERMINATION THAT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF WAS
INCOMPETENT IN HANDLING HER LEGAL AFFAIRS FROM
ABODT 1970 OR WAS A HATTER CLEARLY WITHIN TIB
COMPETENCE OP TIE TRIAL COURT, OR AT TIE VERT
LEAST, WAS WOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellants1
court

committed

major

contention on appeal

reversible

error

when

it

is that the trial
found

that

Elsie

Brinkerhoff was incompetent in her legal affairs from about 1970,
and failed to require that she be represented by independent legal
counsel.

Such

a

position

is

unsupported

by

the facts and

procedural history of this case.
As to the argument that Elsie's competency was never properly
raised as an issue, Appellants are clearly in error*

Indeed, long

before trial Appellants themselves, acting through counsel, had
questioned Elsie's competence in handling her legal affairs.
Defendants1

First

Interrogatories
-22-

to

Plaintiff

(R.

In
46) ,

Interrogatory

23(i)

Appellants

ask:

"At

the

time

Elsie

Brinkerhoff signed the 11977 receipt], please describe in detail
her mental and physical condition and state whether or not she was
under the influence of any person present at the signing. "
51)

(R.

Also, in the Pretrial Order, signed by Appellants1 Attorney,

Issue of Pact, No. 4(F) reads:

"At all times relevant herein, was

Elsie Brinkerhoff competent to act for and on her behalf, and sign
all documents relevant to this action?"

(R. 436)

And finally,

Appellants directly questioned Elsie's competence at trial when
counsel queried:

"Mrs. Brinkerhoff, do you remember in 1982, or

let me back up:

In 1979, do you think you were competent?"

(TR. 325)
It has been held that "decrees in equity and judgments at law
must

have a basis

in the pleadings

AmJur2d, Pleading, Section 382.

and the evidence."

61A

However, it must not be forgotten

that "whether a judgment is supported by the pleadings depends,
not on the allegations in the complaint alone, but on a reasonable
construction of all the pleadings when considered together."
The primary

Id.

importance of the rules of pleading are that the

parties have every opportunity to be heard on all relevant issues.
What constitutes a pleading is generally

i

an issue defined by

statute or rules such as the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Id. at
(

Section 1.
In this

<

case

the Utah

controlling authority.

Rules of

Civil

Procedure

is the

Under Part III, Pleadings, Motions, and

Orders, of the Rules, Rule 16 states that a Pretrial Order "limits

i

the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or
-23i

agreements of counsel; and such order when entered c o n t r o l s
subsequent

course

prevent manifest
Elsie's

of

action,

unless modified

injustice."

competence

was

at

As noted above,

properly

before

the

the

trial

to

the question of

the

court

under

the

P r e t r i a l Order which was signed by counsel for Appellants.
Appellants'

brief

points

out

numerous

statements made

at

t r i a l as t o E l s i e ' s general s t a t e of mind in an e f f o r t to persuade
the Court t h a t there was no evidence of incompetence.
be pointed out t h a t most of
counsel for the P l a i n t i f f s .

these

I t should

statements were e l i c i t e d by

P l a i n t i f f s have never believed t h e i r

case rested upon a determination of E l s i e ' s competence, but t h a t
i s not to say t h a t t h e r e was l e s s than ample evidence upon which
the t r i a l court could base a finding of incompetence.
the

transcript

support

for

clearly
its

shows t h a t

finding?

the

Appellant

recognized the problem when she s t a t e d
anything"

(TR 243:2-13),

trial

Golda

court
B.

that

A review of
has

Adair

Elsie

and became concerned about

ample
herself

"would sign
competency

when she believed E l s i e began signing any documents handed to her
r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r l e g a l effect.

(TR 267, 268, and 268A:1-13).

I t i s i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t a f t e r Elsie signed documents in Appellants'
favor, Golda t o l d E l s i e not to sign any more!
It

is

competence
significance
children.
1970,

particularly
related
of

to

important
Elsie's

documents

The court

Elsie Brinkerhoff

that

ability

(TR 243:6-13)

the c o u r t ' s

finding

to understand the

placed

before

her

by

specifically

stated

that

"from and

on

legal

well-meaning
after

signed documents t h a t were presented t o

her without understanding the legal or other significance of such
-24-

documents.
of

such

She lacked sufficient power to comprehend the subject

documents.. .and

thereto."

was not

able

(R.634, 635; F. of F. 15)

to act

with

discretion

All of the statements

offered by Appellants as proof of Elsie's competence relate to her
ability to take care of herself in the regular affairs of life and
not to her understanding of the legal transactions to which she
was subjected.
Indeedf there is ample evidence to support the trial court's
finding of incompetence in the consistent statements of Elsie that
she

never

read

signature.

documents

that

were

placed

(TR. 304, 305, 308, 311, 312)

indicates

that

Elsie

signed

before

her

for

Each such statement

documents on the basis of

trust

reposed in her children and family, upon influence exercised by
them, and not on the understanding that she was altering her legal
or financial affairs.

<

She never evinced any intent to alter her

affairs.
The

court's

finding

of

constitute reversible error.

incompetence

should

in

no

way

<

As demonstrated above the issue had

been placed before the court and there was ample evidence to show
that Elsie failed to understand the nature and consequences of her
legal transactions.

<

In addition, the record clearly supports the

court's finding that the 1966 contract was in full force and
effect as demonstrated above.

Appellants had full knowledge of

i

this contract and were under no circumstances bona fide purchasers
for value.
court's

(JR. 631, F. of F. 5)

specific

finding

of

undue

And, finally, in light of the
influence,

as discussed

in

i

detail below, there is no justification for reversal.
-25i

EQIffHY
THE TRIAL COURT DID HOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY ASSUMING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OP ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.
Appellants argue that the trial court was required by Rule
17(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to provide Elsie Brinkerhoff
with

a

guardian

ad

litem,

rather

than

assuming

this

responsibility, and that such an assumption constitutes reversible
error.

This argument, however, misconceives the essential purpose

of Rule 17(b).
Rule 17(b) states:
When an infant or an insane or incompetent
person is a party, he must appear either by
his general guardian ad litem appointed in the
particular case by the court in which the
action is pending.
In considering the effect which should be given to such a
rule, the Utah Supreme Court has sought to respect its essential
purpose which is to assure that all meritorious defenses are heard
and that the party

is not deprived of any benefit she might

otherwise have obtained.

Whitney... y^_ Walker, 479 P.2d 469, 471

(Utah 1971); see also T y p l ^ E Yj-flirffr 57 P.2d 332, 335 (Idaho
1936).
In the present case there is no indication on the record or
in Appellants Brief that Elsie has been denied any defenses or
benefits to which she is entitled.

The only outcomes which could

have been adopted by the court were those presented by either
Plaintiffs or. Appellants and each of these positions were fully
represented.

-26-

The only explanation for Appellants1 heavy reliance on such a
technical view of the rule is that they are attempting to protect
their

own

selfish

interests.

As

pointed

out

above,

under

Appellants' view on this case, Elsie would be required to forego
her substantial

interest

payments promised

in the 1966 contract for the lesser

by Appellants.

Such a result would work a

significant disadvantage upon Elsie and would operate in direct
contravention of her stated desires today, particularly where she
has received $50,665.11. (R.611, R.663, Notice of Payment, and
Notice of Final Payment) For this reason Appellants should fail in
their

attempt

at

reversal

in

order

to

obtain

a

technical

compliance with the rule.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has maintained that Appellants
have the burden of showing that the error was substantial and

i

prejudicial and that they were thereby deprived of the opportunity
for a full and fair presentation of the issues.

Redftv&lppment

hmtiM. ,9& J M t , i^S,,, •<?* to y.». ,ftM SHU** 526 P. 2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974),
and S,ippion„lyi.trttffgnL§ra3l ,M^§,.fiMJB*' 4 7 0

p

-2d

399

'

402

(utah

1970)

Appellants have failed to make the required showing.
tQVBLX
ABSENT ART FINDING OF INCOMPETENCE, TIE FACT
THAT ELSIE DID NOT UNDERSTAND TIB NATURE OF
TIB DEEDS TRANSFERRING TITLE IS SUFFICIENT ID
INVALIDATE THE 1979 AND LATER 1981 DEEDS.

<

In order to transfer a valid interest in real property the
grantor must have a present intent to effect such a transfer.

In

order for the grantor to possess the requisite intent she must

4

understand the nature of the transaction being placed before her.
-27I

The

facts

laterf

to

surrounding

the

execution

Appellants

and

others

understanding and, any

of

the deeds

indicate

intent to transfer

in 197 9 and

that

Elsie

propertyr

lacked

or to alter

existing legal relationships.
At

trial

the

following

series of questions

and

responses

clearly indicated that Elsie did not understand the nature of the
documents she was asked to sign:
ME*.-.Bishop:
At the time the [1980 Warranty
Deed, Exhibit D-6] was brought to youf did you
read it?
No
^,B^8.MR<;A^aKliaf^8
' J didn't read it, he
just said — Well I said, "Oh, you came early
in the morning, " and he says "Here Grandma are
some papers I'd like you to sign," and I says,
"What's that for," and he says, "Oh, to see if
we can get a little money for you, "

Mr... J&jghop: Did anybody read it to you before
you signed it?
R^i^B.u.qker^off:

B^M^pfaops

wh

Y

did

No.

y° u

si

9n

it?

.Blale Bxinkerhoff: Because he brought it and
said he wanted me to sign it, and I didn't
know what the deal was.
They never asked me
anything about it.
(TR. 308) .
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where a deed is
executed with no intent to transfer a present interest, it will be
invalidated by a court in equity," and that "a conveyance is valid
only

upon delivery

ftflKlM^Y^itato** 6 8 4
Elsie

did

not

of a deed with present

intent to transfer."

P-2<3 632, 635 (Utah 1984).

possess

the

necessary

transfer.
-28-

intent

It is clear that
to

effectuate

the

Furthermore,

there

was

no

attempt

on

the

part

of

the

Appellants or any other party to secure independent counsel for
their mother.
prepared

and

In other words the grantees had the document
then secured

signature from

the grantor

suggesting that she obtain independent counsel.
bother

to

read

the

document

to

Elsie

prior

without

They did not even
to securing her

signature.
In

a

similar

case,

the

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

fiduciaries and persons having a confidential relationship with
the grantor have a "duty to act fairly, make a disclosure of
material information, and to take no unfair advantage of superior
position."

SgeqgistL ,v, Seequist, 524 P.2d 598, 599 (Utah 1974).

In Seequist the court expressed its displeasure that a grantee
child

had

made

no

attempt

to

secure

independent

advice

or

representation, even though he was aware that his mother had no
independent knowledge of the facts surrounding the transfer.

Id.

at 599.
On this basis alone the Court should find ample evidence to
uphold the trial court's position which refuses to recognize the
1979 and later deeds, including those purportedly

transferring

real property interests to the Appellants.
i

Elsie J. Brinkerhoff never had any intent to do anything but
adhere to her 1966 contract.

(TR 295-307)
i
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I

fflifflLXI
THE "PERFECT TENDER ROLE" HAS NO APPLICATION
TO THIS CASE.
Appellants

contend

that

Plaintiffs

are

not

entitled

to

specific performance of the 1966 contract because they failed to
tender

their

own

performance

prior

to

initiating

suit.

The

context of this case makes it clear that the demands of the
"perfect tender" rule do not apply.
has

demonstrated

that

Elsie

had

The above-outlined argument
waived

her

right

compliance with the contract's payment terms.
above.)

to strict

(See Point II

None of the parties to the contract ever considered the

instrument to be in default.

It would be inappropriate to demand

that

perfect

the

Plaintiffs

tender

performance

when

it was

entirely unclear that there had been a failure of performance at
all, and if there had been, what the nature and extent of the
failure were.

Under

the circumstances of this case, it was

impossible to make a "perfect tender".

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs

told the trial court they would immediately pay any amounts found
due, and did so.

(TR 126:7-10? 144:6-17)

Where a buyer believes in good faith that he has complied
with the terms of the agreement, specific performance may be
awarded, particularly where an unjust forfeiture would occur.
Literal and exact performance is not always
necessary.
Under certain circumstances,
specific performance of a contract will be
decreed in spite of the fact that the
complainant has not wholly performed his part
of the agreement, or where there has been
substantial compliance with the terms of the
contract, as where a party in good faith
seasonably offers and continues ready to
comply with the stipulations of the contract
although he may err in estimating the extent
-30-

of the obligation.
Generally,
where the
plaintiff has made a conscientious effort
fully and fairly to comply with his contract
to purchase land, specific performance will be
granted. . . .
In
administering
equity
in
a
specific
performance case, a technical forfeiture of
rights under a contract, in the absence of bad
faith, is not favored where a preservation of
the contract through specific performance will
yield to each party that to which he is justly
entitled. A court in equity has the power to
relieve
a
defaulting
purchaser
from
a
forfeiture and to compel specific performance
by the seller when, in the court's judgment,
to
do
otherwise
would
result
in
an
unreasonable forfeiture.
71 AmJur2d, Specific Performance, § 62.
Indeed, the Court has granted specific performance in many
cases where there has been no indication that a "perfect tender"
was extended by the buyers in land sale contracts.
«*

«*

See, Tanner,
'

supra; and Fuhriman, supra.

iiimiiiiiH i n

•

'

In such cases, the Court has often

focused on the behavior of the seller to justify an award of
specific performance.

For example, in fa.gk..y, HuU..Jw.elftaa.en.t

Co., Inc., 667 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1983), the Court, in awarding
specific performance, took particular notice of the fact that
seller had waived its right to forfeiture by consistently
i

accepting buyers' late and sporadic payments.

The Idaho Supreme

Court has also taken this position where seller failed to comply
with provisions of a contract pertaining to default.

A grant of

specific performance was awarded even though a payment was
tendered many years later.

Singleton, v.. Pichpn, 635 P.2d 254, 255

(Idaho 1981).
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All

of

the

cases

cited

by

Appellants

to

support

their

contentions that perfect tender was required of the Plaintiffs can
be distinguished on the facts.

In none of these cases is there

any indication that sellers had expressly or impliedly waived the
requirements

of

strict

performance

under

their

contracts.

Furthermore, none of the buyers had yet taken possession of the
land being transferred.

In the present case, however, the

transactions had progressed to a much further extent.

Buyers had

been in possession for many years and a significant history of
dealing was in evidence.

This history made it clear that the

seller did not expect strict compliance with the terms of the
written agreement.

Sellers must elect and give notice of the

remedies they seek.

It would be unjust to require forfeiture for

failure

to comply

with

the technical

rules regarding perfect

tender, particularly where, as here, payment in full has been made
by

Plaintiffs and accepted

by

Elsie J. Brinkeihoff.

(R.611,

Notice of Payment? R.663, Notice of Final Payment; and R.670,
Receipt

of

Brinkerhoff

Funds

and

Initial

Inventory)

Finally,

Elsie

has accepted the benefits flowing to her and has

determined not appeal.

If Appellants claim anything, their proper

relief is a claim for damages against Elsie.
WOIWT VII
ABSENT ALL OTHER FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, TIB
DETERMINATION THAT ALL AGREEMENTS ENTERED BT
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF FOLLOWING 1 9 7 0
WERE THE
RESULT OP UNDUE INFLUENCE I S SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S MOLDING.

The
determined

trial
that

court,
all

independent

contracts

of

all

other

and agreements entered

findings,
by

Elsie

Brinkerhoff following 1970 were the r e s u l t of undue influence:
-32-

19. The Court finds that all of the children
and
certain
grandchildren
of
ELSIE
J.
BRINKERHOFF, from their respective viewpoints,
and because of what they perceived as being
others taking advantage of their mother or
grandmother by such other parties, used their
own influence to convince ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to
execute documents and take legal positions in
order to accomplish what they, the children
and/or
grandchildren or other relatives,
thought was for ELSIE BRINKERHOFF1s best
interest.
20. The Court finds that the children and
grandchildren
who
prevailed
upon
ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF to execute documents and take
legal stands after 1970 did not intend to take
advantage of her for their own purposes.
Nevertheless, they did take advantage of ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF for the purpose of benefiting her
in their own minds, from their own points of
view.
As a result, those persons who
persuaded and induced ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to
sign
contractual,
legal
and
financial
documents, including deeds, and to take
certain legal positions from and after 1970
used
improper
constraint
or
urgency of
persuasion,
whereby
the
will
of
ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF was overpowered, and she was
induced to do or forebear an act which she
otherwise would not do, or otherwise would do
if left to act freely.
21. The
unfair
persuasion
of
ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF on various occasions from and
after 1970 generally took place in private.
The persons persuading her to sign legal and
financial documents were able to obtain her
signature because of her age, psychological
dependency, and existing confidential and/or
family relationships.
22. The transactions leading to the signing
of financial and legal documents by ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF were initiated by her family
members, not by herself, under circumstances
in which ELSIE BRINKERHOFF lacked reasonable
access
to
independent,
non-confidential
advice.
(R. 640-641, F. of F. 19-22; see also, First Amended Judgment and
Decree Quieting Title, Paragraph 1, R. 653-655)
-33-

The Utah Supreme Court has defined

"undue influence" in the

following manner:
The mere relationship of parent and child does
not constitute evidence of such confidential
relationship as to create a presumption of
fraud or undue influence.
While kinship may
be a factor in determining the existence of a
legally significant confidential relationship,
there must be a showing, in addition to the
kinship, of a reposal of confidence by one
party
and
the
resulting
superiority
and
influence
on
the
other
party.
The
relationship must be such as would lead an
ordinarily prudent person in the management of
his business affairs to repose that degree of
confidence in the other party which largely
results in the substitution of the will of the
latter for that of the former in the material
matters involved in the transaction.
The
doctrine of confidential relationship rests
upon the principle of inequality between the
parties, and implies a position of superiority
occupied by one of the parties over the other.
Bradbury^.. Rasnrnssen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965).
The facts outlined

above, as well

as the findings of

the

court, indicate that undue influence has clearly been established
in

this

proceeding.

occupied

a

knowledge

Elsie's

position
of

the

of

legal

children

superiority
and

and

in their

financial

grandchildren
understanding

transactions

which

have
and
were

placed before her following 1970.

The record demonstrates that

Elsie's

led

reposed,

dependency
which

on

her

resulted

family

to

trust,

unjustifiably

in the signing of documents Elsie knew

nothing about.
The Court has indicated that once a confidential relationship
is shown and a transaction occurs which benefits the party in whom
confidence
party

to

is placed,
show

that

the burden is shifted to the benefitting

no fraud

or

-34-

undue

influence

has

occurred.

Cunningham A . .Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 553

(Utah 1984).

The

Appellants have failed to meet their burden and the fact that they
were acting in "somewhat good faith is not enough to free them
from the consequences of their actions."

Id. at 553.

mm$m
All of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case
point to the unfortunate occurrence of a family in distress.

Many

well-intentioned parties have tried to protect their mother and
grandmother from perceived injustice.

The trial court was called

upon to sort out a variety of transactions taking place over a
substantial period of time.

Exercising its power to do equity,

the court has fashioned a remedy to preserve the stated intention
of all parties:

to assure that Elsie Brinkerhoff has sufficient

funds to meet her financial needs during the remaining period of
her life.

The court has achieved this result while remaining well

within the bounds of the law.
Supreme Court affirm
Conclusions

of

Law

Plaintiffs simply request that the

the First Amended
by

sustaining

the

Findings and
First

Amended

Fact and
Judgment

formulated by the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JC/tW day7 of December* 1986.

;HOT'T6TO
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the jQfC\ ^ day of December, 1986,
four (4) copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief were delivered
-35-

<

to the office of Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Appellants,
at 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, pta.JK"j8A120,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
(1) copy of the foregoing
F. Kirk

Heaton,

Attorney

JITL.

day of December, 1986, one

Respondents' Brief was mailed to Mr.
at

Law,

Guardian

for

Elsie

J.

Brinkerhoff, at 70 North Main Street, Kknab, Utah 847^41, by first
class mail, postage fully prepaid.
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C.
WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone:

J^f***,

586-9483

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No.

im

Defendants.
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, who complains
of Defendants, and for cause of action alleges:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
1.

The real property which is the subject of this

action is located in Millard and Kane Counties, State of
Utah, and this action arises out of the ownership, use, and
possession of said real property.
2.

On or about 26 October 1966, a certain "Agreement"

was entered into by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as SELLER, and CLOYD
H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, BUYERS, covering the
sale of certain real properties, located in Millard and Kane
Counties, State of Utah.

A copy of said "Agreement" is

attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "A", and incorporated by
this reference.

The real property which is the subject

matter of this action is more particularly described as
follows:

tv&xW*'

PROPERTY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY UTAH
I.

West 1/2 Section 25, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2
West, containing 320 acres.

II.

NW 1/4 SE 1/4, S 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 26, Township 39
South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 400 acres.

III. Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, SE 1/4 NW 1/4, NE 1/4 SW 1/4,
E 1/2 E 1/2, SE 1/4 NE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4; Section
27, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, containing 478.80 acres.
IV.

V.

East 1/2 NE 1/4, S 1/4 SE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, Section
35, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing
200 acres.
SW 1/4 NE 1/4, W 1/2 SE 1/4, SE 1/4 SW 1/4, Section
29, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing
160 acres.

VI.

NW 1/4, E 1/2 SW 1/4, Section 30, Township 40 South,
Range 4 1/2 West, containing 238.99 acres.

VII.

Lot 2, Section 5, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2
West, containing 39.08 acres.

VIII.

SW 1/4 NW 1/4, of Section 8, Township 40 South,
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40
acres.

IX.

Lot 1, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 31, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West,
containing 79.30 acres.

X.

Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 26,
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, and running thence
South 4.30 chains; thence South 70° East 15 chains
to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of said
creek to the North Line of said Northwest Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.23 chains to
the place of beginning, containing 11.77 acres.
ALSO
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, and running thence South 70° East 15
chains to the middle of the channel of the creek;
thence Southerly along the middle of the channel of
said creek to the South line; thence North 73°45'
West 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30 chains to the
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres.

XI.

Beginning at the S 1/4 corner of Section 23, Township
40 South, Range 6 West, thence East 10.23 chains,
N 80°W 6.36 chains, West 3.63 chains, S 1 chain to
beginning, containing .74 acres.

PERSONAL PROPERTY:
XII.

A one-fourth (1/4) interest in Hobble Canyon Reservoir
(9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona.

XIII.

A one-half (1/2) interest in Sullivan Reservoir in
Mohave County, Arizona.
TOGETHER WITH all grazing privileges and permits annexed

a

to or based upon any of the foregoing real, personal,
reservoir, or water rights as commensurate.
XIV.

Glendale Irrigation Company certificate No. 204, for
9.1 shares of East Ditch Water, to ELSIE J., CLOYD
H., and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 1967.

XV.

Glendale Irrigation Company, certificate No. 354, for
10.4 shares of West Ditch Water, to ELSIE J., CLOYD H.,
and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 1967.

MILLARD COUNTY UTAH
XVI.

Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta
Townsite.

XVII.

Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A", Delta Townsite.
3.

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF received and accepted

payments as specified in Exhibit "AM, thereby acknowledging
the existence of said "Agreement".
4.

The "Agreement" was never recorded and all payments

were made directly to Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, rather
than into the established escrow.
5.

On or about 13 April 1971, Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

signed a certain "Affidavit", setting forth the sale of
certain property to CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF,
and further stating that she would defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.

A

copy of said Affidavit is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit
"B M , and incorporated by this reference.
6.

On or about 6 April 1977, Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

signed a certain statement, having the statement duly notarized,
stating that she had received the sum of $23,000.00 in
payments on said property from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff.
A copy of the statement is attached hereto, marked as# Exhibit
"C", and is incorporated by this reference.
7.

After the death of

CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, Defendant

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed and recorded various deeds covering
the above-described real property, to other individuals, in
an attempt to cloud title to the above-described real property
in passing to the Decedent's rightful heirs.
8.

By virtue of the execution and recordation of these

subsequent deeds, Defendants' claims are adverse or hostile

3
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to and in conflict with the interest of Plaintiff, and a
dispute has arisen with respect to the parties' rights.
9.

The true names of Defendants DOE are unknown to

Plaintiff.

Upon discovery of such true names, Plaintiff

reserves the right to substitute the same in place of the
fictitious names used herein.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
10. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above,
are incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth
herein.
11.

On or about 26 October 1966, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as

SELLER, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK BRINKERHOFF, as
BUYERS, entered into a contract, wherein certain real property,
grazing privileges, and water and reservoir rights in the
States of Utah and Arizona were sold, in consideration of
BUYERS paying to SELLER, the sum of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,388.00) DOLLARS, payable at
the rate of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS per year,
beginning November 1, 1968, BUYERS having paid the sum of
FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for the years of 1966 and
1967 at the time of execution of the contract.

As a further

condition to the contract, BUYERS agreed to pay to SELLER,
for the entire remainder of SELLER'S life, irrespective of
the amount to be paid under this contract, the sum of TWO
THOUSAND DOLLARS per year, and if the contract was not paid
in full at the time of the death of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the
remainder would be paid to her heirs, equally, share and
share alike.
12.

Plaintiff has duly performed all of its obligations

under said contract, except payments for the last two (2)
years, and as to such obligation, Plaintiff has offered and
tendered full performance thereof, but Defendant ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF has wrongfully refused and still refuses to
accept the same.
13.

Defendant failed and refused, and still fails and

^

refuses to perform her obligations under said contract.
14.

Plaintiff has no adequate legal remedy in that the

real property is unique, having special value to Plaintiff,
and is the type of which Plaintiff cannot obtain a duplicate.
15.

The contract, which is the subject matter of this

action, is fair and equitable, and is supported by consideration
as is shown by the above facts and by the fact that Defendant
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, signed a certain notarized statement,
Exhibit "C", stating that she had received, as of 6 April
1977, the sum of $23,000.00 in payments on said property
from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff.
16.

By reson of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF's failure

to perform the remainder of said contract according to its
terms, Plaintiff has sustained damages in the amount of the
fair market value of said property.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
ANTICIPATORY BREACH
17.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above,

are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
18.

In late fall of 1979, Plaintiff was informed that

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF had executed and recorded various
deeds covering the property which she previously sold to
Plaintiff, in an attempt to pass title to other individuals
not entitled thereto.
19. Plaintiff has performed all conditions to be performed
in the contract, and stands ready, willing, and able to
continue said performance.
20.

The actions of the above-named Defendants in

accepting and recording the various deeds covering the
above-described real properties, when they were fully aware
of the existence of the contract with Plaintiff, were done
in anticipatory breach of Plaintiff's rights in and to the
said property.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
QUIET TITLE
21.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above,

^s

A

are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
22.

Plaintiff's interest in and to the above-described

real property is prior in time and right to those alleged
claims of Defendants.
23.

The Estate of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, at all times

pertinent to this action, had, and still has, an interest in
and to certain real properties as above-described.
24.

By virtue of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executing

and recording subsequent deeds to the above-named Defendants,
the claims are adverse or hostile to and in conflict with
the interest of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is entitled to an
order of this Court, declaring and adjudging Plaintiff to be
the owner, in fee simple, of his undivided one-half interest
in and to the real property, and ordering Defendants, and
each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or under
them, to have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in
and to Plaintiff's interest.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
DAMAGES
25.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 8, above,

are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
26.

Alternatively, in the event the Court does not

grant relief under the First through the Fourth Causes of
Action, above, Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the
current market value of the above-described real properties
as may be determined by the Court.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgm«nt against Defendants
as follows:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1.

That the above-entitled Court determine and enter a

declaratory Judgment determining the rights of the parties
to this action to terminate the controversy or remove any
uncertainty as to ownership of the above-entitled property.

i

2.

For Plaintiff's

costs of Court incurred in this

action.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems appropriate in this action.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
4.

That Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF be required to

specifically perform said contract by accepting the payments
as set forth in said contract.
5.

If specific performance cannot be granted, for

damages in the amount of the fair market value of the property.
6.

For costs of Court incurred in this action.

7.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems appropriate in the premises.
8.

That the Court declare the deeds executed and

recorded after the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff to be null,
void, and of no effect.
ON THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
9.

That the above-entitled Court declare Defendant

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to be in anticipatory breach of her contract
and award Plaintiff damages for the current market value of
the above-described property.
ON THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
10.

That Defendants, and all persons claiming by,

through, or under them be required to set forth the nature
of their claims to the above-described real property.
11.

That all adverse claims of said Defendants to the

real property be determined by this Court.
12.

That this Court declare and adjudge that Plaintiff

is the owner, in fee simple, of his undivided one-half (1/2)
interest in and to said real property; and that Defendants,

fe*^£f rr^ai "M: ~7*&:.i.

and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or
under them, have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest
in and to Plaintiff's interest.
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V.

13.

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain

Defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming by,
through, or under them, from asserting any claim whatsoever
to Plaintifffs interest.
14.

For Plaintiff's costs incurred in this action.

15.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems appropriate.
ON THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
16.

That this Court determine the current market value

of the above-described property and award Plaintiff damages
accordingly.
17.

For Plaintiff's costs incurred in this action.

18.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deem appropriate in the premises.
DATED:

q-

June

1982

JILLARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address
Sahara Rancho Medical Center, Suite 201
2320 South Rancho Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89102
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Iota I sum of FIFTY THREE

THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,308.00) DOLLARS, as the full consider*

-I

0

tion therefor, the SELLER covenants and agrees to sell and the BUYERS covenant
and agree to buy the. follov/ing described real property, grazing privileges end
water and reservoir rights in the States of. Utah and Arizona:
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REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, UTAH;
Township 39 South, Range 4£ West, Salt Lake Meridian:
"./est Half of Section 7 % containing; 37") acres.
fL'rt.u>ost Quarter; Soolhoast Quarlxr e;vj Iho Sou : i Mo. i f
.:« the No'-thoasl Ou.srtor containing -'.l:.; acres, al! in
-••..-..'i ^n ..' , Tov.iisfii p oa South, R^n^ji: A •; West, S H": Laho
."••'.-r i L'I o n , c c n t a i r, i n-.
acres, .v..
Lais 1, 7, 3, ane A; Southeast y'uarter of the North
V.-'V- •' U f i ^ H - n r i

M.....4 ' - •-

«

••

-

East Half of the Northeast Quarter; Soulah Ha l.f of Mic
Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 35, containing 200 acres.

.,..,*...***••.

Township 40 South,- Range l | V/es't; Salt Lake Meridian:

Sear ion •'.': Nnrthwcst Quarter: ilnst 11:1,' :<• I mi .Y.>u'• hv.« ••• i
Qii.ricr, :or. i\ai ni no 233.-V ncro::.
5: Lot 2, containing 52.03 ncrcr.

Section

Township -0 South, Range 4 V.'ost, Salt Lake Meridian:
Soulhwost Quarter of Ihe Nor I hw^s {• Quarler
containing -vj acres.

W S'.viian •.',

Township 60 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quartan of -Section 23, Township 40 South, Range
-7 ' *-».^f
•

i

:

•

<"-.!-»:

.";«... i ::';;

;

•< •

i -,f.. ,6 M - . r * r*' '• ••-"
.•.'!.•:'*•'•.

•

-

*~

:'•• :<: ~.. " •v 2 01: t.'.

-

,:....

»•; .- , ..-

• . ' • . . i t ;

1 »: i»

'.

r
••,. :\•

' ' i • * he.;; i m i i .

- .•
c

.

-i ^
:

~?.
\

.%.:\\

.

.

.

\ \\ \ ;•

. /•"

.-.•arc-...
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, anc! running thence South 4.30 chains; thence South 70°
East 15 chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence
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SELLER

C ioyd ! I. \',r i iil-orh., r '

SUYC.^S

A F F I D A V I T
TO WHOM I T MAY CONCERN:
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF KANE

: ss
)

<

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows:
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J.
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of ownership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property.
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these
rights of ingress or egress, to said property.
The real property is described as follows:
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 cabins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point
of beginning.
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, Salt Lake teridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South
73°45! East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres
Total acres:

12.51

That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property
is concerned.

~£> "W X / J ^

j*n/W/SrJt* "P

Elsie Brinkerhoff
>
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / /

day of April, A.D. 1971,

•//<Q zz****- (o/ise?*'^*'1-*'4^ ^
Notary Public /^*7
/
• # ,
Residing at { Z J t d . ^ t l ^
My commission expires

/,
^

C

Jj,£
' ^

»

fi/.ty/r?
EXHIBIT "B"

^

J

To whon i t pay concern:
I t E l s i e BrlnkcrHoff,
/>n<1 Kark Hrlnkerhoff,

have r e c e i v e d from Clqyd
ps payment on p r o p e r t y ,

Ilgned: "<fe

STATE OF UTAH

)

J^^eJ^qAA^^Kt

SS,

County of Kane
0n

^ h i s ("7*1

appeared before me

da

y

of

flp-<.P

117^2

, personally

Elsie Brinkerhoff

, the signer

of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that she executed the same.

Notary Public
Residing at SfX^^?lri$:^

LlT\\£,

EXHIBIT "C

1
2
3
4|
5
6|

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY
Attorneys for Elsie Brinkerhoff,
Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff,
Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A.
Brinkerhoff, Betty.B. Esplin,
and Darlos T. Brinkerhoff
110 North Main Street, Suite G
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

4£rC
''<?/•{

I9^P

of

4£*£
"Wn

7

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

8!

IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

9J
io!
ii

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
Plaintiff,

12 |
13 |

ANSWER, CROSSCLAIM AND
COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.

14 | BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
15 i B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
16
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,
17
Defendants.
18!
19

Civil No. 1826

Comes now Defendants, Elsie Brinkerhoff, Golda B. Adair,

20

Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff,

21

Betty B. Esplin, and Darlos T. Brinkerhoff by and through

22

counsel, and hereby answer Plaintiff's Complaint as follows:

23 J

FIRST DEFENSE

24 j
25 I

Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon

26 I which relief can be granted.
27 !

SECOND DEFENSE

28
29

Darlos T. Brinkerhoff is not a proper party to this action,

30:

and said Defendant reserves the right to move to have Plain-

31

tiff's Complaint dismissed against her at the appropriate time.

32|
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THIRD DEFENSE

2]
3

1.

Answering paragraph one of Plaintiff's Complaint,

4j

Defendants admit that the real property which is the subject of

5

this action is located in Kane County, Utah, but upon informa-

6

tion and belief, allege that the Millard County property was net

7

and is not owned by Elsie Brinkerhoff, and for many years last

8|

past, has not been used or possessed by any of the parties named

9

above.

10 j

2.

Answering paragraph

two of Plaintiff's Complaint,

11J

Defendants admit that said Agreement was in fact entered into,

12!

but allege that the legal description outlined in Plaintiff's

13

Complaint is in error as follows:

14

a.

15

NW h, SE h, S h NE H Section 26,
Township 39 South, Range 4 h
West, containing 400 acres.

16 j
17

b.

18

20
c.

23
d.

26
27
e.

Parcel No. XIV was not described in said Agreement
designated as Exhibit "A". Defendant Charles A.
Brinkerhoff specifically alleges that he is the
owner of the property described in Parcel XIV, and
that Plaintiff has no right, title or interest in
and to the same.

f.

Parcel No. XV, is not particularly described in
said Agreement designated as Exhibit "A", but is

29 |
30 !
31
32|
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Parcel No. XI should be described as follows:
Beginning at the S h corner of Section
23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West,
thence East 10.23 chains, N 80° W 6.36
chains, West 3.63 chains, S 1 chain to
beginning, containing .74 acres.

25

28

Parcel No. IV should be described as follows:
East % NE !j, S H SE h, NW h SE h, Section
35, Township 39 South, Range 4 h West,
containing 200 acres.

22

24

Parcel No. Ill should be described as follows:
* Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, SE !| NW !j, N E ^ S W * , E
h E h, SW*s NE h, NW h SE h; Section 27,
Township 39 South, Range 4 H West, Salt
Lake Meridian, containing 478.80 acres.

19

21

Parcel No. II should be described as follows:

SMSRaflfe?
?«Ny

i

appropriately part of this action inasmuch as it
was part of the water right originally owned by
Merle Brinkerhoff, deceased, husband of Elsie
Brinkerhoff, Defendant herein.

2
3
n
i!

g.

4 j;
5|!
I'

6I
7j8j9

?:

3.

Parcel Nos. XVI and XVII, while legally described
in said Agreement, are not, and have not been for
many years last past, owned by any of the parties
to this litigation. Upon information and belief,
Defendant believe that said property was lost by
reason of non-payment of taxes prior to the tine
the Agreement designated as Exhibit "A" was
executed.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that she received

and accepted some of the payments required by Exhibit "A", but

10 \

denies that she received all payments required thereunder,

111;

specifically alleging that payments were not made by buyers

1 2 I;

therein, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

1 3 |j

4.

Defendants admit that said Agreement was not recorded

141: but specifically deny that all payments were made directly to
ll
1 5 !';

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff.

16 |

that buyers

therein, Cloyd

Defendants specifically allege
H. Brinkerhoff

and Mark

J.

i

1 7 j'.

Brinkerhoff were under an obligation to pay directly to the

18 | escrow as per the terms set forth in the Escrow Agreement.
1 9 {'
:

5.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that her signature

20 i

is upon the Affidavit referred to in Paragraph No. 5 of Plain-

.i?

tiff's Complaint.

li
:

22 !

I1
23 ;;
i
24 i
25 [

However, said Defendant alleges that said

Affidavit was to be effective only so long as Mark

J.

Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff complied with the terms of
said Agreement.
6.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that she signed a

2 6 j:

certain statement which was notarized.

2 7 !'

believe that at the time she signed said statement, the sum of

28 ;

$23,000.00 was filled in as now written.

29 [

was not signed before a Notary Public even though the document

3 0 j'

bears a Notary's signature and seal.

However, she does not

Furthermore, the same

Said Defendant specifical-

ly alleges that she has not received the sum of $23,000.00 as
!i

32 f
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7.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that on June 4th,

21

1979, a Warranty Deed was prepared from herself, as grantor, to

3

Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow, Mark J. Brinkerhoff, a married man,

4!

and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, a married man, all as joint tenants

5

with full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common.

6j

However, said Defendant denies that said Deed was prepared,

7f

executed and recorded after the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff

j8H

!'
9 !'

io I;

inasmuch as it was prepared prior to the death of Cloyd H.
Brinkerhoff.

Said Deed was in a prepared state and brought to

Elsie Brinkerhoff by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff who requested that she

i i |! sign the same which she did, and the Deed was thereafter appar1 2 I;

ently recorded by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.

Said Defendant specif-

j

1 3 ji

ically denies that the Deed was an attempt to cloud title to the

1 4 ji
i;

above-described real property.

Upon the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, Defendant herein,
15 :
16
Elsie Brinkerhoff and co-defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, owned or
17
became entitled to said real property as surviving joint ten-

18|

ants, each as to an undivided one-half interest.

19

and on August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff executed a Warranty

20

Deed to her undivided one-half interest in the subject property

Thereafter,

21 j to Golda B. Adair, a married women, as to an undivided one-fifth
I!

22 |

interest, Warren Brinkerhoff, a married man, as to an undivided

23 |!

one-fifth interest; Arlene B. Goulding, a married women, as to

ji

24 |i

an undivided one-fifth interest; Charles A. Brinkerhoff, a

25

married man, as to an undivided one-fifth interest, and Betty B.

26

Esplin, a married women, as to an undivided one-fifth interest.

27

Simultaneously, each of said named grantees executed individual-

20

ly a Trust Deed Note in favor of Elsie Brinkerhoff with a

29

principal sum of $10,000.00, and collectively a Trust Deed with

30

a principal sum of $50,000.00 to secure payment of said

31

obligation. Therefore the real property which is the subject of

32 |
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1

this action is now subject to the Deed of Trust in favor of

2

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff.

3

8.

Defendants admit that the execution and recordation of

4

these Deeds and recorded instruments are adverse to the interest

5

of Plaintiff.

6

9.

Defendants are without sufficient information to answer

7

paragraph nine of Plaintiff's Complaint, and for lack of such

8

information, specifically deny the same.

9

10.

Defendants incorporate by reference their answers to

10

paragraphs one through nine as more specifically set forth

11

herein.

12

11.

Defendants admit that said contract was entered into,

13

but specifically allege that the first annual payment was to

14

commence on November 1st, 1966, not November 1st, 1968.

15

wise, said Agreement provides that the sum of $4,000.00 was to

16

constitute payment for the years 1964 and 1965, and not 1966 and

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32 1
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1967 as set forth in Plaintiff's Complaint.

Like-

The balance of

paragraph no. 11 is admitted.
12.

Defendants deny that Plaintiff has duly performed all

of the obligations required by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.
Brinkerhoff.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that two annual

payments have been refused, inasmuch as said Agreement terminated many years last past by reason of said non-payment and
non-performance by Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff.
13.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff admits that she has refused

to perform her obligations under said contract, but for the
reason that said contract is terminated and without legal
effect.
14.

Paragraph fourteen is denied.

15.

Defendants admit that when said contract was written it

was intended to be fair and equitable to all parties.

However,

Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff failed to abide by

:

fe?-

1

the terms of said contract, and pursuant to the escrow in-

2

structions set forth on paragraph four of said Agreement, Elsie

3

Brinkerhoff, as seller, was not under any obligation to provide

4

Notice of Default by reason of non-payment, and therefore, by

5

operation of law, said contract terminated and became of no

6

further force or effect when Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.

7

Brinkerhoff as buyers, failed to perform and make payments

8

according to the terms therein set forth.

^ • J * " ,

9

16.

Paragraph sixteen is denied.

10

17.

Defendants incorporate by reference paragraphs one

11
12
13

through eight as more specifically set forth herein.
18.

Defendants are without sufficient information to answer

paragraph eighteen, and for lack of such information, specif-

14 I ically deny the same.
15

19.

Paragraph nineteen is denied.

16

20.

Paragraph twenty is denied.

17

21.

Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs one

18

through eight as more specifically set forth herein.

19

22.

Paragraph twenty-two is denied.

20

23.

Paragraph twenty-three is denied, Defendants specif-

21

ically alleging that the contract terminated by operation of

22

law, and that thereafter, the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff

23

lost any interest in the subject project by reason of his

24

ownership as a joint tenant and his subsequent death.

25

24.

Paragraph twenty-four is denied.

26

25.

Defendants incorporate their answers to paragraphs one

27
28
29

through eight as more specifically set forth herein.
26.

Paragraph twenty-six is denied.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

30
31
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The contract upon which Plaintiff relies is void by reason

1

of the failure on the part of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.

2

Brinkerhoff to perform according to the terms thereof.

3

dants specifically allege that said persons, as buyers therein,

4|

failed to pay according to the terms of said contract, and upon

5

non-payment on a timely basis, the contract terminated by

61

operation of law and without further notice to said persons.

7J

Defen-

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

8|
9

Elsie Brinkerhoff, as the seller, and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff

10 j

and Mark J. Brinkerhoff as buyers, all recognizing the failure

11

on the part of the buyers to perform according to the terms of

12 1 the contract, including timely payments, voluntarily terminated
13 | said contract and became joint tenants of the subject property
14

presumably as a means to settle any disputes created by said

15

contract.

16!

tenancy

17

Brinkerhoff became entitled to an undivided one-half interest in

Upon the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, the joint

previously

in

existence

was

severed, and

Elsie

18 | the subject property and Mark J. Brinkerhoff became entitled to
19

the remaining one-half interest.

By reason of the same, Cloyd

20 1 II. Brinkerhoff and his heirs and successors in interest, ceased
21 ! to own any interest in the subject property.
22

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

23
24

This Plaintiff is precluded from recovery under the doc-

25

trines of waiver, estoppel, laches and the doctrine of unclean

26

hands.

27

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

28
29
30|

31
32 |
CMAMMEftLAiN
ft COftRY
xrrammv AT WMV
tio M. M I M - autre •
». • . M M T M
O P A t ClTT.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages.

1

COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT ELSIE BRINKERHOFF AGAINST PLAINTIFF,

2

AND CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANT AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF.

3
4

Comes now Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, and counterclaims

5

against Plaintiff and crossclaims against co-defendant Mark J.

6

Brinkerhoff as follows:

7

1.

Elsie Brinkerhoff, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.

8

Brinkerhoff entered into the Agreement as more particularly

9

described as Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint.

10

2.

In the event the Court determines that said Agreement

11

is enforceable, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an

12;

accounting from the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and from Mark

13

J. Brinkerhoff, and payment of all unpaid amounts, together with

14

interest on each unpaid payment at the highest legal rate.

15

3.

Plaintiff above-named claims an interest in the subject

16

property adverse to the claim of Elsie

17

is without merit, and the Court should quiet title to an undi-

18

vided one-half interest in the subject property in the succes-

19

sors of Elsie Brinkerhoff, namely, Golda B. Adair, Warren

20

Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and

21

Betty B. Esplin.

22

4.

Upon

information

and

Brinkerhoff.

belief,

Defendant

Said claim

Elsie

23 I

Brinkerhoff alleges that the grazing permits may have been

24 !

unlawfully transferred from her name into the names of Cloyd H.

25 !

Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

26 |

determines that the contract was terminated and is of no legal

27

force or effect, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an

28

accounting and judgment against said persons or estates for all

29

rents and/or other monies deprived from the use of said permits.

30
31 !
32 |
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5.

In the event the Court

Upon information and belief, Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges

that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained

rents from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject proper-

;M*
ty, and she is entitled to an accounting of the same, and
judgment for any amounts that may be due her according to law.
6.

At the time of the death of Merle Brinkerhoff, husband

of Elsie Brinkerhoff, in 1960, he was the owner of sheep and
other personal property.

Upon information and belief, Defendant

Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.
Brinkerhoff unlawfully converted said sheep and other personal

9
10

property

to their own use without compensation

to Elsie

Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, she is entitled to a

1 1 jli| judgment over and against said individuals for the reasonable
12
value of said property.
13
7. By reason of the Agreement designated Exhibit "A",
14

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to a reasonable attor-

15

ney's fee rendered in the prosecution of this action, together

16

with Court costs incurred.

17
18
19
20

COUNTERCLAIM OF REMAINING DEFENDANTS AGAINST PLAINTIFF,

AND

CROSSCLAIM OF REMAINING DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF.

21
22

Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin,

24

and counterclaims against Plaintiff and crossclaims against

25

Defendant, Mark J. Brinkerhoff as follows:

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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Comes now Defendants Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff,

23

1.

Plaintiff claims an interest in the subject property

which is adverse to the ownership of said Defendants.

Said

claim is without merit, and the Court should quiet title in said
named Defendants in the subject property as to their collective
undivided one-half interest.

1

2.

z\

From and after the Deed from Elsie Brinkerhoff to said

Defendants on August 15th, 1980, said Defendants became entitled

3| to an undivided one-half interest ownership in said property,
4| and became entitled to one-half of all rents, profits or other
5| monies deprived from the use of said property.

6I

Upon information

and belief, said Defendants allege that Defendant Mark J.

:

7 ! Brinkerhoff has collected all rents and other profits. By
i;
8p reason of the same, said Defendants are entitled to an account9 :•ing from said Defendant and a judgment thereafter for one-half
10

) of any and all proceeds generated by or through the use of said

11 'property.
|;
1? li
3. Upon information and belief, said Defendants allege
1;

1 3 I;

that Plaintiff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff have unlawfully

1

1 4 J1

obtained the grazing permits and water rights and that the same

15 l!are now in their names.

Defendants are entitled to one-half of

16

all proceeds generated by or through the use of said permits,

17

together with an accounting for the same, and are entitled to an

18

undivided one-half ownership interest in said permits.

19

4.

The interest of Plaintiff is inferior to the collective

20

undivided one-half interest owned by Defendants.

21

the same, the Court should quiet title in favor of said Defen-

22

dants and against Plaintiff, and its heirs, successors, and

23

assigns.

24
25

By reason of

WHEREFORE, Defendant, Elsie Brinkerhoff, prays judgment as
follows:

26

1.

For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action.

27

2.

That in the event it is determined by the Court that

28

the contract is still valid and binding, that the Court award to

29

said Defendant all unpaid sums owed pursuant to said contract,

30

together with interest at the highest legal rate.

31

3.

For an Order determining that Plaintiff has no right,

3 2 I title or interest in the subject property.
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1

4.

For

"

&

*

•

an

accounting

as

against

Plaintiff

and

2

co-defendant, Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and a judgment for all sums

3

due said Defendant.

4

5.

For an Order determining that, as a matter of law, said

5

Agreement upon which Plaintiff relies is void and without legal

6

effect.

7

6.

That the rights of each party be determined by the

8 || Court.
!;

9 ji
1 0 ij

7.

This Court permanently enjoin and restrain Plaintiff,

and all persons claiming by, through, or under them, from

111: asserting a claim whatsoever to Defendant's interests as deter-

iJ
13
14
15
16

mined by the Court.
8.

For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the prose-

cution of this action, together with Court costs incurred.
9.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems

just and equitable.

17

DEFENDANTS, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.

18

COULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN PRAY FOR

19

JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS:

20

1.

For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action.

21

2.

That the Court determine the rights of all parties to

22

this action.

23

3.

That this Court award to said Defendants their respec-

24

tive one-fifth interest of an undivided one-half interest in and

25

to said real property.

26
27
28

4.

That this Court determine that Plaintiff has no estate,

right, title, lien or interest in the subject property.
5.

For an accounting from Plaintiff and co-defendant Mark

29

J. Brinkerhoff, and for any judgment to which said Defendants

30

may be entitled arising out of their ownership in the subject

31

property.

32
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1

6.

•y.

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain Plain-

2

tiff, and all persons claiming by, through or under him, from

3

asserting any claim whatsoever to the interests of Defendants.

4

7.

For costs of Court incurred herein.

5

8.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems

6

just and equitable.

7
8

DATED this /"'''

day of July, 1982.

9
10

/ X.^

11

ANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN

12
13
14
15

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

16

the within and foregoing ANSWER, CROSSCLAIM AND COUNTERCLAIM to

17

Mr. Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O. Box 279,

18

Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff,

19

Glendale, Utah, 84729, first class postage prepaid on this

20

M< « day of July, 1982.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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ft CORKY
nrrmmmv AT LAW
»fO M. MAM - SUITE •
m, 0 . MM TM

oaoAa c»rr.

19

ll
21
3
41

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY
Attorneys for Defendants
110 North Main St., Suite G
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(801) 586-4404
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5I
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

61

KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
81
9

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

10

Plaintiff,

11

vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
12 j BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
13
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF,
BETTY B. ESPLIN,
14
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,
15
Defendants.
16

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF AND CROSSCLAIM
AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF
AND
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF GOLDA
B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B.
ESPLIN, AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM
OF SAID DEFENDANTS AGAINST CODEFENDANT, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF
Civil No. 1826

17

Comes now Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, and counterclaims

18

against Plaintiff and crossclaims against Co-Defendant Mark J.

19

Brinkerhoff as follows:

20
21
22

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

Elsie Brinkerhoff, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.

23

Brinkerhoff entered into the Agreement as more particularly

24

described as Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint.

25

2.

In the event the Court determines that said Agreement

26

is enforceable, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an

27

accounting from the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and from Mark

28
AMBER LAIN
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1

J. Brinkerhoff, and payment of all unpaid amounts, together with

2

interest on each unpaid payment at the highest legal rate.

3

3.

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff,

4|

claim an interest in the subject property adverse to the claim

5

of Elsie Brinkerhoff.

6

Court should quiet title to all of said real property, personal

7

property

8

Brinkerhoff, namely, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene

9

B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.

10

4.

and water

Upon

Said claim is without merit, and the

rights

information

in the

and

successors of Elsie

belief, Defendant

Elsie

11

Brinkerhoff alleges that the grazing permits described in the

12

Purchase Agreement may have been unlawfully transferred from her

13

name into the names of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J.

14

Brinkerhoff.

15

Brinkerhoff, and the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.

16

Brinkerhoff have no right, title or interest in said grazing

17

permits.

18

(Exhibit "A") was terminated and is of no legal force or effect,

19

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, her successors and assigns, are

20

entitled to the return of said permits, or for the reasonable

21

value thereof as damages, and to an accounting and judgment

22

against said persons or estates for all rents and/or other

23

monies derived from the use or transfer of said permits.

24

5.

Said transfer was without authority from Elsie

In the event the Court determines that the contract

Upon information and belief, Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges

25

that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained

26

rents from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject

27

property, and she is entitled to an accounting of the same, and

28

judgment for any amounts that may be due her according to law*
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1

6.

At the time of the death of Merle Brinkerhoff, husband

2

of Elsie Brinkerhoff in I960, he was the owner of sheep and

3

other personal property.

4

Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J,

5

Brinkerhoff unlawfully converted said sheep and other personal

6

property to their own use without compensation to Elsie

7

Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, she is entitled to a

8

judgment over and against said individuals for the reasonable

9

value of said property.

10

7.

Upon information and belief, Defendant

By reason of the Agreement designated Exhibit "A",

11

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to a reasonable

12

attorney's fee rendered in the prosecution of this action,

13

together with Court costs incurred.

14
15
16

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
8.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff incorporates by reference

17

Paragraphs 1 through 7 of her First Cause of Action, and for an

18

additional cause of action alleges and contends as follows:

19

9.

On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff conveyed by

20

Warranty Deed, all her right, title and interest in the subject

21

property to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B.

22

Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.

23

10.

In the event it is determined that said Warranty Deed

24

did not cover water rights and personal property as more

25

particularly described in the Agreement dated October 26th,

26

1966, between herself as Seller and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and

27

Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as Buyers, then and in that event,

28
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1

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to all interest in the

2

same by reason of the termination of said Purchase Agreement.

3!

11.

By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet

4|

title in Elsie Brinkerhoff, her successors and assigns to all

5

real

6!

property, personal property and water rights described in said

7

Purchase Agreement and to determine as a matter of law, that

81

Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff have no right, title or

9

interest in the same, and that they should be permanently

101

enjoined from claiming any interest in said property.

111

12 J

14

AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING,
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN AGAINST
PLAINTIFF AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANTS
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT MARK J. BRINKERHOFF

15

Comes now Defendants Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff,

13 '

16

Arlene B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin,

17

and counterclaims against Plaintiff and crossclaims against

18

Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as follows:

19
20
21

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

By reason of the failure on the part of Plaintiff and

22

Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, to pay and perform

23

according to the terms of the Agreement dated October 26th,

24

1966, all real and personal property described in said Agreement

25

became the sole, separate and absolute property of Defendant

26

Elsie Brinkerhoff.

27
28

2.

On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow,

conveyed to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B.

ttBERLAIN
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4

1

Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, said

2

property, each as to an undivided one-fifth interest.

3

3.

By reason of the same, said Grantees own said real

4

property, personal property and water rights described therein,

5

to the exclusion of Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mark J.

6

Brinkerhoff.

7

4.

By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet

8

title to all real property, personal property and water rights

9

in Golda B. Adair, as to an undivided one-fifth interest; Warren

10

Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth interest; Arlene B.

11

Goulding, as to an undivided one-fifth interest; Charles A.

12

Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth interest and Betty B.

13

Esplin, as to an undivided one-fifth interest.

14
15
16

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
5.

Said Defendants incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1,

17

3, 3 and 4, of their First Cause of Action, and for an

18

additional cause of action allege and contend as follows:

19

6.

From and after the conveyance of the Warranty Deed from

20

Elsie Brinkerhoff to said Defendants on August 15th, 1980, said

21

Defendants became entitled to the entire ownership of said

22

property, and became entitled to all rents, profits or other

23

monies derived from the use of said property.

24

and belief, said Defendants allege that Defendant Mark J.

25

Brinkerhoff has collected all rents and other profits.

26

reason of the same, said Defendants are entitled to an

27

accounting from said Defendant and a judgment thereafter for all

28

proceeds generated by or through the use of said property.
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Upon information

By

5
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1

7.

Upon information and belief, said Defendants allege

2\

that Plaintiff and/or mark J. Brinkerhoff have unlawfully

3

obtained the grazing permits and water rights and that the same

4|

are now in their names. Defendants are entitled to all proceeds

5

generated by or through the use of said property, together with

61

an accounting for the same, and are entitled to the ownership

7

interest in said property.

81
9

8.

The interests of Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff are

inferior to the collective interests owned by Defendants.

By

101

reason of the same, the Court should quiet title in favor of

11

said Defendants and against Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff

12!

and their heirs, successors, and assigns.

13
14

WHEREFORE, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff prays for judgment
as follows:

15

1.

For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action.

16

2.

That in the event it is determined by the Court that

17

the contract is still valid and binding, that the Court award to

18

said Defendant all unpaid sums owed pursuant to said contract,

19

together with interest at the highest legal rate.

20

3.

For

an order

determining

that Plaintiff

and

21

Co-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, have no right, title or

22

interest in the subject property.

23

4.

For an accounting as against Plaintiff and Co-Defendant

24

Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and a judgment for all sums due said

25

Defendant.

26

5.

For an order determining that, as a matter of law, said

27

Agreement upon which Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff rely, is

28
1

void and without legal effect.
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1
2
3

6.

That the rights of each party be determined by the

Court.
7.

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain

4

Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons

5

claiming by, through or under them, from asserting a claim

6

whatsoever to Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff's

7

determined by this Court.

8
9
10
11

8.

interest as

For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the

prosecution of this action, together with court costs incurred.
9.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems

just and equitable.

12

DEFENDANTS, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.

13

GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN PRAY FOR

14

JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS:

15

1.

For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action.

16

2.

That the Court determine the rights of all parties to

17

this action.

18

3.

That this Court award to said Defendants all of the

19

real property, personal property and water rights which are the

20

subject of this action pursuant to the deed from Elsie

21

Brinkerhoff to them as grantees, said deed dated August 15th,

22

1980.

23

4.

As an alternative remedy, that this Court award to said

24

Defendants their respective one-fifth interest of an undivided

25

one-half interest in and to said real property.

26

5. .That this Court determine that Plaintiff and Mark J.

27

Brinkerhoff have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in

28

the subject property.
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1

6.

For an accounting from Plaintiff and Co-Defendant Mark

2

J. Brinkerhoff, and for any judgment to which said

3

may be entitled arising out of their ownership in t; e subject

4|

property.

5

6.

efendants

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain

6

Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons

7

claiming byf through or under them, from asserting any claim

81

whatsoever to the interests of said Defendants.

9'
10
11
12

7.

For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the

prosecution vf this action, together with costs of court
incurred herein.
8.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems

13

just and equitable.

14

DATED this

^J^l^r

day of September, 1982.

15
16
HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN

17
18
19
20
21

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

22

23
24
25
26
27
28

This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the within

and foregoing AMENDED

OF ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF AND CROSSCLAIM AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF AND
AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN, AND
' 1

AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, MARK

awtf"*
•BY* AT LAW
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urn CITY.
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COUNTERCLAIM

n&

\

1

J. BRINKERHOFF to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff,

2

P. 0. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Mr. Mark J.

3

Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah 83729, first class postage prepaid

4

on this ...S*^

day of September, 1982.

5
6

- i ^ /,(/M-———
Secretary
/

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
HAMBERLAIN
* CORRY
TOMKY* AT LAW
l m. MAIN • MMTK •
P. O. B M m
Ca»A* C m r ,
UTAH S47SO
•Ol) BM-4404

9
•V3

A_^A

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 North 300 West
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone:

"&2"*&
C/ori o T I f * ^ ^
»• O&frfcTH°<Ti

586-9483

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
AS TO DEFENDANTS CHARLES
BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B.
ESPLIN

Plaintiff,

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,
Defendants.

Civil No. 1826

Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and pursuant
to the provisions of URCP 41(a)(1), prior to the service by
Defendants CHARLES BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN of an Answer
or of a Motion for Summary Judgment, and gives notice of
dismissal of the Complaint in this action as to said Defendants
CHARLES BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN.
DATED:

e

September 1982

MILLARD ft. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
SERVED the within and foregoing NOTICE OF DISMISSAL AS TO
DEFENDANTS CHARLES BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B. ESPLIN upon the
following:
Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, UT 84720
Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff
Glendale, UT 84729

Mr. Charles A. Brinkerhoff
P.O. Box 64
Orderville, UT 84758
Mrs. Betty B. Esplin
P.O. Box 85
Orderville, UT 84758

i

c-,v.
first class postage fully prepaid this jyki^-

day of September

1982.

^:^^r^4

h-t/T

A-38

1

2
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4

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY
Attorneys for Defendants
110 North Main St., Suite G
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404
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5
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

6

KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8|

9

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

10 |
11
12
13

14
15

16

Plaintiffs,

WITHDRAWAL OF ATTORNEY FOR
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND
BETTY B. ESPLIN

vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.

17
18
19
20
21

Comes now Hans Q. Chamberlain, and hereby gives notice that
he withdraws as counsel of record for Defendants, Charles A.
Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1982.

22
23
24
25
26

CERTIFICTE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

27

the within and foregoing WITHDRAWAL to Mr. Willard R. Bishop,

28

Attorney for Plaintiffs, P. 0. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah 84720,
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1

first class postage prepaid on this , ^ "^

2

1982.

day of December,

3
4

/^W^wSecretary

5

y
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6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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25
26
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY
Attorneys for Defendants
110 North Main St., Suite G
P. O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(801) 586-4404

5
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

6

KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8
9

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

10
11
12
13
14
15

SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
OF ELSIE BRINKERHOFF AND
CROSSCLAIM AGAINST MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF
AND
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.
GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF AND BETTY B.
ESPLIN, AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM
OF SAID DEFENDANTS AGAINST CODEFENDANT, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF

Plaintiff,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

16

Defendants.

Civil No. 1826

17
18

Comes now Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff, and counterclaims

19

against Plaintiff and crossclaims against Co-Defendant Mark J.

20

Brinkerhoff as follows:

21
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

22

23

1.

Elsie Brinkerhoff, Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.

24

Brinkerhoff entered into the Agreement as more particularly

25

described as Exhibit "A" attached to Plaintiff's Complaint.
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2.

In the event the Court determines that said Agreement

is enforceable, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to an
accounting from the estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and from Mark
J. Brinkerhoff, and payment of all unpaid amounts, together with
interest on each unpaid payment at the highest legal rate.
3.

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff,

claim an interest in the subject property adverse to the claim
of Elsie Brinkerhoff.

Said claim is without merit, and the

Court should quiet title to all of said real property, personal
property and water

rights

in the

successors of Elsie

Brinkerhoff, namely, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene
B. Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.
4.

Upon

information

and

belief, Defendant

Elsie

Brinkerhoff alleges that the grazing permits described in the
Purchase Agreement, or Taylor-Grazing Rights, BLM Grazing Rights
and Forest Service Grazing Rights which were not described in
said Agreement, but were appertenant to and used collectively
with the real property which is the subject of this action, may
have been unlawfully transferred from her name into the names of
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

Said transfer

was without authority from Elsie Brinkerhoff, and the estate of
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff have no right,
title or interest in said grazing permits.

In the event the

Court determines that the contract (Exhibit "A") was terminated
and is of no legal force or effect, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff,
her successors and assigns, are entitled to the return of said
2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

permits, or for the reasonable value thereof as damages, and to
an accounting and judgment against said persons or estates for
all rents and/or other monies derived from the use or transfer
of said permits.
5.

Upon information and belief, Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges

that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained
rents from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject
property, and she is entitled to an accounting of the same, and
judgment for any amounts that may be due her according to law.
6.

At the time of the death of Merle Brinkerhoff, husband

of Elsie Brinkerhoff in 1960, he was the owner of sheep and
other personal property.

Upon information and belief, Defendant

Elsie Brinkerhoff alleges that Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and Mark J.
Brinkerhoff unlawfully converted said sheep and other personal
property to their own use without compensation to Elsie
Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, she is entitled to a
judgment over and against said individuals for the reasonable
value of said property.
7.

By reason of the Agreement designated Exhibit "A",

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff

is entitled to a reasonable

attorney's fee rendered in the prosecution of this action,
together with Court costs incurred.

23
24
25

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
8.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff incorporates by reference
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1

Paragraphs 1 through 7 of her First Cause of Action, and for an

2

additional cause of action alleges and contends as follows:

3

9.

On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff conveyed by

4

Warranty Deed, all her right, title and interest in the subject

5

property to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B.

6

Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

10.

In the event it is determined that said Warranty Deed

did not cover water rights, grazing rights, and personal
property as more particularly described in the Agreement dated
October 26th, 1966, between herself as Seller and Cloyd H.
Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as Buyers, then and in that
event, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff is entitled to all interest
in the same by reason of the termination of said Purchase
Agreement.
11.

By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet

title in Elsie Brinkerhoff, her successors and assigns to all
real property, personal property, grazing rights, and water
rights described in said Purchase Agreement, or which belonged
to her as a matter of law or were used in conjunction with the
real property which is the subject of this action, and to
determine as a matter of law, that Plaintiff and Mark J.
Brinkerhoff have no right, title or interest in the same, and
that they should be permanently enjoined from claiming any
interest in said property.

25
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
12.

Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff incorporates by reference

paragraphs 1 through 7 of her First Cause of Action and
paragraphs 9 through 11 of her Second Cause of Action, and for
an additional cause of action alleges and contends as follows:
13.

On or about June

4 th,

t*

particularly described therein, to herself, Mark J. Brinkerhoff
and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship and not as tenants in common.

Said Deed has been

recorded in the Office of the Kane County Recorder, and the
claims of Plaintiff and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, are in
part based upon said Warranty Deed.
14.

At the time said Deed was presented to Defendant Elsie

Brinkerhoff for signature, it was represented to her by Mark J.
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H, Brinkerhoff, that they were entitled to
the real property more particularly described therein, when in
fact they were not for the reason that they have not paid to
Elsie Brinkerhoff all sums required of them,
15.

Said Deed was signed by Elsie Brinkerhoff based upon

the fraud and misrepresentation of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd
H. Brinkerhoff, and by reason of the same, the Court should
declare null and void and without legal force or effect, said
Warranty -Deed, and order the same stricken from the records of
Kane County, Utah, and order all property described therein to
be quieted in Elsie J. Brinkerhoff.

CITY*

ft47SO

Defendant Elsie

Brinkerhoff, by Warranty Deed, conveyed real property more

NKYS AT LAW
4AIN • SUITE «
»• ft*X 7 M
PAR

1919,
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1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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16.

As an alternative request for relief, Defendant Elsie

J. Brinkerhoff alleges upon information and belief, that
herself, as the grantor, and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H.
Brinkerhoff, as grantees, were mutually mistaken as to the facts
which would require Elsie J. Brinkerhoff to execute said Deed or
facts which would entitle Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H.
Brinkerhoff to receive said real property.

By reason of said

mutual mistake of fact, said Deed is void and without legal
effect, and the Court should order the same stricken and removed
from the records of Kane County, Utah.
17.

Said Deed is also invalid for lack of consideration and

said grantees named therein should not be entitled to benefit
from said Deed under the Doctrine of Unclean Hands.
18.

The Court should rule, as a matter of law, that all

real property described in said Warranty Deed is therefore
vested in Defendant Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, or her successors, or
her successors and assigns.

18
19
20
21
22
23

SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF AND ARLENE B. GOULDING,
AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID
DEFENDANTS AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT MARK J. BRINKERHOFF
Comes now Defendants Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff,

24

and Arlene B. Goulding, and counterclaims against Plaintiff and

25

crossclaims against Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, as follows:
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1.

By reason of the failure on the part of Plaintiff and

Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, to make payments and
perform according to the terms of the Agreement dated October
26th, 1966, all real property, water rights, personal property,
Taylor-Grazing Rights, BLM Grazing Rights and Forest Service
Grazing Rights became the sole, separate and absolute property
of Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff.
2.

On August 15th, 1980, Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow,

conveyed to Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B.
Goulding, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin, said
property, each as to an undivided one-fifth interest.
3.

By reason of the same, said Grantees own said real

property, personal property, grazing rights, and water rights
described

therein, to

the

exclusion

of

Plaintiff

and

Cross-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff*
4.

By reason of the foregoing, the Court should quiet

title to all real property, personal property, Taylor-Grazing
Rights, BLM Grazing Rights and Forest Service Rights, and water
rights, in Golda B. Adair, as to an undivided one-fifth
interest; Warren Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth
interest; Arlene B. Goulding, as to an undivided one-fifth
interest; Charles A. Brinkerhoff, as to an undivided one-fifth
interest.and Betty B. Esplin, as to an undivided one-fifth
interest.
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
5.

Said Defendants incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1,

2, 3 and 4, of their First Cause of Action, and for an
additional cause of action allege and contend as follows:
6.

From and after the conveyance of the Warranty Deed fron

Elsie Brinkerhoff to said Defendants on August 15th, 1980, said
Defendants became entitled to the entire ownership of said
property, and became entitled to all rents, profits or other
monies derived from the use of said property.

Upon information

and belief, said Defendants allege that Defendant Mark J.
Brinkerhoff has collected all rents and other profits.

By

reason of the same, said Defendants are entitled to an
accounting from said Defendant and a judgment thereafter for all
proceeds generated by or through the use of said property.
7.

Upon information and belief, said Defendants allege

that Plaintiff and/or Mark J. Brinkerhoff have unlawfully
obtained the grazing permits and water rights and that the same
are now in their names. Defendants are entitled to all proceeds
generated by or through the use of said property, together with
an accounting for the same, and are entitled to the ownership
interest in said property.
8.

The interests of Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff are

inferior to the collective interests owned by Defendants.

By

reason o£ the same, the Court should quiet title in favor of
said Defendants and against Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff
and their heirs, successors, and assigns.
8

G£

1

WHEREFORE, Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff prays for judgment

2

as follows:

3
4
5

1.

For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action.

2.

That in the event it is determined by the Court that

!

6
7
8
9
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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the contract is still valid and binding, that the Court award to
said Defendant all unpaid sums owed pursuant to said contract,
together with interest at the highest legal rate.
3.

For

an

order

determining

MAIN - mm* m

Plaintiff

and

Co-Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, have no right, title or
interest in the real property, water rights and grazing rights
(whether described in the Purchase Agreement or not), as more
particularly set forth above.
4.

For an accounting as against Plaintiff and Co-Defendant

Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and a judgment for all sums due said
Defendant.
5.

For an order determining that, as a matter of law, said

Agreement upon which Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff rely, is
void and without legal effect.
6.

That the rights of each party be determined by the

Court.
7.

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain

Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons
claiming by, through or under them, from asserting a claim
whatsoever

to Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff's

determined by this Court.
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interest as

1

8.

For an order declaring that a certain Warranty Deed

2

dated June 4th, 1979 is void and of no legal effect, and

3

ordering the same stricken from the records of kane County, Utah

4

and declaring

5

successors and assigns, are entitled to all property as more

6

particularly described therein.

7
8
9
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24

9.

that Defendant Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, her

For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the

prosecution of this action, together with court costs incurred.
10.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems

just and equitable.
DEFENDANTS, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, AND ARLENE
B. GOULDING, PRAY FOR JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS:
1.

For judgment against Plaintiff, no cause of action.

2.

That the Court determine the rights of all parties to

this action.
3.

That this Court award to said Defendants all of the

real property, water rights, personal property, Taylor-Grazing
Rights, BLM Grazing Rights and Forest Service Rights which are
the subject of this action pursuant to the deed from Elsie
Brinkerhoff to them as grantees, said deed dated August 15th,
1980.
4.

As an alternative remedy, that this Court award to said

Defendants their respective one-third interest of an undivided
one-half interest in and to said real property.
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5.

That this Court determine that Plaintiff and Mark J.

Brinkerhoff have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in
the subject property*
6.

For an accounting from Plaintiff and Co-Defendant Mark

J. Brinkerhoff, and for any judgment to which said Defendants
may be entitled arising out of their ownership in the subject
property.
7.

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain

Plaintiff, and Defendant Mark J. Brinkerhoff, and all persons
claiming by, through or under them, from asserting any claim
whatsoever to the interests of said Defendants.
8.

For a reasonable attorney's fee rendered in the

prosecution of this action, together with costs of court
incurred herein.
9.

For such other and further relief as to the Court deems

just and equitable.
DATED this

/<.

day of February, 1-983.

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN

V(
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This' is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM OF ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF AND CROSSCLAIM AGAINST MARK J. BRINKERHOFF AND
11
m «47ao

Q<7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

SECOND AMENDED

COUNTERCLAIM

OF GOLDA

B. ADAIR, WARREN

BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF AND
BETTY B. ESPLIN, AND AMENDED CROSSCLAIM OF SAID DEFENDANTS
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF to Mr. Willard R.
Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, P. 0. Box 279, Cedar City, Utah
84720, and to Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah 83729,
first class postage prepaid on this /.?

—

day of February,

1983.

9
10
11

Secretary

?" ] •'
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August 13, 1983
Mr. Hans Q Chamberlain
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
RE: Brinkerhoff vs Brinkerhoff

Civil No. 1826

Dear Mr. Chamberlain:
Based on the following facts and provisions, I am writing
to inform you of my intent to withdraw completely from the suit
in question.
A- This action has caused such a division in my family because
of the underhanded manner in which the deeds were changed, that
the feeling may be impossible th reconcile.
B- Because the outcome of this action will be of no financial
advantage to me, I will not assume any financial obligation that
may arise from continued involvement.
C- It is my intent and desire to restore all Property, Permits
and Water Rights to thier rightful owners, Mr. Mark J. and
Mrs. Lena A. Brinkerhoff. That the annual payment of Two
Thousand be due and payable outlined in the original agreement.
D- That my son Warren may, with prior approval, have enough
space to plant a garden and provide for the needs of his family.
E- That all family members try to resolve thier differences
and reunite as a family group.
F- I also express my displeasure at the allegation of financial
wrong doing against my son Mark, they are false and with put base
The record will show that this action is done of my own free will
and choice, and represents my complete and total separation from
any and all future involvement in this suit.

fsie J'' Brinkerhoff

cc: Mr. Willard R. Bishop

(

l

1!
2|
3
41
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY
Attorney for Defendants
110 North Main, Suite G
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
(801) 586-4404
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5
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

61

KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7
8!
9

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

10

DEFENDANTS' FIRST
INTERROGATORIES TO
PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,

11;

vs.

12

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

13
14
15
16

Defendants.

Civil No. 1826

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Comes now Defendants, and pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, propound the following Interrogatories
to Plaintiff, to be answered according to Utah law:
(For purposes of these Interrogatories, Plaintiff means
Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff and/or his Personal Representative.)
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Please

state when Plaintiff was

appointed as the Personal Representative of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Please

state all assets

in the

estate of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff which Plaintiff is administering.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3;
Brinkerhoff

Please state whether or not Cloyd H.

and Mark J. Brinkerhoff

conducted business as a

AMBERLAIN
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1

partnership.

2

partnership.

3

If

so, please

INTERROGATORY

NO.

state the

4:

If

said

inclusive dates

parties

of

operated

the

as

a

41

partnership, please

5

filed a partnership income tax return.

6|

these Interrogatoriesf copies of all partnership returns filed by

7

said parties from and after 1966.

81
9

state whether or not the partnership

INTERROGATORY NO. 5;

If so, please attach to

Concerning a certain agreement for

the purchase of real estate dated October 26f 1966, and for all

10!

payments

11!

following:

required

to

be

paid

therein,

please

12

(a)

13

payment.

14

(b)

By whom.

15

(c)

The amount paid.

16

(d)

To whom said payment was made.

17

(e)

18

ever

provide

The date of each payment, including

The

form of

the payment

the

the down

(i.e., cash, check,

etc.).

19

(f)

20

or delivered

21

provide

22

occasion.

23

INTERROGATORY

Whether or not any other consideration was paid
in lieu of the payment

details

of

NO.

6:

the

Do

required.

consideration

you

have

paid

knowledge

If so,
on

of

each

any

24

records, documents, books of account, or other memoranda in which

25

a record has been kept of these transactions?

26
27
28
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7:
(a)

If so, state:

The nature of the records, documents, books of

account or other memoranda.

lj

(b)

The

date

the

records,

documents,

books

of

2|

account or other memoranda were written or the date the

31

last entry was made in them.

4|

5

(c)

books of account or other other memoranda.

6
7

(d)

Who has possession and control of the records,

documents, books of account or other memoranda.

8|

9

The present location of the records, documents,

(e)

Please produce a copy of said documents.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

According to the records, documents,

101

books of account or other memoranda, or the personal knowledge of

11

Plaintiff,

12'

consideration paid by Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff pursuant

13

to the agreement of October 26, 1966?

14

what

is

INTERROGATORY

the

total

NO.

9:

amount

of

According

money

to

15

documents, books

16

amount of any balance still due Elsie Brinkerhoff?

17

of

INTERROGATORY

account

NO.

or

such

records,

or other memoranda, what

10;

Has

Elsie

other

is

Brinkerhoff

the

ever

18

demanded that you render an account for transactions which you

19

made pursuant to the agreement of October 26, 1966?

20
21
22

INTERROGATORY NO. 11;

(i.e. letter, telegram, telephone, personal meeting)?
INTERROGATORY NO. 12;

23

or other

24

Brinkerhoff?

25

If so, how was that demand made

Pursuant to any letter, telegram,

conversation, have you rendered

INTERROGATORY NO. 13;

an account

to Elsie

If so, state;

26

(a)

Date rendered to Elsie Brinkerhoff.

27

(b)

Present location of account.

28

(c)

Amount account shows due Elsie Brinkerhoff.
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1

INTERROGATORY NO. 14

In the event Plaintiff claims that

2

consideration

3

Brinkerhoff, please state whether or not there was any conversa-

4J

tion whereby

5

lieu of the payment due:

6

other

Elsie

(a)

than

money

was

Brinkerhoff

If

so,

paid

agreed

please

to

state

or

given

accept

the

to

the

date

Elsie

same

of

in

the

7

conversation, who was present, and who spoke and what was

81

said.

9

INTERROGATORY NO. 15;

In the event Plaintiff claims that

10

money was deposited

11

lieu of paying her directly, please state the following:

into the account of Elsie

Brinkerhoff

in

121

(a)

The account to which said money was deposited.

13

(b)

The date of the deposit.

14

(c)

15

deposit.

16

(d)

The

form

of

the

payment made

in making

the

Whether or not Elsie Brinkerhoff was notified

17

of the payment.

18

INTERROGATORY

NO.

16:

In

connection

with

Plaintiff's

19

Complaint, please state the status of the real property which is

20

located in Millard County, Utah, that is, please state whether or

21

not Plaintiff has been in possession of said property during the

22

past ten years.

23
24
25

INTERROGATORY

NO.

17:

Please

state

in whose

name

the

Hobble Canyon Reservoir interest is now vested.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

18:

If

the

Hobble

Canyon

Reservoir

26

interest .; has

27

Brinkerhoff or other third-party persons, please state when said

been

transferred,

28
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4

Ar,

to

Plaintiff

or

Mark

J.

1

transfer was made, by whom, to what person, and

2

consideration received by reason of the transfer.

3
4

INTERROGATORY

NO.

19;

Please

state

in

the

of

name

the

whose

Sullivan Reservoir interest is now vested.

5

INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

If the Sullivan Reservoir

6

has

7

other

8

made, by whom, to what person, and the amount of

9

received by reason of the transfer.

been

10

transferred,

third-party

to

INTERROGATORY

NO.

Plaintiff

12

Reservoir Certificates.

13

Plaintiff

persons, please

11

21:

Elsie

15

following:

or

Mark

J.

state when

Please

state

Brinkerhoff

16

(a)

17

(b)

18

purpose.

19

(c)

on

interest

Brinkerhoff

said

transfer

was

what

Irrigation

basis
Company

Concerning the Affidavit signed by

April

13,

1971,

please

state

the

Who prepared said Affidavit.
Why

was

said

Who

requested

Affidavit

that

prepared

or

for

what

Elsie 'Brinkerhoff sign

the

Affidavit.

21

(d)

Does Plaintiff maintain

that

such an

affidavit

22

was required by reason of the original agreement

23

into

24

Brinkerhoff in October of 1966.

25

or

consideration

upon

claims an interest in the Glendale

INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

14

20

amount

between

(e)

Why

Plaintiff,

was

only

Mark

a

J.

portion

Brinkerhoff

of

the

entered

and

real

Elsie

property

26

described in said Affidavit as compared to all of the real

27

property purchased from Elsie Brinkerhoff.

28
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1

(f)

Has

the

real

property

described

in

said

2

Affidavit

3|

purchaser.

41

conveyance, the reason for the conveyance and the amount

5

of the consideration received for such conveyance.

6

INTERROGATORY NO. 23;

been

sold

or

so f

please

If

conveyed
state

any

the

third-party

date

of

the

Concerning the statement signed by

7

Elsie

8|

Complaint, please state the following:

Brinkerhoff

to

designated

,f

Exhibit

C"

to

Plaintiff's

9

(a)

Who prepared the statement.

10

(b)

Why was the same prepared.

111

(c)

Was the statement prepared for any income tax

12

purpose.

13

(d)

14

If so, for what purpose.
Was the sum of $23,000 filled in at the tine

Elsie Brinkerhoff signed the same.

15

(e)

Was the document signed by Elsie Brinkerhoff in

16

front

17

Ruth S. Anderson.

18
19
20

of

(f)

the

Who

notary

else

public

was

indicated

present

when

therein, to-wit:

Elsie

Brinkerhoff

signed said statement.
(g)

If there was any conversation at the time Elsie

21

Brinkerhoff signed the same, please state in substance and

22

effect who spoke and what was said.

23
24
25

(h)

How was the sum of $23,000 arrived at prior to

the time the same was inserted in said statement.
(i)

At the time Elsie Brinkerhoff signed the same,

26

please

27

condition

28

influence of any person present at the signing.

describe
and

in

detail

state

whether

MBERLAIN
CORKY

mmrm AT LAW
MAIN - SUITS a
• • B*X ? ! •
ISAM CITY.
AN S 4 7 * 0
) •••-4404

6

6/

her
or

mental
not

and

she was

physical
under

the

(j)

In

the event

Plaintiff

had not paid

to Elsie Brinkerhoff

the time

signed

agreed

she

to

or Mark
the

J.

sum of

said document, please

indicate

that

she

had,

Brinkerhoff

in

$23,000

state why
fact,

at
she

received

$23,000.
(k)

Since the escrow agreement requires payments to

be made to the escrow at the bank

located

in Hurricane,

Utah, please state why Plaintiff did not request the bank
to sign a statement that the sum of $23,000 had been paid
to Elsie Brinkerhoff.
INTERROGATORY
Plaintiff's

NO.

Complaint

24:

which

Concerning

indicates

that

Paragraph
Elsie

12

of

Brinkerhoff

refused to accept the last two payments tendered to her, please
state the following:
(a)

When the first payment was tendered to her.

(b)

When the second payment was tendered to her,

(c)

The

form

of

the

payment

tendered

on

each

occasion.
(d)

Who was present on each occasion when the tender

was made.
(e)

Why Elsie Brinkerhoff refused to accept the same

on those occasions,
(f)

Why

Plaintiff

or

Mark

J.

Brinkerhoff

deposit said monies to her account instead of
them

to her

personally

since

same.

7

she

refused

to

did

not

delivering
accept

the

1

(g)

If any conversation took place when the tender

2

was made, please state each and every person present and

3

state in substance and effect who spoke and what was said.

41

INTERROGATORY NO. 25:

In reference to Paragraph

16 of

5

Plaintiff's

6

Plaintiff maintains is the fair market value of said property on

7

each of the following dates:

81

(a)

9

(b)

101

Complaint

concerning

damages,

please

state

what

The date that the contract was signed.
The

date

of

the

alleged

breach

by

Elsie

Brinkerhoff.

11

(c)

12

INTERROGATORY

The date these Interrogatories are answered.
NO.

26:

Please

state

the

date

that

13

Plaintiff first became aware that Elsie Brinkerhoff had executed

14 I

and

15 !

action to the other named Defendants herein.

16

conveyed

the

real property which

INTERROGATORY NO. 27:

is the

subject

of

this

When Plaintiff became aware of the

17

existence of said documents, please state what Plaintiff did in

18

relation thereto.

19

Plaintiff had with Mark J. Brinkerhoff on that occasion.

20

Also state what other conversation, if any,

INTERROGATORY NO. 28:

Please state whether Plaintiff has

21

ever recorded any Notice of Interest in the real property which

22

is the subject of this action.

23

the same, why the same was recorded and who prepared the document

24

recorded.

25

INTERROGATORY NO. 29:

If so, please state the date of

Attached hereto is a Warranty Deed

26

(designated Exhibit "A") from Elsie Brinkerhoff, Grantor, to Mark

27

J.

28

connection with said Deed, please state the following:

Brinkerhoff

and

Leah

Brinkerhoff,

MBERLAIN
CoTlRY
MBV* AT LAW
MAIN • SUITC O

». max 7»»
BAM CITY,
tM « 4 7 » 0
> Bae-4«04

8

husband

and

wife.

In

1

(a)

When was said Warranty Deed prepared.

21

(b)

Who prepared said Warranty Deed.

3|

(c)

Why does said Deed convey the property described

4!

therein only to Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Leah Brinkerhoff

5!

when the contract which

61

requires

7

Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and their respective

81

wives.

9

INTERROGATORY

10 | Deed

the property

is the subject of

to be conveyed

NO. 30:

Attached

this

action

to both Cloyd

hereto

is a

H.

Quit-Claim

(designated Exhibit "B") from Elsie Brinkerhoff to Mark J.

111

Brinkerhoff

121

connection

and

Leah

Brinkerhoff,

husband

with

said

Quit-

Deed,

Claim

and

wife.

In

please

state

the

13 | following:
14

(a)

When was said Quit-Claim Deed prepared.

15

(b)

Who prepared said Quit-Claim Deed.

16

(c)

Why does said Deed convey the property described

17

therein only to Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Leah Brinkerhoff

18

when

19

requires the property

20

Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and their respective

21

wives.

22

INTERROGATORY NO. 31:

the contract which

is the subject of this

to be conveyed

action

to both Cloyd

H.

Please state whether or not the

23

Deeds described

24

deeds, have ever been deposited to the Hurricane Branch of the

25

Bank of St. George.

in the previous Interrogatories, or any other

If so, please state:

26

(a)

Who prepared said deeds.

27

(b)

When were said deeds prepared.

28

(c)

When were said deeds deposited to the escrow.

• BERLAIN
COJtflY
mrm AT LAW
IAIN • SUITE •
. BOX 7 M
»A« CITY,
M S47*0
•06.44O4

9
^ ^hZ/

A

* 1

1

INTERROGATORY

NO.

32:

In

connection

with

2

instructions

3!

subject of this action, please state the following:

41

which

(a)

are

Was

found

in

Plaintiff

the

or

agreement

Mark

J.

the

escrow

which

is

Brinkerhoff

the

ever

5

notified of any default by Elsie Brinkerhoff or the escrow

6'

agent.

7

default, who sent the same, and what was the response of

8|

Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

9

If so, please state the date of the notice of the

(b)

Does Plaintiff admit that Elsie Brinkerhoff was

101

not under any obligation to provide to Plaintiff notice of

11;

default

12

interest was not paid?

13 1

(c)

in

the

event

the

payment

of

principal

and/or

If your answer to the preceding Interrogatory is

14

in the negative, please state why notice of the default

15

for failure to pay principal and/or was required by Elsie

16

Brinkerhoff.

17

INTERROGATORY NO. 33:

Please state whether Plaintiff or

18

Mark J. Brinkerhoff have paid the taxes on the real property

19

which is the subject of this action for each year since 1966.

20

all taxes have been paid, please provide the date that taxes were

21

paid for each year from 1966 through and including 1981.

22

INTERROGATORY NO. 34:

If

Please state whether Plaintiff or

23

Mark

24

possession of the real property which is the subject of this

25

action.

26

when

27

reason they failed to do so.

J.

Brinkerhoff

has

always

said- persons did

not occupy

28

•ox m
ui Crry.
I B47SO
•8C4404

in

total

and

exclusive

If the same has not occurred, please provide the dates

BERLAIN
:ORRY
CVS AT LAW
M N • •UITK •

been

10

said

property

and

for what

1

INTERROGATORY NO, 35: Attached hereto is a Warranty Deed,

21

designated as Exhibit

31

with said Deed, please state the following:

M

C W , dated June 4, 1979.

In connection

41

(a)

Who prepared said Deed.

5

(b)

Why was said Deed prepared.

6!

(c)

Where did you obtain the legal description that

7

is found on the back of the Deed?

8|

9

(d)

What was the actual consideration that passed at

the time the Deed was executed and delivered?

10

(e)

11

property

121

dated October 26, 1966?

13
14
15
16
17

Why does said Deed fail to convey the personal
that

is described

on page

Elsie

3 of the Agreement

(f)

Who requested

Brinkerhoff

to sign the

(g)

Who was present when Elsie Brinkerhoff

same.
signed

said Deed, and who spoke and what was said.
(h)

Why was the Warranty Deed prepared as a joint

18

tenancy deed as compared to a deed to create a tenancy in

19

common•

20

(i)

What was the purpose of the Deed

21

deeds,

22

previously prepared.

23

to-wit,

(j)

Exhibit

"Aw

and Exhibit

since other

"B", had been

Prior to the creation of the Deed, was there any

24

conversation between Plaintiff, Mark J. Brinkerhoff and

25

Elsie Brinkerhoff concerning the need to prepare, execute

26

and record the Deed.

27
28
.MBERLAIN
CORRY
tMEYS AT LAW
MAIN - »UITK «
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(k)

At whose request was said Deed recorded, and who

paid for the recording.
11
f\ X71

1

(1)

Why was said Deed recorded as compared to being

2

deposited

3

Plaintiff's

4

subject of this action was still in effect at the time the

5

joint-tenancy Deed was prepared.

6

(m)

to

the

escrow

position

At

the

which

that

time

was

the

said

created

agreement

Deed

was

if

which

it

is

is

the

prepared,

was

7

Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff aware of the difference

8

between a joint-tenancy deed and a deed which creates a

9

tenancy in common.

10

INTERROGATORY

NO.

36;

In

connection

with

all

grazing

11

permits which are in part the subject of this action, please

12

state the following:

13
14
15

(a)

When Plaintiff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff obtained

said permits in their own name, and by what authority.
(b)

Whether

or

not

said

permits

have

been

16

transferred onto third parties, and if so, the date when

17

said transfer was made, and the name of the transferees.

18

(c)

If

said

grazing permits have been

leased

to

19

third parties, please

20

whom received, the date the payment was received and the

21

reason for leasing the permits as compared to utilizing

22

the same themselves.

23

INTERROGATORY

NO.

state

37;

the amounts

Please

state

received,

whether

or

from

not

24

Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff have ever obtained any rents

25

from coal or other mineral leases upon the subject property.

26

so, please state the following:

27

(a)

The date of the lease agreements.

28
1

(b)

The amount of each payments.

antf"

T » AT LAW
IN - MlfTK •
• O X 7B»
m CITY,
•47*®

12

If

ll

(c)

Who made the payment.

21

(d)

Under what authority the lease was executed in

3

as much as record title to the subject property has always

4

been in the name of Elsie Brinkerhoff.

5

INTERROGATORY

NO.

38;

Please

state

whether

or

not

6

Plaintiff or Mark J. Brinkerhoff ever came into possession of

7

certain

81

Merle Brinkerhoff prior to his death.

91

following:

sheep

and other personal property

that were

owned by

If so, please state the

10J

(a)

Describe the sheep and personal property.

11

(b)

How many sheep were obtained.

12

(c)

When possession of the sheep was obtained.

13

(d)

Whether or not any consideration was paid for

14
15
16

the same.
(e)

What happened

property.

17

(f)

18

personal

19

proceeds.

20

INTERROGATORY

21

to the sheep or other personal

If any money was received when
property

NO,

was

sold,

39;

state

Please

the

state

the

sheep or

amount

why

of

the

Darlos

Brinkerhoff was joined as a party Defendant to this action.

22
23

DATED this

J AJ

day of September, 1982.

24

CHAMBERLAIN & CORRY
/')

25

/

26
27

^I<U^J^
\

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN

28

WBhT
mmrm AT LAW
MAIN - • U I T 1 •
BOX y u
IftAft CfTY,
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e.
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T.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing DEFENDANTS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO
PLAINTIFF to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O.
Box 729, Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Mr. Mark J. Brinkerhoff,
Glendale, Utah 84729, first-class postage prepaid, on ther^/wr/
day of September, 1982.

'/M/P&Ptv
retary I

Qlf^L^r

"f

14

<&?

A

^cn

t-v**r>, -

,;i^

^**»
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WARRANTY DEED

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GRANTOR, of Glendele, County of Kane, State of Uteh,
hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to MARK BRIMKERHOFF and tEAH BRINKERHOFF, husband and
wife as joVe^ t•^a^t^^t*>«^t*/•|g^U^»vry^vo^$hIp

and not as tenants in coewon,

c ^ v r T r c r , ->r c u - i . ^. c o u n * . <-' »*ur.*, s-«~ic n. •!.: ,

:

..:. i." . • *.

DOLLARS, anc4 rthcr goyd, valuable, end adequate cc-nci ocr.ji . ru, JH uriii. .•idi.c: onehalf interest in and "to "the following described real property »r. Millard and Kane
Counties, State of Utah:
Lots 1, 2, T>, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta Townsite
Lot 2, Block 2t, Plat "A", Delta Townsito
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
Township 39 South, Range 4j West, Salt Lake Meridian:
Section 25: West Half, containing 320 acres.
a r t e r . and Soutf) M i f f © f ^ ; ,

>c&*^*3%&i!m
',.II.-;.T;

;::.rt :»....-r I ynurle- of

thr

r

j ; jlh^c-, 1 ' > J - - r , , : r i

:

,r

«l

H

"

;

'

'f

the

Cost M a l t ; Southwest v u ^ r t e r of t h e N o r t h e a s t Q u a r t e r c*nd t h t northwest
Q u a r t e r o f Southeast Q u a r t e r , c o n t a i n i n g 4 7 0 . 8 0 a c r e s .
S e c t i o n 3 5 : East H a l f of t h e N o r t h e a s t Q u a r t e r ; S^uth H a l f of t h e Southe a s t Q u a r t e r ; Northwest Q u a r t e r of t h e S o u t h e a s t Q u a r t e r , c o n t a i n i n g 200
acres.
Township 4 0 S o u t h , Range 4 j W e s t , S a l t Lake M e r i d i a n ;
S e c t i o n 2 9 : Southwest Q u a r t e r o f t h e N o r t h e a s t Q u a r t e r ; West
felMrf.
t h e Southeast Q u a r t e r one* t h a S o u t h e a s t Q u a r t e r of t h r Southwest Q u a r t e r ,
c o n t a i n i n g 160 a c r e s .
S r r . t i ^ n 3 »: tlcr 4 hv.cr,t Q u a r t e r ; E e r t H.» 1 ' :»f t h e "•ci;tnv.f:r.,t Q u a r t e r , e o n ..• I fil •»

Section

' •':<.

.' .-•••*rri, »

5 : Lot 2 , c o n t a i n i n g 3 9 . 0 6 a c r e s .

EXHIBIT A.

Township 40 S o u t h , Range 7 West, S a l t Ic.'.:* Meri d i a n :
Bc-jinning a t t h e Southwest Corner of t h e Southwest ^ u u r t r r of t h e S o u t h cnr.t Q u j r ^ c r of S e c t i o n 2 3 , To*nshi D 4 0 S*>utn, r.-0nge 7 West, S j l t Lefrf*
M e r i d i a n and r u n n i n g thence East "i,;.?* e n g i n e : tt.c-»ce M . - t h f'.O* Wost
»'. N", ch^inr.; thence West 3 . r £ c h a i n - . ; t h e n c e South 1 ch.-in t ^ b e g i n n i n g ,
c o n t o i p i n y .7-'. a c r e s .
Bc<jinning a t t h j N o r t h w e s t Corner o f 1hc N o r t h w o - t Qudrlcc o f t h e N o r t h e a s t Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 2f» and r u n n i n g t J c n c c South 4 . 3 0 c h a i n s ; thence
South 7 3 * East \rj c h a i n s t o ttie m i d d l e of t h e channel of t h e c r e e k ;
thence N o r t h w c v l e r ly o l o n g t h e m i d d l e «>' the <h.»nn^l ui *i.j i <J creek t o
i:-.e N j r i - L i n e of s a i d N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r of t » o h ' , r l h t u ^ t V u u r t e r ;
t i . c n . e V.'csi 1 1 . 2 1 c h a i n s t o t h e plooc of Ijrvj* r.n i ™j.

Beginning 4 . 3 0 c h a i n s South of t h o N o r t h w e s t Ct>mnr :>f tht.: N o r t h w v . t
Q u a r t e r of t h e N o r t h o a s t Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 26 and r u n n i n g thence South
7 0 * East 15 c h a i n s t o t h e M i d d l e of t h e c h a n n e l of ihe c r e e k ; t h e n c e
S o u t h e r l y a l o n g t h e m i d d l e o f t h e c h a n n e l o f s a i d c r e e k t o t h e South
L i n e ; thence N o r t h 7 3 * 4 5 * WeSt ' 1 4 . 6 0 c h a i n * : i^nrr
M-rt» /:. r ^ -'• ' - * •
IT

!

'•©

i •-.

•••j.

c'j'lt.ii ni n j

'>.-0

• ." "•; .

The JI'JVC t h r e e t r a c t s being p o r t of l^nd s i t u a t e d in S e c t i o n s 71 j n d 7".
cf s a i d tov.nship and r a n g e , sometimes r e f e r r e d t o u n o f f i c i a l l y as Lot "A".
Township /Q S o u t h , Range A W e s t , S a l t Lake M c r i d i o n :
Southwest Q u a r t e r of t h e N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n L ,

cont.

«'0 a c r e s .

Township -10 S o u t h , R.imje Aj West, S J H L«iko M c r n l i . m ;
Lot 1 ; N o r t h e a s t Q u a r t e r of t h e N o r t h w e s t Quorter
79.30 acres.

of S e c t i o n 31 , c o n t a i n ! n;.

T o g e t h e r w i t h a l l improvements end a p p u r t e n a n c e s t h e r e t o annexed or
any way a p p e r t a i n i n g .
WITNESS t h e hand of s o l d GRANTOR t h l § ^ £

**y*t

.

in

1966.

•^•.fe^^
_J^>g>«:.,^

:y^L^^/^

J.,4^'^-J^-

IlMoFtnkcrhofI
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE

S/j

)
: SS.
)

On t h i s • " (T

d^y of

^L

r f

,

19C&, p e r s o n a l l y appeared

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, t h e s i g n e r of t h e w i t h i n end f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t ,

before, me
who d u l y e c k n o * -

tedged *o ne t h a t she executed t h e seme.

-#•

My Commission E x p i r e s : '.•« - /

' , X (• _#>/ • *

s /

/

y

/ >

A-69

yr» 3 ^ > * f r

yv?*$**»+**

/ w ^ » i y <

QUITCLAIM DCr.D

ELSIE BUNKERHOFF, GRANTOR, o f G l a n d a l a , County of Kane, S t a t e o f U t a h ,
h«r%W Q U U C l A l l f c * © * * § * W 1 l * 0 W f ^ t f U f t ^ l ^ R M O F F ,

DCLlA : ; r -,
hilt

:nt. -.Ihr.r

interest

Moheve C-xinty,

huiband and w / r t ;

;::>oii, v a l u a b l e , and 3decuo1c; con:.»li^rot i .'\z,

i n and tvj t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d +^'-rr
S t o l e of

ricMs

in

Arizona:

interest

i n Su I hi van R e s e r v o i r

WITNESS the hjnd of SJid GRANTOR thi'.

-XX

at

'"n " ' " n vi ci.r' :•-•

rind r e s e r v o i r

A one f o u r t h i n t e r e s t i n Hobble Canyon R e s e r v o i r
Mohave County, S t o t e of A r i z o n a .
A one hn If

,

. •

U*ifc&m.<^* ^^^^^^

(v-JO-l?)

i r.

i n MoVavo C o u n t y ,

d «v <>! /

Arizona

< V •

,

l ^ .
r .

fr^r^
:

'

'

•

;

*

-

*/'
STATE Cf UTAi
COUNTY OF KANE

I
)

ss.

On t h i s / t

this ££

day of

day of

ft J

L ^

t^f

C^J tJt

~

~

, 196G, p e r s o n a l l y appeared b«f

> ^96Ct

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, t h t s i g n e r of t h e w i t h i n and f o r e g o i n g i n s t r u m e n t , who d u l y
acknowledged 1o me t h a t she executed t h e same.

'I
My Conmission E x p i r e e : , c s • >;- r. * y +
iw^v.. • ••;> - -*».v •
ft?. ^ • * i r ^ t r

r>
v

EXHIBIT B

l

JLm*
itf^rRecorded at Reowaet of
•t

. ft*. F M Paid $ .

By

County fceconoar

Dtp.-

•©ok-

GranleejL.

Mai! tax notice to .

...filjcndale., llUh._BAZ2SL.

Addms.

WARRANTY DEED
Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow,
«f

Glendale

CONVEY

of

, County of

and WARRANT

Glendale,

frantor

Utah

Kane

, State of Utah, htreby

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, a x
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a married man,
all as Joint Tenants with full rights of survivorship,
and not as Tenants in Common,
t/|

to

grantees
for the sum of
-DOLLARS,

84729

$10.00 & other valuable
the following described tracts of iand in
KANE
State of Utah:

consideration-

County,

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.

WITNESS, the hand

of said grantor

, this

4th

day of

June

, A. 0. 19 7 9 .

.^..J^
Elsie Brinkerhoff

Sionod in the Presence of

H A T E OF UTAH
County of

) SS.

Kane
On tht

4th

appearad before mt

the tionor
to ma that

day of

June

A. D., 19 79

Elsie Brinkerhoff,

a widow,

of tht within mstrument who #u)y acknowledged
s He
executed tht same
James B.

My Commission expires — J.UM..19.._J9Za

Adair

My residence i s -

MUTMfM vTft* ttflf t N T M T . t 0 •«• T • K m * VHft MWV

personalty

EXHIBIT C
Notary Public

Ordery.l].l.e fc ...Utab.
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PARCEL 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
X5J^W5TT the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Quarter (NE^SW^); the East Half
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SWWE'O
and the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter (NW^SE**) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (EhNE>0; the South Half of
the Southeast Quarter (SSSE*a) and Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
(NWHSEVi) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranae 44 West, Salt Lake Base and
~ Iteridian, centaining 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5.: The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SW*NE*); the West
Naif of the Southeast Quarter (W*»SE>*) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
— tlmrUr
(SE%S*n*) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4H West, Salt Lake Base
and Iteridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Quarter (fW*)#and the East Half of the Southwest
barter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Hrridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less.
..... PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4S We6t, Salt Lake Base
and HericJUn, containino 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (SWyiW**) of Section
8, Townshiof40 South, Ranae 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NE'^NW**)
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranae 4l? West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containina 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0 o 35 l West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 803.0 feet, more or less, to the North line of
Section 26; thence South 89057* West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 11; BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence Horth
80° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
++

++

++

++

++

++

++
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone:

586-9483

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

ANSWER OF MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF TO SECOND
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AND CROSS-CLAIMS OF
DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff,

vs
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B.
ESPLIN, DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and JOHN DOES I
through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants
Comes now Defendant MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and answers
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AND CROSS-CLAIM as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AND CROSS-CLAIM fails to state a claim against Defendant
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
1.

This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs

(

^2///

\

\

1 and 13.
2.

This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs

2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.
3.

Answering paragraph 3 of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S

SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM, this Defendant
^mirsr-rtrair he claims an interest in the subject property
adverse to the claim of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and denies each
and every other allegation contained in paragraph 3.
4.

Answering paragraph 9 of said counterclaim and

cross-claim, this answering Defendant admits that ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF purported to convey certain rights and property
in a Warranty Deed dated 15 August 1980, but denies that the
Warranty Deed actually conveyed any right, title, and interest
whatever in the subject property to others named in paragraph
9.
5.

This answering Defendant denies each and every

allegation of said Counterclaim and Cross-Claim not specifically
admitted herein.
THIRD DEFENSE
6.

As a separate and affirmative defense, this answering

Defendant states that he has, or may have, further and
additional affirmative defenses which are not yet known to
this Defendant, but which may become known through further
discovery, including, but not limited to, accord and satisfaction,
arbitration, award, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, license, payment,

3V0-
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release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
waiver, and other matters constituting an affirmative defense.
7.

This answering Defendant asserts each and every

affirmative defense as may be ascertained through future
discovery.
VJHEREFORE, having fully answered Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF'S
SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM, this Defendant
prays that the same be dismissed without more, and that he
be awarded his costs incurred herein.
Comes now Defendant, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and answers
the Second Amended Counterclaim and Cross-Claim of Defendants
GOLDA-B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING,
as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Defendants1 Second Amended Counterclaim and Cross-

Claim fails to state a claim against this Defendant upon
which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Defendant MARK J. BRINKERHOFF denies each and every

other allegation of Defendants' Second Amended Counterclaim
and Cross-Claim.
THIRD DEFENSE
3.

As a separate and affirmative defense, this answering

Defendant states that he has, or may have, further and
additional defenses which are not yet known to this Defendant,

i

~D/H

i

but which may become known through further discovery, including,
but not limited to, accord and satisfaction, arbitration,
award, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, failure of consideration,
fraud, illegality, license, payment, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and other
matters constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
4.

This Defendant asserts each and every affirmative

defense as may be ascertained through future discovery/
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Defendants1 Second
Amended Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, Defendant MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF prays that the same be dismissed without more
and that he be awarded his costs incurred herein.
DATED:

1^0

Septemb*

WILLARD R. BISHOP
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
SERVED the within and foregoing document upon the
Defendants above-named, by mailing a full, true and correct
copy to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendants, at
110 N. Main Street, Cedar City, Utah 84720, first class
postage fully prepaid this /j&fi^

day of September^983,

pad
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BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 North 300 West
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE UF UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.
GOULDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF,
BETTY B. ESPLIN, DARLOS T.
BRINKERHOFF, and JOHN DOES I
through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
Based

upon the motion of Willard R. Bishop, Attorney for

Plaintiffs, and the stipulation of Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for
Defendants,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiff be granted leave to
file a second amended complaint and substitute parties in the abovecaptioned case.
DATED this ^

<iay of

4Acf«

A-**}

, 1983.

1URT:

DON V.
District
i

^?/0.

BISHOP AND RONNOW, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone:

<$£&>'?>,

586-9483

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY; ^
STATE OF UTAH

LENA BRINKERHOFF and MARK
J. BRINKERHOFF,

SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA
B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.
GOULDING, CHARLES
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B.
ESPLIN, DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and JOHN DOES I
through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
Come now Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, who
complain of Defendants, and for cause of action allege:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
QUIET TITLE
1.

This action arises out of the ownership, use, and

possession of real property located in Millard and Kane
Counties, State of Utah.
2.

On or about 26 October 1966, a certain "Agreement"

was entered into by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as SELLER, and CLOYD

"7'T /
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H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, BUYERS, covering the
sale of certain real and personal properties, located in
Millard and Kane Counties, State of Utah.

A copy of said

"Agreement" is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "A", and
incorporated by this reference.

The real property which is

the subject matter of this action is more particularly
described as follows:
PROPERTY LOCATED IN KANE COUNTY, UTAH
I.

West 1/2 Section 25, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2
West, containing 320 acres.

II.

NW 1/4 SE 1/4, S 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 26, Township
39 Soi ch, Range 4 1/2 West, containing 400 acres.

III. Lots 1. 2. 3, 4, SE 1/4 NW 1/4, NE 1/4 SW 1/4,
E 1/2 E 1/2, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4; Section
27, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, containing 478.80 acres.
IV.

East 1/2 NE 1/4. S 1/2 SE 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, Section
35, Township 39 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing
200 acres.

V.

SW 1/4 NE 1/4, W 1/2 SE 1/4, SE 1/4 SW 1/4, Section
29, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West, containing
160 acres.

VI.

NW 1/4, E 1/2 SW 1/4, Section 30, Township 40 South,
Range 4 1/2 West, containing 238.99 acres.'

VII. Lot 2, Section 5, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2
West, containing 39.08 acres.
VIII.SW 1/4 NW 1/4, of Section 8, Township 40 South,
Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40
acres.
IX.

Lot 1, Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 31, Township 40 South, Range 4 1/2 West,
Containing 79.30 acres.

X(a).Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest

- v:r n
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Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 26,
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, and running thence
South 4.30 chains; thence South 70° East 15 chains
to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of
said creek to the North Line of said Northwest Quarter
of the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.25 chains
to the place of beginning, containing 11.77 acres.
X(b).Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner
of the Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt
Lake Meridian, and running thence South 70° East 15
chains to the middle of the channel of the creek;
thence Southerly along the middle of the channel of
said creek to the South line; thence North 73°45'
West 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30 chains to the
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres.
XI.

Beginning at the Southwest corner of the SW 1/4 SE 1/4
of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt
Lake Base & Meridian/ and running thence East 10.23
chains; thence North 80° West 6.36 chains; thence
West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point
of beginning. Containing .74 acres.

PERSONAL PROPERTY:
XII.

A one-fourth (1/4) interest in Hobble Canyon Reservoir
(9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona.

XIII. A one-half (1/2) interest in Sullivan Reservoir in
Mohave County, Arizona.
TOGETHER WITH all grazing privileges and permits
annexed to or based upon any of the foregoing real,
personal, reservoir, or water rights as commensurate.
XIV.

Glendale Irrigation Company certificate No. 204, for
9.1 shares of East Ditch Water, to ELSIE J., CLOYD
H., and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April 1967.

XV.

Glendale Irrigation Company, certificate No. 354,
for 10.4 shares of West Ditch Water, to ELSIE J.
CLOYD H., and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, dated 29 April
1967.

MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH:
XVI.

Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta

A_QO
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Townsite.
XVII.

Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A", Delta Townsite.
3.

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF received and accepted

payments as specified in Exhibit "A", thereby acknowledging
the existence of said "Agreement11.
4.

The "Agreement11 provides that "the SELLER shall

execute a Warranty Deed to the real property hereinabove
described and quitclaim conveyances to the water and reservoir
rights hereinabove described, of an undivided one half
interest to each. BUYER and his wife as joint tenants with
full rights of survivorship, . . . .".
5.

The "Agreement" was never recorded and all payments

were made directly to Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, rather
than into the established escrow.
6.

On or about 13 April 1971, Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

signed a certain "Affidavit" setting forth the sale of

(

certain property to CLOYD J. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF,
and further stating that she would defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.

A

^

copy of said Affidavit is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit
"B", and incorporated by this reference.
7.

On or about 6 April 1977,. Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

<

signed a certain statement, having the statement duly notarized,
stating that she had received the sum of $23,000.00 in
payments on said property from Cloyd and Mark Brinkerhoff.

4

A copy of the statement is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit

i
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"CI", and is incorporated by this reference.
8.

On or about 4 June 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

executed a Warranty Deed (attached as Exhibit MD,f) , purporting
to convey to herself, Plaintiff MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as joint tenants, the same property
conveyed under the "Agreement", (Exhibit "A").

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

executed the warranty deed without the knowledge of either
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF or CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.
9.

After the death of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, Defendant

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed and recorded various deeds covering
the above-described real property, to other individuals, in
an attempt to cloud title to the above described real property
in passing to Decedent CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF's surviving
joint tenant.

10.

By virtue of the execution and recordation of

these subsequent deeds, Defendants1 claims are adverse or
hostile to and in conflict with the interest of Plaintiffs,
and a dispute has arisen with respect to the parties1
rights.
11.

The true names of Defendants DOE are unknown to

Plaintiffs.

Upon discovery of such true names, Plaintiffs

reserve the right to substitute the same in place of the
fictitious names used herein.
12.

Plaintiffs1 interest in and to the above-described

real property is prior in time and right to those alleged

3^4
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claims of Defendants.
13.

Plaintiffs, at all times pertinent to this action,

had, and still have, an interest in and to the real properties
as above-described.
14.

By virtue of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executing

and recording subsequent deeds to the above-named Defendants,
the claims are adverse or hostile to and in conflict with
the interest of Plaintiffs and said Plaintiffs are entitled
to an order of this Court, declaring and adjudging r.aid
Plaintiffs to be the owners, in fee simple, of their undivided
one-half interest each in and to the real and personal
property, and ordering Defendants, and each of them, and all
persons claiming by, through, or under them, to have no
estate, right, title, lien, or interest in and to Plaintiffs1
interest.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment against Defendants
as follows:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1.

That the above-entitled Court determine and enter a

declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties
to this action to terminate the controversy or remove any
uncertainty as to ownership of the above-entitled property.
2.

That Defendants, and all persons claiming by,

through, or under them be required to set forth the nature
of their claims to the above-described real property.

7
3.

That all adverse claims of said Defendants to the

real property be determined by this Court.
4.

That this Court declare and adjudge that Plaintiffs

are the owners, in fee simple, of their undivided one-half
(1/2) interest each in and to said real and personal
property; and that Defendants, and each of them, and all
persons claiming by, through, or under them, have no estate,
right, title, lien, or interest in and to Plaintiffs1
property
5.

That this Court permanently enjoin and restrain

Defendants, and each of them, and all persons claiming by,
through, or under them, from asserting any claim whatsoever
adverse to Plaintiffs1 interest.
6.

For Plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action.

7.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems appropriate.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
1.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14, above,

are incorporated by this reference as though fully set forth
herein.
1.

On or about 26 October 1966, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, as

SELLER, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK BRINKERHOFF, as
BUYERS, entered into a contract (Exhibit f,Atf) , wherein
certain real property, grazing privileges, and water and
reservoir rights in the States of Utah and Arizona were
sold, in consideration of BUYERS paying to SELLER, the sum
-2/T7

8
of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,388.00)
DOLLARS, payable at the rate of TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00)
per year, beginning November 1, 1968, BUYERS having paid the
sum of FOUR THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) for the years of
1966 and 1967 at the time of execution of the contract.

As

a further condition to the contract, BUYERS agreed to pay to
SELLER, for the entire remainder of SELLER'S life, irrespective
of the amount to be paid under this contract, the sum of TWO
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($2,000.00) per year, and if the contract
was not paid in full at the time of the death of ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF, the remainder would be paid to her heirs,
equally, share and share alike.
3.

Plaintiffs have duly performed all of their

i

obligations under said contract, except payment for the
last several years has- been tendered and offered in full
performance thereof, but Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF has

<

wrongfully refused and still refuses to accept the same.
4.

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF has at no time declared

the "Agreement" in default, but has failed and refused, and

{

still fails and refuses to perform her obligations under
said contract.
5.

Plaintiffs have no adequate legal remedy

in that

i

4 the real property is unique, having special value to Plaintiffs
and is the* type of which Plaintiffs cannot obtain a duplicate.
6.

The contract, which is the subject matter of this

<

(

9
action, is fair and equitable, and is supported by consideration
as is shown by the above facts and by the fact that Defendant
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, signed a certain notarized- statement,
(Exhibit

,f M

C ) , stating that she had received, as of 6 April

1977, the sum of $23,000.00 in payments on said property
from CLOYD and MARK BRINKERHOFF.
7.

By reason of Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFFfs failure

to perform the remainder of said contract according to its
terms, Plaintiffs have sustained damages in the amount of
the fair market value of said property.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment on the Second
Cause of Action as follows:
1.

That Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF be required to

specifically perform said contract by accepting the payments
as set forth in said contract.
2.

If specific performance cannot be granted, for

damages in the amount of the fair market value of the property.
3.

For costs of court incurred in this action.

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems appropriate in the premises.
5.

That the Court declare the deeds executed and

recorded after the death of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff to be null,
void, and of no effect.

O/ZC?
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
ANTICIPATORY BREACH
1.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14, above,

are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
2.

In late fall of 1979, Plaintiffs were informed that

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF had executed and recorded various
deeds covering the property which she previously sold to
Plaintiffs, in an attempt to pass title to other individuals
not entitled thereto.
3.

Plaintiffs have performed all conditions to be

performed in the contract, and stand ready, willing, and
able to continue said performance.
4.

The actions of the above-named Defendants in

accepting and recording the various deeds covering the
above-described real properties, when they were fully aware
of the existence of the contract with Plaintiffs, were done
in anticipatory breach of said Plaintiffs' rights in and to
the said property.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief on their Third
Cause of Action as follows:
1.

That the Court declare Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

to be in anticipatory breach of her contract and award
Plaintiffs1 damages for the current market value of the
above-described property.
2.

For Plaintiffs' costs incurred herein.

3. . For such other relief as the court deems appropriate.

r?/ a\
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
DAMAGES
1.

The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 14, above,

are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.
2.

Alternatively, in the event the Court does not

grant relief under the First through Third Causes of Action,
above, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the current
market value of the above-described real properties as may
be determined by the Court, together with interest thereon
at the legal rate.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief on their Fourth
Cause of Action as follows:
1.

That this Court determine the current market value

of the above-described property and award Plaintiffs
damages accordingly.
2.

For Plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action,

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court

deems appropriate in the premises.
DATED:

2^?

November 198^
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
SERVED the within and foregoing document upon the
Defendants above-named, by mailing a full, true and correct
copy to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney for Defendants, at
110 N. Main Street, Cedar City, Utah 84720, and to Elsie
Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah, all mailings first class postage
fully prepaid this ^ 7 % . day of November 1983.
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A G R E E M E N T

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into by and between ELSIE f ^ H 1 :

';-*%:

of Glendale, County of Kane, State of Utah,. PARTY OF THE FIRST PART, herein-

afterr V e f e r r i ^ ^
-•jiiM'Jv

.i-.'ior ;v..:rr«.'u

andMARK a=?fN'f£-'-> •

Ka.'K*,

.o aa; t h e

Giala

;.• '

vi'i -J :*« .

P.Yt-.7 1 ;.'.".

a',-

a,'.','

'.'\ ' V i l a

I'V.i

,

"IWERS",

iill!i£-iliilil:
THAT WHEREAS, the SELLER i s the owner of the r ^ l property, a - a privilege'.*, and water rights in the Stoics of Utah ond Arizona;
AND WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire to purchase the r.a.-nc-;
AND WHEREAS, the parties have.agreed upon trr-v, and a->nui i i -u.a .' .sale thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual
r^vr-,-,- + '. """".f4 n - r ^ ^ - ^ ^ t " . S?rr1 n ^ i ^ - r ~' _ t r a t t'-'-*
...)<:

'.•'•-;...'(••;>

:i:;i:

1.

. : I K : ' ! ;;:;;*

..'•'.;

iol.

Tj'-.S*.

•

. V

--•:••!!"•• ' v ; •:•:*.•':•-r
'

- "

"' —

'

.

•'•<••

• "

That for and in consideration of the total su-n ai FIFTY 7h-.-~

THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,338.00) DOLLARS, as the full ccr.si :
tion therefor, the SELLER covenants and agrees to sell and the BUYERS covens
and agree to buy the following described real property, grazing privileges :
water and reservoir rights in the States of. Utah and Arizona:
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH:
I ^!v. \

: , " , i.nd .'"., a i . c h ~:>, P l a t

!.- •: •: , ,3! .-.:•:; ,:• , P ! r t
• • < •

'A

-\\ : , U M t . ; .;•>...:

\ ; REAL PROPERTY: I t i : KANE COUNTYV'UTAH:

of S e c t i o n 2 5 , i c o r i t n i n i : r .

v .

.. .

•

Township 39 South, Range 4 i West, S a l t
West H a l f

i.a-lta Tav.nsi t - - .

ako M e r i d i a n :
'0

acres.

N o r t h w e s t Q u a r t e r ; S o u t h e a s t QuarN:
: n d I ho U.;v:th H a l f
a.r 1 ! : - : N o r t h e a s t y - j n r t c r c o a t a i n i r u 'J?, a c r e s , a ! ! i n '
S e c t i o n 2C, Township Z>'j S o u t h , Rvjn^ <* £• W e s t , G a i t i_ah'
i-'.-ri c'i a a , c o n t a i n i n g -V0 a c r c ^ , nar
or l e s s .
L a t s 1 , 7, 3 , and a ; S o u i h e a s t vuar a r o.' t h e N o r r h v.a-;! Q u a r t e r ; Nur1 ia:aa |- Q u a r t e r a '
c Gout!.west
Q a a r t o r ; E a s t H a l f of \)^ E a s t H a l l ; a A , N.aac 1 y u a r - ^ r
o f t h e N o r t h e a s t y u a r 1 ' r ; Nurthv.es I v , - { -' r ''or af t h e
S a u l h c a s l Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n 2 7 , Tuvaishi j : ".• G s a i h ,
Raa<-c '".} W e s t , c o n t a i n i n g '".70.3J a c r e s .

EXHIBIT "A"

-2Eost Half of the Northeast Quarter; South H a \ f of the
Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quorter of the Southeast
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.'•Vvi'-.v;*;-!;-,::-"
•"•^•.ix^C'.ir

..n:•••• !! : I ( ::: r h e Sout!».-!jS'i

.'."'.ricr o n e ! "»!:•: S o \ :;.:;:v

, • rtcr

;:." ti;cj Southwest Quarter, r: o:vt -'ii ni ng ' 6 0 ocrcs.

Section 33: Northwest Quarter: East lb I: of llm Sou' hv.-o^.t
Quarter, containing 238.9'.) acres.
Section

5: Lot 2, containing 39.03 acres.

Tov-'nship 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian:
S-:i. ! iiwcst Quarter of the Nor i hv.vj I Quvirlcr .if Lie.: I ion •_'.
c :>r.t-"ii ni ng '0 acres.
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Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian:
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of .Section 23, Township 40 South, Range
i

v
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Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, and running thence Souih 4.30 chains; thence South 7 0 *
East 15 chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of-said'creek-to
the North/Line of said Northwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter; thence West 11.23 chains to the place of beginning.
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the
Northv.est Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 70.,
Tr>w;v;;>i;) 'C S>>nth, n.irv:^ 7 Wert, Salt La!;.- Meridian and run•:!:' ;<•:;:-<• .; v.jth 7-;.1* !•!•:! i • .•.••.•lines \r t h e . u - V I n o < tl'.o
,'. n . ••' •.,' I'r.c '-.reck:
! ''rr. r- . ;.•! h.y.' \ v : ! : v •!:••.• -\\ iC\<*
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•..•!.•;• ^ *.-..ic.' r ^ N ; ' • v' j? J ••ti'i:. 1. i:K*; I! • "v.-.'~.
\'.o'~'•-^

. - " . * i."ust !•! .'00 clwiinu; I hence Nor in •'.-..*0 chair.':: to rhc
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres.
Tho above three tracts being part of land situated in Sections
23 end 26 of roid towns'-.ip and ronoo, V.OT.CT incr. r~i>-rrod to
V-- f : i - i: I Iv -;r
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PERSCXIAL PROPERTY:
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i n c c f a u I t aere::5 .

noy o i l cocii> -ziul oJreoconob le a t t o r n e y ' s , fee i n t h e e v e n t c n f o r c c o c n J- o f
contract

i s required.
VilTNESS t h e hands o f t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o t h i s
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE

)
:
)

ss

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows:
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J.
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of ownership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property.
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these
rights of ingress or egress, to said property.
The real property is described as follows:
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point
of beginning.
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, Salt Lake teridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South
73°45f East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres
Total acres:

12.51

That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as Che Real Property
is concerned.

~c> <£$ x^f Jo A j.*+^wjrSrJ*^

fip

Elsie Brinkerhoff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before roe this

/ 7

.'s^ytu^c-

l

day of April, A.D. 1971,

itf/Cu*******-'*- ^ „

' Notary Public jf)
/ m • /? ., A //t/L
Residing at &JU&'W^
fc<*"^

My commission expires

jLf.fy/f?^
EXHIBIT "B"

To whom It nay concern:
1, Elsie Brlnkcrhoff, have received from CXoyd
and Kark Brlnkerhoff, ps payirent on property,

S1 *ncd: %

STATE OF UTAH

)

Jy±JUzJjAJ^)Ct>U<4>gL

SS.

County o f Kane
On t h i s

(n?h

appeared before

1C 7

day o f CXp^ ,P
rae

> J2

# personally

Elsie Brinkerhoff

, the signer

of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that she executed the same.

\Tt*ril S ' f l ^ t / t .

• . j T *t (

Notary Public
Residing at /fA.U-„?ki$z*

Ut[(i;

EXHIBIT ,fC
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Recorded it Request of
•t

,

M. Fat Paid $ .

County Recorder

By

Da».-

Mail tax notice to

GrantCf.V.

Book.

Plot.

Rtt.:

Add rots.

.Jalenda,le^ilUJi_a4I21_„

WARRANTY DEED
Elsie Brinkerhoff,
o*

Glendale

CONVEY

of

a widow,

a/amor
. County of

and WARRANT

G l e n d a l e , Utah

to

Kane

. State of Utah, hartby

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a
m a r r i e d man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a m a r r i e d man,
a l l as J o i n t Tenants w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p ,
and not as Tenants i n Common,

84729

for t h ^ m of
-DOLLARS,
County,'

$10.00 & other valuable consideration
tha following dascribad trace of land in
KANE
Stata of Utah:

m V
|
D

•

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.
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a $s
2
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I
A
WITNESS, tha htnd

of v*& frantor

this

4 th

June

62

, A. D. I I 7 9 .

yl

sL<«^b^/Lu*^t.
Elsie Brinkerhoff

m tha Pratanca of

^

)

HATE OF UTAM
County of

day of

) SS.

Kane

)
On the

4th

appeared before me

the signer
to me that

day of

June

Elsie Brinkerhoff,

A. D., 19 79

parsonally

a widow.

of tha within instalment who duly acknowledged
S he
executed the same.
.....J^.?jft^..^^Lt_
James B. Adair

My Commwon axoim -. J.U.n*...i9.*.l*7S

Netary Public

My residence is ™l..QTlter!f.lUta....U.UIl„
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SCHEDULE

M M

A

PARCEL 1: The West Half of Section 25, Township 39 South, Ranqe 4S West,
Salt Like Base and Meridian, contalnlnq 320.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Ouarter (NWS); the Southeast Ouarter (SEU) and the
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (SSNEU) of Section 26, Townshio 39 South,
Ranoe 4H West, Salt Lake Base ir\6 Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 3: Lots 1. 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter
[SEU4WM; the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE**SW\); the East Half
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWVJES)
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NW\SEli) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESNE**); the South Half of
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSEH) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter
(NYSE's) of Section 35. Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 44 West. Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5.: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ogarter (SW^NEH); the West
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSEV4) and the Southeast Ouarter of the Southwest
Ouarter (SESSWM of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West. Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NWS) and the East Half of the Southwest
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containlna 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SWVJW\) of Section
8, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEV*W**)
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
contalnlnq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section.26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
O ^ S 1 West 567.SO feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thtnce Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the Horth H n e of
Section 26; thence South 09°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, R a n g e d West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
44

44

44

44
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BISHOP AND RONNOW, P.C.
WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720

(FILED FOR RECORD,

1$ ~Mpl

19,

cjnhjwi, <&MHdrmn
Clerk of the District Court.

Telephone:

586-9483

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,

NOTICE TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,
Civil No. 1826

Defendants.

Come now Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, and hereby
give notice to Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, to appoint
counsel or appear personally to represent herself in these
proceedings.
DATED:

12 September 1984.

BISHOP
Attorney for "Plaintiffs

/?«?

A-QQ

V

I
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY certify that I delivered a full, true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing NOTICE TO APPOINT
COUNSEL to Mrs. Elsie Brinkerhoff, Glendale, Utah on this
/£)

day of September 1984.

m

A-inn

1

z
3
4
5

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendants and Cross-Claimaints,
Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and
Arlene B. Goulding
110 North Main St., Suite G
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

6
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

7

KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

11

Plaintiff,

12

vs.

13

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.
GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

14
15
16
17

CROSS-CLAIM OF GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF
AND ARLENE B. GOULDING
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT,
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.

18
19
20
21

Comes now Defendants, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff
and Arlene B. Goulding, and hereby cross-claim against CoDefendant, Elsie Brinkerhoff, as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

22
23
24
25

1.

The real property, water rights and grazing rights

which are the subject of this action are located in Kane County,
Utah.

4BERLAIN
MIGBEE
« Y « AT LAW
IAIN - MIIT* •

i. sex » « •
MM CITY.
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1

2.

Cross-Defendant, Elsie Brinkerhoff, is the mother of

2

Cross-Claimants, Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene

3I

B. Goulding, and she is also the mother of Cross-Defendant, Mark

4

J. Brinkerhoff and the mother-in-law of Lena Brinkerhoff, who is

5

the surviving widow of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.

6

3.

On or about October 26, 1966, Elsie Brinkerhoff

7

executed a certain agreement covering the sale of certain real

8

and personal property which is the subject of this action to

9

Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff.

10
11

1.

After the agreement entered into between Elsie

12

Brinkerhoff as seller and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H.

13

Brinkerhoff, as buyers, was executed, the buyers therein failed

14

to pay to the seller therein all sums due under said agreement.

15

2.

Upon information and belief, Cross-Claimants allege

16

that Elsie Brinkerhoff demanded of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd

17

H. Brinkerhoff the payments to which she was entitled, but they

18

refused to pay to her all sums due and owing.

19

same, Elsie Brinkerhoff declared the agreement entered into on

20

October 26, 1966, to be null and void, or it became null and

21

void by operation of law.

22

3.

By reason of the

On or about June 4, 1979, Elsie Brinkerhoff deeded the

23

real and personal property which is the subject of this action

24

to herself, Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, as

25

joint tenants.

IAMBERLAIN
fit H I G B E E
OUNIYS AT LAW
I. MAIN - SUITE 9
>. O. BOX 7 t «
CKOAR

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Said deed was thereafter recorded in the office

of the Kane County Recorder.

CITY,

UTAH « 4 7 * 0
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1

4.

Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff died unexpectedly on October 14th,

2

1979, and the joint tenancy created by the June 4, 1979 deed was

3

severed.

4

one-half of said real and personal property and Mark Brinkerhoff

5

owned the other one-half of said property.

6

5.

By reason of the same, Elsie Brinkerhoff owned

Cross-Claimants

knew

that

7

Brinkerhoff, was not getting paid by the two sons who had

8

purchased the subject property, and likewise knew that she was

9

in need of funds, being rather aged and with little or no

10

income.

11

Elsie Brinkerhoff owned one-half of the subject property by

12

reason of the severing of the joint tenancy, and to assist their

13

mother, entered into an agreement with her whereby they (Golda

14

B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, Betty B.

15

Esplin and Charles A. Brinkerhoff) would purchase Elsie

16

Brinkerhofffs one-half interest from her for the total sum of

17

$50,000, payable at the rate of $150.00 per month, with each of

18

said five children to pay to Elsie Brinkerhoff the sum of $30.00

19

per month.

20

6.

Cross-Claimants also became aware of the fact that

Pursuant to that agreement, Elsie Brinkerhoff deeded to

21

said five children her undivided one-half interest in the

22

subject property, and the five children executed back to Elsie

23

Brinkerhoff a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed on the subject

24

property, and established an escrow at State Bank of Southern

25

Utah in Orderville, Utah.

Payments pursuant to said Purchase

OltNEYS AT LAW
I . MAIN • SUITE O

. o. mox 7te
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their mother, Elsie

.m

*

<

1

Agreement were thereafter made and have continued to be made

2

since the date the escrow was established.

3

7.

Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Lena Brinkerhoff, as the

4

surviving widow of Cloyd H. Brinkerhoffr attempted to reinstate

5

the contract entered into in 1966 by making payments to Elsie

6

Brinkerhoff.

7

the position that the contract had been terminated and that Mark

8

J. Brinkerhoff, as a surviving joint tenant, owned an undivided

9

one-half interest in the subject property.

Elsie Brinkerhoff refused said paymentsf taking

Elsie Brinkerhoff

10

continued to receive payments from Cross-Claimants and at all

11

times has recognized the existence of the agreement entered into

12

between herself and Cross-Claimants.

13
14
15

8.

In June of 1982, Lena Brinkerhoff caused to be filed

the above-entitled action.
9.

At that time, Elsie Brinkerhoff resisted the attempt of

16

Lena Brinkerhoff to enforce the 1966 contract, and engaged the

17

services of Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney at Law.

18

five children to whom she had deeded the property were initially

19

represented by the same attorney, who prepared

20

pleadings on behalf of said Elsie Brinkerhoff to deny the

21

allegations made by Plaintiff.

22

10.

Likewise, the

numerous

Defendants, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin,

23

thereafter elected not to remain in the litigation, and executed

24

warranty deeds covering the interest acquired from their mother

25

to Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Lena Brinkerhoff.
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11.

Thereafter, Elsie Brinkerhoff requested Hans Q.

2

Chamberlain to withdraw as her attorney of record.

3

she was apparently being unduly influenced by Dale Brinkerhoff,

4

the son of Mark J. Brinkerhoff.

5

12.

At that time

In September of 1984, Elsie Brinkerhoff entered into a

6

stipulation under duress and pursuant to undue influence

7

exercised upon her by Dale Brinkerhoff, the son of Mark

8

Brinkerhoff, and other parties to this action, whereby she now

9

attempts to recant the agreement entered into between herself

10

and her five children in 1980, and to reinstate the 1966

11

contract between herself and Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H.

12

Brinkerhoff.

13 j

13.

That said stipulation is void and of no legal effect.

14

14.

The deed under which Cross-Claimants claim ownership is

15

entitled to be enforced and given legal effect by this Court,

16

and Cross-Defendants are entitled to an order quieting title to

17

them, as their interest may appear, in and to the real property,

18

water rights, and grazing rights pursuant to the warranty deed

19

from Elsie Brinkerhoff to them dated June 4, 1979, and pursuant

20

to all rights acquired pursuant to a Quit-Claim Deed dated

21

September 9, 1980, with Elsie Brinkerhoff as grantor and

22

Cross-Claimants as grantees.

23
24
25

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Cross-Claimants

incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1

through 14, and further allege and contend as follows:

IBERLAIN
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1

15.

In the event the Court finds that Elsie Brinkerhoff is

2

entitled to recant, withdraw and cancel the agreement entered

3

into between herself and her five children in 1980, then Cross-

4

Claimants , Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B.

5

Goulding, will be damaged and will have lost the benefit of the

6

bargain made by them in 1980.

7

are entitled to damages over and against Elsie Brinkerhoff in an

8

amount to be proven at the time of trial based on the loss of

9

the benefit of the bargain.

10

16.

In that event, Cross-Claimants

Cross-Claimants are also entitled to damages over and

11

against Elsie Brinkerhoff for breach of warranty of title and

12

such other damages as may be proved at the time this matter is

13

heard on the merits.

14

WHEREFORE,

15
16

Cross-Claimants

pray

judgment

against

Cross-Defendant Elsie Brinkerhoff as follows:
1.

For an order determining the stipulation signed by

17

Elsie Brinkerhoff in September of 1984 to be null and void and

18

of no legal effect.

19

2.

For an order of this Court quieting title to said

20

individuals to the real property, water rights and personal

21

property which are the subject of this action as their

22

respective interests may appear over and against Mont R.

23

Anderson, Personal Representative of the Estate of Cloyd H.

24

Brinkerhoff, Lena Brinkerhoff, Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Elsie

25

Brinkerhoff, Charles A. Brinkerhoff and Betty B. Esplin.

MBERLAIN
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1

3. As an alternative relief, for judgment over and against

2

Elsie Brinkerhoff for damages in an amount to be proven at the

3

time of trial based on breach of contract, breach of warranty of

4

title, loss of benefit of the bargain, unjust enrichment,

5

together with all other damages as may be proven at the time of

6

trial.

7

4.

For a reasonable attorney's fee, for costs of court

8

incurred herein and for such other and further relief as to the

9

Court may appear just and proper.

10

DATED this 28th day of September, 1984.

11

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

12

7^£AdA

13
14

" ans Q. Chamberlain
ttorney for Cross-Claimants

15
16

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

17

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

18

the within and foregoing CROSS-CLAIM OF GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN

19

BRINKERHOFF AND ARLENE B. GOULDING AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT, ELSIE

20

BRINKERHOFF, to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP & RONNOW, attorney

21

for Mont R. Anderson, Lena Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff,

22

first class postage prepaid on this _-^/7{7 —

23

1984.

day of September,

,.---x

1

24
25
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HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
C/or*
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Defendants and Cross-Claimants,
Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and
Arlene B. Goulding
110 North Main St., Suite G
P. 0. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

< * f~
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C
°urf.

6
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

7

KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

8
9
10

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,

11

Plaintiff,

12

vs.

13

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B.
GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN,
DARLOS T. BRINKERHOFF, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

14
15
16
17

NOTICE TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR
ATTORNEY, NOTICE OF PENDING
LITIGATION AGAINST YOU AND
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
HAMBERLAIN
& HIGBEE
•TOBNEYS AT LAW
M. MAIN • *UITC O
P. O. BOX 7 » »
CEDAR C I T Y .

TO:

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GLENDALE, UTAH
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are still a party

Defendant to the above-entitled action, and by reason of the
same, your legal rights may be affected in the lawsuit that is
pending against you.
By reason of the fact that you have asked Hans Q.
Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, to withdraw as your attorney, you

1
2

are hereby requested to appoint another attorney to represent

3

you in this matter, and that you should do so within ten (10)

4

days from receipt of this document.

5

You are further hereby notified that Golda B. Adair,

6

Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. Goulding, have caused to be

7

filed against you a Cross-Complaint seeking to enforce a deed

8

you signed and executed with yourself as grantor and them as

9

grantees, said deed dated August 15, 1980; or in the

10

alternative, for damages over and against you for breach of

11

contract, breach of warranty of title, unjust enrichment and

12

such other damages as may be proven at the time of trial. A

13

copy of this Cross-Claim is being served upon you at the same

14

time this document is being served upon you.

15

could be affected by this Cross-Complaint and you should

16

consult with an attorney concerning the same.

Your legal rights

17

You are further hereby notified that your deposition will

18

be taken by Hans Q. Chamberlain, Attorney at Law, (the attorney

19

for Golda B. Adair, Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene B. Goulding),

20

in the immediate near future.

21

time, place and date of said deposition in writing.

22

however, required to appear pursuant to that Notice of Taking

23

Deposition by reason of the fact that you are a party to the

24

lawsuit now pending.

You will be given notice of the
You are,

25
MBERLAIN
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1

PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.

2

DATED this 28th day of September, 1984

3

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
/

4
5

ans Q. Chamberlain
ttorney for Cross-Claimants

6
7
8
9
10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

11

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

12

the within and foregoing NOTICE TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR ATTORNEY,

13

NOTICE OF PENDING LITIGATION AGAINST YOU AND NOTICE OF TAKING

14

DEPOSITION to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, BISHOP & RONNOW, attorney

15

for Mont R. Anderson, Lena Brinkerhoff and Mark J. Brinkerhoff,

16

first class postage prepaid on this

17

1984.

^ J

—

day of September,

/-

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
IAMBERLAIN

& HIGBEE
TORNEYS AT LAW
1. MAIN - SUITS S
>. O. BOX 7 * 6
CEOAH CITY.

Secretary

yi^V

BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop
Attorney cor Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9433

(f-'ILEp FOR RECORD)

^l^iim-L^Qa^
Clerk of i!:a District Court.

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION

vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant in the above-entitled action,
agrees and stipulates as follows:
1.

That

the

certain

agreement

dated

October

26, 1966

(hereinafter "Agreement" attached as Exhibit "A"), executed by
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Seller, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, Buyers, together with any other agreement containing
substantially the same terms, is a valid and binding contract
which she executed without coercion, and with full knowledge and
understanding of its provisions and duties.
2.
and

That she agrees to conform to the- terms of the Agreement,

perform

all

conditions

and

duties provided

and

thereunder, including specific performance on her part.

. s/M

imposed

3.

That she recognizes she improperly attempted

to convey

land to others contrary to the terms of the Agreement, and hereby
repudiates a certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, (Exhibit
n

Bn)

purporting

to

convey

to

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF,

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as Joint Tenants, the same
property conveyed under the Agreement, and further repudiates any
other deeds or instruments of conveyance which have the effect of
divesting

or

in

any

way

diminishing

the

right,

title,

and

interest of buyers and their wives, in the property specified in
the Agreement.
4.
Buyers,

That
and/or

she acknowledges
their

the receipt

heirs, MARK

J.

of

$2,000

BRINKERHOFF

and

from
LENA

the
A,

BRINKERHOFF, for the 1983 payment pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement,
5*

That she forgives and waives all rights to any and all

delinquent amounts currently due under the Agreement.
6.

That she recognizes the validity of a certain affidavit

dated April 13, 1971, (attached as Exhibit

f,

C"), and reaffirms

the statements contained therein and further agrees to cooperate
and assist Plaintiffs in the litigation of their claims against
- other named Defendants in the above-entitled action*
7.
her

That her Amended Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and

Crossclaim

against

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF,

as filed

in this

action, shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
8.

That

the

Court

shall

performance against her.

-2-

enter

a

decree

of

specific

In

consideration

for

the

Stipulation

specified

above,

Plaintiffs hereby stipulate as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs will not seek any award of damages against

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF under their Second Amended Complaint.
2.

Plaintiffs will

reimburse

Defendants, GOLDA B.

ADAIR,

WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING for the amounts paid
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
specified

under

for

the purported

transfer

of properties

the Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, Exhibit

"B", in return for the said Defendants' Agreement

to drop all

their claims filed in the above-entitled lawsuit and dismiss the
same with

prejudice.

If said

claims before 20 September

Defendants

do not dismiss

said

1984, Plaintiffs shall be under

no

obligation of reimbursement.
3.

That the above-entitled

judgment

in conformance

with

Court may enter

this Stipulation

its Order and

and

Plaintiff's

prayer for relief as specified in their Second Amended Complaint.
DATED this

£f*~

day of September, 1984.

~£IxL^

BRJtfKERHOFF"/V

ELSIE
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of

J"'

On the
appeared

7

before

"~day of

ioAj^Jki^X^p

I

^CtyjiUfJUj

,

, 1984, p e r s o n a l l y

me ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant

-3-

- x/ffi?

named in

the

above-entitled

action, the signer

of the above and foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.

NOTAR

IC, residing at: /

ar fe£ pet-git
res:

day of September,

DATED t h i s

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff**
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of

)

:ss.
On the

/0

day of

tjryiLLULs

, 1984, personally

appeared before me WILLARD R. BISHOP, attorney for Plaintiff
ANDERSON in the above-entitled action, the signer of the above
and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC, resi

(UtAfiX*, 7/J ?<tteO
My Commission expires:

_<3£.

W/M^J

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of

the

above

and

foregoing

STIPULATION

to

Mr.

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 110 North
Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, Utah 84720, by first class
mail, postage fully prepaid this

day of

,

1984.

.-^/y-/
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1.
V\WMD

That for ond In consideration of tho t o t a l ru-n of FIFTY 7ir.>.J!

-nrvCE HUNDRED nOJTY-EIGJIT U53,30D.OD) DOLLARS, cs tho f u l l z or.s; i dcrr..-|

t l o n t h o r o f o r , tho SELLCR covenant end ©grooc t o C G I I and tt»o BUYERS covoror.t
end ooxoo t o buy tho following doscrlbed r e a l property,

grazing p r l v l Ic^c*; ond

votor ond rosorvolr r i g h t s In tho Statoo of Utah or»d Arlzcos:
REAL PROPERTY IN MILK®

COUMTY, UTAHi

Lola 1 , 2 , 3 , and 4 , Clock 25, Plot "A", Do I to TovmsU*.
l o t 2 , Block 26, P l o t W ,

tolta

Tovnslto

REAL PROPERTY IM KATIE COUNTY, UTAHt
Township 39 South, Rango 4 | Kcr.t, Sslt U:!;o ttarldlen;
Vest I k H oi Sect I on 23", containing 320 ecrcs.
!brthvcr.t Quortorj Southeast C a r t e r ond tho South KJ I f
of iho Nrrthoast Quarter corstrlnlnQ 0 0 c : r c s , o i l In
Soctlon 20, Tounnnlp ;>j South, Puxujo 4 f Loot, S a l t toko
Meridian, containing AQQ acrcv, «noi*o or loss.
t o t f \9 ?t 3, ond /,; Southonot Q\»artor o^ tho Northi.-cist Q^ortor; Nortl-.ooit ^ n r t o r of tho Southwest
Quortor; Lont l b If of 1hu Vast I h t ! ; S-w.;1tit<ost v j ^ r l c r
of the florthojot ^u.vrlor; Horthwotst <tor"tor of th3
SoMthcor.V g o r i e r of fcc1lo> T?, lo-Aiif.hIp 3'; Sou1i\,
IU^.^QO A | V.C/:tf containing -V/0.OD t c r o a .

-2Eost Half of tho Northojst Quarters South Half of tho
Southeast Qu.'irtor; Narthi/ost tyartor of tho Southeast
ftjartor
of Soctlon 35, containing 200 acres.
Township 40 South, Rango 4 f Wost, S a l t lako Meridian:
Section 29: Southt/ost Quarter of tho Northaast Quarter;
V.'ost Half of tho Soothoost Quartor and tho Southoast Quarter
of tho Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres.
Soctlon 30: llorthvost Quarter; East Half of tho Southwost
Quarter, containing ?ys.1?) acres.
Soctlon

5: t o t 2, containing 3?.00 acres.

Tovnshlp 40 South, Rango 4 Vost, S a l t tako Meridian:
Southeast Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Soctlon 8,
containing 40 ccros.
Township 40 South, Rango 7 West. S a l t Lake Meridian:
(V>gInning a t tho Southv/ost Corner of the Southv.ost Quartor of
1ho Southeast Quarter of Soctlon 23, Township 40 South, Rin'jo
7 U'ost, C:>lt liiko Moridlcn »>nd running thor.ee Cest 10.23
chains; thcnco North 60* Vest 6.36 chains; thcnco Vest 3.5o
chains; thonso South 1 chain t o beginning, containing .74
ocros.
[V^glnnlng a t tho forthwest Corner of tho Northwest Quarter o t ^ v
tho Northeast Quartor of Section 26, Township 40 South, Hingo
7 V.'ost, end running thonco Soulh 4.30 chains; thonco Scuth 70*
East 15 d o I no t o tho ml (Id lo of tho chmnol of 1ho creek; thcnco
Karthv/estor ly clong tho mlc'dlo of tho chsnnol of said creek t o
tho Morifi Lino of said Northivast Quartor of tho Northeast
Quartor; Ihosvso V.'ost 11.23 chains t o tho placo of beginning.
DogInnleg 4.30 chains South of tho Morthuoat Cor nor of tho
Northwest Quortcr of 1ho Nort heart Quartor of Section 2C,
Township 40 South, Range 7 l o s t . S a l t toko Meridian and running thonco South 70* East 15 chains to tho mlddlo of tho
channol of tUo crook; thence Southerly along tho mlddlo ol
1ho chsnnol of said crock to tho South t i n e ; thonco North
73*45* t e s t 14.CO chains; thonco North 4.30 chains t o tho
placo of beginning, containing 5.60 ocros.
^ /
Thd obovo threo t r a c t s bolng part o j land sltuutod In Sections
23 end 26 of said tounshlp ond rango, couotltrws roforrod to
u n o f f i c i a l l y as t o t "A".
To*n9hlp 40 South, ftanyc* 41 Kost, S a l t U k o Moridlon:
t o t \\ Korthcnct Quartor of tho Ibrthvost Quartor of Soctlon
3 1 , conlalrilng 7P.30 acros.

(
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PERSCeiAL PftOPCRTYl
*\ Tha fol Icntlng doscrlbod voter end reservoir r i g h t s t
A one*fourth Intorost In llobbto Canyon Reservoir
In Mohovo Crxjnty, Arizona.

(9-36-1?)

A o r * to If Interest In Sullivan Rosorvolr I n Mohovo County,
Arizona*
And o i l grazing prIvl logos and ponnlts annexed t o or btscd
upon any of th3 vcrogol ng r c o l , personal, r e s e r v o i r , or wirror
r i g h t s 0$ co.vKjnsurato.
2.

Tho parties rgreo t h a t f o r and I n consideration of tho sale by tho

SELLER to 1ho OUTERS of tho foregoing real and personal property, v.utor znd
reservoir r i g h t s and growing p r l v l logos, tho BUYERS w i l l pay t o tho SELLER tlio
sun of TWO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS, o c h yoar, beginning vHi'i ifvc l e t c'jy
of Novcnbor, 1964, of %hlch payments tkia on Kovonbor 1 , \CJCA and iio,t>i!!»cr 1 ,
1-JC5 oro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER f r o * tho EWERS and the IXI/1T.S vl I I
continue t o pay annual In^tallaonts of $2,000.00 on tho 1st day of »\':>\e.:ijcr In
oach year thcroaftor boglnnlng Havtxnbor t , 1906 and continuing during the c n t l r d
I I f o of tho SELLER.
Tho BUYERS agroo thot thoy w i l l pay tho sini of $2,000.00 per yo:»r t o
tho SELLER for tho ontlro romalndor of SELLER'S II fo trrcspoctlvo of 1!.o *nrjur,t
tihlch ooy ba paid undor t h i s contract whothor I t axceods tho t o l a l

consideration

horelnabovo t o t out or vhothor 1hat t o t a l mount shall not be p-sld by applying
annual paynents of $2,000.03 ©gainst tho purchaco price during tho I I fo tl-no of
tho SELLER and In consideration of on undortaklng by tho OtTrERS t o pay tho
osKXjnt of $2,000.00 por year for tho Iff© of tho SELLER Irrcspoctlvo of tho
fraount which nay bo p^ld, 1ho SELLER walvos Intorost upon tho unpaid

talancas.

I t l i provldod, howovcr, t h a t ohould tho t o t a l coosldoratlon h e r e i n above provldod not bo paid by tho CUfERS t o tho SELLER during SELLER'S

llfotlrw

then upon tho douth of 1ho SELLER any ooounto regaining vndor t h i s Agrcooant
a f t e r c r o d l t l n g a l l payoo.nti* vhlch havo boon node horoundor, * h a | | bo paid
annually 0* provided l>croln In oqual sharoo, aliaros and r.horo a l l k o , t o

|
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t'orron Brlnkorhoff ond Char Joy Arland Brlnkorhoff tvo-sovonths ( 2 / 7 t h s )

(1//ths

t o oach) of tho balances djo ( I t being s t i p u l a t e d tlvnt tho BUYERS tooothor with
Warren EHnkorhaff, Chorloy Arlond Drlnkorhoff,

totty

0 . E a p l l n , Golda B. A d j i r ,

ond Arlono B. Gouldlng c o n s t i t u t e a l l tho holrs a t law of tho SELLER ond t h s t
other provision tes boon mado for 1ho l a t t e r thrco named h o l r s ) , together wit.'-.
I n t e r e s t at four lAf)

por cont per ennun on tho dofcrrod declining bsloncca.

Tho BUYCRS soy, e t any t l n o f prepay o i l or cny psrt of tho regaining
principal duo under t h i s c o n t r a c t .
3«

Tho SELLER ch-^f f oxocufo o Varranty Dood t o the roal property

hereinabove described and quitclaim convoynncoo to tho water ond reservoir
r i g h t s hcrolnsfovo described, of en undlvldod one half I n t e r e s t t o oich BUYER
nnd his wife cs Joint tcjvanta with f u l l r i g h t s of survivorship, and s f n l l
deposit said Instruments In tho Hurrtcano Branch of tho Brink of S t . George
vhlch thai I hold those documents In t r u s t nnd In escrow- subject to tho f o l l o U r r j
ESCROW INSTRtCTlCfft
I f tho BUYERS s h a l l wnko o i l poymonts of principal and I n t e r e s t herein
provldod ond perform o i l tho other covenants and agreements heroin eo.rfalnod,
then upon piymant of tho f i n a l Installment duo hercundor tho Escrow Depositary
shall do I Ivor t o tho BUYERS o i l tho cscrovod dccuTonts.
In tho ©vent of a do f a u l t In tho payment of any Installment of p r i n c i p a l
or Intorest ond In tho cvont of a d e f a u l t In any othor t e r n or condition heroin
ond In tho ovont notico of o default other than f o r paymont of principal and
Intorost t h a i I bo given t o tho BUYERS by tho SELLER and o cubscquont f a ! l u r o
t o roaody tho farno shall contlnuo for o period of t h i r t y (30) days, than tho
5ELLLR osy# ot her option, donwnd o rodollvory t o her of o i l of the ©scrovod
docuA>ont« vhoroupon tho OUTERS w i l l vacoto ond poaccably surrondor n i l of tho
provisos hereinabove doscrlbod ond tho SELLER m3y ra-ontor Into possess I on of
tho for*) without furthor process ond en*y r e t a i n as rent ond licjuldatod dorva^os
o i l cu^s ttiorotoforo paid by BUYERS under t h i s Agroo^ont,
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As an a l t e r n a t i v e rowdy th« SELLER may o l o c t t o roduco any payraent
or a l l payjncn-hs, occ e l ore t i n g and entering tho o n t l m balance of p r i n c i p a l and
Intcrost Immediately, t o Judgront or may have said ronody on w o or nor© succosslvo or I n t e r m i t t e n t occasions or ewy o l o c t t o t r o o t t h i s Agroonont us a
noto vnd nortgogo passing t i t to through t o tho BUYERS end foreclosing tho sc/:o
In tho ovinncr provided by low.
Coring tho period tho CUYERS ore complying with tho terms of t h i s
Agreement, thoy shall bo o o t l t l o d t o tho c o l e , cxcluslvo, and b e n e f i c i a l uso,
occupancy, and onjoy^ont of tho abovo doscrlbod provisos subject only t o tho
r i g h t s of tho 5ELIXR t o Inspoct tho $ » » a t rotsonoblo times.
4.

Tho OUYEFvS have Inspected sold promises ond find tho suae in a

.nsnnor Dotlsfoctory t o tho^ cod thoro oro no covenants or warranties oth^r
t t o n expressly sot f o r t h heroin.
5#

Tltao shall bo of tho ossonco as t o a l l tho terms ond conditions of

t h i s Agrocr»ent which shall bind and Inuro t o tho borieflt of tho h e i r s , Suecossors, end assigns of the parties hereto and tho party In dofoult agrees to
pay a l l costo and a reasonable ottornoy's foo In the ovent enforcement of t h i s
contract I s requlrod,
WT7ESS the hands of tho parties hereto t h i s

m/&mm

day o*

cc

mJ^

*

£*L^*J^

>

'fr

tlslo^lTikorTiorf^

yS

V
„..rf
dS :fciXis.J-. • - A / /
DUTtRO

,/<<,•

Lr.y*'<?**<<•

A-IZO

c
Recorded it Requtst of —
it

,

M. F M Paid $ -

By

County Racordar

Dtp. —

Book.

Sranle&s..

Mail Ux notice to .

Ret.:

Piot Address.

..{ajBndal^.Utaii_.a4I2£

WARRANTY DEED
Elsie Brinkerhoff,
of

Glendale

CONVEY

of

a widow,

•

, County of

and WARRANT

G l e n d a l e , Utah

grantor

to

Kane

, Statt of Utah, htrtby

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a
m a r r i e d man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a m a r r i e d man,
a l l as J o i n t Tenants w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p ,
and not as Tenants i n Common,
Qranttflc
for the turn of
-OOLLARS,
County,

84729

$10.00 & other valuable consideration
trtt following described tracts of lend in
KANE
Statt of Utah:

s*
8

t i
* -

8 ;
1"

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.

1

8

a
2 ^

M
ST!

M

**+
WITNESS, tht hand

of said grantor

. this

4 th

day of

June

. A. 0. 19 7 9 .

i~>,::Ll^£jb!^JL^^

Signad in tht Presence of

&&

Elsie Brinkerhoff

STATE OF UTAH
County of

) SS.

Kane

)
On the

4th

appeared before me

the signer
to me that

day of

June

A. 0., 19 79

Elsie Brinkerhoff,

personally

a widow,

of the within instrument who duly acknowledged
S he
executed the same.
jU^yy^..r/^..../j^ui
James B. Adair

My Commission tapires -...June . 19*. .1979

My residence is

~
Notary Public

...O.rdery.1.Ile»...U.Ufl..

IOOTHI•• VTAN nni e««f AMI . f t %m i • K M * , V M um

M?

Exhibit:

M

BM

^

SCHEDULE "A"
PARCEL 1: The West Half of Section 25, Townshlo 39 South, Ranqe 4S West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contalnlnq 320.0 acres, nore or less.
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Ouarter (NW>0; the Southeast Ouarter (SE1*) and the
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (SVIE1*) of Section 26, Townshlo 39 South,
Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, contalnlnq 400.0 acres, more or less
PARCEL 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter
TSE^NW^); the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE^SW**); the East Half
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SW^NE**)
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (nWiSE1*) of Section 27,
Townshlo 39 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 4.78.80
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESNE**); the South Half of
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSE^) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter
(NW<iSElJ of Section 35, Townshlo 39 South, Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWWEfc); the West
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSEl«) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Ouarter (SESSW^) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (M\)
and the East Half of the Southwest
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshlo 40 South, Ranne 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containinn 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake Base
and Mericfian, containlna 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SWVWj) of Section
8, Townshlo 40 South, Ranne 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEW**)
of Section 31, Townshin 40 South, Ranoe 41, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containinq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40
SbUtTi, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet; more or less, to the North line of
Section 26; thence South 09°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 11; BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range>7"West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
44
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE

)
:
)

ss

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows:
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J.
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of ownership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property.
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these
rights of ingress or egress, to said property.
The real property is described as follows:
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point
of beginning.
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chalna; thence South
73°45' East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres
Total acres:

12.51

That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property
is concerned.

~&'£SA*4J?A

Ar^t/k/^rJ^^/

Elsie Brinkerhoff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s

/

/

Jy

day of A p r i l , A.D, 1971.

My commission e x p i r e s

fefy/r?*EXHIBIT "C"

A-123

BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

iHLL-D FOR RE/~pF"i)
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^feS* *^
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-'Ourf,
District Court

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA
BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,

ANSWER OF ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
TO CROSS-CLAIM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
COMES NOW ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, by and through counsel, who
answers the Cross-claim of Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF
and GOULDING, admitting, alleging and denying as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

The

allegations

of

paragraph

1

of

the

General

Allegations are admitted upon information and belief.
2.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the General Allegations are

admitted.
3.

Paragraph 1 of the First Cause of Action is denied.

In

any event, even, if certain sums were not paid, they were forgiven
by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and Cross-claimants have no standing to
assert otherwise.

V

4.

Paragraph 2 of the First Cause of Action is emphatically

denied.

At

no

time

did

ELSIE BRINKERHOPP

demand

payment

of

alleged past due sumsf nor did she ever declare any default or
give any notice, orally or in writingf of any alleged default of
MARK J. BRINKERHOPP and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, giving any time,
reasonable or otherwise, in which to cure any alleged default.
5.

Answering

paragraph 3 of the First

Cause

of Action,

ELSIE ^BRINKERHOFF admits that on or about June 4, 1979, someone
improperly
informing
purpose

induced her to place a signature on a deed, without
her

for

that

it was a deed and without

requesting

her

signature.

telling her the

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF

affirmatively asserts that she did not read the document signed
by her, that she did not intend the document to convey real or
personal property, and that the document was never delivered by
her

to any

one or more

consideration

supported

of

the named

the document.

grantees.

Likewise, no

The document

was later

recorded, but not by reason of any request of ELSIE, CLOYD H., or
MARK J. BRINKERHOFP.
6.

Answering paragraph 4 of the First Cause of Action, this

Defendant

admits

October 14, 1979.
denied,

that

CLOYD

H.

BRINKERHOPF

died

on

or

about

All other allegations of said paragraph 4 are

the June 4 1979

"deed" having

no legal

effect,

being

invalid for the reasons stated above, among others.
7.

The allegations of paragraph 5 of the First Cause of

Action are denied.

Any documents relied upon by Cross-claimants

were obtained without the knowledge, intent or agreement of ELSIE
BRINKERHOFP, and in full knowledge of the existence of the 1966
-2-
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A

(

or

1967

(

contract

BRINKERHOPF

conveying

which

had

the land

never

been

to CLOYD H. and MARK

J.

terminated

J.

by

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF.
8.
ELSIE

Answering

BRINKERHOFF

paragraph
admits

individuals, obtained

6 of

that

the First Cause of Action,

one

CLYDE

GOULDING,

or

other

her signature on various documents which

are relied upon by Cross-claimants, but asserts that she had no
intent to convey property, which intent is required by law, that
she did not read the documents, that no one told her what they
were, that there never was a meeting of minds, and that had she
been

told

the Cross-claimants

have the effect

they

now

signed said documents.

would

claim

her

signature

would

claim to have, she would never have

All other allegations in paragraph 6 are

denied.
9.

Answering

paragraph 7, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

admits

that

upon the incorrect and bad advice of some unknown person, she
refused one or two contract payments.

All other allegations of

paragraph 7 are denied.
10.

Paragraph 8 of the First Cause of Action is admitted

upon information and belief.
11.

Answering

paragraph 9, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF admits that

she attended one meeting in the office of Hans Q. Chamberlain.
All

other

allegations

of

said

paragraph

9

are

denied,

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF never having been given any opportunity to object to,
or to approve, any actions taken by Hans Q. Chamberlain, who was
actually acting for Cross-claimants.

-3A
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12.

\

Answering paragraph 10, ELSIE BRINKERHOPF admits upon

information and belief that CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP and BETTY B.
ESPLIN executed
BRINKERHOFP.
13.

certain deeds

in favor of MARK J.

and LENA

All other allegations of paragraph 10 are denied,

Answering paragraph 11 of the First Cause of Action,

ELSIE BRINKERHOFP admits that she terminated the services of Hans
Q. Chamberlain, but denies all other allegations in said paragraph 11.
14.

Answering paragraph 12, ELSIE BRINKERHOFP admits that

in September of 1984, she executed a certain Stipulation in order
to resolve any differences with Plaintiffs on the terms therein
contained.
15.

All other allegations of paragraph 12 are denied.
The allegations of paragraph 13 are denied, and Cross-

claimants have no standing to assert that the Stipulation is void
and of no legal ffect.
16.

Paragraph 14 of the First Cause of Action is denied.

17.

Answering paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Second Cause of

Actionf ELSIE BRINKERHOPP denies the same.
SECOND DEFENSE
18.

The Cross-claim fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted.
THIRD DEFENSE
19.

The documents upon which Defendants rely were obtained

through misrepresentation and/or fraud.
FODRTH DEFENSE
20.

Cross-claimants have not done equity, have unclean

hands, and are not entitled to any equitable relief.
-4-
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FIFTH DEFENSE

21.

Cross-claimants

have

no

standing

to

contest

the

September, 1984 Stipulation.
SIXTH DEFENSE
22.

Any deeds relied upon by Cross-claimants were and are

void and of no legal

effect

for the following

reasons, among

others:
A.

No intent to convey title to real or personal
property on

the

part of

the grantor, or on

the part of the grantees with respect

to the

June, 1979 deed.
B.

No delivery to all named grantees,

or any of

them, as applicable.
C.

No acceptance by named grantees.

D.

Lack of proper attestation and/or acknowledgment.

E.

U.C.A. 57-3-3, et seq (1953, as amended).

F.

Actual notice on the part of
of the conveyance to

MARK

Cross-claimants
J. and

CLOYD

H.

BRINKERHOFF by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.
G.

Constructive and "inquiry" notice through the
actual

possession

of

MARK

J. and CLOYD H.

BRINKERHOFF, and his successors.
H.

Lack of any

termination

contract.
I.

Mistake.

J.

Lack of consideration.
-5-
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SEVENTH DEFENSE

Qross-claimants
from

are barred

maintaining

their

and estopped

Cross-claim

by their

against

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
WHEREFORE, having

fully

answered

the Cross-claim,

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF prays that the same be dismissed, and that she be
awarded her costs and such other relief as the Court deems
appropriate.
DATED this / V T A day of February, 1985,

WILLARD R. BrSHOl
Attorney for ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the H7^

day of February, 1985, I

mailed a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE,
Attorneys at, Law, 110 North Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City,
Utah 847 20, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid.
TJL^LM^&UVJMM
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BISHOP AND RONNOW, P.C.
WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone:

Clark ot the District Court.

586-9483

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA
BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,

PRETRIAL ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and
JOHN DOES I through V,
Defendants.

Civil No. 1826

This matter came before the Court on Friday, 2 December
1983, for pretrial conference.

Plaintiffs were represented

by their attorney, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.

Defendants other

than ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were represented by Mr. Hans Q.
Chamberlain.
by counsel.

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was not represented
The matter was again treated by the Court on

Wednesday, 12 September 1984, during a telephonic conference
between the Court and counsel.

The status of the case was

reviewed, and the following actions were taken and noted:

2
1.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE were admitted by counsel,

and were found by the Court to be proper.
2

•

GENERAL NATURE OF THE CASE AND CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES:A.

Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, and

Stipulation:
(1) Plaintiffs brought this action against
Defendants seeking to quiet title to certain real property,
water and grazing rights, and personal property in Plaintiffs,
claiming ownership of the same under an Agreement dated 26
October 1966 or 10 December 1967 between Defendant ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF as seller, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H.
BRINKERHOFF as buyers.

As against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Plaintiffs

seek an order requiring specific performance of the Agreement
and recognition of the same, and originally sought an award
of damages as alternative relief against ELSIE BRINKEELHOFF.
Plaintiffs and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF have composed their differences,
however, in the form of a Stipulation over the duly-verified
signatures of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF and counsel for Plaintiffs,
which Stipulation has been filed. In the event Defendants
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and GOULDING prevail as to title,
Plaintiffs seek an award of damages against them for interference
with contract.
(2) Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF
and ARLENE B. GOULDING are deemed to have answered Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint, and have denied that Plaintiffs

J\!rfi
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are the owners of the property in dispute, claiming that the
Agreement of 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967 is void as
a matter of law, with or without notice; that the Agreement
of 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967 was voluntarily
terminated, abandoned, rescinded, or reformed by the parties
to it, the same becoming joint tenants in the property
involved; that the death of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF severed the
joint tenancy, leaving MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
as equal tenants in common; and assert waiver, estoppel,
laches, accord and satisfaction, perfect tender rule and the
doctrine of unclean hands as affirmative defenses, along
with failure to mitigate damages and any other defense to
which the Court deems them entitled.
B.

Second Amended Counterclaim of Elsie Brinkerhoff

and Crossclaim Against Mark J. Brinkerhoff:

All claims and

issues raised in the Second Amended Counterclaim of ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF and Cross-claim Against MARK H. BRINKERHOFF are
claimed to have been resolved by the Stipulation now on
file, between Plaintiffs and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.
C.

Second Amended Counterclaim of Golda B. Adair,

Warren Brinkerhoff and Arlene Goulding, and Amended Crossclaim
of Said Defendants Against Mark J. Brinkerhoff:
(1) Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and
GOULDING seek a decree quieting title in them as to their
claimed interests in the property which is the subject of

4
this action, including water and grazing rights, said
interests to be determined by the Court, and also seek an
accounting from MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and judgment against
him for any amount allegedly due to Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING
and WARREN BRINKERHOFF by reason of their alleged ownership
interests, from rents, profits, or proceeds from the property.
(2) Plaintiffs deny the allegations made by
ADAIR, GOULDING and WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and assert as defenses
those matters set forth in their Second Amended Complaint,
together with lack of standing to attack the Agreement of 26
October 1966 or 10 December 1967; knowledge of the existence
of said Agreement; lack of any lawful termination of said
Agreement, including lack of any sufficient notice or
reasonable time to cure alleged defects in performance;
waiver of conditions by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF; accord and
satisfaction between Plaintiffs and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF; lack
of intent, lack of delivery, mistake, and lack of acceptance
in connection with a Warranty Deed dated 4 June 1979; the
same defenses with respect to a Warranty Deed of 15 August
1980 and a Quitclaim Deed of 9 September 1980; actual and
constructive notice and knowledge of Plaintiffs1 claims,
interest, use and possession of the land, and of the Agreement
of 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967; laches; estoppel;
waiver; lack of proper acknowledgement and recordation; and
any other defense to which the Court may deem them entitled.

obi
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D.

Cross-claim of Defendants G0ULD1NG, ADAIR and

WARREN BRINKERHOFF Against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF:

As a result

of the position taken by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF in the Stipulation
recently filed in this matter, Defendants assert the following
claims against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and seek the relief indicated:
(1) That the Agreement of 26 October 1966 or
10 December 1967 become null and void as a matter of law.
(2) That ELSIE BRINKERHOFF agreed to convey
to Defendants her 1/2 interest in the property in exchange
for Defendants promise to pay her as per the terms of the
Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note.
(3) That the Stipulation entered into by
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF is void and of no
legal effect.
(4) That the deed under which Defendants
claim should be given legal effect.
(5) That in the event ELSIE BRINKERHOFF is
entitled to recant, withdraw and cancel the deed she issued
to Defendants, the Defendants have lost the benefit of their
bargain and are entitled to damages over and against ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF in an amount to be proven at the time of trial.
(6) For damages against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
for breach of contract, breach of warranty of title, and
unjust enrichment.
Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF has generally and specifically

6
denied the operative allegations of the Cross-claim against
her, and has asserted affirmative defenses, including failure
to state a claim, misrepresentation and/or fraud, failure to
do equity, unclean hands, lack of standing, mistake induced
by Cross-claimants, no intent to convey title, no delivery,
no acceptance, lack of proper attestation or acknowledgement;
actual, constructive and inquiry notice to Cross-claimants;
no termination of 1966 or 1967 contract, lack of consideration,
estoppel and such other defenses to which the Court deems
her entitled.
3.

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS as established by admissions

in the pleadings or otherwise, are as follows:
A.

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF is the widowed mother of

MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, deceased; WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE GOULDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF and BETTY
ESPLIN.

She is the mother-in-law of LENA BRINKERHOFF.
B.

On or about 26 October 1966, or 10 December

1967, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed a certain Agreement covering
the sale of certain real and personal property to MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.

All the family members

were and are aware of the existence of the contract.

The

purchasers went into and remained in possession.
C.

Upon completion of the contract, MARK J.

BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF were to be given title
to an undivided one-half (1/2) interest each in the property

Mpi
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covered by the Agreement, as joint tenants with right of
survivorship with their respective spouses.
D.

At various times and places, and in various

forms, payments were made to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, the amounts
and manner of payments of which are in dispute by Defendants.
E.

On or about 4 June 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

issued a deed to herself, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H.
BRINKERHOFF, covering certain real property also included in
the Agreement.

The deed did not include all items covered

in the Agreement, nor did it name the wives of MARK J. and
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.

The deed was subsequently recorded in

the office of the Kane County Recorder, and purported to
create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship in the
three.
F.

CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF died 14 October 1979,

rather unexpectedly.
G.

On or about 15 August 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

issued a deed to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE
B. GOULDING, BETTY B. ESPLIN and CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, in
undivided one-fifth (1/5) interests.

This deed was subsequently

recorded.
H.

On or about 15 August 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR,

WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF
and BETTY B. ESPLIN issued a Trust Deed With Assignment of
Rents, in favor of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF which was later recorded.

8
I.

On or about 9 September 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

issued a Quit-Claim Deed covering certain water rights, to
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING,
BETTY B. ESPLIN and CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF.

This deed was

also recorded later.
J.

Later, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B.

ESPLIN delivered Warranty Deeds covering their interests, to
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA BRINKERHOFF.
K.

On 9 September 1984, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed

a certain "Stipulation".
4.

ISSUES OF FACT, including any implicitly raised in

paragraphs 2 and 3, above, remain for trial as follows:
A.

Did Plaintiffs comply with the contract dated

26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967, including payment of
all sums required thereunder?
B.

Did ELSIE BRINKERHOFF demand full compliance

with the contract, including payment of all sums due and
owing?
C.

Was there any type of understanding between

the parties to the 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967
contract whereby full payment was not required by the buyers
on a timely basis?
D.

Did Plaintiffs obtain title to some of the

property sold under the 26 October 1966 or 10 December 1967
contract in violation of the terms of said contract, and if

J ^
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so, what were the circumstances surrounding the same?
E.

Was an escrow ever properly established at a

financial institution and were deeds properly deposited
therein, if so, were said deeds ever removed from said
escrow, and if so, by whom and under what authority?
F.

At all times relevant herein, was ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

competent to act for and on her behalf, and to sign all
documents relevant to this action?
G.

At all times herein, was ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

under the undue influence of any party or family member, and
if so, whom?
H.

With respect to the Warranty Deeds dated 4

June 1979 and 15 August 1980:
(1) What was the understanding and intent of
the grantor?
(2) Who caused it to be prepared, and under
what circumstances?
(3) Was it ever delivered, and if so, when
and to whom?
(4) Was it ever accepted, and if so, when
and by whom?
(5) Was it properly acknowledged and recorded?
I.

With respect to the Trust Deed dated 15 August

1980:
(1) Who caused it to be prepared?

10
(2) Was it ever delivered, and if so, to
whom?
(3) Was it ever accepted, and if so, by whom
and when?
(4) Was it properly acknowledged and recorded?
J.

With respect to the Quit-Claim Deed dated 9

September 1980:
(1) What consideration, if any, was given
the grantor?
(2) Who caused it to be prepared, and why?
(3) Was it ever delivered, and if so, when
and to whom?
(4) Was it ever accepted, and if so, when
and by whom?
I

(5) Was it properly acknowledged and recorded?
K.

What properties and rights covered by the

Agreement were not included in the deeds of 4 June 1979, 15
August 1980, and 9 September 1980?
L.

What actions, if any, were taken by the parties,

to terminate it?
M.

Have Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and

GOULDING wrongfully interfered with Plaintiffs' contract
with ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and if so, how?
N.

If so, have Plaintiffs1 been damaged, and in

what amount?
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0.

If Plaintiffs have suffered damages, have they

failed to mitigate the same, and if so, how?
P.

Did Plaintiffs or their successors in interest

wrongfully obtain title to grazing and water rights, and if
so, when and in what manner?
Q.

If Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING and WARREN

BRINKERHOFF own an interest in the real property in this
action, what use has been made of the property by MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF since 15 August 1980?
R.

What rents, profits, proceeds or other monies

has MARK J. BRINKERHOFF received from the real property
which is the subject of this action, since 15 August 1980?
S.

Did ELSIE BRINKERHOFF declare the Agreement in

default, or did she ever give notice, verbally or in writing,
to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and/or CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, or their
respective spouses, of any alleged default and its nature,
or did she grant any reasonable time for cure?
T.

Have Cross-claimants been damaged by any

improper acts of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, and if so, in what
amount.?
5.

ISSUES OF LAW, including those implicitly raised by

the matters set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, above,
remain for disposition as follows:
A.

Are Defendants entitled to the benefit of any

affirmative defenses against Plaintiffs1 claims, and if so,
what?

12
B.

Are Plaintiffs entitled to the benefit of any

affirmative defenses against Defendants' claims, and if so,
what?
C.

Is ELSIE BRINKERHOFF entitled to any affirmative

defenses against the Cross-claim, and if so, what?
D.

Are Plaintiffs entitled to a judgment and

decree quieting title as against Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING
and WARREN BRINKERHOFF?
E.

Are Plaintiffs entitled to judgment against

Defendants for interference with contract, and if so, in
what amount? \
F.

Are Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING and BRINKERHOFF

entitled to a judgment and decree quieting title as against
Plaintiffs, and if so, to what interests in what property
and/or rights, if any?
G.

Are Cross-claimants entitled to judgment

setting aside the September 1984 Stipulation signed by
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF?
H.

Are Defendants ADAIR, GOULDING and WARREN

BRINKERHOFF entitled to judgment against Plaintiff MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF for rents, profits or proceeds from real property
since 15 August 1980, and if so, in what amount?
I.

Are Cross-claimants entitled to a judgment

against ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for damages, and if so, in what
amount?
J.

Is any party entitled to an award of costs?

Att
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K.

Are any parties entitled to judgment

against

any other parties, and if so, upon what theories?
6.

EXHIBITS were marked, offered and received as

follows:
EXHIBIT
NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

OFFERED BY

RECEIVED

P-l

Copy of Agreement dated
26 October 1966, between
ELSIE BRINKERHDFF as seller,
and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and
CLOYD H. BRINKERHDFF, as
buyers.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-2

Copy of Agreement dated
10 December 1967, between
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF as seller,
and MARK J. BRINKEFHOFF and
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as
buyers.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-3

Affidavit signed by ELSIE
Brinkerhoff, dated 13 April
1971.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-4

Copy of document dated 6 April
1977, signed by ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF, acknowledging
payment to her of $23,000.00.

Plaintiffs

Yes

D-5

Copy of Warranty Deed dated
4 June 1979, running from
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF, MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H.
BRINKERHOFF.

Defendants

Yes

D-6

Copy of Warranty Deed dated
15 August 1980, running from
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES
A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B.
ESPLIN.

Defendants

Yes

14
D-7

Copy of Trust Deed dated 15
August 1980, running from
GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING,
CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and
BETTY B. ESPLIN to Southern
Utah Title Company, Trustee,
for ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,
Beneficiary.

Defendants

Yes

D-8

Copy of Quit-Claim Deed dated
9 September 1980, running from
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN.

Defendants

Yes

P-9

Warranty Deed dated 24 August
1982, running from BETTY ESPLIN
to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA
BRINKERHOFF.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-10

Warranty Deed dated 24 August
1982, running from CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF to MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF and LENA
BRINKERHOFF.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-ll

Copy of letter from ELSIE
J. BRINKERHOFF to Hans Q.
Chamberlain, dated 13 August
1983.

Plaintiffs

P-12

Certificate of Death of
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.

Plaintiffs

D-13

Last Will & Testament of
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.

Defendants

Accounting from State Bank of
Southern Utah re: payments
made by Defendants to ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF pursuant to Trust
Deed.

Defendants

Yes

Copy of deposit slip for
$706.00, and of check for
$1,300.00, dated 13 November
1979 and 24 February 1980,
constituting 1979 contract
payment.

Plaintiffs

Yes

C D-14

P-15

Ml

Yes

I
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P-16

Envelope and check to ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF, FOR $2,000.00,
for 1980 payment on contract.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-17

Letter dated 14 October 1981
from Willard R. Bishop to ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF, with check for
$2,000.00 for 1981 contract
payment, with envelope by which
check was returned.

Plaintiffs

Yes

P-18

Copy of letter dated 29
October 1982, from Willard R.
Bishop to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,
with letter from Hans Q.
Chamberlain to Willard R.
Bishop dated 2 December 1982,
with check in the amount of
$2,000.00 for 1982 contract
payment.

Plaintiffs

Yes

D-19

Copy of Entry Book, Kane County
showing recordation of Exhibit
D-5, and of warranty deed from
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF.

Defendants

Yes

D-20

Copies of Promissory Notes (5), Defendants
and Escrow Agreements (5) running
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, signed by
GOLDA B. ADAIR, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
BETTY B. ESPLIN, and ARLENE B.
G0ULDING.

Yes

D-21

Copy of Affidavit of survivng
Defendants
joint tenant, dated 9 September
1980, signed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.

Yes

D-22

Schedule of payments to ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF, prepared by MDNT
ANDERSON.

Yes

Defendants

If other exhibits are proposed, copies shall be provided
to opposing counsel prior to trial.

A
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7.

WITNESSES at trial will be called as follows:
NAME

PARTIES CALLING

MARK J. BRINKERHOFF

Plaintiffs

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

Plaintiffs/Defendants

LENA BRINKERHOFF

Plaintiffs

CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF

Plaintiffs

GOLDA B. ADAIR

Defendants

WARREN BRINKERHOFF

Defendants

ARLENE B. GOULDING

Defendants

JAMES B. ADAIR

Defendants
Defendants/Plaintiffs

DALE BRINKERHOFF
MONT ANDERSON

Defendants

WEB ADAIR

Defendants

BARRY JUDD

Defendants

Witnesses MONT ANDERSON, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF. ARLENE B.
GOULDING, JAMES B. ADAIR and DALE BRINKERHOFF will be present
to testify at trial without the necessity of issuing and
serving subpoenas.
In the event that other witnesses are to be called at
trial, a statement of the names and addresses of such witnesses
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and of the general subject matter of their expected testimony
shall be provided to opposing counsel prior to trial.
8

DISCOVERY shall continue until the time of trial.

9-

AMENDMENTS to the pleadings may be made, if desired,

-

in order to conform them to this Pretrial Order, or may be
made by agreement or upon application to the Court, good
cause being shown.
10.

MODIFICATION AND INTERPRETATIONS:

This Pretrial

Order will control the course of trial, but may be amended
by consent of the parties or by order of the Court in the
interests of justice.
herein.

The pleadings are deemed merged

In the event of any ambiguity of this order, reference

may be made to the record of the Pretrial Conference to the
extent reported by stenographic notes and to the pleadings.
JL1. : TRIAL:

This matter has been set for non-jury trial

before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, on 21 and 22 February
1985.
12.

POSSIBILILITY OF SETTLEMENT is considered remote.

DATED: '

"

February 1985.
BY THE COURT:

DON V. TIBBS, District Judge

A *-/>//_
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APPRO

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

/

HAj*S' Q. CHAMBERLAIN
Aiftorney for Defendants
\ADAIR, GOULDING, and
WARREN BRINKERHOFF

WILLARD R. BISHOP
BISHOP & RONNOW, P. C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT OF KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, personal
representative of the Estate
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFP,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,

FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFP, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February
21 and 22, 1985.
representative

of

Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal
the

Estate

of

CLOYD

H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA

BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF appeared personally and were
represented by their counsel of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.
Defendant

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFP

appeared

personally

and

was

represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING also appeared personally, and were represented by their
attorney

of

record,

Mr.

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain.

BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present.

CHARLES

A.

The Court noted
A-ltJG-,

that originally, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit
by reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs.
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented.
had.

Argument was

Based upon the evidence, good cause appearing, the Court

now makes and enters its:
FINDINGS OP PACT
1.

Prior to to August of 1960, MERLE BRINKERHOFF and ELSIE

J. BRINKERHOFF were husband and wife, residing in Kane County,
Utah.

MERLE

accumulated

ERINKSREOFF

various

farming

was
and

a

farmer

and

ranching

rancher,

properties

and

in Kane

County, Utah, and in Northern Arizona.
2.

MERLE and ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were the parents of MARK J.

BRINKERHOFF,

CLOYD

H.

BRINKERHOFF,

now

deceased;

WARREN

BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B.
ESPLIN, and GOLDA B. ADAIR.

Plaintiff LENA BRINKERHOFF is the

surviving widow of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.
3.

In or about August of 1960, MERLE BRINKERHOFF died.

As a

result of the normal probate process, the farming and ranching
property owned by MERLE BRINKERHOFF passed to Defendant ELSIE J.
BRINKERHOFF.
4.

On or about October 26, 1966, or December 10, 1967, ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF executed a certain agreement covering the sale of
certain of the farm and ranch real and personal property to MARK
J. BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.

The contract was the

result of arm's length bargaining, and was entered into by ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF with the advice of counsel.

At the time of entering
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into

the

agreement,

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF

was

fully

competent,

legally and in every other sense.
5.

Prior

tof

concurrent

execution of the agreement

with,

between

and

subsequent

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

to

the

MARK

J*

BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, all the family members were
and still are aware of the existence of the contract.
6.

Upon execution of the contract, the purchasers, MARK J.

BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF went into and remained in
possession of the real property covered by the agreement.
the

date

of

trial,

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF,

and

the

As of

personal

representative and heirs of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, still remained
in possession of the real property, including grazing and water
rights.

If any other children of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF desired to

use or graze livestock upon the property, they were permitted to
do so without objection.
7.

Basically,

conveyance

of

the

the

agreement

personal

and

provided
real

that

in return for

property

to

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, the buyers would pay the
minimum sum of $53,388, payable at the rate of $2,000 per year,
without interest, during the lifetime of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF.

In

the event that the total minimum price of $53,388 was not paid by
the time of the death

of

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF,

ambiguous

to

the disposition

with

respect

the contract

and

payment

was

of the

unpaid, amount of the minimum. The contract provided that it and
documents

of .conveyance

were

to

be

placed

in

escrow

in the

Hurricane Branch of the Bank of St. George, so that upon full
performance

by

the

purchasers,
-3-

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOFF

and

LEAH

BRINKERHOFF, his wife, would receive legal title to an undivided
(H)

one-half
CLOYD

H.

interest

BRINKERHOFF

in the
and

property,

LENA

as joint

BRINKERHOFF,

his

tenants; and
wife,

would

receive an undivided one-half (*$) interest in the properties, as
joint tenants.

Payments were to be made to the Hurricane Branch

of the Bank of St. George.
8.

The only documents which were ever

actually

deposited

with the escrow agent, consisted of a Warranty Deed from ELSIE
BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF, and a Quit Claim Deed
from ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to MARK and LEAH BRINKERHOFF.
documents

were

ever

deposited

into

the

bank

escrow,

No other
and

no

payments were made to the escrow holder.
9.

Payments were made by the purchasers to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

outside the escrow, as follows:

A.

$2,000.00 paid on or before November

B.

$2,000.00 paid on or before November

C.

$430.75 paid June 17, 1972.

D.

$780.00 paid November 17, 1972.

E.

$500.00 paid March 19, 1973.

F.

$500.00 paid October 26, 1973.

G.

$780.00 paid November 28, 1973.

H.

$500.00 paid Hay 13, 1974.

I.

$600.00 paid January 20, 1975.

J.

$500.00 paid December 15, 1975.

K.

$400.00 paid in December of 1976.

L.

$706.00 paid November 13, 1979.

M.

$1,300.130 pa:id on November 13, 1979.
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N.

$2,000.00 paid November 6, 1983.

0.

$2,000.00 paid November 4, 1984.

As of the date of trial, contract payments totalled $14,996.75.
10.
MARK

J.

On various occasions and at various
BRINKERHOFP

and

CLOYD

H.

times, Plaintiff

BRINKERHOFP,

now

deceased,

claimed to have made additional payments to ELSIE BRINKERHOPF in
the nature of support and assistance, as required and requested
by

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF.

The

Court

finds

that

such

additional

payments and contributions were not intended to be payments under
the

contract

BRINKERHOFF

by

which

were

MARK

purchasers,

J.

BRINKERHOFF

but

were

and

CLOYD

supplied

to

H.

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFP in the nature of gifts and support which sons would
normally provide to their widowed mother.
11.

At no time from and after the inception of the agreement

between ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H.
BRINKERHOFF

and

the time of trial, did ELSIE BRINKERHOFP ever
\t

declare

herself

dissatisfied

with

the

performance

of

the

purchasers under the contract, nor did she declare the contract
in default or attempt to terminate the contract.

That contract

is still in existence, in full force and effect.
12.

Although

delinquent

the

agreement

provided

for

no

interest

on

amounts, the Court finds that ELSIE BRINKERHOPF was

and is entitled to receive interest at 6% per annum on delinquent
amounts

accruing

prior

to

May

14, 1981,

and

is

entitled

to

receive interest at 10% per annum on delinquent amounts accruing
after May 14, 1981.
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13.

The Court finds the following to be a true and correct

accounting of amounts due, payments made, and the balance due
through

January

31,

1986,

on

the

contract

between

ELSIE

BRINKERHOPF, MARK J. BRINKERHOFP, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF:

CONTRACT ACCOUNTING
(6% interest on delinquent amounts
accruing prior to May 14, 1981)
NOV

1, 1964

Payment due
Payment made

§ 2,000.00
• 2,000.00
-0-

NOV

1, 1965

Payment due
Payment made

2,, 0 0 0 , .00
r 0 0 0 ,.00
-0-

NOV

1, 1966

Payment due

2 , 0 0 0 , .00

NOV

1, 1967

1 year interest
at 6% on §2,000

120,.00
2 ,000 .00

Payment due

• III! • * »

4,120.00

NOV

1, 1968

1 year interest
at 6% on §4,000

240.00
2,000.00
6,360.00

Payment due

NOV

1, 1969

1, 1970

§360 accrued interest, §6,000
principal

360.00

1 year interest
at 6% on §6,000

2,000.00
8,720.00

Payment due

NOV

§120 accrued interest, §4,000
principal

§720 accrued interest, §8,000
principal

480.00

1 year interest
at 6% on §8,000

2,000.00
11,200.00

Payment due

§1,200 accrued interest, §10,000
principal
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NOV

1, 1971

1 year interest
at 6% on $10,000
Payment due

JUN 17, 1972

229 days interest
at 6% on $12,000
Payment made

NOV

1, 1972

137 days interest
at 6% on $12,000
Payment due

NOV 17, 1972

16 days interest
at 6% on $14,000
Payment made

MAR 19, 1973

122 days interest
at 6% on $14,000
Payment made

OCT 26, 1973

221 days interest
at 6% on $14,000
Payment made

NOV

1, 1973

6 days interest
at 6% on $14,000

600.00
2,000.00
13,800.00

$1,800 accrued interest, $12,000
principal

451.72
430.75
13,820.97

$1,820.97 accrued
interest, $12,000
principal

270.25
2,000.00
16,091.22

$2,091.22 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

36.82
780.00
15,348.04

$1,348.04 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

280.76
500.00
15,128.80

$1,128.80 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

508.60
500.00
15,137.40

13.81

$1,137.40 accrued
interest, $14,000
principal

Payment due

NOV 28, 1973

27 days interest
at 6% on $16,000
Payment made

MAY 13, 1974

2,000.00
17,151.21
71.01
•_ 780.00
16,442.22

166 days interest
at 6% on $16,000

500.00
16,378.82

172 days interest
at 6% on $16,000

2,000.00
18 , 8 3 1 . .20

NOV

1, 1975

285 days interest
at 6% on $18,000
Payment due

—

600, .00
18 , 4 6 7 , .91

44 days interest
at 6% on $20,000
Payment made

NOV

1, 1976

321 days interest
at 6% on $20,000
-8-

$467.91 accrued
interest, $18,000
principal

843, .28
2 , 0 0 0 .00

21,311.19

DEC 15, 1975

$831.20 accrued
interest, $18,000
principal

236, .71

80 days interest
at 6% on $18,000
Payment made

$378.82 accrued
interest, $16,000
principal

452.38

Payment due

JAN 20, 1975

$442.22 accrued
interest, $16,000
principal

436.60

Payment made

NOV 1, 1974

$1,151.21 accrued
interest, $16,000
principal

$1,311.19 accrued
interest, $20,000
principal

144.66
500.00
20,955.85

$955.85 accrued
interest, $20,000
principal

1,055.34
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2,000.00
24,011.19

Payment due

DEC

1, 1976

30 days interest
at 6% on $22,000

NOV

1, 1977

335 days interest
at 6% on $22,000
Payment due

NOV

1, 1978

1, 1979

1 year interest
at 6% on $24,000

2,000.00
30,371.19

1 year interest
at 6% on $26,000

2,000,00
» l » i > i >••< tm

33,931.19

1, 1980

$4,371.19 accrued
interest, $26,000
principal

1,560.00

m,

NOV

$2,931.19 accrued
interest, $22,000
principal

1,440.00

Payment due

NOV 13, 1979

$1,719.68 accrued
interest, $22,000
principal

1,211.51
2,000.00
26,931.19

Payment due

NOV

108.49
•
400.00
23,719.68

Payment made

$2,011.19 accrued
interest, $22,000
principal

12 days interest
at 6% on $28,000

55.23

Payment made

706.00

Payment made

- 1,30Q,00T
31,980.42

353 days interest
at 6% on $28,000
Payment due

$5,931.19 accrued
interest, $28,000
principal

$3,980.42 accrued
interest, $28,000
principal

1,624.77
.. 2#000.00
35,605.19

$5,605.19 accrued
interest, $30,000
principal

-9A _/«r/_

JAN 31, 1986

5 years, 92 days
interest at 6% on
$30,000

9,453.69

Payment made
p o s t - t r i a l after
ruling by Court

-50,262.95

CREDIT (Applied
below)

( 5,204.07)

CONTRACT ACCOUNTING
(10% interest on delinquent amounts
accruing after Nay 14, 1981)
NOV

1, 1981

Payment due

NOV

1, 1982

1 year interst at
10% on $2,000.00

$ 2,000.00
200.00
2,000.00
4,200.00

Payment due

NOV

1, 1983

1 year interest at
10% on $4,000.00

400.00

2,000.00
6,600.00

Payment due

NOV

6, 1983

5 days inteest at
10% on $6,000.00

NOV

1, 1984

2,000.00
4,608.22

2,000.00
tm« mi l i t

• ••• >M»U III

7,062.73
4, 1984

$4,608.22 principal

454.51

360 days interest
at 10% on $4,608.22
Payment due

NOV

$600.00 accrued
interest, $6,000
principal

8.22

-

Payment made

$200.00 accrued
interest, $4,000
principal

5.43

3 days interest at
10% on $6,608.22
-

Payment made

$454.51 accrued
interest $6,608.22
principal

2,000.00

5,068.16

$5,068.16 principal

-10-

(0t>

A-157

(

(

NOV

1, 1985

361 days interest
at 10% on $5,068.16

501.26

Payment due

NOV 15, 1985

2,000.00
7,569.42

14 days interest at
10% on $7,068.16

27.11

Payment made
JAN 31, 1986

- 2,115.0Pr
5,481.53

77 days interest at
at 10% on $5,481.53

As of

BRINKERHOFF

was

- 5,204.07
$
399.10

the date of
86

years

$5,481.53 principal

115.64

CREDIT APPLIED
14.

$501.26 interest,
7 ,068.16 principal

trial
of

$399.10 principal

in February

age,

and

is

of 1985, ELSIE

a

wonderful

and

beautifully aged lady.
15.

The Court finds by the clear and convincing weight of

the evidence presented at trial that, although ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
was fully competent

in all senses of the word at the time she

entered into the agreement between herself as seller and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as buyers, in 1966 or 1967,
because

of

her

age,

BRINKERHOFF

had

to

especially

concerning

and
rely

beginning
on

others

in
to

or

about

do

1970,

things

for

ELSIE
her,

her financial and legal affairs, and she

has relied upon her sons, daughters, members of her family, and
grandsons, and that from and after 1970, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signed
documents that were presented

to her without understanding the

legal

of

or

sufficient
including

other
power
will,

significance
to comprehend
deeds,

documents.

the subject

contracts
-11-

such

and

of

She

lacked

such documents,

promissory

notes,

their

naturef and their probable consequences, and was not able to act
with discretion in relation thereto.

Prom and after 1970r ELSIE

J. BRINKERHOPP was and still is, legally incompetent.
17.

Prom and after 1970, when ELSIE BRINKERHOFP signed any

contractual, financial or legal documents, or took certain legal
stands and positions, she did so in total and strict reliance
upon her sons, daughters, grandsons or whomever else came to her
requesting
legal

her

signature or

requesting that she take certain

positions, all without

knowing the nature and probable

consequences of such documents, and without knowing the nature
and

probable

consequences

of

the

legal

positions

she

was

requested to take.
18.

The Court finds that the purpose of the 1966 or 1967

Agreement was to furnish ELSIE BRINKERHOPP with support for as
long as she lived, and that Agreement and that purpose were never
abandoned.
19.

The Court finds that all of the children and certain

grandchildren

of

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOPP,

from their

respective

viewpoints, and because of what they perceived as being others
taking advantage of their mother or grandmother by such other
parties, used their own influence to convince ELSIE BRINKERHOPP
to

execute

documents

and

take

legal

positions

in order

to

accomplish what they, the children and/or grandchildren or other
relatives, thought was for ELSIE BRINKERHOPP's best interest.
20.

The Court finds that the children and grandchildren who

prevailed upon ELSIE BRINKERHOFP to execute documents and take
legal stands after 1970 did not intend to take advantage of her
-12-
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for their own purposes. Nevertheless, they did take advantage of
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for the purpose of benefiting her in their own
mindsf from their own points of view.

As a result, those persons

who persuaded and induced ELSIE BRINKERHOFF to sign contractual,
legal

and

certain

financial

legal

documents,

positions

from

including
and

after

deeds,
1970,

and
used

to

take

improper

constraint or urgency of pursuasion, whereby

the will of ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF

induced

was

overpowered,

and

she

was

to

do

or

forebear an act which she otherwise would not do, or otherwise
would do if left to act freely.
21.

The unfair persuasion of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF on various

occasions from and after 1970 generally took place in private.
The persons pursuading her to sign legal and financial documents
were

able

to

obtain

her

signature

because

of

her

age,

psychological dependency, and existing confidential and/or family
relationships.
22.

The transactions leading to the signing of financial and

legal documents by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF were initiated by her family
members,

not

BRINKERHOFF

by

herself,

lacked

under

reasonable

circumstances
access

in

to

which

ELSIE

independent,

non-confidential advice.
23.

Following 1970, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF executed the following

financial and legal documents, among others:
A.

On

or

about

April

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF

executed a certain affidavit, admitted

in evidence

as Exhibit P-3.
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13,

1971,

On or about April 6, 1917,

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF signed

a

that

document

$23,000

acknowledging

from

BRINKERHOFF
prepared

MARK

as
by

BRINKERHOPP'S
Certified

J.

of

had

BRINKERHOPP

that

date.

Plaintiff

MONT

grandson-in-law,

Public

she

and

The

received
CLOYD

receipt

ANDERSON,
who

Accountant.

was

The

H.
was

ELSIE

and

is a

receipt

was

prepared by him for the benefit of giving MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOPP certain "tax
breaks", and the receipt was prepared and obtained
without

regard to the tax consequences

for ELSIE
i

BRINKERHOFF.

The receipt was admitted as Exhibit

P-4.
On or about June 4f 1979, ELSIE BRINKERHOPP executed
a Warranty Deed running from herself, as grantor, to
herself,

MARK

J.

BRINKERHOPP,

BRINKERHOPP, as joint tenants.

and

CLOYD

H.

This document was
i

admitted as Exhibit D-5.
On or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was
induced

to execute

a Warranty

Deed

running from
(

herself,

as

BRINKERHOFF,
BRINKERHOFF,

grantor,
ARLENE

to GOLDA
B.

B.

GOULDING,

ADAIR,

WARREN

CHARLES

A.

and BETTY B. ESPLIN, each as to an

undivided 1/5 interest.

See Exhibit D-6.

On or following August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN executed a Trust
-14-
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Deed in favor of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF as beneficiary.
See Exhibit D-7.

The Trust Deed was to secure notes

running to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, one being executed by
each of the grantors named in the Trust Deed.

See

Exhibit D-20.
F.

Also on or about August 15, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
was induced to execute certain "Escrow Agreements".
See Exhibit D-20.

G.

On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was
induced

to

execute

a

Quit

Claim

Deed,

conveying

interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF,
BRINKERHOFF,

ARLENE
and

B.

BETTY

B.

undivided 1/5 interest.
H.

GOULDING,
ESPLIN,

CHARLES
each

as

A.

to an

See Exhibit D-8.

On or about September 9, 1980, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was
induced to execute a certain affidavit.

See Exhibit

D-21.
I.

On

or

about

executed

a

April

23,

document

1982,

ELSIE

entitled

BRINKERHOFF

"Last

Will

and

Testament of ELSIE BRINKERHOFF".
J.

On or about September 9, 1984, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was
induced

to execute

a certain

"Stipulation".

See

Exhibit P-40.
24.

The Court specifically finds that with respect to each

and all of the documents listed in the preceding paragraph, the
same

were

signed

incompetent,

and

by
was

ELSIE
acting

BRINKERHOFF
and

when

functioning

she

was

under

legally

the

undue

influence

of the persons who obtained

requested

her

documents.

to take the legal
As

contractual

a

result,

financial

and

the

her signature, or who

positions
Court

finds

testamentary

indicated
that

documents

by said

all legal,
executed

by

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP from and after 1970, as between and as
related to the parties to this action, are null, void, and of no
force or effect whatever, and should be declared cancelled.
25.

On or about August 15, 1980, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN

BRINKERHOFP, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY
B. ESPLIN executed notes in favor of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP in
connection
Agreement

with

the

mentioned

Warranty

Deed,

Trust

Deed,

in paragraphs 23D, 23 E, and

and

Escrow

23F, above.

Thereafter, certain payments were made by the promisors to ELSIE
J. BRINKERHOFF.

The notes bore interest at the rate of "NONE

percent (0%) per annum".
26.

At trial, the Court inquired of GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN

BRINKERHOFF,

ARLENE B. GOULDING,

CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and

BETTY B. ESPLIN whether they desired the return of funds paid by
them to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP under the transactions mentioned in
light of the Court's ruling that said transactions were null,
void, and of no effect.

CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B.

ESPLIN informed the Court that they did not desire any repayment.
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING requested that their money be returned to them by ELSIE
J.

BRINKERHOFF,

who

requested

that

the Court

grant

her

the

privilege of repaying said Defendants.

The Court finds that the

notes

Trust

to

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERHOFF,

the

Deed,

the

Escrow

-16-
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Agreement

and all other

described

above

are

documents

nullf

void,

related
of

no

to the

effect

transactions

and

should

be

BRINKERHOFF

is

cancelled and set aside.
27.

As

of

February

28,

1985,

ELSIE

J.

indebted to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, AND
ARLENE B. GOULDING

in the

principal

amount

of

$1,620.00

plus

accrued interest at the rate of 10% per annum in the amount of
$356.40, for a total amount of $1,976.40, each.
28.
ELSIE

As stated
J.

in paragraph 7, above, the contract between

BRINKERHOFF,

BRINKERHOFF

was

and

MARK

J.

is vague

BRINKERHOFF,

and

ambiguous

and
with

CLOYD

H.

respect

to

disposition of any portion of the $53,388.00 minimum which might
remain unpaid as of the date of death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF.
The Court finds that

it was the intent of the parties to the

contract that any part of the minimum amount remaining unpaid as
of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF be paid and divided equally
between

her

children,

or

any

surviving ' heirs

if

any

child

predeceased her, and the contract should be reformed to express
clearly this disposition and intent.
all

children of

As of the dates of trial,

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF,

including

the surviving

spouse of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, consented to such

reformation,

with the exception of Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and
GOULDING, who originally agreed to such reformation but changed
their minds.

Likewise as of the time of trial, all children of

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF except Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
and GOULDING were in agreement that any and all funds left in a
trust account mentioned below, as of the date of death of ELSIE
-17-

J. BRINKERHOFF, be divided and distributed equally between them
and LENA BRINKERHOFF.

Defendants ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF and

GOULDING originally agreed, but changed their minds.

The Court

finds that all funds referred to in this paragraph should be
distributed, upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, equally to
her children, with LENA BRINKERHOFF receiving the share allocable
to her deceased husband, CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF.
29.

Any amounts awarded to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF should be

paid to Mr. Kirk Heaton in trust for the benefit of ELSIE J.
BRINKERHOFF, and for the use and benefit of her now-surviving
children and LENA BRINKERHOFF.

Mr. Heaton was present in Court

at the time of the Court's ruling and consented to be appointed
as trustee and guardian of the financial, business and legal
affairs of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, under the supervision of the
Court.

Mr. Kirk Heaton should be appointed as such trustee and

guardian for the purpose of receiving such funds awarded to ELSIE
J. BRINKERHOFF, depositing

them

in a trust account at Zion's

First National Bank, and disbursing them appropriately, but not
to any of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF1S children except as specifically
ordered

by

the

Court.

He

should

qualify

by

taking

the

appropriate oath, and should serve without bond or any stated
fee, but should be permitted to apply to the Court for reasonable
fees upon appropriate showing and notice.
30.
Bishop,

When this action was originally commenced, Willard R.
attorney

BRINKERHOFF
interests

and
of

for
other

ELSIE

Plaintiffs,
named

BRINKERHOFF

brought

Defendants.
were

suit

against

Thereafter,

represented

by

ELSIE
the

Hans Q.
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Chamberlain, who also represented other named Defendants.
BRINKERHOFF then

requested

ELSIE

in writing that Hans Q. Chamberlain

withdraw as her attorney of record, which he did in September of
1983,

The letter wherein she requested Hans Q. Chamberlain to

withdraw

as

BRINKERHOFF.

her

attorney

was

prepared

by

her

grandson,

DALE

Thereafter, following signing of the September 9,

1984 Stipulation by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and following receipt
of a written request from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF dated October 16,
1984, Willard R. Bishop, entered an appearance on her behalf and
represented

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF even though he had originally

sued her on behalf of Plaintiffs in the first instance.

Hans Q.

Chamberlain had by then sued ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF in behalf of
the other named Defendants even though he originally represented
her, by a Crossclaim dated September 28, 1984.
31.
1985,

During the first day of trial, to-wit, February 21st,
the

Court

determined

that

the

interests

of

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF were not being fully protected, and by reason of that
fact,

she needed

separate

counsel

to

represent

her

interests.

The Court determined that it would watch out for the interests of
ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF,

obtaining
trial.

counsel
Therefore,

and
to

that

the

represent

during

trial
her

would

during

continue

the

course

without
of

the

part of the first day of trial and

during the entire second day of trial, ELSIE BRINKERHOFF was not
represented by counsel.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters its:

-19-

A^T*

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

That

contractual

any

and/or

and

all

other

legal,

financial,

documents

executed

testamentary,
by

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERHOPP from and after the year 1970, as between and as
related to the parties to this action, were and are null, void
and of no effect by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J,
BRINKERHOFP and the exercise of undue

influence over her in

connection with the execution of said documents, by certain of
her children and grandchidren, and should be declared to be null,
void, cancelled terminated, and of no effect whatever, as should
any

promissory

notes, trust deeds, escrow agreements and any

other documents executed by others, but related thereto,
2.

The Agreement between ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP as seller, and

MARK J. BRINKERHOPF and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOPF, deceased, dated
October

26, 1966 or December

10, 1967, is and at all times

pertinent has been, in existence, and in full force and effect.
3.

That the vague and ambiguous terms of said Agreement

pertaining to disposition of any part of the minimum amount of
$53,388.00

remaining

unpaid

as

of

the

death

of

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERHOPP, should be reformed to provide for an equal division
of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERHOPP, LENA
BRINKERHOPF, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP, BETTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFP,

and ARLENE B. GOULDING,

share and

share alike.
4.
title

Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment and a decree quieting
with

appropriate

injunctive

relief

BRINKERHOPF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF

in

favor

of

LENA

in the real and personal
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property, grazing rights and water rights which are the subject
matter

of

this actionf

as tenants

in commonr

each

owning

an

undivided one-half (*$) interest therein, subject to the terms of
the Agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December
reformed,

running

to

10, 1967 , as

ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF as seller, free and

clear of any claim whatever on the part of Defendants GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING.

Because of

the legal incompetency of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, upon payment of
all

amounts due under

said Agreement,

any judgment

and decree

issued in this matter should function and operate as a judicial
deed

conveying

BRINKERHOFF,

to

the

Plaintiffs

interests

MARK

stated

J.

BRINKERHOFF

above.

In

the

and

LENA

event

that

Plaintiffs deem it necessary, a judicial deed should issue upon
appropriate application and notice.
5.

That Mr. Kirk Heaton should be appointed as trustee and

guardian of the financial, business and legal affairs of ELSIE J.
BRINKERHOFF, under the supervision of the Court, he to take the
appropriate oath and to serve without bond or stated fee.
such

trustee

awarded

ELSIE

and
J.

guardian,

Mr.

BRINKERHOFF,

Heaton

should

should

deposit

receive
them

As

amounts

in a trust

account at Zionfs First National Bank, and should disburse such
funds for the benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, but not to her
children, except as such disbursements to children may be ordered
by the Court.

Upon

appropriate

notice, Mr. Heaton

should

be

permitted to apply for reasonable fees in his capacity as trustee
and guardian of the financial business and legal affairs of ELSIE
J.

BRINKERHOFF.

Mr.

Heaton

should

be

permitted

to

pay

his

-21/7-/77

reasonable costs incurred for his administration of the account,
from the account.
6. That Plaintiffs should be required to pay to Kirk Heaton,
in trust for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOPF, the
amounts due on the Agreement as stated above, plus any accrued
interest, said amounts to be paid within ninety (90) days of the
execution of any judgment by the Court in this matter.
7.

That from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Heaton for the

benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP, Mr. Heaton should be required to
disburse to Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and
ARLENE B. GOULDING, the amount of $1,976.40 each, together with
interest upon said amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after March 1, 1985, all without further order of
this Court.
8.
in his

That upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, Kirk Heaton,
capacity

as

trustee,

should

be

required

to

pay and

distribute any and all funds still being held by him in trust for
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, together with any funds received by him
thereafter in connection with the Agreement of October 26, 1966
or December 10, 1967, to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, LENA BRINKERHOFF,
i

BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF,

and ARLENE B. GOULDING equally, share and share

alike.
I
9.

That

all

other

claims

and

pleadings

of

any

party

requesting affirmative relief other than or inconsistent with the
above conclusions, should be dismissed, with prejudice and upon
the merits.
-22-
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10.

(

The parties should be required to bear their own costs

and attorney

fees.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this A r

day of

J

/ i f ffrVK^

> 1986.

BY THE COURT:

-^...'

<or,,- .rx.**
i „

DON V.VflBBS, D i s t r i c t Judge

<T\^\ffl

APPROVED, AS TO FORM:

^LA-v^M^r?

WILLARD
R. BIS.HOP
BMiifc.a»>!!>••
niii»iMni <n<Hi,a i»i>ii<<»i.fcni«WiiM^iirii> n
Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f s
>

/

%%%

A
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' J1ANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
/ A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t s ADAIR,
' GOULDING, and WARREN BRINKERHOFF

CERTIFICATE;, OF MAII, m?
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing FIRST AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN &
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Utah
84720? to Mr. Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street,
Kanab, Utah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale,
Utah 84729,

all by first class mail,

<2gN*y ot TEfeeuAeV

postage fully prepaid this

me.

%MmmhM2.
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WILLARD R. BISHOP
BISHOP & RONNOW, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 27 9
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE CODNTY
STATE OF DTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, personal
representative of the Estate
Of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,

FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND
DECREE QUIETING TITLE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the
Court, sitting without a jury, on Thursday and Friday, February
21

and

22, 1985.

representative

of

Plaintiffs MONT R. ANDERSON, as personal
the

Estate

of

CLOYD

H. BRINKERHOFF, LENA

BRINKERHOFF and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF all appeared personally and
were

represented

Bishop.

by their counsel of

record, Mr. Willard R.

Defendant ELSIE BRINKERHOFF appeared personally and was

represented by her attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.
Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING also, appeared personally, and were represented by their
attorney

of

record,

Mr.

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain.

BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN were present.

(0^

CHARLES

A.

The Court noted

A-180
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hat originally, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF and BETTY B. ESPLIN had
been named as Defendants, but had been dismissed from the lawsuit
by

reason of having settled their differences with Plaintiffs.

Witnesses were sworned and evidence was presented.
had.

Argument was

The Court being fully advised in the premises, and having

heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That

contractual

any

and

and/or

all

other

legal,

financial,

documents

executed

testamentary,
by

ELSIE

J.

BRINKERHOFF from and after 1970, as between and as related to the
parties to this action, were and are now, null, void, and of no
effect whatever, by reason of the legal incompetency of ELSIE J.
BRINKERHOFF and by reason of the exercise of undue influence over
her

in

connection

with

the

execution

of

said

documents,

certain of her children and grandchildren,

and said

should

to

be

and

they

hereby

are,

declared

be

by

documents

null,

void,

cancelled, terminated, and of no effect whatever, together with
any

and

all

related

promissory

notes,

trust

deeds,

escrow

agreements, and any and all other documents executed by others
related to in any way to the null and void documents executed by
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF.

The documents which are hereby declared
I

null, void and of no effect include, but are not limited to, the
following:
A.

A certain affidavit executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF
on or about April 13, 1971.

~2~
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A certain document executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP
on or about April 6, 1977, acknowledging that she
had received $23,000.00 from MARK J. BRINKERHOPF and
CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF as of that date.
A certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1975, running
from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFP, as grantor, to herself,
MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as
joint tenants.
A

certain

Warranty

Deed

dated

August

15, 1980,

running from ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, as grantor, to
GOLDA

B.

GOULDING,
ESPLIN,

ADAIR,

WARREN

CHARLES

A.

each

BRINKERHOFF,

BRINKERHOFF,

as to an undivided

and

ARLENE

B.

BETTY

B.

one-fifth

(1/5)

interest.
A certain Trust Deed executed by GOLDA B. ADAIR,
WARREN BRINKERHOFF, ARLENE B. GOULDING, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN, running to ELSIE
J.

BRINKERHOFF,

certain

trust

as
deed

beneficiary,
notes

running

together
to

ELSIE

with
J.

BRINKERHOFF from GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE

B.

GOULDING,

CHARLES

A. BRINKERHOFF,

and

BETTY B. ESPLIN, executed on or about August 15,
1980.
Certain "Escrow Agreements" dated August 15, 1980,
executed by ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and by GOLDA B.
ADAIR,

WARREN

BRINKERHOFF,

ARLENE

B.

GOULDING,

CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFF, and BETTY B. ESPLIN.
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G.

A

certain

Quit-Claim

Deed,

purporting

to

convey

interests in water rights to GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN
BRINKERHOFF,

ARLENE

BRINKERHOFF,
undivided

and

B.

BETTY

one-fifth

GOULDING,
B.

(1/5)

ESPLIN,
interest,

CHARLES

A.

each

to

an

executed

by

ELSIE BRINKERHOFP on or about September 9, 1980.
H.

A certain affidavit, executed by ELSIE BRINKERHOFF
on or about September 9, 1980.

I.

A

certain

"Last

BRINKERHOFF",

Will

executed

and
by

Testament

of

ELSIE

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF

on or

about April 23, 1982.
J.

A

certain

"Stipulation"

executed

by

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF on or about September 9, 1984.
2.
seller,

That
and

the
MARK

agreement
J.

between

BRINKERHOFF

ELSIE

and

J.

CLOYD

BRINKERHOFF
H.

as

BRINKERHOFP,

deceased, dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, should be
and it hereby is, declared to be in existence, and in full force
and effect.
3.

That

disposition

the

of

any

terms
part

of

of

the

said

agreement

minimum

amount

pertaining
of

to

$53,388.00

remaining unpaid as of the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, should
be

and

they

hereby

are,

reformed,

to

provide

for

an

equal

division of any amounts so remaining between MARK J. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERHOFP, CHARLES A. BRINKERHOFP, BETTY B. ESPLIN, GOLDA
B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFP, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, share and
share alike.
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4.

That Plaintiffs LENA BRINKERHOFP and MARK J. BRINKERHOFF,

own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet and peaceful use,
possession

and

enjoyment

of

that

certain

real

and

personal

property, including grazing rights and water rights, as tenants
in

common,

each

owning

an

undivided

one-half

(^)

interest

therein, subject to the terms of the Agreement dated October 26,
1966, or December 10, 1967, as reformed, running to ELSIE J.
BRINKERHOFF as seller, said real and personal property, including
grazing and water rights, being more particularly described as
follows:
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH:
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, Block 25, Plat "A", Delta
Townsite.
Lot 2, Block 26, Plat WA", Delta Townsite.
REAL PROPERTY IN KANE COUNTY, UTAH:
Township 39 South, Range Ah West, Salt Lake
Meridian:
West Half of Section 25, containing 320 acres.
Northwest Quarter; Southeast Quarter and the
South Half of the Northeast Quarter containing
400 acres, all in Section 26, Township 39
South, Range Ah West, Salt Lake Meridian,
containing 400 acres, more or less.
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4; Southeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter; Northeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter; East Half of the East Half;
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter;
Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 27, Township 39 South, Range Ah West,
containing 478.80 acres.
East Half of the Northeast Quarter; South Half
of the Southeast Quarter; Northwest Quarter of
the
Southeast
Quarter
of
Section
35,
containing 200 acres.
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Township 40 South, Range 4H Westf
Meridian:

Salt Lake

Section
29:
Southwest
Quarter
of
the
Northeast Quarter; West Half of the Southeast
Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres.
Section 30:
Northwest Quarter; East Half of
the
Southwest
Quarter,
containing
238.99
acres.
Section 5:
Township 40
Meridian:

Lot 2, containing 39.08 acres.
South,

Range

4 West,

Salt Lake

Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
Section 8, containing 40 acres.
Township 40
Meridian:

South,

Range 7 West,

Salt Lake

Beginning at the Southwest Corner of the
Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West,
Salt Lake Meridian and running thence East
10.23 chains; thence North 80° West 6.36
chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South
1 chain to beginning, containing .74 acres.
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 26, Township 40 South, Range 7 West,
and running thence South 4.30 chains; thence
South 70° East 15 chains to the middle of the
channel of the creek; thence Northwesterly
along the middle of the channel of said creek
to the North line of said Northwest Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter; thence West 11.23
chains to the place of beginning.
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest
Corner
of the Northwest Quarter
of the
Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian and
running thence South 70°east 15 chains to the
middle of the channel of the creek; thence
Southerly along the middle of the channel of
said.creek to the South Line; thence North 73
45' West 14.60 chains; thence North 4.30
chains to the place of beginning, containing
5.60 acres.

-6-

The above three tracts being part of land
situtated in Sections 23 and 26 of said
township and range, sometimes referred to
unofficially as Lot "A".
Township 40
Meridian:

South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake

Lot 1; Northeast Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of Section 31, containing 79.30 acres.
PERSONAL PROPERTY:
The following
rights:

described

water

and

reservoir

A
one-fourth
interest
in
Hobble
Canyon
Reservoir (9-36-12) in Mohave County, Arizona.
A one-half interest in Sullivan Reservoir in
Mohave County, Arizona.
And all grazing privileges and permits annexed
to or based upon any of the foregoing real,
personal,
reservoir,
or
water
rights as
commensurate.
5.

That

the claims of Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR,

WARREN

BRINKERHOPP, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, and the claims of any and
all persons claiming with, by, through or under said Defendants,
are without any
WARREN

right whatever, and Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR,

BRINKERHOPP,

and

ARLENE

B.

GOULDING

and

any

and

all

persons claiming with, by, through or under them, have no estate,
right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or any part
thereof.
6.

That Defendants GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOPP, and

ARLENE B. GOULDING, and any and all persons claiming with, by,
through or under them, should be and they hereby are, permanently
enjoined and restrained from claiming any estate, right, title,
lien or

interest

in or

to the described

property

or any part

-7-
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thereof adverse to the interests and title of MARK J. BRINKERHOFF
and LENA BRINKERHOFF.
7.

That because

of the legal

incompetency

of

ELSIE J.

BRINKERHOFF and the fact that a complete set of documents of
conveyance was never deposited into the escrow anticipated by the
agreement dated October 26 r 1966 or December 10 f 1967f

this

Judgment and Decree Quieting Title shall, upon the death of ELSIE
J. BRINKERHOFF, function and operate as a judicial deed conveying
to MARK J. BRINKERHOFF and LENA BRINKERHOFF the interests stated
above.

In the

event

that MARK J. BRINKERHOFF

and/or LENA

BRINKERHOFF deem it necessary, a judicial deed shall issue upon
appropriate application and notice.
8.
and

That Mr. Kirk Heaton, Attorney, of Kanab, Utah, should be

he

hereby

business

is, appointed

and legal

affairs of

as

guardian

ELSIE J.

of

the financial,

BRINKERHOFF,

and as

trustee of all funds flowing to ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF from the
Agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, for the use
and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, and also for the use and
benefit
ESPLIN,

of

MARK

CHARLES

J.
A.

BRINKERHOFF,
BRINKERHOFF,

LENA BRINKERHOFF,
GOLDA

B.

BETTY B.

ADAIR,

WARREN

BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING, said appointments being
subject to the supervision of this Court.

Mr. Kirk Heaton shall

take the appropriate oath and shall serve without bond or stated
fee.

As such trustee, Mr. Heaton shall

receive all amounts

awarded ELSIE. J. BRINKERHOFF herein, together with any proceeds
from the agreement dated October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967,
as reformed above, and shall deposit them into a trust account at
-8-
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Zion's First National Bank, and shall hold and disburse such
funds for the use and benefit of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, but not to
her children, except as such disbursements to children may be
specifically
Court.

authorized

herein,

or

otherwise

ordered

by

the

Upon appropriate application and notice, Mr. Kirk Heaton

shall be permitted to apply for reasonable fees in connection
with his administration of the trust, and in connection with his
guardianship of the financial, business and legal affairs of
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF.

Mr. Kirk Heaton shall be permitted to

deduct his reasonable and normal costs incurred in connection
with his administration of the trust, from the trust corpus.
9.

That Plaintiffs should be and they hereby are, required

to pay to Kirk Heaton, as trustee, for the use and benefit of
ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF and for the use and benefit of MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, LENA H. BRINKERHOFF, BETTY B. ESPLIN, CHARLES A.
BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING, the sum of $399.10, being the amount due and unpaid on
the agreement as of January 31, 1986, plus any accrued interest
at ten percent

(10%) per annum upon principal, and less any

payments made after January 31, 1986, said amount to be paid
within ninety (90) days of the execution of this First Amended
Judgment, Plaintiffs having already paid the sum of §50,262.95 on
January 31, 1986, and $2,115.00 on November 15, 1985, after the
initial ruling by the Court.
10.

That, from amounts received by Mr. Kirk Heaton as stated

above, and as received by him prior to February 1, 1986, Mr.
Heaton should be and he hereby is, required to disburse forthwith
.9-
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to Defendant GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B.

GOULDING, the amount of $1,976.40 each, together with interest
upon said amounts at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from and after March 1, 1985, all without further order of this
Court.
11.

That upon the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, Mr. Kirk

Heaton, in his capacity as trustee, should be and he hereby is,
required to pay and distribute any and all funds still being held
by him in trust at the death of ELSIE J. BRINKERHOFF, together
with any funds received by him thereafter in connection with the
agreement of October 26, 1966 or December 10, 1967, to MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,

LENA

BRINKERHOFF,

BETTY

B.

ESPLIN,

CHARLES

A.

BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B. ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B.
GOULDING equally, share and share alike.
12.

That any and all other claims and pleadings of any party

in this action

requesting

affirmative

relief, other

than or

inconsistent with the above, should be and they hereby are,
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
13.

That the parties should be and they hereby are, required

to bear their own costs and attorney fees.

DATED this ;70

hthVuA

day of

r > < ,.,' 1986-

BY THE COHHWVK

K

••) J L N - ^ i
\

APPROVED AS

\
TCLFQRM:.

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiffs

DON V. TIBBS, D i ' s t r i c t Judge

M~$

P-/ID
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I
\

HANS Q. CHAMBERLAIN
Attorney for Defendants ADAIR,
\GOULDING, and WARREN BRINKERHOPF
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing

FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE

QUIETING TITLE, to Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain, of CHAMBERLAIN &
HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 250 South Main Street, Cedar City, Utah
84720; to Mr. Kirk Heaton, Attorney at Law, 70 North Main Street,
Kanab, Utah 84741; and to Mrs. Elsie J. Brinkerhoff, Glendale,
Utah 84729,

&$*

day of

all by first class mail,

fSe£/lA£V

postage fully prepaid this

, 1986.

-11-
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A G R E E M E N T

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into by nnd between ELSIE D R I N K S
'••'•• l : ; 4 | r T -

Glendale, County of
of Kane,
Kane, S
State
of U
Utah,
of Glendale,
t a t e of
t a h , PARTY OF THE
THE FIRST PART,
PART, hercinherci
*,VlV.
:at+*r^Wite)todr^
Wd'MARK 8RJNKE,

f'.'.•'.- ' ^

1NKERHCF

of Glev:<-'•"..' l e , County Q. IC:n<?, SI . i t s :>..'• LI 1 vj;i, IVtfVfl :.;3 .;.•? Tlli-' '.."I -..i!"..'
a f t e r i v i a r r o u t o as t h e "BUYERS",

lliIil£5.£!LILl :
THAT WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner of the real property, grar.ir.j
privileges and water rights in the States of Utah unci Arizona;
AND WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire.to purchase the same;
AND WHEREAS, the parties have.agreed upon tor-Ms .m<! o m n i i i ;M>% i'Mrsale thereof;
K S

'•

f.1

i .
"

.

/

•

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the

tx'fefc
Uli

crv/ohnntr' nnrj n r r o ^ n o n t n h e r e i n a f t e r

*ouS
o * S.
<5 • w

>..)(', ' ; o t v . c e . i , o n e .•.•Mother

5 S
3."-

.

.

os

f o.l l o v . s :

T-t nH
•..

•n

%

~»rti-^r

mutual

; : O i ' O i rt:r ' I «:r ':y.r r e

.'£• •".'•*•••*•'.'• ^ *

- ,

j

••'..•

' v-

"•'. ' :

;

I. That for and in consideration of the total sum of FIFTY THREE

THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT ($53,308.00) DOLLARS, as- the full consider
tion therefor, the SELLER covenants and agrees, to selI and the BUYERS covenant
and agree to buy the following described real property, grazing privileges end
water and reservoir rights in the States of. Utah and Arizona:
:

REAL PROPERTY.IN MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH:
l^l-i: 1, 2, .!, and /», 'M :ck : r > , P l o t

v -^V,*,. rs..'.v «

J.

».

••* •->'';

l...'i-.-y, i.?l.«::-k ;.-! , J - M r i

f,

V , D-1 I M T o v . n s i t o .

".V : , Uc i v.; .;•..•...»:-. i A

' - V R E A L PROPERTY; IW; KANE COUNTY, UTAH:
•:... Township 39 South, Range 4j West, So It.Lake Meridian:
West Half of Section 25,'containing 3/0 acres.
Mort.Vcst Quarter; Southeast Quar.'-cr a;uJ I v.o Sai:th Ho I f
af tli-.: Northeast Quarter containing «'.0J acres, o I ! in
Section 20, Township 3v South, Ran.je <\ l: West, Suit Lohe
Miri c'iar,, containing .'.;.j .icrcs, no re or loss.

fi

-puwnrrs. •

icmmrtia..,, *,"r,
ro* PfraClpAnoN

i

Lots 1 , 7, 3 , and <i; Southeast Q u a r t e r oi t h e H o r t h v.os-l Q u a r t e r ; N o r t h o a s f v u a r i c r of t h e Southwest
J u a r t o r ; East H a l f o f t h e East l l o l f ; S:A, flv.vost ( / j a r t o r
of ti>o N o r t h e a s t v i i a r t r r ; Nor lhv.es I y ' . o r i c r of the
Southeast Q u a r t e r of S e c t i o n ?7 T v . n - . h i n v* r . * i : * h

*-<ti

East H a l f of t h e N o r t h e a s t Q u a r t e r ; South Ha Lf >ol t h e
Southeast Q u a r t e r ; Northwest Q u a r t e r of t h e Southeast

S r r l i o n :"9: S o u t h . w e s t Vji;-;C:!* : f..o !! •;•'. !.o ,r , ; -.vi« :r »'•-r ;
V.osi H a l f of t h e Soutliojs-I ',vartcr ;Jnci t!v: o O ' / i ' h c ^ v T . ' : r t c r

or the Southwest Quarter, contai ni \\c 160 acres.
Section 30: Northwest Quarter; East Halt of I ho Sou i hv:o*~. !
Quarter, containing 230.9(J acres.
Section

5: Lot 2, containing 59.00 acres.

Township 40 South, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Meridian:
. Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Scolion 0,
containing 40 acres.
Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Meridian:
•-•••• 3 ' - r /.ifo-'l fit . K ...
<••:.. .W : 1 . ! V -

1

111 ' '

s^iiliif
^o-b3
15 • £

•s f
-3 .":

, ; ^ i - B e g i n n i n g at the^Sputhv/est Corner, of the Southwest Quarter of
i:&j^f^
40 South# Range
<.:n .i i

chains;

:j:.-rt;
thorn.:'.? :3oi11*I• 1 » : h : i : i

!•» b'?.{ji nn.i u

f

'.o\\[

\ ni

ucrci\.
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of the Northwest Quarter of
the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, and running thence South 4.30 chains; thence South 70°
East 15 chains to the middle of the channel of the creek; thence
Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of-said creek to
the North A i n e of said Northwest Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter; thence West 11.23 chains to the place of beginning.
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Northwest Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 2G,
• Tr>w,v.:.hi .) 'C South. Hanjo 7 Wcr-t, Salt Lak;; Meridian and runuir. _ 'i :.«"-r.::'" .out:* 7 0 ° \'\-.\
'. • '.*:.'">i,v.; \r vr.c vii M I lo ;'•' t k o
•:.'« •!»•.•..•• •-;,' •{ ::o ':reek; !>\sr. "• .1 n,|l'.:r|y :!";v; v".ux -ni J<.!!o o '
II.'.- •••;»;. •!.••: i ..•; ::•<. ic •;ror-i; " •• v c: J tr '., i. i:v?; \\.~r.~'': '.JorV'n

/- n \'.-' i.'^st 1«! .00 <;haiirj; Ihcncc Norih »'.-.:>G chaifiS to tnc
place of beginning, containing 5.60 acres.
The above three tracts being part of land situated in Sections
23 and 26 of said township and range, r.onictimcs r^iorred
to
unofficial ly ^ Lot ".•V.
Township •»0'South, Range Aj V.'ost, S.ilt • L-ke I i^ri cii -\m:
Lot ". : N^rthonst Quarter of :'tc> N\;rthv.?
31. cor. iai ni MO 7V.:'»0 acres.

.irifT 3i J ^ C T i ;;n

... ^U
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PERSONAL PROPERTY:

I;» M o i , •••-'•••• C o u r t v y , « A r i :oo-. : .

A one ho i v interest in Su i ! i v..:n [Reservoir in M^hovc "ovintv,
' Ari r.ona.
And oil grazing privileges and permits annexed So o." barx-d •
upon any of the foregoing real, personal, reservoir, or water
rights as commensurate.
?.

The parties agree that for and in consideration or the sole by th

SELLER to the BUYERS of the foregoing real and personal property, water onereservoir rights and grazing privileges, the BUYERS will ji.iy \o II.o :>r„LLL.M :;.»
sum of TOO THOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS, each year, beginning with the 1st ds\

.;of;November>r;1964,rqf which;payments due on November 1,, 1964 and November, 1,

c o n t i n u e t o poy annual

i n s t a l l m e n t s ol It./,0'i'j. •!.)'./

»:» i if. ', :./i d ; 7 of liooo'irjor i-

each year thereafter beginning November 1, 1. 06' and continuing during the cr.;
life of the SELLER.
The BUYERS agree that they wi II pay the sum of 52,000.00 por year to
the SELLER for the entire remainder of SELLER'S life irrespective of the ar.vju
which may be paid under this contract whether it exceeds the total considerai
hereinabove set out or whether that total amount shall not be paid by apilvin
'inni.nl

r.';iv:\v'r

of 7,0,}J'>. 0 0 C'-"i.u"/ .'.'.-.^ ,:,jrc'*. :::o

." '..v '•'.! !.«.'/•: ..-fi'.' in O...N:-i d o r o + i o n .-o' m

^ricn d;;ri;v; th'? l i f e t ' v -

uuclr: r ; •. ai ,,.. u;''iiit iJ'JY.^.'V-v '. o p^y t h e

amount of $2*000.00 per year for the life of the SELLER irrespective of the
amount which may be paid, the SELLER waives interest upon tl.o unpaid balance-.
It is province!, however, M-.-.iv r;: •,:.»•.: Id the total consideration herein.'hove provided not be paid by the HUYLoS to tlv? SELLERriurirv;:SELLER'S lifcti
then u;)on vr.c: c.'r-.rMi of the SELLER an--- -ir.iounts reoainin- un-j'.r tniii Agrconcni
after crediting all payments which have been -aade Ucrounoir,

shall l.o paid

annuo! I, as provided herein in equal shores, shares and share alike, to

V/arren B r i n k c r h o f f

and Char ley- Ar land Hri nkcrnof i

I •V.O-'.'DVOH i Ls ( / 7 / i L s )

(l/'i

, t o each) of -:thei balances due, ( j t , bei ng s t i p u l a t o d . t h a t - t ^ a J3UYERS together
\ r ! : . ' v ' ?••' - J : •:'•..:'• . Pel ' •- P. r-:» »t - . r . L . ' -

V'arrer: p r ! n ' ^ r V ^ f •, ^ e r l r v

other

provision

has boon r.uuio ;":,r iiir-

i. »*! i or t h r o . * u.r;»«*d i;«»i . • * ) ,

n

wi t

,. /•'•!:•

i'»«i« t . n r

i n t e r e s t a t f o u r ( ' £ ) per c e n t per annum on t h e d e f e r r e d d e c l i n i n g

..» •'

balance.

Tho3UYERS m?y, a t any t i m e , prepay a l l or any p a r t of t h e r c m o i n i r v .
p r i n c i p a l due under t h i s
:>.

contract.,

The ScLLLR s h a l l execute n t.\.irr>-inty D'od t o ! he r e a l

hereinabove:; closer i bod and • | i i i t " c l a i m

properiy

< nvoyan<../•«. I > I!,*' v^.hr ..:.«» i ^ ' i ' - r v . / i r

r i g h t s h e r e i n a f o v c d e s c r i b e d , of an u n d i v i d e d one h a l f

i n t e r e s t t o each BUYER

ivand, his .wife as j o i n t , t e n a n t s w i t h ^ f u l I r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , and s h a l !
.;•••;

>•• I '

':•;..'

f ' • . .' ."

' :

i ."

'.'

' •

'','•"'•

• •'

: ) • ' ' : ' . • •

...»'

i " r•

;* T . - '

. '

.

' ? » " •**.,

•...hie!) sha I I 'uale those documents ; n tr.ist and i;i os'jrov. '.:\\>\r.:-vr to the ;';!l..'. •
ESCROW I NSTiAUCTIONS
If the BUYERS shall make all payments of ;ri :i: i ;>» 1 one! interest hereiprovided and perform all the other covenants and agreements heroin contained,
then upon payment 6i the final installment due hereunder the Escrov: Depositor
shalI. deliver to the BUYERS all the escrowed documents.
In the event of a default in the payment of any installment of princi

or i iv! crest ;:r.d :;. Y'-O event ;v'- •:> -;r:•'•. •• • •' i e ?.r.\- ri her term .:.r condition her
nci

If

•'•':***

i.'.••:•;.'.•

...-\'i;:«-

.-> '

:\

e'r •/.••: '*

•''•-,-

\ '

:r. ,' , e •

• v e ; w ~ ?.. [

, r ' ' rv\ \ yi \

•:':;:•_

interest shall be given to the BUYERS by the SELLER and a subsequent foi lure
to remedy the same shall continue for a period of thirty (JO) days, then the
SELLER may, nt Lor option, demand a redelivery to hr.r of all :;' 'he oscrov.ee'
?.' .e:. i ;.t:: •..'hsreeper, V e C-jYERS '•• « I! v:;;:;:te an:! .loacoab ly zurrcrJ^r
^remi: e: j;e-ei r.ahove d^.-serihed -/MI; M:-. Si.LLi:!! 'j'.ay r*e-'-;i!er \n\\\
t!ie same vitlrj:.:t 'uriiKN" procc;:r

all of T:':

»•./.'./."»". i >:i .,

!

-«i .!.••; r-otaii; as rent ar.d I i ruji d jted rfemj^e

a!! rums ti-cretof ^ o p.vud by BUYERS under Ibis .vfjrco v.nt.

A-l<

. ' • • •

:**','.'

''••'•' ( '•»

As an alternative remedy the SELLER may elect to reduce any paynem
il

if

'

i

-.•'.»•''<»'•

»

• -

;->'*:'W^ • ; - | ^

jtf'.'*^T

1

*

:prfrici-paf a n o

: : o s s i v c o r i rr.'or ni t i o n v
note and mortgage

occasions

passing t i t l e

i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by

o'~ :•.*.•.

rlcct

through

v : vro.Y

\w\". .\:;r\,o .iOii > as

l a Mu- UJYi !/* •u.?' > ' r » v | : ; " - i , i f . ! h

law.

D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d t h e BUYERS a r c c o m p l y i n g v.i Mi t h e tor.MC o f t h i s

2

they

occupancy,

and e n j o y m e n t o f t h e above d e s c r i b e d

rights

2«
Id

Agrecmrnl.

shall

he e n t i t l e d

I a it i e s o l o ,

prenisne

o f t h e SELLER t o i n s p e c t t h e SJ:.JO a t r e i s e r . . b !e
4.

The BUYERS have

suhi'mt

<:r.-:

i J .

ti.i..s.

i n s p e c t e d s a i d premises and

find

the same i n c

J

as*

^ M ^ B ^

\

o % r l u r . i w , nuc! h o n o f i c i a I

od

covenants o r w a r r o n t i e s

other

"

J< 5
< »r»i f£

en

:;na i I j o o r t h e c;.:-c.-nv

*

ror:r.s

0

, !K: <;:..;.'- » , i o

t h i s A g r e e m e n t w h i c h s!v?l I b i n d and i n u r o t o t h e b e n e f i t

o.f 1 he h e i r s ,

c e s s o r s , and a s s i g n s

i n cicfaulv

pay a l l c o s t s
contract

or the parties

and ^ r e a s o n a b l e

h ? r e t o a n d t h e ;.iarty

attorney's

across

r o e i n t h e e v e n t e.: -.'or:;c :»c.n Y o , t ;

is required.
WITNESS t h e hands o f t h e p a r t i e s

1900.

suc-

hereto this

s?

• a

Jl.L

day or ( Q ^ K J ^

./?

£1££.<-•.<*> lz. .;$>.^/3v!v::7<JX>
SELLER

'

/

C r a y ! | ; . | ; r i h l ' ^ r h . ^ r '<

M^MS^M^Jy^k
i /7/. lir i v.-;<:rn ,.

ivp^e
OL'YC

A

i nc t

^

,/$5i>
V^r/;>-^i^\-^? //

AG

ntEiiEH Y ^ ^ > ^ ' / ;OS«.W / /
'

/ • "

THIS AGREElEffT, m*do «nd ontcrod I n t o by find between ELSIC^i:L^RHCFr|
of Giondalo, County of tone, State of Utah, PARTY OF TI& FIR3T PART, horclna f t o r roforrod t o es tho "SELLCR" and CLOYD H. GRINISKIOFF ond MARX

VUlSZftiXir

of Glondolo, County of fona, State of Utah, PARTIES OF TH3 SECOfiO PART,

torsin-

of t o r r e f e r r e d t o as tho ,!CUYCRS"#

liiI]!£iS.£IIis
THAT WF.REAS, tho SuLLCR I s the owner of tho re-sl property, $r?.zln;:
p r i v i l e g e s ond water r i g h t s \n tho Sister, of Utah ond Arizona;
AHD V.1CREAS, tho EUYEES dsslro t o purchaso tho swaa;
Al£> WHCPvEAS, tho parties havo agreed upon terms and conditions (or t h
safe thereof;
NCW TlERCFCMI, I n consideration of tho prenlscs end of tr-e iwtual
covenants and agrocaisnto h e r e i n a f t e r set a i t tho part I or. hereinafter ^qrio »1 rh
and bolvoen one another as f o l lowr»i
1«

That f o r and I n consideration of tho t o t a l sim ot FIFTY Tllfc'E

TM0U3Atf) THREE HIJNSRED EICHTtf-EIGKT ($53,32S.o;» DOLLYS, cs tho f u l l car-sidcr*
t l o n t h o r e f o r , tho SELLER covenants end ogroos t o c e l l and t h o BUYERS covor-or.t
end egrco t o buy tho following described r e a l property, orsjrlng p r i v i l e g e s snd
voter ond rosorvolr r i g h t s I n tho Statoo of Utah and Arizona*
REAL PROPERTY IN MILLARD COUMTY, UTAHt
Lots t , 2 , 3 , and 4 , Block 2 5 , P l o t "A", Oolta T a m s t t e .
Lot 2 , Block 2 6 , Plot W ,

telta

Townslto

REAL PROPERTY i n KANE COUNTY, UTAHI
Township 39 Sooth, Rang<> 41 V,er.t, S ^ l t Lf:!;o Meridian:
Vest Iks 11 oi Section 25, containing 320 ecrcs,
ttortlwest Quortorj Southeast Quarter and tho South Ho If
of i h n tbrtltonst Quarter c:;ntr.lnh;g 0 0 sores, a l l In
Section ?/:, Tounnnlp :>J South, fidixj* < f V * s t , S a l t Loko
Meridian, containing 400 acrcv, » W Q or loss.

PUINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT NO

FOR

Lot* 1 , 2 , 3 , and /.; Southeast Quarter of tho Northwest Quortor; Martheart Quarter of tho Southwest
Qjiirtor; Cost l b If of tho Cost K u f ; S-^tln.-ost y j u r t c r
of the Northeast Cuorlcr; I b r t h v o c t Vv^rtor of t t o
S:x»tho.ist p o r t e r of Section 2 7 , lovmshlp 3*; South,
lUv.go **i \czt, contolr.Jng i/O.a^ t c r o a .

«mWfAJ

0*T^1985»TR:HW
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•2East Half of tho Morthoost Quarter* South Half of the
Southeast Qiwrtor; Northuont Quarter of tho Southeast
Quarter of Section 3 5 , containing 200 acres.
Township AO South, Rango 4{ Woof, S a l t lako Meridian:
Soctlon 29: South^ost Quarter of tho K'orthoast Quarter;
V.ost I b l f of tho Southeast Quartor and the Southoost .Quarter
of tho Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres,
Soctlon 30: Northvost Quarter; East I b l f of tho Southwost
Quertor, containing 233.59 acres,
Soctlon

5; Lot 2, containing 32.93 ecros.

Township 40 South, Range 4 Vest, S a l t lake Merldlon:
Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Soctlon 8 ,
containing 40 ceres.
^
O
K »>.
r CO * «

2<!i
I I J D

oo 5 .
J < i* ^
z
7
2

s

3 "
o

Township 40 South, tango 7 West, S a l t lake Merldlon:
Beginning e t tho Southv/ost Cornor of the Southwest Quartor of
tho Southeast Qusrtor of Section ?3, Township 40 South, Hanro
7 Vtost, £-:>11* take Moridlen %>nd running thence Cast 10.73
chains; thonco Worth 60* V.'ost 6.36 chains; thonco V.'ost 3.r>!>
chains; thonco Sooth 1 chain t o beginning, containing .74
ceres.
Beginning n t tho Northwest Cornor of t h e Northwest Quarter O T X
the Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Township 49 South, Hinge
7 V.'ost, end running thonco South 4,30 chains; thence South 70*
East 15 chains t o tho middle of the channel of tho creek; thonco
Northwesterly olong tho *nlddlo of the channel of sold crock t o
tho North Lino of sold Northtvast Quortor of tho Northeast
Quarter; thonco V.'ost 11.23 chains t o tho place of beginning.
Beginning 4.30 chains South of the Korthuoat Cornor of tho
Northwest Qvirlcr of tho Northeast Quortor of Section ?t,
Tov/nshlp 40 South, Range 7 l o s t . S a l t Lake Mori dl en 3nd running thonco South 70* East 15 chains t o tho middle* of the
channel of the crock; thonco Southerly along tho middlo of
tho channel of sold creek to tho South l i n e ; thonco North
73*45 f Vest 14.CO chains; thonco North 4.30 chains t o tho
y
pleco of beginning, containing 5.60 ecros.
^ /

M 3 *•'-

The ebovo thrco t r e e t s being pert of lend situated In Sections
23 ond 26 of sold township ond rongo, sonetlmes reforrod t o
u n o f f i c i a l l y es t o t "A".
Totvnshlp 40 South, tango 4 l V.'ost, Siift take Mori dl on:
l o t \\ Korthcnst Quortor of tho Northwest Quarter of Section
3 1 , containing 73.30 ecro3.
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*3PERSONAL PR'QPCRTYl
s

\ Tho following doscrlbod voter ond reservoir rights*
A one-fourth Interest In tlobblo Cjnyon Reservoir (9-36-1?)
In Mohovo County, Arizona,
A one half Interest In Sullivan Reservoir In Mohauo County,
Arizona.
And a l l grazing prlvl legos end pomlts annexed to or fctsod
upon any of tho vorogoing real, personal, reservoir, or fairer
right6 os caivcnsurato.
2.

Tho parties ?greo that for and In consideration of tho sale by tho

SELLER to tho BUYERS of the foregoing r a i l and personal property, v;ator md
reservoir righto and grazing prlvliogos, tho BUYERS will pay to tho SCLLCft ii^a
sutj of TOO THOUSAND ($2,033.03) DOLLARS, each year, beginning with the 1st djy
of Movombor, 1964, of thlch payments duo on November \t

1SG4 and ibweuhcr 1,

1-/C5 aro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER froa tho BUYERS and the VU'tVrSfclII
continue to pay annual Inctallttonis of $2,003.03 on tho 1st day of November In
each year thcroafter beginning November 1, 1966 and continuing during the c n t l r i
11 fo of tho SELLER.
Tho BUYERS cgroe that they will pay tho sun of S2,003.03 per yo:ir to
tho SELLER for tho entire rcraalndor of SELLERS II fo Irrespective of tho amount
uhlch way bo paid under this contract whother I t oxcoods the total consideration
horclnabovo sot out or whether that total amount shall not be fvsld by applying
annual payments of 52,030.03 ogolnst tho purchaso price during the l i f e thio of
tho SELLER and In conslderation of an undertaking by tho ESJfERS to pay tho
Mount of $2,003.03 per year for tho l i f e of tho SELLER Irrespoctlvo of tho
iracwnt which cvay bo paid, the SELLER waives Intoroct upon the unpaid balances.
I t Is provided, howovcr, that should tho total consideration hereinabove provldod not bo paid by tho BUYERS to tho SELLER during SELLER'S lifolino
then upon tho death of the SELLER ony onounts remaining undor this Agrec*rcnt
of tor crediting a l l payments Uilch l>avo boon nodo horoundar, shall bo paid
annually o* provided heroin In oqual sheroo* sltoros ttr\tl chero ullko, to

t-

4

I'orrcn Brlnkerhoff and Charley Arland Brlnkerhoff tvo~soventh3 (2/7ths) (1/7ths
to ceveh) of tho balances duo ( I t being stipulated that tho WfT.TS togother with
Karron B^inkorhaff! Charley Arlond Brlnkorhoff, t&tty 0. Esplln, Golda B. Adjlr,
tnti Arlono B. Gouldlng constitute a l l tho heirs at law of tho SELLER and that
other provision tvss been asdo for tho latter threo no-nod holrs)j together kith
Interest ot four (<#) tvr cont per ennun on tho doferrod declining balances

|

Tho BUYERS way, ot eny time, prepay oil or any pirt of tho rcr.v3inlng

|

principal duo undor this contract.
3#

i

The SELLER chnfI oxocufo o Warranty Dood to the res I property

hereinabove described and quitclaim conveyances to tho water ond reservoir
rights hcrolnsfove described, of ci\ tindlvldod one half interest to csch BUYER
end his wife cs Joint tenants with f u l l rights of survivorship, and thai I
deposit said Instruments In tho llurrlcano Branch of tho Bank of 5 1 . George
vhlch shall hold those documents In trust ond In escrov subject to tho follcn.inq
ESCR0Wt IWSTmCTiqiS
"

^ ^ S ^ ^

s

— ^

mn,c0

«—' P^V^nts of principal and Interest herein

provldod and perform o i l the other covenants and agreements herein eontstnod,
then upen payment of tho final Installment duo' tieixnjndgr Jfho Esc ro*\ Depositary
shall dollvor to tho BlATttS oil tho cscrovod drcuirants,
In the ©vent of a default In tho payment of any Installment of principal
or Interest and In tho ovont of a default In any other term or condition heroin
end In tho ovont notice of o dofeult other than for payment of principal end
Interest shall bo given to tho BIATRS by the SELLER and a subsequent fel luro
to rcnedy tho sm»o shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days, then tho
SELLL'R ney, at her option, tiooand a redelivery to hor of a l l of the escrowed
documents vhoreupon the BITTERS will vacate and peaceably surrentior nil of tho
premises hereinabove doscrlbod and the SELLER rosy ra-entor Into possession of
tho saroe without furthor process and any retain as ront ond IIC^JI dated donagos
o i l turns thorotoforo pold by BUYERS undor this Agrounont.

As an alternative rorody t h * SELLER may eloct to roduco any payment
jor a l l payments, accelerating and ttttvrlng tho entlr* balance of principal ond
Intcrost Inroodlatoly, to Judgraont or uuy have said ronedy on one or nor© successive or Intermittent occasions or way oloct to troat this Agreement as a
noto ond nortgaga passing t l t l o through to the BUYERS ond foreclosing tho saso
In tho cunocr provided by lay.
During tho porlod tho BUYERS Gro complying with tho terms of this
Agreement, thoy shall bo entitled to tho sole, exclusive, andbeneficial use,
occupancy, and onjoyaont of tho above described promises subject only to iho
rights of tho SELLER to inspect tho sarao ot rosaon^lo times.
4«

Tho BUYERS have Inspected said provisos and find tho same in a

aannor satisfactory to then tind thoro erono covenants or warranties oihor
than expressly sot forth heroin,
5t

Time shall bo of tho essence 03 t o a l l tho terms end conditions of

this Agreement which shall bind end Inure to tho borioflt of tho heirs, successors, end assigns of the parties hereto and tho party In default agrees to
pay n i l costs and a reasonable attorney^ foe In the ovent enforcement of this
conlract Is roqulrod.
WITUESS the hands of the parties hereto this ^4?

day of y ^ ^

,

/ ^

. :fi^if^u^jL?i ftcij&j^H^
ElsiOyUrliiKorlioff
^

^py
SELLER

JlL&iiJ^L^L^i2L
.1

Cloycl H. Drir.UcrloTF

/nh^^^J^^:.
1

H-UK OrfnliorhDv*

/(/
DUVERS

/&•

£y<*^^
A-200

COUNTY OF KANE

:
)

ss

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows:
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J.
Brlnkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of ownership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property.
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these
rights of ingress or egress, to said property.
The real property is described as follows:
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point
of beginning.
ALSO BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40 South, Range
7 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South
73°45* East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres
Total acres: 12.51
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property
is concerned.

~€? £l*cXdtfAA<^ri/f?fS<d<t **

jrp

Elsie Brinkerhoff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/

.'

Q sz^*V

My commission expires

day of April, A.D, 1971,

^V
/ /? .
CC/isCf*^'*-^^^
—

m

NTt

,

•

\s

-ij^Z^/^''
7
^PUMTIFF'S
EXHIBIT **>
P~3
X FOn lOCNTOJCATfON

I OAT* 1 9 8 > ™ ; HW

To whom It nay concern:
I, Elsie Brlnkcrhofff have received from Clqyd
, jnd Kark Brlnkcrhoff f *s payrrent on property,

Jf3hfiCs&
Signed: ~ £ ^ £ ^ X ^ ^ ^

STATE OF UTAH

J SS.

County of Kane
0n t h l

s (rfti

appeared before

d&

y

rae

of

&Fiul

n7J2

, personally

Elsie Brinkerhoff

f

the signer

of the above and foregoing instrument, v/ho duly acknowledged
to me that she executed the same.

iTi'tic,

.n^w^i,i, T > t ,

Notary Public
Residing at A/Xt^^l^^

Utlj/',

- PLAINTIFF'S

i

EXHIBIT no.
P-4
FOR IfgWfICATION

1 QATI-1 Qfit; o « .

ur?

Rtcordfd it Request of
it

.

:—

M. F M Piid $

By

County Recordir

Dip._

Book

Pegi

_Lr.an.teLe^..

MuT tix notki to .

Rit.: ....

Address....

..fil£nda.l£*..iltah.-.a4729.

W A R R A N T Y DEED
E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow,
of

Glendale

CONVEY

•

grmtor
, County of

md WARRANT

to

Kane

, Stat* of Utih, hireby

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a
m a r r i e d man, 9t\<\ CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a m a r r i e d man,
a l l as J o i n t Tenants w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p ,
and not as Tenants i n Common,

3 >J
of

Glendale, Utah

gnnttts
for tht turn of
— -(DOLLARS,
County,

84729

S10.00 & other valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n tht following described tracts of land in
KANE
Statf of Utih:

B

SM

it

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.

5
a •• "
o «4 -•

Mi
«s
WITNESS, thi htnd

of i&id grmtor

, this

4th

diy of

June

A. 0. 19 7 9 .
v,

JjJUi^LjL^^t

Signtd in thi Presence of

Elsie Brinkerhoff

HATE OF UTAH
County of

)
} SS
)

Kane
(

^ m^

On thi

4th

diy of

June

A. 0., 19 79

personally

V\
fWriTMlY^

»

ippeired before me

Elsie Brinkerhoff,

a widow,

PUBLIC . .
the signer
to me that

of the within instrument who duly icknowltdgtd
s he
executed the tame.
M A 7 > : ^ . J ^ L ^
James B. Adair

My Commission expire* _ June .19... 1979

My residence is

r

j ^ fffr

Notary
v 111p

-

\[\j£

public

SCMEDOU "A"
PARCEL 1: The West Half of Section 25, Township 39 South, Range 4S West.
ITlt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 320.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Ouarter (NW-J; the Southeast Ouarter (SE^a) and the
South Half of the Northeast Ouarter (S»,NEl«) of Section 26, Townshio 39 South,
Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 3: Lots 1. 2. 3. and 4; the Southeast Ouarter of the Northwest Quarter
( S E V M ) ; the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE^SW^); the East Half
of the East Half (ESES); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Quarter (SW«*NE>*)
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NVAiSE^) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South. Range 4H West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESNE^j); the South Half of
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSE^) and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter
( N W W O of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWfcNE1*); the West
Half of the Southeast Ouarter (WSSE»a) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Ouarter (SE^SW1.) of Section 29. Townshio 40 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base
^nd Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NV,) and the East Half of the Southwest
Ouarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containino 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containino 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SWVAft) of Section
B. Townshio 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEWW**)
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranae 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
containing 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section.26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00* East 963.6 feet; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the Worth line of
Section 26; thence South 09°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, R a n g e d West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80* West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
•4
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A-,204

Recorded i\ Request of
at

County fkc.crder

M. Fee Pari 5;

By

Hep

Bonk

|'a-|i!

Mail tax notice to

AdJnrss

W A R R A N T Y DEED
Elsie Brinkcrhoff, a widow,
0I

.jrantnr

Glendale

CMIM'UV

Kan...«

of

, Sut? of Utr.h. hneby

CONVF.Y and W A R R A N T tn • GOLL'A B. A0AIR, a married woman, as to an undivided 1/5
interest;
WARREN
BRINKERHOFF, a married man, as to an undivided 1/5 interest; ARLFNE B. GOULOING,
r
a married woman, as to an undivided 1/5 interest; CHARLES A. RRINK 'RHOFF. a
narried
married man, as to an undivided 1/5 interest and BETTY B. ESPLIN, a married
i:<|
woman, as to an undivided 1/5 interest,
waiters
'"J
J
of Orderville, Utah
foor the sum of
$10.00 b other valuable cons ideration-COLLARS. »
the following described tiatt
State of Utah:

of l.siicf in

rCu:mrv

KANii

— '

SEE" SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AIM BY THIS RLf'LRLNCF MADE A PART HEREOF:

BH

i*

WITNESS, the hand

of said grantor

, this

15th

day of

August

t

5^

A. D. 19 2 0

\ ..C:A^<. < , JO- l.:.,Y^±^:L:A,^:

Signed in the Presence of

\

Elsie

Brinkerhoff

u.

)
)

STATE OF U T A H
County of

) SS.

Kane

)
On the

15th

appeared before me

the signer
to me that

day of
Elsie

August

A. 0 . . 19 3 0

Brinkerhoff,

personally

a widow,

of the with.n instrument who duly ac' nOA-lcdynd
She
txciuted the same.

<#AL
'/James
My Commission expires •• .'JllHC

I 9 . . . 1 W J 3 ...

B.

Adair

My residence is

^
Notary Puhlis

0r.<lt\r.V i..11.<?.»...Ut«ih.... |

f\

~3-°

IjKrTIIDMITO

5

|

AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF (1/2) INTEREST IN AND TO THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY:
SCHEDULE "A"
PARCEL I: The West Half of Section 25, Towi^hin 39 South, Rar.qe 4'j, West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containinq 320.0 acres, core or less.
PARCEL 2: The Northwest Quarter (NW1.,);l the
Southeast n u arter (SL^) and the
South Ma 1 f of the Northeast Ouarter (S ,NElJ of Section 26, Townshio 39 South,
Ramie 4~, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 400.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 3^ Lots lt 2, 3, and 4; the Southeast n u artcr of the Morthwest
Quarter
5
T S E \ N W 1 ; ) ; the Northeast Ouarter of the Southwest Ouarter (NE^SW *); the East Half
l
of the East Half (E',E >); the Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Quarter (SWU«E!,,
and the Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter (NW-«SE^) of Section 27,
Townshio 39 South, Range 4\, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.c^
acres, more or less.
PAJRCiLJLi The East Hjlf of the Northeast Quarter (E^NE\j); the South Half of
"the Southeast
Ouarter (SKSE^) and Northwest n u arter of the Southeast Ouarter
(NWsSE1*) of Section 3S, Townshio
39 South, Ramie 4S, West, Silt Lake Base and
Meridian, ccntainin':j 200.0 azrvr,, no re or l<;ss.
PARCEJ. 5: Th'- Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWvU/i); the West
H a T f o T the Southeast Ouarter (w!,SE^) and the Southeast Quarter of the v.^thwes*.
Ouarter (SLVSW'1,) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt l ^ e Da:e
and pridian, containing 160.0 .icres, more or less.
PA
i?Ca„i_i. Thl- Northwest Quarter (NW**) and the East Half of the Southwest.
O'uaVter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Pan no 4'-j West, Salt Lake Bisc- .«.r,d
teridian, containinq 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lere Base
and Meridian, containina 39.08 acres, more OJ less.
>'WSt-L3^. The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest b a r t e r (SWVW 4 ) of Section
8", "TowfisTVio 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt L?ke Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 i\nc\ the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEV.W'i)
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and tteri'Han,
containinq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running% thence South
0°35* West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, S03.0 feet, more or less, to the North line of
Section 26; thence South 89°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
. PARCfL.lL : BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, S a H
Lake
Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
30 3 West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.6a chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, trore or less.

j&
.^AA^^

Elsie B'rinkerhbff

'BSST

i

or\£

WHEN RECORDED, MULT
....Southern..Utah. Title Company .
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M

r
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Space Above This Lino For Recorder's t > e

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of R e n t s
T H I S T R U S T D E E D , made this
•M&

. .15th ...day o f . .

August

.19.1*9...

between
GoJ.da. B.. A d a i i v a ..nuirriocf .woman;
.. Warren..
B r i n k e r h o f f , a married man; ArU-nc G. Gouldinn, a married woman-; Charles
ft. B r i n k g r h p f f , a i r a r n e d rcan « Hetty. B, E s p l i n , a narriQd. womjn; n s TRUSTOR,
whose address is

Ordervi 1 le .?«. Glendale
(SMrH HI,-I

MI'UITI I

'
8 !
g j

Utah

{• T.v)

IS-.itr»

t>

.J

& v;
..SQUIJ.IE R.N...UTAH TITLE COMPANY., n li?ah. C o r p o r a t i o n

Elsie...Br.mker.hoff, a widow
WITNESSETH:

:r,

T R U S T E E / ur.d

, as

PENEFICIARY,

T h a t T r u s t o r C O N V E Y S A N D W A R R A N T S T O T R U S T E E IN T R U S T ,

W I T H P O W E R O F S A L E , t h e following described property, situated in

c

^i

NJ

,

3 ^ 1

KANE

B

County, S t a t e of U t a h :

^

P V-

SEE SCHEDULE " A " ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF:

T o g e t h e r with all buddin;^, fixtures a n d improvements thereon am! all water right-*?, rights of
wny, casements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditament >. privilege* and appurtenances
t h e r e u n t o belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or a n y part thereof,
S U B J E C T , H O W E V E R , to the right, power and a u t h o r i t y hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR T H E P U R P O S E OF S E C U R I N G

( 1 ) p a y m e n t of the indebtedness evidenced by 5 pro-

missory notesof even d a t e herewith, m the principal sum of $ . 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0
t made by
T r u s t o r , payable to the order of Beneficialy nf the times, in the mumter and with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions a n d / o r renewals or modifications thereof; r j l the performance of
each agreement of T r u s t o r herein contained; CO t h e payment of such additional loans or adv.ince.-i as
hereafter m a y be made to T r u s t o r , or his successors or assigns, when evidenced bv a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by thin Tried. Deed; and (1) the p a y m e n t of all sums
expended or advanced hy Pencficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.

~

ft-J*t

-j

•NOTK: Trustr* mini IK? »I m'-rnhrr of tin- Ttrih State H-ir; a l.;mk. IniiMint' in I loan a s w i a t i o n <•, ...v.inm
and lonn iM9oriftti<iri atithi.ti/.d to ,|„ ,.», J, )tW*itws* ,,, I !.-,», ., «,„,..„;,ti, i n .iiitliori/cd to tf» a tnnt l.n.it..-.* m

u.ffh: or o title insiiiiuit'0 i»r al^frut company nufhori/iil !<• <!.. .u»I. IMMIM.-IH m Ui.»li

gmmmmmmmmmmmmm^

TO P H O T E C r T l l i : Sl-X'PWTY 01

T H I S T l t U S r DKI I). T H C S T O H

ACini'S:

1. T o keep .'.»id property in go.Hl condition and repair, not >.• remove or <h moli . h .in. building th< f o n , to
Complete or restote p m i n p l l v .ind in |;*•«•<I and workmaalil e m a n n e r anv huil.imc. .• hi. ii :r,.i. | .• t n 'itet.-d
damaged or destroyed t h e n o n . to c.unplv w i 111 ;ill lav. v H A , -nam.-, .mil n ^ l r i . II.IIC. all.rii!.,' aid p c ; H I ! V . :.<;!
to curnnut or permit *a-.te thereof, not to i v n n m l , sufh-r o r permit an*, at I upon .-aid pr«>p«Tly HI •. i« •';• 11« >n • I l a * . 1:
do nil other acts w h u l i fit.in I hi' ( harat It- r or us..- of said pri>p.'il\ ma', he leasonahb. ueees- wy, the S|M i die
e n u m e r a t i o n s herein IH>1 i x . I n.linu* the general, and. it t h e I-,.IM M-< nr.-d hereby or anv part il.»-n of is I eon: <•)>
taincd b»r the p u r p o e of li:i.m< uig construction of impro .eiea nl-. on --ail p m p e i U . T r u s t o r further .upees
(a)
To commence (oii-.tinclioii promptly and to put \i<- ->.uue with re.i-...nahlc ilili,:t-iu> to i omj.J.Hon
in a r c u d a n e e with plans and specification-* s i t : -factory to I d u e f u i iry. and
(h)

T o allow 1»« m fi.aary to inspect said property at a!I limes cliiriait* cot.strui lion

T r u s t e e , upon presentation to it of an affidavit si.tmil hy Hem liciarv. -.eHiiii; forth l.m.s showing a d. fault
l»y T r u s t o r under this numht red p a r a g r a p h , is aut'nori/"d to accept a ; t i n e and conducive all f.ith and MalernciiLs therein. and to act tin icon h e r e u n d e r .
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of such type «T P. p-s and amount's as I d u e l i c ! ar- may !«••,,nr<\ en
the improvements now e \ i - i m g or hereafter erected ei placed on -aid p r o p e i i v .^mh UMir.iiuv shall \»- l a r r w d
in c o m p a n i e s approved hv H e n e f m a r y \silh |n,s payable rlau-.es in favor oj ami in foim .n i t y i able lo l i r e li. i.'.ry.
In cvvnt of loss. T r u s t o r shall g i w immediate noliee to fleuofici.ii v. who tnav make proof at loss, and each in- iir;::i<y
c o m p a n y concerned is heri'hy authorized and directed to m a k e pavment tor MH h l i s . d i r n i l y to I'.. ie 1 av.iry
instead of to T r u s t o r and Id-m-l M iar\ jointly, ami the wi.uianee proceed-.. ,.-r any p u t th. r i o j . ma> he a p ; l » d
hy lleneficiary, at its option, to reduction of tin? iudehlednc-.s heiehy s< < ured or to the r« v o r a t i i n or !.-pa;r o|
the p r o p e r t y damaged
3. T o deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary unlil the indebtedness si cured I rebv is p nd in full,
such evidence of title a; lien. le. iary may requite, in< ludm,: al>ar.i. t.-. ot nil. o» poliej.•;, <•! titie i n s u i a n i e and
any extensions or renewals thereof or s u p p l e m e n t s thereto.
4. T o a p p e a r in and d ' f e n d a n v action or pr:.ceedin:; purporting to affe. t
said j)roperty. or th.- rights or pi»wets of I i e m f i . i a r y or T r u s t e e , and should
also a p p i a r in or dtfetr.l any such action or pr.K as-dm^. t» pav all ir.,ts and
dence of title and ait uney"; tee-, in a reasonable sum incurred by Mencf ieiai y or '[

the s r e n n t v hereof, tu^ title to
Itemficiarv or T r u s t e e ehv.-t to
expenses, ifuhidinc «o.-t if evirujtee.

6. T o pay at least id d a y s before deliixpiencv all taxes and a s s e s a n e n l s affe. lim; s»id prr-perty, i n ' l u d i n f
all assessments upon water cuinpauv stock and ail rent;, as:.e>smeiits aiul e h a r c e s for water, a p p u r t e n a n t t> or
used in connection '.".ith :-aid p r o p e r t y ; to pa.'., when d u e . all encumbrances, i barj,'''s, .'•/».! IMT.S \%ii!\ i:if«.«reit,
on said property or anv piirl thereof, which at any time appear to l».- p n o r c.t superior hereto, to pay al) c . ' . n .
fees, and e i p e a s e s of this '\ rust.
ii. Should T r u s t o r fail to m a k e any p i y m e n t or 1<> do any a« t as herein |«rn\ jdcJ. then Panefi* i.»ry or
T r u s t e e , but without »>bhj;ation i.i to do and without notice to or d e m a n d upon T r u s t o r and without nb-a^ii.c.
T r u s t o r from any . Miration hereof mny: M a k e or do t h e ±;\mv in such m a n n e r and to such extent as either n u y
deem necessary to protect th.e security hereof, iienelieiary or Trustee heim; a>ithorr/ed \u enter •!;•«•:» .said
p r o p e r t y for such purposes; c o t n n v n e r . a p p e a r in ;in:l defend any indi«>n or (iroeeednu'. purpcrtirj,' to a'fect U:e
security hereof or the rii;hU .f p o w e n of Itcnefjciaiy *r Truster, pay. p u r c h a . e , . o n U s t , K.T <-ompiomis.' «ir.y
encumbrance, charge or I n n whii h in the jiu!i;jr;«:it of either appear*- to IK- prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any *uch powers, incur ar.y liability, evpend whatever amounts in ds a h . o b i t e dis« r« 'ir>rj it may c*-:m
necessary therefor, including o-st of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees
7. T o pay inum.iliately ae.d w i t l e u l d e m a n d ail sums i<vpi aded hereuirb-i by lb :. 'fi-iar y or T r u - t e * .
with interest from dale of expenditure at the rate oi ten p.-r cent, i 10'; ) per aiiriim ur.td paid. an.', the r\ j . :yment thereof shall be secured l v a b y .
I T IS M U T U A L L Y AGHKITJ T H A T :
8. Should said property or any part Ihon-of be taken or d a m a r c d by teas »n of a a v mjblie impr-..<r:.'?nt \
or c o n d e m n a t i o n proo-e Utv,', or fjam^Kci by file, or earth.p.i..l;e, or :n a n v other m a i m e r . Id scficiary .ball h* •
entitled to all (on-.pen di >n. awards, and other p a y m e n t s or relief therefor, and .-hall !••• er.s-tled at ;t> opiicn
to coir.raer.ce. a p p e a r m irwi pro'.e. ute m \\* own n a m e , any action or p v . . , duurs. or io make .\r,\ I U : I , | I J mise or settlement, in owino-liiii with Mich taking os d a m a g e . Al! s;:ch conineie;.«!io;). awani
.iaieawv... rf.;i;L<
of action and proceeds, including tin: proceeds of any police-: of fire and ( th r insurance aff.'itm,; said pr.i|><»ily,
are hereby assigned to Hi-ni f u i a i y . who may. alter t b d u c t i a , : lie refiom ali its .-xp. rises, w.cb.da.i' attorn' \ "s leey.
apply the s a m e on anv indebtedness .seemed hi reby. 'Trustor ;i;-r.ei to execute MI.-h l u i t b . i a - -i«iirra-ni< of an>
compensation, award. ilamaj;es. and riK'its of ai-lioii am! pr<«e,-,| s va Ib-neflciary or 'J'ni.>t* e may requj"-.
9. At any t«m«' and from time to time upon writtdm rerpn^d nf llenefi.i try. p a y m e n t of i{; fees a.-.d presentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in v;i<v of full re.-onvevance. for canceilaii wi and
r e t e n t i o n ) , without affecting the liability of any person b i the (Mvnvnt of ih*« indebt'd.-;. , . '—.•in-ed herr-by.
T r u s t e e may (a) enn-ent to the making of any majj o r plat ef >aid p r o p e r l y ; fh) join in /jrantmK anv ex**.*
m e a t or creating a n y restriction thereon; (e) join in any sultoi'dination or either a ^ i n i m nt affe'-tic.;: this 'Tru-.t Deed
or the lien or charge :b. reed. i'di reconvev, wp.'uait. w a r r a n t y , id I or any p u t of said properiv 'The »'iant/»e in
any reconveyance may h<; de:»rriU-d as "I he pers »n «>r persons m t i t b ^ l thereto", and the recitals tie i. in <f any
m a t t e r s or facts shall b«? conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof T r u s t o r agrees to pay n.isoi.able 'IrusU-e's
fees for any of the M'rvsces mentione«l in thii para^rap.h.
10. As additional security. T r u s t o r hereby av.u.ns fieaefi. iarv, durim; the continuance of these in.:••••., all
rents, issues, royallits, an 1 f>rofit-> of the property at/eeied by t i n ; 'Tried l>«-etl and of any personal property
located thereon. I'ntil 'Trustor shall default in the p a y m e n t of any indebtedness securer! h e p by or in the performance of any agreement bere.mder. 'Trustor shall have the nr.bt to <o|het all such rents, i> ues. royalties.
arid profits earned prior to default us they become d u e and payable, li T r u . d o r shall default as a f o r e . a i l ,
T r u s t o r ' s right to collect any of S J . h moneys shall cease and Heneficiaiy shall have th» rn;ht. with or v. iihotii
taking posseision of the property affected hereby, to collei t all rent.s, royalties, issues, and profits Failure or
discontinuance of l i e : u d i n a r s «t »«ny time or from t i m e to hrne to collect any such mom-vs f,hall iv-i in any
m a n n e r affect th»? subse<picnt erdorcemeat by Iteiieficiary of the ri^ht. power, arid iuithoritv to colb« i the* >.am>.
Notinng contained herein, nor the exercise of tie* rii;ht Iv.' fieriefinary tr» eo||..-et. -.hall l»e. or be construed to
be. an nffimudion by H« neficiary of any tenancy, l"i»s#» or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor n
subordination of the ben or charge of this T n : s l D^-d to any such tenancy, lease or option
11.

Upon

any defuult by T r a s t o r hereunder, Beneficiary m a y nt any lime wifh-uit notice, either in
by a receiver to l>e appointed by a court ( T r u s t o r herebv eun:»eatin»; to the ;ippomtir»-nt of
receiver), and without regard to Iho adecpiacy <jf any security b»r the wtdehtrduesi hereby
and take possession of said property <»r a n y part thereof, in it*- own nata'» -m- b.r t r
oliierwistT collect said t^-ntM. iviucs. ami profiL;, including thos*- past d u e arul unpaid. ;:nd apply the >ame, W:*
cosU ami expenses of operation and collection, including reav>n-ible attorney's frs.-s. upor. any i.i lebiednt-ai
necurcd hereby, and in such order tu Hen. ficiary may determine.
terson, by agent, or
fsecured,
l«uieficiary aa such
e n t e r upon

12. T h e entering upon ai»<l Uikins possession t»f said property, tin* colh.cton of siu It renf.s. i c m s
and
profits, or the proci»c<is of fire and other insurance policies or compensation or aw.irm f..r any taking or
d a m a g e of said property, and t i e application or release then .f as aforesaid, shall n ( c ;n; or v.ae.e anv
default or notice of default h e r e u n d e r or invalidate a n y art doa»- pur:-mint to such aotn.e.
13. T7ie failure on the part of lleneficiary to promptly cnlttrco any rjfdit h e r e u n d e r «-hdl not op»-rat» na
a waiver of such right and the *.'juvc. L<y iienefieiaiy of a n y d . l a u l t shall not caustitx.te a waiver of any otl»er
or subsequent default.
H . T i m e is of the e.sen< t- hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the p a v r r a n t of any ituh.'bf^lness teoirecl hereby or in th«; pcrform.irice of any ogreenient hereunder, oil sums v - c u r e l hereby shall i.nme.Ji id ly Income due
Aiul p a y a b l e at the option of Ilen-fi*aary In the e \ e n t of such default. Iienefieiaiy m a y execute or c:iu«e 'Trustee
to execute a written notice A default and of vlsjctic.n t o cause said property to IK? s«dd to satisfy U'.e obligations
hrre«f. iuad T r u s t e e khul! fde such notice f(»r ree^id in each county wherein said p r o p " i t \ or Koine p a r t or
parcel thereof is situated JWaeficiary also shall depouit with 'Trustee, the note and all documenta evidencing
e x p e n d i t u r e s secured hereby.
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15. Aft#r the laps** of such tune as may then ho rrqniicd hy law folio* iff, the vcordati'.n of said no'.ice of
default, and notice of default nod notice of s.»i<> having be, n civ. i ;n then requir.fl hy I iw, 7 rusUc, \\ilh'.u! «hv:iand
on Trustor, shall sell s o i l property on tho. date mid ;.t the rune md pl;uc deviirnat.'-il n : -ml n " e „f *.i|.'. either ai
a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order a> it_ may defem mi- <l>t;t .'.object lo anv '.(•ilutory iii;ht of I ruslor to .
il ki».wn |.>(
p . i n c h , shall be sold.). at public
direct the order in which such property, if const-imp of M
auction U> the highest bidder, tho nurcha.ie price pa>able in l.i^'ful mjf.e;, « t the United Sf.tte* at 'he '..ue o f
tale. Tl>c person conducting the sale may, for any cause h«' dr.irv expedient, postpone the tab* from time to
lima until it shall be completed and, in every CHU', notice of pn;'p"rienu>nt shall lw Rivtn by p.iblic tied irMi<»n
thereof by such pernm at the time and place l.i.t appointed for the side, prove). <l, if the s.ile i? p»• spoiled
for longer than out* day beyond the day deKigimted in the rK.ti.t- id sale, notice thereof tdiall be riven in the
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute ioid deliver to * I *«• pirn INCUT it. Deed c ;n
veyirif said property so wild, but without any covenant or warranty. e«pr»-s«c or implctl. Th«* recitM* in th;Deed of any mutters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthlulnes*: thereof Any tvrv.n. includiri:'. B<»r.e
ficiary. mav bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceed* of the sale !«» payment of (I) the' c.st.s ant'
expenses of exercising the jnwer of sale and of the sale, inclulini; the pa> merit if the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with s j c h sale an I revenue :-tanips on Trustee'* l)tt<\.
(3) aJI sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, v.ith accrued ir.*'i^est at 10'v- per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; end (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or perjoru
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with, the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, l',en<fi< iary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed u\ the manner provided bv l r *
for the foreclosure of mortgages on r--»al property <md FUnefi.KH> shall be entitled t> n e v e r in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including u reasonable attorney's fee in such anvu:nt as shall be
fixed by the court.
17. Beneficiary may npp'int a »uccossor trustee at any ti"ie by fdiru: for record in th<? office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property r»r some part thereof i*; s p o i l e d , a substitution of tr.J !•••• From
the time tlic substitution is filed for record, the new trur.tr-e .shall sueroej ta ull fI»4» powers, duties, nathirity
and title of the trustee named h o ^ i n or of any Mjco-vsor tru-tee Kuch «.uch substitution ih.*dl lie executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall In* fiiven and proof thereof rn-ide, in the manni. r provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to
devisc«s. adminstrat'ars, executors, s t r e s s o r s and
several. T h e term "Uenefici irv" shall mean the
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural

liie benefit of. and bird al! parties hereto, their heirs, lri^tee-s,
assign.?. All obligations of Trustor hereunder «rc joint and
owner ;ii-.d holder, ineludirii' any pledgee, of the noU» secured
i e q u i p s , tho masculine t:«t.'ier includes the feminine .-uid/or

19. Trustee accepts thin Trust when this Trust Dof-.-l. duly executed and afl:nr> vleil^.-d. is made a public
record as provided by law Trustee is not obligated to notily any pa;»> hereto of pending r;a?e under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, lie; icficmry, or Truatcv shall be a pntty, u t d e »
brought by Trustee.
20.

This Trust Deed

shall

be construed

according to the laws of the State of

21. T h e undersigned Tiustor requests thai u copy of any notice
hereunder be mailed to him ut the address hereinbefore set forth.

Uteh

<f default end of .•

notice, of sale

Signature of Truster
.I....U

;..::.. ;..;\n„i.;\.t.£,...{.'.'.

Gbl
3bliJa B., Ada j.r> .

Iu^:\..t..,7.r.l../J.» ^-W-.

J Be tty p. E5p_l!i ri

/

m&lKtfMHm
Warren SrinkeHioff
(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF Kane

6S

-

On the ...15th

August
* D§ I 9 AO ., nCr5onaUy
d a y of
Golda B. Adair, Betty B. Esplin, Charles A. BrinkerhofT,
appeared before me ...Arlpn(?..P....Gpulding,
"...*.K?.r.f?.n...^r.V^f-rflP.ff...,
the signer(t) of the? above instrument, %vho duly acknowledged to mo that they, executed the

j s?

../^r^'£./%^
cf
My Commission Expires:
June 19, 1983

*

s<t>J^$K

At^T^xf:

Notary Public resifinjj/aj;rr
VV;\ •"*. V , V \
Order v.i.Ue^...Utah

3£?
(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OK UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the

ss

*
day of

appeared before me

, A.D. W

, personally

, who lehvt: by mc duly sv,r>m,

says that he is the
of
,
tho corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and thai said insfrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

ackiiuwledgud
-

k-V>1

OV.IC3)

1'iui u

\j i

iv. J J .

PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (ESHE*s); the South Half of
the Southeast Ouarter (SSSEV; and Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter
(NW^SE^i) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South,, R.NUIO 4^ West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter (SW^NEV); the West
H~aT7 o f T h e Southeast Quarter (W'iSE**) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Quarter (SEUSW1-,) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4>a West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NWVi) and the East Half of the Southwest
ftuarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ramie 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containinq 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 4^ West, Salt Lake Base
and MericTian, containina 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Ouarter (StfVJW^) of Section
BTHT ownsfino 40 South, Ranoe 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter ( N E W * ) .
of Section 31, Townshio 40 South, Range 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
contairv-nq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°00' East 963.6 feet; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the North line of
Section 26; thence South 89°57' West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 11; BEGINNING at the Southwest Corner of the Southwest Quarter of
the Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
30° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1.0 chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.

,M7

•••Si.

++

++

++

Recorded at Request of
at

M. Fc«Paid$.

by

Dep. Book

Mail tax notice to

Pai;c

~

Rcf.

Address

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
E l s i e B r i n k e r h o f f , a widow,
yj-.nuor
Glendale
, County or
Kane
, St.siv* ot U u h , lurch)
.\HJIT-CLAIM
to G01.0A B. ADAIR, a m a r r i e d woman, cv> ?.o an un<! ivinV-J ! ' 5
i n t e r e s t ; WARREN BRINKERHOFK, a married mar;. as tc an undivicky) l,'1- ^ I ^ T C - I ;
ARLENE B. GOULDING, a m a r r i e d woman, *;; 1.0 an • j r d i v i r i H 1/5 in tore"* v. ''>!/'(=!.t'S
A. BRINKERHOFF, a m a r r i e d -ran, a:, t o an undivided \/J i n t e r ^ t ; <-nd 3M1Y i : .
ESPUN, a m a r r i e d wcvr.cin, as to an undivided 1/5 i n t e r e s t ,
<r.iiucec.
>}' Glendale & O r d e r v i l l e , Utah
i-r rhv s-iui oi »,l
SIO.OO ^ olf.or v a l u a b l e cons irjrrat. ion- - J X>t l.AKS A^
:.f

#3

m

.:he following described W^.^Jxxx:l».U>^i<M^
Stare of Utah:

<:

;

v,at . r r T ' i - s

5J ?-

County.

in Kane

>• 3

.•i

•»

o

A l l of Water Users Claim Number* 23-4, ?35, ?.'tt% *.'J7, 238, 23J,
242, 243 and 244.

i

\n
g I *g
B

1$
33
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this
9th
September
t A. D. one thousand nine hundred and

day of

eighty

J
Signed in the presence of

j .:'.0'\ i<l •<-.
'r.lZlL/.-.U.Ji.-'C
J F":si€» O i n k e r h o f f

>-cy/

- J

i>TATE OF U T A H ,

j
»• s s .

bounty of Kane
On the
9th.
:housand nine hundred and
E l s i e Brinkerhoff,

J
e i uh ty

day of
Soptenler
personally appeared before me

A. D. one

a widow

.he signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that

sile^/tJxeCutei

f Y^J]-^i\mmmn.

V

August 13, 1983
Mr. Hans Q Chamberlain
Attorney at Law
F.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
RE: Brinkerhoff vs Brinkerhoff

Civil No. 1826

Dear Mr. Chamberlain:
Based on the following facts and provisions, I am writing
to inform you of my intent to withdraw completely from, the suit
in question.
A- This action has caused such a division in my family because
of the underhanded manner in which the deeds were changed, that
the feeling may be impossible th reconcile.
B- Because the outcome of this action will be of no financial
advantage to me, I will not assume any financial obligation that
may arise from continued involvement.
C- It is my intent and desire to restore all Property, Permits
and Water Rights to thier rightful owners, Mr. Mark J. and
Mrs. Lena A. Brinkerhoff. That the annual payment of Two
Thousand be. due and payable outlined in the original agreement.
D- That my son Warren may, with prior approval, have enough
space to plant a garden and provide for the needs of his family.
E- That all family members try to resolve thier differences
and reunite as a family group.
F- I also express my displeasure at the allegation of financial
wrong doing against my son Mark, they are false and with out base.
The record will show that this action is done of my own free will
and choice, and represents my complete and total separation from
any and all future involvement in this suit.

S/U^Jt^
.sie

Brinkerhoff

cc: Mr. Willard R. Bishop
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Dtl'ARIMENr OF SOCIAL SERVICES

m^h

DIVISION OF HEALTH
VITAL STATISTICS

w
:lassified as
ider the Utah
P'actiMs Act.

|:;£|iwjl;^;;f; 'M

C9-01

.

'.JB^^E^B^H^^

STATE'OF UTAH - DIVISION OF HEALTH

LOCAl FILE NUMBER

RACE (White, black. Am. Indian, etc.)' JATF-. OF OfcATH (Mo.. Oay. Year)
Specify
t

Cloyd

Harris

Brinkerhoff

Male

..July 1 3 , 1923
CITIZEN ct whai country

DIRFHPLACE (State or foreign
country)

.

Utah

MamMJ ^
Never
Married 3

U.S.A.

Wood S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
Merle
2 1 South

200 E a s t

CITY OR TOWN

DICAL
MINER
OR
ICIAN'S
RTIFITION

8^729

Lena

J

I

I

Utah

jl8d.

)^ In patient
~ E D . patten!
Z DOA

G a r f i e l d Memorial H o s p i t a l

iCITYORTOWN

l20b.

P a n g u i t ch

.

j COUNTY-,

\ \

\j£\(\ G a r f i e l d
l

A)

MO.

HOUR:

J£

DAY

'

NAME AND LOCATION OF CEMETERY OR CREMATORY

CONDITIONS IF ANY
WHICH GAVE RISE TO
THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE
(A). STATING THE UNDERIVING CAUSE LAST.

Jk

AGO

JTTTAM ¥ MY3

#*-l

27.

Interval between onset v

C'A7\

DUE TO, OR
(B)

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF

H

"(

1 '• \

j

~

'

"^interval between onset a /

DUE TO, OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF
(C)
;

!

I

^vA^H,rvj

MQ-AYQVCNI

|intervai between onset ar*

,\

DATE ol Injury (Mo . day. Ytar>

Pending Investigation
Suicide
Homicide

./YA

Undetermined if Injured
Accident!/ or Purposety

A/A

AUTOPSY

l

ITIME OF INJURY
I {24HourC1l<

m

NA

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OCCURHED (eotet sequence of events which resulted in Injury. NATURE OF INJURY
SHOULD BE ENTEREO IN ITEM 29)

^juRYArwbnx?

^yVft*

Nn

Were laco'atOiy tests done for
drugs or tot«c cf>
37

£ This is to certify that this is a true copy of the certificate on file in this office. This certified copy is
V issued under authority of Section 26-15-26 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended.
S Date Issued: OCT
COUNTY:

%$ 10 JQ

SOUTHWESTERN UTAH
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VESD NOG

PLACE OF INJURY (Specify home. farm. f»cl>».
street, office buildings, etc^l / A

Nh

LT)

IF YES, were findings conf,nd

YES D N O ^ I

_J.31b
.Distance from place of m|ury to
j'jsuat residencei'tem.18)

LOCATION OF INJURY-STREET AND NUMBER OR LOCATION ANO CITY OR TOWN.

UHS • 12 Rev. 1/78
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Q
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Hate accepted for registrfttio«<
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CO
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j LICENSE NU \\
,___.
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Ut

a . S p i l s b u r y & Graff Mortuary, Kc : |

(filter only «n«C

IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

1:2C

I PATE SIGNED (Mo.. Day. Year)

\S

G l e n d a l e Cemetery, G l e n d a l e . Utah

2«.

N

FUNERAL HOME—Name, address and license number

t/mv\

\zx> O c t . 16,79

23a.

t...Garfield C l i n i c 2nn N

YEAR

SlGNAT'JPF'of Funeral d ' e c V " " "

Entombent L I D A T E
Cremation C'
Other
Z

*

| 7JME of death U

8,47-19

PART It. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS-CONTRIBUTING TO DEATH, BUT NOT RELATED TO THE
IMMEDIATE CAUSE GIVEN IN PART I.

I

Y E $

IT.

/'»

Burial ^
Removal Z\

hm

Was decedent eve* in l
Armed Forces?

L> O A L W ^ I L I U W irx L

,A)

INJURY
INFORMATION

B

Adair

Lena A. B r i n k e r h o f f
P.O. Box 2 1
G l e n d a l e , Utah 84?29

YES S NO O

110b.
ISTATE

ICOUNTY

jPART I. DEATH WAS CAUSED BY:

CAUSE
OF
DEATH

^
12.
NAME of surviving spouse (if, wife, er.tor maiden nam*.)

.MEDICAL EXAMINER: I hereby certify that to the test ol rr./ Kncwifedgw the death occurred at the hour,
I PHYSICIAN OH MEDICAL £XAMIN££ .SIGNATURE 4
[date and place stated above from the causes stated below based on examination of the oody and lot
nvesiigation of the circumstances.
Z19
Decedent was pronounced dead at: HOUR:
DATE:
PHYSICIAN: I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the daath occurred at
j C E R T l F l e R ' S n a m e and title (Type or print)
hhe hour, date and place stated above from the causes stared below, that I attended the
1
(decedent, and I last saw the decedent alive on.
_
S)
f
|
^
B r i a n
I ' a n d l e V J l . D .
w
C
day
) ^
H not certified by medical examiner, was death reported to him? YES i r ' N O LJ If yes.
CERTIFIER'S address and Jip code
enier the date and hour reported: (24 hour clock)
22.

JERAL
ECTOR
LOCAL
iSTRAR

SOCIAL. SECURITY MUMSE* j

INSIUE CITY LIMITS? NAME A MAILING ADDRESS OF INFORMANT

NAME of hospital, nursing home or other institution wh-sre death occurred.
[(If outside an institution, give street address or location.)
20a.

Yn.

E l s i e Jones

Brinkerhoff

Glendale
CEOF
•ATH

IF UNDER 24 .M

Days

MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER

I USUAL RESIDENCE—(S:reet ana number or location and Zip cede)

DENCE

11.

Lumber
i13b Kaibab I n d u s t r i e s

NAME OF FATHER

;UAL

,.56*

IF UNDER lyaar

cv>UCATI0/4—vi:pt?ci»y only higheal y a d e cornp-ettd)
Elementary or Secondary jd-12) College (1CM6 or 17 + )

Divorced G
Widowed rJ
Other
D

• KINO OF BUSiNSSS OA INDUSTRY

USUAL OCCUPATION (Give Kind of work done during most of
working life, even if retired )

. October 1A, VMM

White
AGE (Last
Birthday)

WAS OECEOENT OF SPANISH ORIGIN? YES Z NO V If yes. indicate type: OAIE OF BiRTH (Mo.. Pay. Year)
Metican Z Puerto Rican Z'. Cuban 3 Other Z (I' other, specify)

13a>

*m

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

NAMEOF DECEDENT

EDENT
50NAL
*TA

^ ^ X t f f e ^ g f g *

• DIRECTORQF VITAL STATISTICS

Werw laboratory tests
done for •1cgryfi?>#

YES/yNj

I

If motor vehicle accident, specify
if decedent was driver.passenger
or pedestrian.
40.

j

\V

T R U S T DEED

NOTE

DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this nole, with Trust Deed securing some, must be surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$

l0.,0Q0.t00

^r^Ue?..^
August 15

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly

^ l98p

and severally, promise to pay to the order of

Elsie Brinkerhoff, a widow
The Sum of
Ten Thousand and no/100

.::..::::::::::::::

"...DOLLARS ($..J.P.AP.?O ! OO I>>)>

together with interest from date at the rate of
NUNt
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

pCf

c c m

^ U

cjc) pc r annum on

The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance is
paid in full.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of
cent (

?"!?.!:.

per

»•-•%) per annum until paid.

If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in die payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

Gollfla B. Adair

&j2d*k.

i-DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT M 0/V2£L
.-__

i

PON IDENTIFICATION
DATl:

RPTftHt*)

P L A N K NO.
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ESCROW AGREEMENT
Escrow No..
..Au.gil.s.t..!5

19.80..

STATE RVNK OF SOLTIIEILt' UTAH
Orderville,
t Utah
Gentlemen:
The undersigned, (Seller)
E.1.5.1e..J6r.iDX?.r.b.Q.f.fj..A..Wl4o.W
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is
filendale,..Utah
84729
and (Buyer) ...Golda...B.....AdaJ.r,...a...rn.arrled..woinan.,

hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is
.Qrder.vi.lie*.. Utah....B4758
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree.
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED:
1.
++

Trust Deed Note
++

++

++

+••-

++

++

YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $.MXXXXXXXXX
principal, ($
?!/A
having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original principal afnount of $
..:..) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at....Np.ne.
per cent per
annumjfrom
N/A
,19
, to be paid as follows:
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on
the 15th day of.each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00
has been paid or until the death of the Grantor above named, whichever occurs
first.
++

++

4+

++

++

4+

++

t

Remit payment to the account of the Grantor at State Bank of Southern Utah,
Orderville, Utah.

The undersigned hereby agree as follows:
1. The
State Hank of Southern Utah
(hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions.
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the
bank in writing by Grantor.
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of
any person executing or depositing the same.
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indemnified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability.
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties.
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct.
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or employee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care.
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the construction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liability and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel.
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its compensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur.
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and demands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other disposition of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing instructions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until:
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved herein or affected hereby; and/or
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been notified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested.
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, including money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent.
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $
as an acceptance
fee with respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided however, that a minimum fee of $
shall be charged for each payment received. It is also
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary services it may be required to render hereunder. Should any money, document or property remain in escrow
after one year from date hereof, the undersigned hereby agree to pay the bank the sum of $
for each year or fraction of year that such money, document or property is held by the bank hereunder;
and in the event such annual charge remains unpaid for a period of one year, the bank shall have the
right and is hereby authorized and directed to close its records with respect hereto and destroy any documents held by it hereunder.

iS.^WrrC,^

GRANTOR
GRANTEE
The
State Bank of Southern Utah
hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions
above set forth.
STATE RVVK OF SOUTHER* UTAH
Date:

19
By-

Received from The
to above.
Date:

State Bank of Southern Utah

all of the papers and documents referred

19.
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TRUST DEKD NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must bt surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$ 1°.!?9.Q-.9.Q

....Prderyi.].le,..Utah
...Augus.t...15

§ 198Q...

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of

^Ui?...?T.l!}.^T.h9.fJ.>..?..^lf!P.V.
The Sum of
TEN..TH0MNB.ANO

<i.l.Q.,0P0.t.QP

together with interest from date at the rate of
HP.N.v...
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

per cent ( V

c

/c)

),

per annum on

The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance
is paid in full.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of
cent (

0—%) p*f annum until paid.

NONE.

per

\

If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

tharles A. Brinkerhoff

fc

ESCROW AGREEMENT
Escrow No
August 15

80

19

STATE RANK OF MRTIIRRN UTAH
Orderville, Utah
_

!

. Utah

Gentlemen:
The undersigned, (Seller)

EMe.BrM^^^

hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is
y.e.nf!?l?»..Mtd.n....3*IQ
and (Buyer)
£h$r!?.?.../!U..B^
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is
Prderyi:lie,..Utah....84758
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree.
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED:
1.

Trust Deed Note.

++

++

++

44

44

+4

++

++

YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents a n l j ? * g j i ^ ^
Grantee upon P&ynient to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $..l?*3®^^»¥^
principal, ($
having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original principal amount of $
H/A
) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at
!i9.n.?....per cent per
annum from
B/A
,19
, to be paid as follows:
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on the
15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 is paid
full or until the death of the Grantor above named, which ever occurs f i r s t .
++

+4

44

4+

++

4+

4+

++

Remit payment to the account of the above named Grantor in the office of State
Bank of Southern Utah, Orderville, Utah.

(OVER)

A-218

The undersigned hereby agree as follows:
1. The
State Dank of Southern Utah
(hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions.
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any
time after the dates herein specified therefo• and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the
bank in writing: by Grantor.
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary mly, and is not responsible or liable in any manner
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of
any person executing or depositing the same.
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indemnified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability.
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties.
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct.
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or employee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care.
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the construction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank, shall incur no liability and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel.
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its compensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur.
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and demands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other disposition of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing instructions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until:
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved herein or affected hereby; and/or
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been notified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested.
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, including money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent.
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $
as an acceptance
fee with respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided however, that a minimum fee of $
shall be charged for each payment received. It is also
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary services it may be required to render hereunder. ShHClkkXHXtfWRKWdsotxrao^^
JCt«*»lwx/«xi*xfttt»xMxtateM^

6c*xeeK^XK*tx*xxfmti«axtf^
*n<kxKxbb<xsx«rtx*MKb^MWH>^xoJw
tMgk k )axixlxl^b(*reJti5^»xt5iK)nKC^xRA xtt wxx*<x *a x^'tfxx JUxwcBxixawxlx xtt*R*#xlXW** xwdxdrtfxax xwax dwx*x
tWMfefc hakfctoyxi*)!)©rxitn«UK
rS
arles A. Brlnlcerhoff
'""char

E l s i e ' Br rnkerhbff

r

^

^.:i;.:^i^/i^
GRANTOR
GRANTEE
The
Stme Bunk of Southern Utah
hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions
above set forth.
STATE IM.WCOF SOtTllERA UTAH
Date:

19
By..

Received from The
to above.
Date:

State Bank of Southern Utah

all of the papers and documents referred

19..

A.~:LI<?

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

I

.....s.t:..^.or.^.!..^.tah.

10a000s00

....August J5

FOR

VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly

119.

.80

and severally, promise to pay to the order of

Elsie..Brinkerhoff, a
The Sum of
Ifcn.J.hp.us.«nrt..^

($..J.o,P.oo.qp
n e

together with interest from date at the rate of
...!:.?. . .
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

per cent (.. .*:.

)%

%) per annum on

The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on the
15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance is paid
in full.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of
cent (

...9.....

.....per

Q-%) per annum until paid.

If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
ox without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

Warren Brinkerhoff

\
BLANK NO.

0 I S O GEM PIC. CO. — 320 t o aeoo I * M — IALT LAMC CITV

~*f~~

ESCROW AGREEMENT

Escrow No

_

August,15

19.80...

STATE IIWK <» SOITIIKR* tTAII
Orderville
Uuh
Gentlemen:
The undersigned, (Seller)

.^ie.Brinkerhoff,

hereinafter called ••Grantor", whose address is
and (Buyer)
Warren Br.inkerhpff

a widow

Gjendale, UtahL.8472?

hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is 295. South 30.0 West, St... George,..Utah ...84770
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and properly hereinafter described, to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the following inst ructions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to which the underpinned hereby aprec.
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED:
1.
++

Trust Deed Note
++

++

+

++

-K

4 +

YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $..^^M^^M^.,
principal, ($ N/A
having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original principal amount of $ N/A
) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at....Nohe per cent per
annum from
M/.A
,19
, to be paid as follows:
j
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on the
15th day of each.and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 is paid
or until the death of the Grantor above named whichever occurs first.
•H-

++

*

+

-H

+

++

Remit payment to the account of the above named Grantor at State Bank of Southern
Utah, Orderville, Utah

<ovr.K)

A~-XZ\

The undersigned hereby agree as follows:

»

1. The
state Hank of Southern Utah
(hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions.
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the
bank in writing by Grantor.
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of
any person executing or depositing the same.
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indemnified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability.
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties.
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct.
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attpmey or employee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care.
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the construction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liability and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel.
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its compensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur.
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and demands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other disposition of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any.of them or to any person named in the foregoing instructions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until;
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved herein or affected hereby; and/or
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been notified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested.
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, including money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent.
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $
as an acceptance
fee with respect to its services hereunder tor one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to
pay the bank an additional fee of one-ter.th of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided however, that a minimum fee of $
shall be charged for each payment received. It is also
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary services it may be required to render hereunder. XkMKkkXKXWWXiX^d^KawdXOW^
afe*9(;C>RKXWXiXxto»xri^
fc*>w aciixy WCIXKX tfxxwxx^
ai^>iaxtf;<#aK*mxM^XHXMXiXxolxx^
ri gh K awirfxtexuawx^^
mK«^J?KW<kXXJ^H>OJM«5<J<'X

Elsie""Brinkerhoff

"Warren Brinker'hbff

ZllSiS^

IK2<LIZBAZ.

ORANTOK
GRANTEE
The
Stan- lUnk of Southern l.toh
hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions
of which the foregoing is a copy and of tho papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions
above set forth.
STVTK BAKK Of SOUTHERN UTAH
Date:

10
By

Received from The
to above.
Date;

Stan* H«nk of Southern Utah
11)

all of the papers and documents referred
-

—

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be mode.

I

0r

10,000., 00

^ e . r . v . i ..l 1 . e ..v.. uta . f1 ..

August 1 5 ^

FOR

^30

VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of

njj.e...exlnk.5xhpfiaL..a...wirJp.w.
The..Surn..of.

MIHOUSAN^^

($.1.Q.,000,00

together with interest from date at the rate of
!;."!*.!:
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

per cent (.. .9

%)

}>

per annum on

The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance
is paid in full.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
suchl installment not paid when due s!
shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of
cent (

...*:!?.••

per

-Q---%) per annum until paid.

If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and

payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
t reasonable attorney's fee.
, The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

^....^...t^^Lw...
Betty 6/ Esplintf

!
ESCROW AGREEMENT
Escrow No
August,15 ?

_
19

go

STATE IIAXK iW MHTIIKR\ UTAH
Qrriervillfi

, Utah

Gentlemen:
The undersigned, (Seller)
E.l5.1eJr.lnk.erhDf.f # ..a ..widow
hereinafter called ''Grantor", whose address is....5.1enda.l.e.*..Utdh....B4729
and (Buyer)
B.eMy...BA..£5.Dli.n»..ft..mrrie(J..W.Qfn^n,
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is
Qrderyille.,...Utah 84758
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree.
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED:
1.

Trust Deed Note.

++

++

++

++

++

-M-

++

YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $~XX.XXXXMXX,
principal, ($
^/A
having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original principal amount of $
N/A
) a n d interest on the unpaid balance thereof at NOfte per cent per
annum from
WA
,19
, to be paid as follows:
The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00 is
paid in full or until the death of the Grantor above named, which ever occurs
first.
++

+•

++

+

++

++

++

Remit payment to the account of the above named Grantor in the office of State
Bank of Southern Utah, Orderville, Utah.

(OVER)

The undersigned hereby agree as follows:
1. The
Stotc Rnnk of Southern t'tnh
(hereinafter called the- "bank"), is not a party, or
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing" instructions.
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any
time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the
bank in writing by Grantor.
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of
any person executing or depositing the same.
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indemnified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability.
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties.
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct.
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attorney or employee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care.
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the construction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liability and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel.
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its compensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur.
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and demands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other disposition of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall
not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing instructions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until:
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved herein or affected hereby; and/or
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and the bank shall have been notified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested.
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, including money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent.
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $
as an acceptance
fee with respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided however, that a minimum fee of $
shall be charged for each payment received. It is also
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary services it may be required to render hereunder. Sh$i*l*!xi!W>*ttHKW
*ft^&*a;4x^>d*»KxrixtahK)w>fx^
totttxtchx/ttwxH Krfxxotwo: x i x;*xwxt>b^x9odhxRKJwyx^
tt^ xtt > $ ^ W*n& *MRlx *MHp^
righk nailxaxbcor*toyxjwdbtox>w^

m**W*h*Wxfcx *x )hanMH*x»x

&,8&LL

ETsTe''Brinkerhbff

'" Betty fi- Es'pl
Jljfl

~&*£:}U^j£A..L:xaJiAslJ*-&-s

r

-

:..-
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GRANTOR
GRANTEE
The
State Hunk of Southern Utah
hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the terms and conditions
above set forth.
STATE IMAKOF SOUTHERN ITAI1
Date:
19
By..
Received from The
to above.
Date:

State Bonk of Southern Utnh
li)

all of the papers and documents referred
-...

A - ^

'r;*r~

T R U S T DEED

NOTE

DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: Whan paid, this note, wilh Trust Deed securing tome, mutt be surrendered
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$. J.9>999:99

Glenda.le>..U.tah
.....Auflust J.5

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly

t 19..80

and severally, promise to pay to the order of

nsi^.Br.inkerh^ff.,..A..wijclow
The..Sum..of
TEN..TH0US^
together with interest from date at the rate of
NONE
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

($..10,000.00.
per cent (.. 0

),

*/c) per annum on

The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980 and a like amount on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the entire balance
is paid in full.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. Any
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of
NONE
per
cent (

0—%) p^r annum until paid.

If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

BLANK NO.

6 1 3 O C I M n o co — »aio to a«oo CAST — SALT L A M CITV

0 0 £

ESCROW AGREEMENT
Escrow No

_

AUSUSOS

19.B0...

STATE IIAISK OF SOUTHERN UTAH

Orderville, Utah
_

!

, Utah

Gentlemen:
The undersigned, (Seller) £ l s j e j r j n ^
hereinafter called "Grantor", whose address is .?.]endale.,...Utah

84729.

and (Buyer)
-Ar.l£ne..R....Goulding,...a..married woman,
hereinafter called "Grantee", whose address is
.?J.?/?.d.?.l?.!.M*h..M?M
herewith deliver to you in escrow, the documents and property hereinafter described, to be held and disposed of by you in accordance with the following instructions and upon the tenns and conditions hereinafter set forth, to which the undersigned hereby agree.
PAPERS, INSTRUMENTS, MONEY and/or PROPERTY DEPOSITED:
1.

Trust Deed Note.

++

++

++

++

++

-H

++

++

YOUR INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
You are hereby authorized and directed to deliver the above described documents and property to
Grantee upon payment to you, at your above address, for the Grantor of the total sum of $.??M?.??.5f.!f.X
principal, ($
HZ A.
having already been paid by the Grantee to the Grantor on an original principal amount of $
H/A
) and interest on the unpaid balance thereof at....?!?!??.
per cent per
annum from

Jy.A

,19

, to be paid as follows:

The Sum of $30.00 monthly, beginning September 15, 1980, and a like amount on
the 15th day of each and every month thereafter, until the sum of $10,000.00
has been paid or until the death of the Grantor above named, whichever occurs
first.
4+

+

++

++

++

++

++

Remit payment to the account of the Grantor above named at State Bank ofSouthern
Utah, Orderville, Utah.

(OVER)

'

£^~

yxTf

The undersigned hereby agree as follows:
1. The
State Bank of Southern Utah
(hereinafter called the "bank"), is not a party, or
bound by any agreement which may be evidenced by or arise out of the foregoing instructions.
2. The bank is hereby authorized to receive any or all such payments or any part thereof at any
.time after the dates herein specified therefor and prior to receipt of notice of default delivered to the
bank in writing by Grantor.
3. The bank acts hereunder as a depositary only, and is not responsible or liable in any manner
whatever for the sufficiency, correctness, genuineness or validity of any instrument deposited with it
hereunder, or with respect to the form or execution of the same, or the identity, authority, or rights of
any person executing or depositing the same.
4. The bank shall not be required to take or be bound by notice of any default of any person, or
to take any action with respect to such default involving any expense or liability, unless notice in writing
is given an officer of the bank of such default by the undersigned or any of them, and unless it is indemnified in a manner satisfactory to it against any such expense or liability.
5. The bank shall be protected in acting upon any notice, request, waiver, consent, receipt or other
paper or document believed by the bank to be genuine and to be signed by the proper party or parties.
6. The bank shall not be liable for any error of judgment or for any act done or step taken or
omitted by it in good faith, or for any mistake of fact or law, or for anything which it may do or refrain
from doing in connection herewith, except its own wilful misconduct.
7. The bank shall not be answerable for the default or misconduct of any agent, attprney or employee appointed by it if such agent or employee shall have been selected with reasonable care.
8. The bank may advise with legal counsel in the event of any dispute or question as to the construction of the foregoing instructions, or the bank's duties thereunder and the bank shall incur no liability and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with the opinion and instructions of such counsel.
9. The bank shall have a first lien on the property and papers held by it hereunder, for its compensation and for any costs, liability, expense or counsel fees it may incur.
10. In the event of any disagreement between the undersigned or any of them, and/or the person
or persons named in the foregoing instruction, and/or any other person, resulting in adverse claims and demands being made in connection with or for any papers, money or property involved herein or affected
hereby, the bank shall be entitled at its option to refuse to comply with any such claim or demand, so
long as such disagreement shall continue, and in so refusing the bank may make no delivery or other disposition of any money, papers or property involved herein or affected hereby and in so doing the bank shall
* not be or become liable to the undersigned or any of them or to any person named in the foregoing instructions for its failure or refusal to comply with such conflicting or adverse demands; and the bank
shall be entitled to continue so to refrain and refuse so to act until:
(1) The rights of the adverse claimants have been finally adjudicated in a court assuming
and having jurisdiction of the parties and the money, papers and property involved herein or affected hereby; and/or
(2) All differences shall have been adjusted by agreement and'the bank shall have been notified thereof in writing signed by all of the persons interested.
11. No assignment or transfer of this escrow agreement or of any documents or property, including money, held in this escrow or of any interest therein can be made, but said documents and property
may be withdrawn and this escrow agreement terminated by mutual consent.
12. The undersigned agree to pay to the bank the sum of $
as an acceptance
fee W'ith respect to its services hereunder for one year from the date hereof and further hereby agree to
pay the bank an additional fee of one-tenth of one per cent of all funds received hereunder, provided howgver, that a minimum fee of $
shall be charged for each payment received. It is also
agreed that additional compensation shall also be paid to the bank for any additional or extraordinary services it may be required to render hereunder. )(xbaM>AOW»ra>mxbojiM5^
a*^w**mK*R^x*>texk9^
f«K *JMtto x^wexwx imA MXk»*X)X»x AtxaX >aoxhxixup»iou<d«owroxHkx*xiww^
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VV!I?.1;,vaU.^J.^..,.iiA.V:A:Elsie Brinkerhoff

n

Arlene B. Goulding
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•
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"GRANTOR
""•
GRANTEE
The
State Bank of Southern Utah
hereby acknowledges receipt of the letter of instructions
of which the foregoing is a copy and of the papers, money or property therein referred to and agrees to
hold and dispose of the same in accordance with said instructions and upon the termg and conditions
above set forth.
STATE BANK CNP SOUTHERN UTAH

Date:

-

19
By

Received from The
/e.
jto above,

State Bank of Southern Utah

pate:

10

-

-

-

all of the papers and documents referred
-••-
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TO TM CREDIT OF
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K3
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To whom It may concern:
If Elsie Brlnkerhoff, have received from Cloyd
2.nd Hark Brlnkerhoff, as payment on property,

Jf3 ?,<)&§

•

:

^

v

Signed:

STATE OF UTAH

)

SS.

County of Kane
0n thi

s (^h

day of

appeared before me

n?^

Q-^JLJ

$ personally

Elsie Srinkerhoff

9

the signer

of the above and foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that she executed the same,

1 ? / ^ s XU i

r V U Wl/irlT- *'«iy«»

Notary Public

' ftMress
Residing at JfXu^ht^
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2 PLAINTIFFS

BISHOP 6 RONNOW, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

m

IN THB SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY,
STATE OP UTAH
MONT R. ANDERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF,
LENA BRINKERHOFF, and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION

vs.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, GOLDA B.
ADAIR, WARREN BRINKERHOFF,
ARLENE B. GOULDING, and JOHN
DOES I through V,

Civil No. 1826

Defendants.
ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant

in the above-entitled

action,

agrees and stipulates as follows:
1.

That

(hereinafter

the

certain

agreement

dated

"Agreement" attached as Exhibit

October

26,

1966

" A " ) , executed by

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Seller, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF and MARK J.
BRINKERHOFF, Buyers, together with any other agreement containing
substantially

the

same terms, is a valid and binding

contract

which she executed without coercion, and with full knowledge and
understanding of its provisions and duties,
2.
and

That she agrees to conform to the terms of the Agreement,

perform

all

conditions

and

duties

provided

and

imposed

thereunder, including specific performance on her part.

p,-^y

3.

That she recognizes she improperly attempted to convey

land to others contrary to the terms of the Agreement, and hereby
repudiates a certain Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1919,

(Exhibit

"B")

MARK

purporting

to

convey

to

ELSIE

BRINKERHOFF,

J.

BRINKERHOFF, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, as Joint Tenants, the same
property conveyed under the Agreement, and further repudiates any
other deeds or instruments of conveyance which have the effect of
divesting

or

in

any

way

diminishing

the

right,

title, and

interest of buyers and their wives, in the property specified in
the Agreement.
4.

That she acknowledges the receipt of $2,000 from the

Buyers, and/or

their heirs, MARK J. BRINKERHOFF

and

LENA A.

BRINKERHOFF, for the 1983 payment pursuant to the terms of the
Agreement.
5.

That she forgives and waives all rights to any and all

delinquent amounts currently due under the Agreement.
6.

That she recognizes the validity of a certain affidavit

dated April 13, 1971, (attached as Exhibit

n

C") , and reaffirms

the statements contained therein and further agrees to cooperate
and assist Plaintiffs in the litigation of their claims against
other named Defendants in the above-entitled action.
7.

That her Amended Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and

her Crossclaim against MARK J. BRINKERHOFF, as filed in this
action, shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
8.

That

the

Court

shall

performance against her.

-2-

enter

a

decree

of

specific

In

consideration

for

the

Stipulation

specified

above,

Plaintiffs hereby stipulate as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs will not seek any award of damages against

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF under their Second Amended Complaint.
2.

Plaintiffs will reimburse Defendants, GOLDA B. ADAIR,

WARREN BRINKERHOFF, and ARLENE B. GOULDING for the amounts paid
to ELSIE BRINKERHOFF for the purported transfer of properties
specified under the Warranty Deed dated June 4, 1979, Exhibit
"B", in return for the said Defendants1 Agreement to drop all
their claims filed in the above-entitled lawsuit and dismiss the
same with prejudice.

If said Defendants do not dismiss said

claims before 20 September 1984, Plaintiffs shall be under no
obligation of reimbursement.
3.
judgment

That the above-entitled Court may enter its Order and
in conformance with

this Stipulation and Plaintifffs

prayer for relief as specified in their Second Amended Complaint.
DATED this

0*-

day of September, ,1984 .

ELSIE
STATE OF UTAH

BRjtfKERHOFFjT

)

:ss.
County of
On the
appeared

£ •a day of

)

5,*P

, 1984, personally

before me ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, Defendant named
I

in the

-3A~^> J

above-entitled

action, the signer

of the above and foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.

NOTAR

ijUng at: /

/^77X^

day-.of September,

DATED th

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff*STATE OF UTAH
ss.

County of
On the
appeared

/0

zA

day of

/n^ U^U <

r

1984, personally

before me WILLARD R. BISHOP, attorney

for Plaintiff

ANDERSON in the above-entitled action, the signer of the above
and foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to roe that he

executed the same.

,M//M fwb.iding
NOTARY PUBLIC,

resi

at:

•J/£MkJ>

mmission expires:
My Commission

i/Mypti/ ?J
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of

the

above

and

foregoing

STIPULATION

to

Mr.

Hans

Q.

Chamberlain, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, Attorneys at Law, 110 North
Main Street, Suite G, Cedar City, Utah 84720, by first class
mail, postage fully prepaid this

day of

,

1984.
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T1US AGREEMENT, mado end entered I n t o by find botwon ElSIC'tRIHXCRHCFrl
of GI coda to, County of t'ono, Stota of Utah, PARTY OF TIC FIR3T PART, h e r e i n a f t e r roforrod to t% tho '•SELLER" ond CLOYD H. GRIKICSHOFF ond MARC inirHCftCTF
of Glondolo, County of tana, Stato of Virt,

PARTIES OF P.IZ SECOND PART, tioreln-

e f t o r r e f e r r e d t o as tho "BUYERS"|

HiIli£I5.£I!i J
THAT Vir.REAS# tho SELLER U tho ovner of tho r e * I property, smzln;;.
p r i v i l e g e s ond voter righto I n tho Slatos of Utah t\n6 Arizona;
AlO VI ERE AS # tho EUYERS dcclro t o purcLaso tho scoo;
v

AID WCREAS, tho prxtlos havo ogrood upon icmt

ond c o n d i l l t n s \zr vh

sale thareof;
IKW THEREFOR!, I n consideration of the prenlscs end of f , o r i t u a l
covenants ond agrocnonvo horolnaftor t c t a i t the pnrtler. h c r o l n M t o r :tc,r^-> V»1T;>
ond t>e1vocn ooo oncthor os fof lo*sj
1.

Thot for ond I n consideration of tho t o t a l tun of F I R Y Tir.v-.E

TH0U3A.\O TirXE HUMMED T.|C*nY-EIC«T (S53,30S % 00) DOLLARS, as tho f u l l

considcra-j

t l o n thorofor, tho SELLER covenants ct\4 ogrooe t o t o l l and tl»o BUYERS covenant
end agree t o buy tho following tiascrlbcd r c o l property, grsrlng p r i v i l e g e s £n<!
votor ond rosorvolr t i g h t s I n tho Statoo of Utah ond Arlzonai;
REAL PROPERTY \U HILLASD COUTHY, UTAMi
Lota 1 , 2 , 3 , and /., Block 25, P l o t *A», Oolto Tar-melt*.
l o t 2 , Block 26, P l o t W , a ? I t s Tovnsltc
HEAL PROPERTY 111 KANE COUNTY, UTAHt
Township 39 South, Rango 4 j Kent, S a l t Lcko Meridian:
Vest To If of Section 25", containing 320 ocrcs.
Ibrthv-cst Quortorj Southeast Charier and tho South it* If
of tho Ibrthcnst Quarter CDntrlnlr.g O D ocrcs, a l l I n
Section '/0, Township :>j Sooth, Konge l \ l o s t , S a l t Laka
Meridian, contolnlng 400 acrev, * a f e or loss.
t o t * 1 , ?# 3 , ond /.; Sauthoast Qmartor of tho Nc.rtht c s t Quartor; Uartheast Quirtor of tho Southwest
Quarter; Lust l U l f of 1ho Lout l l \ i f ; S ^ l l n . o s t v e r i e r
of the i::»rthojst Qu*Tlcr; lbr»hv.-o?5t v»\;jrtor of tho
Southeast O-'urtcr o< f t c t l o ^ 2?# 1o^i»r.hto 3'> Sojti\ #
IITACO '.J V.cst, containing V/D.O^ t c r o a .

EXHIBlf ''A1
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•2Eost Half of tho Morthoist CiKJrtorj South Half of tba
Southeast Qu.Mrtor; Northuort Quarter of tho Southeast
^ j a r t o r of Soctlon 35, containing 200 ocros.
Township 40 South, Rar\QQ 4 J West, S a l t Lako Meridian!
Section ?0: Southvost Quarter of tho Karfhoant Quarter;
l o s t l b If of tho Southeast Quarter and tho Southoast Quarter
of tho Southwest Quarter, containing 160 acres.
Soctlon 30: North-root Quarter; East l b If of tho Southwost
Quartor, containing 23*J.W ocrcs.
Soctlon

5t Lot 2, containing 3J.03 ocros.

Township 40 South, Range 4 Vost, S a l t Lako Meridian:
Soutfnvoct Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Soctlon B,
containing 40 ccros.
Tovnshlp 40 South, Range 7 West. Salt Lo!;o Meridian:

m

Poglnnlng at tha Southvost Corner of the Southv.ost Quarter of
tho Southeast Qusrtor of Section 73, Township 40 South, Ranro
7 Vost, Salt Luko Moridlcn and running thence Cast 10.23
chains; thenco North 6 0 * Vest 6.36 chains; thenco Kost 3.5?;
chains; thonco South 1 chain t o beginning, containing .74
acres.

V

Doglnnlng a t tho Narth*est Corner of tha Narthwost Quarter of
tho Northeast Quarter of Section 26, Tovnshlp 40 South, Ringo
7 Kost, end running thenco Soulh 4,30 chains; 1 hence Ssuth 70*
East 15 chains to tho middle of tho channel of 1ho creek; thenco
Northwesterly olong tho mlddlo of tho channel of t o l d crook to
tho North Lino of sold Northeast Quartor of tho flarthoast
Quarter; thonco Lost 11.23 chains t o tho placo of boglnnlng.
Doglnnlr.g 4.30 chains South of t b * Nortlmoat Corner of tho
Northwest Quortcr of the Northeart Quarter of Section 2C,
Township 40 South, Range 7 l o s t . S a l t Loko Marldlan 9nd run*
nlng thanco South 70* East 13 chains to tho middle of the
chonnol of tho creek; thence Southerly along the middle of
tho channel of said creek to tha South Line; thonco North
73*45t vest 14.00 chains; thonco North 4.30 chains t o tho
placo of beginning, containing 5.60 ocros.

M3

y

Thd obovo throo t r a c t s bolng part of land s i t u a t e d In Soctlons
23 ond 26 of said tounshlp end range, soaotlmes roforrod t o
u n o f f i c i a l l y as Lot M A".
Tovnshlp 40 South, Ronyo 4 | Host, S a l t Lako Moridlon!
Lot 1 ; Northeast Quartor of tho Uorthvost Quartor of Soctlon
3 1 , containing 75.30 acres.

i

. i

\(\-Xtf

pcnsceiAi rropcRTYi
*\ Tho following described water and reservoir r i g h t s !
A ono«fourth Intorost In Mobblo Canyon Reservoir
In Mohovo County, Arizona.

(9-56-1?)

A ona half Intarost In S u l l i v a n Rocorvolr I n Mohavo County,
Arizona.
And a l l grazing p r l v l logos nnd p o m l t i annexed t o or b'.iod
upon any of tho vcrogolng r e a l , personal, r e s e r v o i r , or terror
r i g h t s as co.nvcncuroto.
2.

Tho parties rgroo t h a t f o r and I n consideration of tho calo by tho

SELLER to tl*> BUYERS of tho foregoing rani and pers:>:ial property, viitor ^nd
rcccrvolr r i g h t s and grazing p r l v l l o g o s , tha SLIVERS w i l l w

t o tho SELLER t;ia

su-3 of TWO THOUSAND (S?,0DD.0D) DOLLARS, each yoar, beginning v l t i i the 1st oV/
of Msvombor, 1964, of *hlch payments CKJO on fbvtnbor 1 , 19G4 and Ho tender 1 ,
r;C5 aro hereby acknowledged by tho SELLER f r o * tho DUVERS and the fX//;T.S * l I I
contlnuo t o pay annual In'Jtalloants of 12,033.03 on tho 1st day of N'ovou'jor In
oach year thoroaftar beginning fbvettbor 1 , 1966 and continuing during tho cntlr<|
I I fo of tho SELLER.
Tho BUYERS agrco t h a t thoy w i l l pay tho sum of S2,003.03 per your t o
tho SELLER for tho o n t l r o roaalndor of SELLER'S I I to Irrospoctlvo of tho Amount
tihlch tvay ba paid undor t h i s contract whotlier I t axceods tho t o l a I consideration
horclnabovo sot out or whothor t h a t t o t a l amount s h a l l not be paid by applying
annual paynonts of $2,003.03 against tha purchaco price d j r l n g tho I I fo tlw> of
tho SELLER and I n conclderation of on undertaking by tho 0UYERS t o pay tho
asKXjnt of $2,000.03 por yoar l o r tho I f f o of tho SELLER Irrcspoctlvo of tho
ftaount which cway bo paid, tho SELLER walv03 I n t o r o s t upon tl*> unpaid balancos.
I t I t provldod, howovor, t h a t ohould tho t o t a l consideration horolnabovo provldod not bo paid by tho BUYERS t o tho SELLER during SELLER'S l l f o t l r x *
than upon tho doath of tho SELLER any amount* remaining undor t h i s Agreement
of tor c r e d i t i n g a l l psyoo.nta which havo boon nodo horoundar, fchall bo paid
annually as provided horoln In oqual sharoo, ctoroa and t)wrx> a l l k o , t o
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lerren Orlnkorhoff ond Charley Arlond Drlnkorhoff tvo-sovonths (2/7ths) (1//ths
to each) of tho balances duo ( I t belnrj ctlpuloted ttot the OLIVERS togothor * l t h
Karron Drlnkorhof<, Chorloy Arlond Crlnkorhoff, totty B. Esplln, Colda B. Adjir,
end Arlono B. Gouldlng constitute a l l tho holrs at Inw of tho SELLER ond that
other provision has been rasdo for the lattor thrc<i no-nod holrs), together kit;-,
Interest at four itf)

nor coat per ennua on the dofcrrod declining toloncca.

The Ct/YCRS icy, nt ony time, prepay oil or cny pirt of tho regaining
principal duo under this contract.
3.

Tho SELLER chnf f oxocuto o Varrnnty Dood to the roM pro^srty

herolnebovo described and quitclaim convcynncos to tho v»atcr ot\d reservoir
rights hcrolnefovc described, of en undlvtdod one ho If Interest to och GUYLR
end his vlfe oa Joint tenants with f u l l rights of survivorship, end ^h-sll
deposit told Instruments In tho Hurrlcono Drnnch of tho Bnnk of St. George
vhlch shall hold those documents In truot end In escrow subject to tho follovirnl
ESCROW t risTntxrri crn
If the BUYERS shell mako e l l payments of principal ond Interest herein
provided ond perform o i l the other covenants and agreements herein eontelnod,
then \$^ot\ payment of tho final Installmont due hereunder the Escrov Depository I
shall dollvor to tho KJYCRS e l l the cscrovod documents,

j

In the ovent of a default In the psynont of any Instoll^nt of principal
or Interest tnd In, tho event of a default In any other term or condition herein
end In tho event notice of a default other than for paymont of principal and
Interest shall bo given to tho BUYERS by the SAILER and a subsequent fal lure
to remedy the tome shall contlnuo for a porlod of thirty (30) days, iho<\ tho
SELLER nsy# at her option, dorwnd a redelivery to her of oil of the occrovod

i

docuftwnts vhoreupon the BUYERS will vacate and peaceably currondor nil of the
promises herelnobovo descrlbod and the SELLER msy ro-entor Into poosossloncf
the ***» without furthor process end my retain as rent ond liquidated dorv3£os
e l l sums ti>orotof ore paid by BUYERS under this Agroonont.

A ' ^

/

As fin a l t e r n a t i v e ronacdy tha SELLER raay o l c c t t o roduco any payment
or a l l payments, accelerating ond entering tho o n t t r * balenco of p r i n c i p a l ond
Intcrost Imaac'lotoly, t o Judjwnt or mjy tovo cold rarady on ooo or ooro sue*
coccivo or I n t e r m i t t e n t occasions or uay o l o c t t o t r e a t t h i s Agroaiwnt us a
noto ond mortgage passing t l t l o through to tha EtftfERS ond foreclosing tho SCJSO
I n tho oanocr provldud by low.
During tho porlod tho OUYEHS oro complying with tho terms of t h i s
Agreement, thoy s h a l l bo e n t i t l e d t o tho s o l o , cxcluslvo, and bonoflclcl use,
occupancy, ond onjoy-wnt of tho above descrlbod provisos subjoct only t o tho

3 i

r i g h t s of tho SELLER t o Inspect tho saraa o t rosson^blo tlmos,
4,

Tho BUYEGS havo Inspected sold prenlsos ond f i n d tho SUAO in a

ha

^annor s a t i s f a c t o r y t o thea and thoro oro'no covenants or warranties orhor

tijS
*o89

than cxprossly sot f o r t h horoln.

»*5
?, 5

5.

Tlrao s h a l l l>o of tho ossonca as t o a l l tho torms end conditions of

t h i s Agreement which s h a l l bind and Inure t o tho borioflt of tho h a i r s , suc~
cossors, end assigns of tho p a r t i e s hereto and tho party I n d e f a u l t agrees t o
pay a l l costs and a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s foo In tho ovent onforco^ont of t h i s
conlract I s roqulrod.

"

UITUESS tha hands of tho parties hereto t h i s

j
m /&

, day of t„&*•*.

fcifsl OyUrlnkor ho TT

#|

py
SELLER

V / C l o y d H. Drlr.Ucrh>?F

OLWTRS

/&* Sr-yf^tf:
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Elsie Brinkerhoff,
of

a widow,
, County of

Glendale

CONVEY

grantor

tnd WARRANT

to

Kane

, State of Utth, htrtby

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, a widow, MARK J . BRINKERHOFF, a
married man, and CLOYD H. BRINKERHOFF, a married man,
a l l as J o i n t Tenants w i t h f u l l r i g h t s of s u r v i v o r s h i p ,
and not as Tenants i n Common,
tj

l

of

G l e n d a l e , Utah

grantat $
for tht turn of
-^•COLLARS,
County,

84729

$10.00 & other v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n tht following described tracts of land in
KANE
Start of Utah:

i
J

11

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF.

8

a

if

o

2

a

3 i
r

r
i

***

WITNESS, tht hand

of said grantor

, this

4th

day of

June

, A. 0. 19 7 9 .

Signtd in tht Presence of
Elsie Brinkerhoff

/<

STATE OF UTAH
County of

SS.

Kane

)
On tht

4th

appeared btfort me

the signer
to me that

day of

June

Elsie Brinkerhoff,

A. 0., 19 79

personally

a widow,

of tht within instniment who duly acknowledged
S ht
txecuttd tht same.
..^j»^../^.^^Lt
James B. A d a i r

fcty frtftmibiiM txpires ..June...19.....1979.

4

My residence is

IOVTMIM * f AM m i l CtMtANf . f • to. T - R w * . * * MKI

_
Notary Public

...Orrtery.lU.B.t-.U.UIi..

M
t*l
r !t

w. w..v U M ^ V i.iii i lL->io/% me. iouifiweu uuarier of the Northeast Quarter (SWliNEH)
and the Northwest n u arter of the Southeast Ouarter (NW^SE1*) of Section 27,
TownshiD 39 South, Range 4S West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing 478.80
acres, more or less.
PARCEL 4: The East Half of the Northeast Quarter (EV»E»*); the South Half of
ihe Southeast Ouarter (SSSEM and Northwest Ouarter of the Southeast Ouarter
(NWHSE**) of Section 35, Townshio 39 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containing 200.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 5: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northeast Ouarter (SWWE»*); the West
flaYTof the Southeast Ouarter (WS>SEl4) and the Southeast Quarter of the Southwest
Ouarter (SE»*SWV) of Section 29, Townshio 40 South, Ranqe 4S West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containing 160.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 6: The Northwest Ouarter (NWHj and the East Half of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 30, Townshio 40 South, Ranne 4S West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, containino 238.99 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 7: Lot 2, Section 5, Townshio 40 South, Range 44 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, containino 39.08 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 8: The Southwest Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (SW»iNW4) of Section
8, TownlKio 40 South, Ranne 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, containing
40.0 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 9: Lot 1 and the Northeast Ouarter of the Northwest Ouarter (NEWW 1 *)
bisection 31, Townshio 40 South, Ranae 4l, West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
contalnlnq 79.30 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 10: BEGINNING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Township 40
South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South
0°35' West 567.60 feet; thence South 78°Q0' East 963.6 feet; thence Northwesterly along the creek bed, 808.0 feet, more or less, to the Horth line of
Section 26; thence South 89°57 l West 741.18 feet to the point of beginning.
Containing 11.77 acres, more or less.
PARCEL 11: BEGINNING at the Southwest C o m e r of the Southwest Quarter of
tFe Southeast Quarter of Section 23, Township 40 SoOth, R a n g e d West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 chains; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South i.O chain to the
point of beginning. Containing 0.74 acres, more or less.
+4

44

44

44

44

++

44

W
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COUNTY OF KANE

)
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared

ELSIE BRINKERHOFF, who stated under oath, as follows:
That she has sold Real Property described hereinafter to Mark J.
Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff, and that she will defend the rights of ownership and also any rights of way of ingress or egress to the said Real Property.
That she will enter into a lawsuit or any other procedure needed to protect these
rights of ingress or egress, to said property.
The real property is described as follows:
BEGINNING at the South Quarter Corner of Section 23, Township 40 South, Range 7
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah, and running thence East 10.23 chains; thence North
80° West 6.36 cahins; thence West 3.68 chains; thence South 1 chain to the point
of beginning.
ALSO BEGINKING at the North Quarter Corner of Section 26, Tovnship 40 South, Range
7 West, Salt Lake teridian, Utah, and running thence South 8.6 chains; thence South
73*45' East 14.6 chains; thence Northwesterly along the middle of the channel of
the creek to the North boundary line of said Section 26; thence West 11.23 chains
to the point of beginning. Containing 11.77 acres
Total acres: 12.51
That the Affiant will at any time help to defend and protect the
rights of Mark J. Brinkerhoff and Cloyd H. Brinkerhoff as far as the Real Property
is concerned.

Qt^^JjAA+i^/H/A/fo*

Elsie Brinkerhoff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/ /
/?

•-•'--

^

day of April, A.D. 1971,

^-y

/ ' / > •

i::T(Oa~>^ ^-^

Nota
Residing
My commission expires

1

i

\

'l/.^/f^ /

EXHIBIT "C M

I)

t-j \ . /

U-i

Y\

OCT I 6 1984
&

Glendale, Utah
October 7, 1984

Willard R. Bishop
36 No 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Dear Mr. Bishop,
Request is hereby made to Mr, Willard R. Bishop to act
as counsel for and in behalf of Elsie J. Brinkerhoff.

Yours sincerely,

Elsie J. Brinkerhoff

PLKADING

§381

01A Am Jur 2d

variance would result where the precise nature of the defect in the machinery
or apparatus causing the injury is within the defendant's knowledge and any
surprise which might exist from the defect proved would be to the plaintiil.M
A variance as to the cause of the death of a person87 or an ; nimal88 from the
wrongful acts of others may not be fatal.
As hereinafter shown,69 a party cannot generally declare in u>rt and recover
on proof of a contract. In such cases, of course, there is a variance between
the allegations and the proof. But no variance arises in an action in tort where
the evidence discloses a written contract, although the complaint merely
alleges a contract in general terms by way of inducement.60
XIX. CONFORMITY OF JUDGMENT TO PLEADINGS [§§ 382-388]
A. IN GENERAL [§§ 382,

383]

§ 382. Generally.
Decrees in equity61 and judgments at law62 must have a basis in the pleadings
and the evidence. A party's proof cannot materially vary from his allegations,63
and the verdict64 and judgment 65 must respond to the issues as raised by the
pleadings. The parties should be confined in their recovery to that to which
they are entitled within their allegations.68 It is not upon the evidence alone,
but upon the pleadings and the evidence applicable to the pleadings, that the
plaintiff can in any case recover.67 This seems to be a principle necessary to
the due administration of justice in the courts,68 and its observance is necessary in order to give the judgment the merit of finality of an adjudication
between the parties.69
56. Willey v Boston Electric Light Co., 168
Mass 40, 46 NE 395.
57. In Clinkenbeard v Reinert, 284 Mo 569,
225 SVV 667, 13 ALR 485. it was held that
there was no variance between an allegation
that a person died from the effects of of the
bite of a vicious dog and proof that he died of
rabies caused by such bite.
58. McKee v Trisler, 311 111 536, 143 NE 69,
33 ALR 1298.
59. § 387, infra.
60. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v Teeters. 166 Ind
335, 77 NE 599.
6 1 . See 27 Am Jur 2d, EQUITY § 247.

62. American De Forest Wireless Tel. Co. v
Superior Court of San Francisco, 153 Cal 533,
96 P 15; Beckett v Cuenin. 15 Colo 281, 25 P
167; Citizens Slate Bank v E. A. Tessman 8c
Co., 121 Minn 34, 140 NVV 178; Slate ex rel.
McManus v Muench, 217 Mo 124, 117 SW 25;
Branz v Hylton, 130 Neb 385, 265 NW 16;
Haney v Neace-Stark Co., 109 Or 93, 216 P
757, reh den 109 Or 119, 219 P 190; Ft. Worth
v Cause, 129 T e * 25, 101 SW2d 221; Roy v
Bennett* 141 W Va 260, 89 SE2d 843.
63. §5 368 ct seq., supra.

64. As to conformity of the verdict to the
pleadings and proof, see 76 Am Jur 2d, TRIAL
§§ 1133 et seq.
65. United States v Seminole Nation, 299 US
417, 81 L Ed 316, 57 S Ct 283; White v Ward,
157 Ala 345, 47 So 166; White v Hamilton, 38
Ariz 256, 299 P 124; Tarien v Katz, 216 Cal
554, 15 P2d 493, 85 ALR 334; Angel v Mellen,
48 Idaho 750, 285 P 461; Bloom v Nathan
Vehon Co., 341 111 200, 173 NE 270, 72 ALR
232; Samuels v Weikel, 195 Ky 552, 242 SW
836; Bank of Monroe v E. C. Drew Inv. Co.,
126 La 1028, 53 So 129; Bemis v Bradley, 126
Me 462, 139 A 593, 69 ALR 1399; Farrell v
Manhattan Market Co., 198 Mass 271, 84 NE
481; State v Black Bros., 116 Tex 615, 297 SW
213, 53 ALR 1181.
66. The Schooner Hoppet v United States, 11
US 389, 3 L Ed 380; Benedict v Bray, 2 Cal
251.
67. Hetzel v Baltimore 1 O. R. Co., 169 US
26, 42 L Ed 648, 18 S Ct 255.
68. The Schooner Hoppel v United Slates, 11
US 389, 3 L Ed 380.
69. Reynolds v Stockton, 140 US 254, 35 L
Ed 464, 11 S C t 7 7 3 .
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Whether a judgment is supported by the pleadings depends, not on the
allegations in the complaint alone, but on a reasonable construction of all the
pleadings when considered together. 70 It is the facts pleaded, and not the
technical designation of the action, that constitute grounds of recovery. 71 A
judgment upon a matter outside of the issues raised by the pleadings must, of
necessity, be altogether arbitrary and unjust, as it attempts to conclude a point
upon which the parties have not been heard. 78 Such a judgment cannot be
saved by the fact that it conforms to the findings, the findings themselves
being upon questions foreign to the issues. 73
§ 383. Restriction to relief claimed.
As a general rule, in the absence of statute or rule, the relief awarded by the
judgment will be restricted to that claimed by the party in his pleading. 74
Irrespective of what may be proved, a court cannot, without statutory authority, adjudge to the plaintiff more than he claims in his pleadings. 79 However,
where judgment is improperly entered for more than the amount permitted
under the rule requiring conformity to the pleadings and issues, the excess
may be remitted and the remainder of the judgment will stand. 76
Relief proper under the pleadings and the facts may be granted although it
is less than chat which the plaintiff demands in his pleading. 77
T h e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that except as to a party
against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 78
B. RESTRICTION TO CAUSE OF ACTION OR THEORY PLEADED [§§ 384-388]

§ 384. Generally.
A material variance arises where a party pleads one cause of action or
defense and attempts to prove another and different one. 70 It follows that a
70. Hamm v Hamm, 30 Tcnn App 122, 204
SVV2d 113, 175 ALR 523; Chesney v Chesncy,
33 Uuh 503, 94 P 989.
71. Thomas v Taylor, 224 US 73, 56 L Ed
673, 32 S Ct 403.
72. Reynolds v Stockton, 140 US 254, 35 L
Ed 464, 11 S Ct 773; Falls v Wright, 55 Ark
562, 18 SW 1044.
73. White v Hamilton, 38 Ariz 256, 299 P
124.
74. United Slates v Seminole Nation, 299 US
417, 81 L Ed 316, 57 S Ct 283; England v
Valley Nat. Bank, 94 Ariz 267, 383 P2d 183;
Angel v Mellen, 48 Idaho 750, 285 P 461; Ft.
Jefferson Imp. Co. v Dupoyster, 112 Ky 792,
66 SW 1048; Branz v Hylton, 130 Neb 385,
265 NW 16; Tulsa Red Ball Transfer Co. v
Whittaker, 176 Okla 29, 54 P2d 626; Re Seattie, 59 Wash 41, 109 P 1052.

As to the effect of the prayer on the scope of
relief, see §§123, 124, supra.
75. Cox v United States. 31 US 172, 8 L Ed
359; Ex parte United States Cast Iron Pipe &
Foundry Co., 211 Ala 159, 99 So 912; Meisner
v Mcintosh, 205 Cal 11. 269 P 612; Sache v
Gillette.
101 Minn 169, 112 NW 386; Charles v
Wfhite, 214 Mo 187, 112 SW 545; Tulsa Red
Ball Transfer Co. v Whittaker, 176 Okla 29, 54
P2d 626; Seamster v Blackstock, 83 Va 232, 2
SE36.
76. Curtis v Herrick, 14 Cal 117; Tulsa Red
Ball Transfer Co. v Whittaker, 176 Okla 29, 54
P2d 626.
77. Hughes v Union Ins. Co., 21 US 294, 5 L
Ed 620; Murphy v Portrum, 95 Tenn 605, 32
SW 633.
78. § 123, supra.
79. § 373, supra.
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§ 62. Sufficiency of performance; avoidance of inequitable forfeiture.
Literal and exact performance is not always necessary. Under certain circumstances, specific performance of a contract will be decreed in spite of the fact
that the complainant has not wholly performed his part of the agreement,74 or
where there has been substantial compliance with the terms of the contract,75
as where a party in good faith seasonably offers and continues ready to comply
with the stipulations of the contract although he may err in estimating the
extent of his obligation.76 Generally, where the plaintiff has made a conscientious effort fully and fairly to comply with his contract to purchase land,
specific performance will be granted,77 as, for example, in a case in which
compensation may be made for the injury occasioned by the complainant's
noncompliance with the strict terms of the contract.78
In administering equity in a specific performance case, a technical forfeiture
of rights under a contract, in the absence of bad faith, is not favored where a
preservation of the contract through specific performance will yield to each
party that to which he is justly entitled.79 A court of equity has the power to
relieve a defaulting purchaser from a forfeiture and to compel specific performance by the seller when, in the court's judgment, to do otherwise would
result in an unreasonable forfeiture.80 Specific performance may be granted
despite a minor breach by the plaintiff, but the court should condition its
decree on the performance of that matter by the plaintiff.81 Specific performance may properly be decreed despite a minor breach by the plaintiff involving
no substantial failure, and in such a case the defendant has a right to
compensation for the breach, which may be given either by an abatement in
74. Breckcnridge v Clinkinbcard, 2 Litt (Ky)
127; landau v St. Louis Public Service Co. 364
Mo 1134, 273 SW2d 255, 48 ALR2d 1200;
Albachten v Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 427,
72ALR2dU22.

79. Henschke v Young, 224 Minn 339, 28
NW2d 766,

80. Rothenberg v Foilman, 19 Mich App 383,
172 NW2d 845 (where there was a default in
an instalment, the property was purchased for
$40,000, and the balance of the principal was
75. Vendees under a land contract who have only
$7,500).
substantially complied with the terms of the
The trial court may award a vendee specific
contract are entitled to a decree for the specific
performance thereof. Moore, K. 8c Co. v Ward, performance and deny to the vendor the right
to forfeit the contract according to its provi- j
71 WVa393, 76SE807.
sions, where it appears that the vendee made a j
76. Willard v Tayloe. 8 Wall (US) 557, 19 L down payment of $7,500—nearly one-fourth of 1
Ed 501 (tender of United States notes when the total purchase price—and made " Quite reg- j
ular" monthly payments of $150 cacn on the j
contract called for gold or silver coin).
balance of the principal and interest, and there |
77. Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v Cryder, was only $575.95 owing on the purchase price,
361 111 274, 197 NE 750, 101 ALR 1420; and where the buyer had made valuable im- i
Claytcn v Proutt, 227 Md 198, 175 A2d 757; provements of the property, which had appreciFour-G Corp. v Ruta, 25 NJ 503, 138 A2d 18; ated greatly in value after the execution of the i
Albachten v Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 427, contract. Williams v De Lay (Alaska) 395 P2d j
839, the court saying that it would be inequi72ALR2d 1122.
table to enforce the forfeiture provision.
Where more than half the purchase price of
81. Clayten v Proutt, 227 Md 198, 175 A2d
land was paid in advance, and possession continued in the purchaser until alter the balance 757.
was due, and valuable improvements were
Specific performance will not be decreed if
made by him with the consent of the seller, and the plaintiff has himself committed a material
without any intimation of an intent to insist on breach, unless refusal of the decree will effectuthe strict performance of the contract as to ate an unjust penalty or forfeiture, but specific
time of payment, the purchaser was held enti- performance may properly be decreed in spite
tled to specific performance. Ahl v Johnson, 20 of a minor breach or innocent misrepresentaHow (US) 51, 15 L Ed 1005.
tion by the plaintiff involving no substantial
failure of the exchange. Landau v St. Louis
78. Hyde v Booraem, 16 Pet (US) 169, 10 L Public Service Co. 364 Mo 1134, 273 SW2d
Ed 925; Wynn v Garland, 19 Ark 23.
255, 48ALR2d 1200.
90
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§ 63

the price or by making the decree conditional on the payment of reasonable
compensation." And to defeat specific performance because of the plaintiffs
nonperformance, it should appear that some injury has resulted to the
defendant from such nonperformance. If the defendant has taken possession
of land which is the subject matter of the contract, and has likewise executed
the agreement in part, the court may consider him as having waived his
objections to the complainant's default, and may decree a specific performance
of the contract. 63
§ 63. Time of performance.
The well-established general principle in equity, that time is not ordinarily
regarded as of the essence of contracts unless it is so stipulated by the express
terms thereof or it is necessarily to be so implied from the character of the
obligations assumed, 84 has been frequently reiterated and applied in actions
for specific performance. 85 This is especially true as regards executory contracts for the sale of land which are considered in equity as vesting the
equitable title in the purchaser subject to the claim of the vendor for the
purchase money. 86 Therefore, in the ordinary cases of sales of realty, the
general object being to make a sale for an agreed sum, the time of payment is
regarded in equity as formal, and as meaning only that the purchase shall be
completed within a reasonable time, and substantially according to the contract, regard being had to all the circumstances. 87 Hence, specific performance
may be decreed in cases where justice requires it, even though literal terms of
stipulations as to time have not been observed. 88 Thus, under an option
agreement giving the optionee an option to purchase certain property on a
specified date, but not prior thereto, upon giving the optionor not less than 30
days' notice in writing of an intention to exercise the option on the specified
date, the optionee may obtain specific performance notwithstanding a failure
to give notice strictly in accordance with the contract, where the optionee
attempted literal compliance in good faith, and where the optionor was not
prejudiced or damaged by reason of the delay.89 Where a contract for the sale
of lands fixes no time for its performance, and by its terms the payment of the
price and the transfer of title are to be concurrent acts, a vendee does not lose
his right to specific performance by any delay short of the period fixed by the
82. Clayien v Proutt, 227 Md 198, 175 A2d
757, wherein the plaintiff purchasers failed to
remove certain underbrush and loose limbs
from the property.
83. Ramsay v Brailsford, 2 SC Eq 582.
84. See 17 Am Jur 2d, CONTRACTS § 332.

85. Taylor v Longworth, 14 Pet (US) 172, 10
L Ed 405; Brashier v Gratz, 6 Wheal (US) 528,
5 L Ed 322; Russell v Ferreli, 181 Kan 259,
311 P2d 547; Wimer v Wagner, 323 Mo 1156,
20 SW2d 650, 79 ALR 1231; Strasbourger v
Hcsu Realty Co. 198 App Div 805, 191 NYS
133; Meineke v Schwepe, 93 Ohio App 111, 50
Ohio Ops 244, 111 NE2d 765; Albachten v
Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d 427, 72 ALR2d
U22.
86. Taylor v Longworth, 14 Pet (US) 172, 10
I- Ed 405; Bank of Columbia v Hagner, 1 Pet
(US) 455, 7 L Ed 219; Brashier v Gratz, 6
Wheat (US) 528, 5 L Ed 322; Russell v Ferreli,

181 Kan 259, 311 P2d 347; Wimer v Wagner,
323 Mo 1156, 20 SW2d 650, 79 ALR 1231;
Meineke v Schwepe. 93 Ohio App 111, 50
Ohio Ops 244, 111 NE2d 765.
Annotation: 79 ALR 1240.
87. Russell v Ferreli. 181 Kan 259, 311 P2d
347; Jones v Robbins, 29 Mc 351; Meineke v
Schwepe, 93 Ohio App 111, 50 Ohio Ops 244,
111 NE2d 765.
88. Stinson v Dousman, 20 How (US) 461, 15
L Ed 966; Taylor v Longworth, 14 Pet (US)
172, 10 L Ed 405; Bank of Columbia v Hagner,
1 Pet (US) 455, 7 L Ed 219; Brashier v Gratz, 6
Wheat (US) 528, 5 L Ed 322; Wimer v Wagner,
323 Mo 1156, 20 SW2d 650, 79 ALR 1231;
Young v Rathbone, 16 NI Eq 224; Beckett v
Kornegay, 150 Va 636, 143 SE 296.
89. Albachten v Miller, 216 Or 379, 339 P2d
427, 72 ALR2d 1122.
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of motion to amend the pleadings to conform to
evidence of estoppel would not he overturned
absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Big
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah
1977).
IV. RELATION BACK OF
AMENDMENTS
Relation back despite intervening statute of limitations. Amendments are allowed
to complaints and process, even though the
amendment relates back to the time of original
filing and even though, but for the right to
amend, the statute of limitations period would
have run. Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d
879 (Utah 1981).
The amendment of a complaint dismissed for untimely service must also be
dismissed. Cook v. Starkev, 548 P.2d 1268
(Utah 1976).
Subdivision (c) does not apply to an
amendment which substitutes for or adds
new parties to those brought before the court

Rule 16.

by the original pleadings, whether plaintiff or
defendant; but an exception to this Rule operates where there is a relation back, as to both
plaintiff and defendant, when new and old
parties have an identity of interest, so that it
can be assumed or proved that the relation
back is not prejudicial. Doxey-Layton Co. v.
Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976).
Inapplicable to amended third-party
complaint. The relation-back doctrine does
not apply to amended third-party complaint
where there was no identity of interest with
the existing parties other than privity of
contract, since privity of contract is insufficient
identity of interest for purpose of subsection (c)
of this Rule. Perry v. Pioneer Whsle. Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984).
V. SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Permitting supplemental pleadings is
largelv discretionary with the trial court.
Rowley v. Milford Citv, 10 Utah 2d 299, 352
P.2d 225 (1960).

Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues.
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of
counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the
action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in
its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions may
be placed for consideration as above provided.
I. General Consideration.
II. Pretrial Order.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION

II. PRETRIAL ORDER

Cited in Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d 62,
387 P.2d 239 (1963); Rumsey v. Salt Lake City,
16 Utah 2d 310,400 P.2d 205 (1965).

Issues of law may be decided in order.
Subdivision (5) permits and contemplates that
disputed issues of law should be recognized and
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ruled upon, if possihle, before a case is called
for trial; this will assist counsel in their
attempts to settle the matter and, if settlement
cannot be effected, then the parties will know
better how to marshall the evidence for trial.
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 147,
442 P.2d 468 (1968).
The pretrial order controls the issues of
the case where it is made without objection
and no motion is made to change it, unless it is
modified at the trial to prevent a manifest
injustice. Citizens Cas. Co. v. Beckett, 17 Utah
2d 304,410 P.2d 767 (1966).
But this rule is not to be read as precluding modifications thereof prior to trial for
good cause shown. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d
94 (Utah 1981).
Pretrial orders are blueprints for the trial
which ought not to be relaxed in the absence of
good cause, but they are not hoops of steel and
may always be modified in the interest of the
administration of justice. Dugan v. Jones, 615
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).
This Rule must be rend in conjunction
with U.R.C.P. 15(b), which provides for liberality in allowing amendment cf the pleadings
to conform to the evidence- Stubbs v. Hemmert,
567 P.2d 168 < Utah 1977V
But amendment of order to be less liberal than amendment of pleadings. Where
objection is made to evidence en the ground it
is outside the pretrial order, the court should
be somewhat less liberal in amending the order
than it would be if mere pleadings were
involved. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales,
Inc. v. Lords, 23 Utah 2d 152, 460 P.2d 321
(1969).
Prejudicial effect of order to be factor in
considering modification of order. In determining whether to modify a pretrial order in

Rule 17

the interest of justice, the court should consider
the possible prejudicial effects of its enforcement of the order. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d
1239 (Utah 1980).
Amendment of order may be allowed
prior to trial. If plaintiff is given ample
opportunity to meet the issue, defendant may
be allowed to raise a new issue and amend the
pretrial order after the pretrial conference, but
before trial. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,
15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964).
Order may be amended to conform to
evidence. A pretrial order may be amended,
even after trial, to conform the order to the
evidence to be. or already, presented. Reich v.
Christcpulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238
(1953).
Order deemed modified to conform to
evidence. Where no objection has been made
to the introduction of evidence outside a pretrial order, it is deemed that the court modified
the pretrial order as a matter of its own
discretion. Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168
(Utah 1977).
No abuse of discretion in refusing modification of order. It was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to rule that
defendants could not inject a wholly inconsistent i?sue they had failed to assert and have
included in the pretrial order. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Lords, 23 Utah 2d
152, 480 P.2d 321 (1969).
No error in allowing evidence outside
scope of order. It is not error for the trial
court to refuse to admit evidence on issues
outside the scope of the pretrial order even
upon objection thereto by the opposing party.
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977).

PART IV.
PARTIES.
Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant.
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, adrr.inistrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
37
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the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or an insane or
incompetent person is a party, he must appear either by his general guardian,
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any
case when it is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is
prosecuted expedient to represent the infant, insane or incompetent person in
the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by him. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary
to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be an infant
or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian Ad Litem; How Appointed. When a guardian ad litem is
appointed by a court, he must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the infant, if he
is of the age of fourteen [14] years, or if under that age, upon the
application of a relative or friend of the infant.
(2) When the infant is defendant, upon the application of the infant if
he is of the age of fourteen [14] years and applies within 20 days after the
service of the summons, or if under that age or if he neglects so to apply,
then upon the application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any
other party to the action.
(3) When an infant defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff,
upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some
suitable person to be guardian ad litem for such infant defendant, unless
the defendant or someone in his behalf within 20 days after service of
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such
infant. Service of such notice may be made upon the general or
testamentary guardian of such defendant, if he has one in his state; if not,
such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be served in
the manner provided for publication of summons upon such infant, if over
fourteen [14] years of age, or, if under fourteen [14] years of age, by such
service on the person with whom such infant resides. The guardian ad
litem for such nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his
appointment in which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates May Be Sued by Common Name. When two or more persons
associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or
other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common
name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may be
sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon
their joint liability.
38

TAH CODE
1W-19M

Statutes

68-3-12

\ tt-2-9. Effect 01 salts sad prosecutions pendlag.
;. No suit or prosecution, pending when this repeal
takes effect, for an offense committed, or for the
^recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, shall be
' affected by the repeal, but the proceedings may be
.conformed to the provisions of these revised statutes
\ as far as consistent.
my

68-3-7. Time, how computed.
The time in which any act provided by law is to
be done is computed by excluding the first day and
including the last, unless the last is a holiday, and
then it also is excluded.
IMJ

tt-M. Cooaaoa law adopted.
, 6&£-2. Statutes la derofjuiaa of coouaoa Uw BfceraQy
cofirfraoi - Rules of equity prevail.

tt-3-9. Seal, how affixed.
When the seal o f a court or public officer is
required by law to be affixed to any paper, the
word "seal" includes an impression o f such seal
upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or a
wafer affixed thereto. In ail other cases the word
"seal* may include a scroll printed or written.
tW3

6S-3-I. When a day appointed is a holiday.
Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than
i i l - M O . "Heretofore" and "hereafter* defined.
a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law
* The terms "heretofore" and "hereafter" as used or contract to be performed upon a particular day,
pin these revised statutes, have relation to the time which day fails upon a holiday, such act may be
';. when the same take effect.
ttt* performed upon the next succeeding business day
with the same effect as if it had been performed
upon the day appointed.
1953
Chapter 3. Construction

61-3-3. Kettstd tt&tates aot retroactive.

Ur%4. QtO gad eriaiiaal remedies cot isergsd.
41-3-5. Effect of rtpcaUag a statute.
4t-3-6. lacattea! provision* deemed a eoatiaaatloa, aot
a*w eaactoBtat.
tt-V7. That, how compatcd.
O-J-8. Wbeo a day appointed is a hoUdty.
tt44. Seal, bow afftsed.
' 6&-M0. Jotat authority b anthortty to majority.
• *g>Ml. Raits of cociU action as to words and phrases.
414-12. Roles of ccostractloa as to these statutes.

68-3-1. Common law adopted.
The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant t o , or in conflict with, the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or the Constitution or
laws o f this state, and so far only as it is consistent
with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
decision in all courts of this state.
1953

69-3-10. Joint authority is authority to majority.
Words giving a joint authority to three or more
public officers, or other persons, are 1:0 be
construed as giving such authority t o a majority o f
them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act
giving the authority.
IMJ
63-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and
phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according
to the context and the approved usage of the
language; but technical words and phrases, and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
19S3

61-3-2. Statates In derogation of common law
68-3-12. Rules of construction as to these statutes.
liberally construed - Roles of equity prevail.
In the construction of these statutes the following
i
The rule o f the common law that statutes in dcr* ogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no rules shall be observed, unless such construction
i application to the statutes o f this state. The statutes would be inconsistent with the* manifest intent of
r establish the laws o f this state respecting the the Legislature or repugnant to the context of the
f subjects to which they relate, and their provisions statute:
(!) "Month" means a calendar month, unless
; and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
£' construed with a view to effect the objects o f the otherwise expressed, and the word "year," or the
statutes and t o promote justice. Whenever there is abbreviation " A D . " is equivalent t o the expression
*•' any variance between the rules o f equity and the "year cf our Lord."
(2) "Oath* includes "affirmation," and the word
ruks of common law in reference to the same
!
matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
iwa "swear" includes "affirm." Every oral statement
under oath or affirmation is embraced in the term
61-3-3. Retised statute* not retroactive.
"testify," and every written one, in the term
fc No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, "depose."
r unless expressly so declared.
i9S3
(3) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign
written with the intent to authenticate any instrumf C&-3-4. Civil and criminal remedies not merged.
When the violation of a right admits of both a ent or writing.
(4) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and
\'•civil and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the
\. one is not merged in the other.
itsj typewriting.
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic
.; 0 - V 5 . Effect of repealing a statute.
and corporate, partnerships, associations, and comThe repeal of a statute does not revive a statute panies.
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and
' previously repealed, or affect any right which has
1 accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or the plural the singular.
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the
any action or proceeding commenced under cr by
virtue of the statute repealed.
i«3 other.
(8) Words used in the present tense include the
61-34. Identical provisions deemed a continuation,
future.
not new enact sent.
(9) "Property" includes both real and personal
The provisions of any statute, so far as they are property.
the same as those of any prior statute, shall be
(10) "Land," "real estate," and "real property"
construed as a continuation of such provisions, and include land, tenements, hereditaments, water
, not u a new enactment.
itss rights, possessory rights, and claims.
l
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Paul TANNER, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Esbern BAADSGAARD, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16569.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 27, 1980.
Assignee of purchasers brought action
for specific performance of contract for sale
of one and one-half lots of undeveloped
property. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered judgment awarding specific performance, and
vendor appealed. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, C. J., held that: (1) evidence warranted a finding that assignee had not
abandoned contract and supported finding
that vendor had waived strict compliance
with the provisions relating to time of payment, and (2) trial court was justified in
finding that fact that parties had agreed
that interest would be paid for the time it
took to complete the transaction, but had
not agreed on a definite amount, did not
result in any such uncertainty as to prevent
specific performance.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <s=»931(l), 1009(4)
Though Supreme Court may review the
evidence in a case in equity, Court will
indulge considerable deference to trial
judge's findings, and, where the evidence is
in dispute, the Supreme Court will assume
that trial judge believed that which is favorable to his findings, and the Supreme
Court will not disturb the findings unless it
clearly preponderates to the contrary.
2. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>101
After waiver of strict compliance with
dates of payment stated in earnest money
agreement, vendor must give notice and a
reasonable time to perform before he may
insist on holding purchaser strictly to the
time requirements.

3. Vendor and Purchaser <*=>315(1), 350
When parties have entered into formal
contract, such as for purchase of real property, it is to be assumed that they will
cooperate with each other in good faith for
its performance, and one refusing to so
perform, or claiming a forfeiture thereof,
has burden of showing justification for doing so.
4. Specific Performance 0^121(11)
In purchasers' assignee's action for specific performance of contract for sale of one
and one-half lots of undeveloped property,
evidence warranted determination that assignee had not abandoned contract and supported finding that vendor waived strict
compliance with provisions relating to time
of payment.
5. Specific Performance o=»28(l)
To warrant specific performance, essential terms of the contract must be sufficiently definite to enable parties to understand what their obligations are, but proper
application of such rule is as a shield to
protect from injustice, and not as a weapon
with which to work an injustice.
6. Specific Performance <&=> 121(8)
In purchasers' assignee's action for specific performance of contract for sale of one
and one-half lots of undeveloped property,
trial court was justified in finding that fact
that parties had agreed that interest would
be paid for the time it took to complete the
transaction, but had not agreed on a definite amount, did not result in any such
uncertainty as to prevent specific performance.

Jeril B. Wilson, Provo, for defendant and
appellant.
M. Dayle Jeffs, Provo, for plaintiff and
respondent.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Paul Tanner brought this action
against the defendant Esbern Baadsgaard,
seeking specific performance of a real es-
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tale contract providing for the sale of one
and one-half lots of undeveloped property
in Spanish Fork. From a judgment awarding that relief, the defendant appeals.
[1] As is so often true in such controversies, there is sharp conflict in the evidence
as to material and controlling facts. Notwithstanding the correctness of defendant's
urgence that this Court may review the
evidence because it is a case in equity,1 it is
our well-established rule that due to the
prerogatives and advantaged position of the
trial judge, we indulge considerable deference to his findings.2 Where the evidence
is in dispute, we assume that he believed
that which is favorable to his findings, and
we do not disturb them unless it clearly
preponderates to the contrary.3
On March 19, 1977, the plaintiff and his
brother and sister-in-law, Dwight and Velma Blood, went with the defendant and
inspected the»propcrty. Later that day, the
Bloods and the defendant signed an earnest
money agreement of sale for $40,000, $500
down, for which Mr. Blood gave a check.
Further payments were to be: $14,500 upon
delivery of a deed to half of the whole lot
on May 1, 1977, $12,500 on April 1, 1978,
and $12,500 on April 1, 1979, the latter two
payments to also include 8.5 percent interest from April 1, 1977.
The $14,500 payment, which was due on
May 1, 1977, was not made. Mr. Blood
testified that shortly thereafter, he contacted the defendant and informed him that he
had not been able to obtain the necessary
financing to make the payment, but told
him that he would continue to attempt to
do so. About two months later, near the
end of June, 1977, the defendant contacted
Mr. Blood and told him that he had lost the
$500 check. Mr. Blood said they agreed
that he should mail a check for $1,200, both

to replace the lost check and the rest to
apply on the interest which had accrued to
the defendant.4 In the letter accompanying
the check, Mr. Blood stated that he appreciated the defendant's patience and that if
"circumstances change, necessitating that
we move more quickly or arrange separate
financing on the land before we get our
construction loan, please advise." He received no response, nor any complaint about
delay.
The plaintiff Tanner testified that he
spoke with the defendant several times during the next six months about the fact that
Mr. and Mrs. Blood had assigned their interest in the contract to him and he was
still having difficulty in obtaining financing. The defendant still made no complaint
about the delay. But he did tell plaintiff
Tanner that it would be necessary to charge
a higher interest rate. In response thereto,
the parties agreed that interest was to be
paid "in full for all of the time it took until
we closed the transaction."
Just prior to December 25, 1977, the
plaintiff, who could not then obtain the
financing, told the defendant that there
was an individual who was very interested
in beginning construction on the lots and
that financing for the project would be
arranged in January or, at the latest, February. According to the plaintiff, the defendant again reminded him that "all of the
interest would be due when the transaction
was closed."
On February 21, 1978 the plaintiff contacted the defendant to inform him that
financing had been obtained and to arrange
for a time to close the transaction. The
defendant then told plaintiff Tanner for the
first time that he had arranged the sale of
the property to another. Two days later,
the plaintiff again approached the defend-

1. Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, Utah, 4. The defendant testified that, at the time, he
told Mr. Blood: "I'll sell you the property at the
544 P.2d 481 (1975).
2. .Id.; Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539 P.2d 452
(1975); McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d
997 (1978).

same price you bought it for, providing you pay
me interest by the month until you get your
financing together."

3. See Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478
P.2d 327 (1970); McBride v. McBride, supra,
note 2.
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ant, but was told that no money would be
accepted for the purchase of the property.
[2] Based on the foregoing, the trial
court found that, by his conduct, the defendant had waived requirement of strict
compliance with the dates of payment stated in the earnest money agreement, which
waiver had been relied upon by the plaintiff. The court applied the rule that after
such a waiver, the seller must give notice
and a reasonable time to perform before he
may insist upon holding the buyer strictly
to the time requirements.5 The trial court
concluded that the plaintiff would be entitled to specific performance of the contract
upon the payment of the stated purchase
price, plus the interest as agreed upon.
The defendant contends that the trial
court erred because the only reasonable
finding from the evidence should be that
the plaintiff had abandoned the contract
before he attempted to complete the transaction in February, 1978; and that the
plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance because he had not met the conditions nor made the payments as required
under the contract.
[3,4] As to that contention, these observations are pertinent: When parties have
entered into a formal contract, such as for
the purchase of real property, it is to be
assumed that they will cooperate with each
other in good faith for its performance,8
and one refusing to so perform, or claiming
a forfeiture thereof, has the burden of
showing justification for doing so.7 Proceeding on that premise, it is our opinion
that there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the trial court's refusal to believe
that the plaintiff had abandoned the contract, and for finding that the defendant
had waived strict compliance wTith the provisions as to time of payment.

[5, 6] The defendant also contends that
the terms of the contract had become uncertain when the parties had agreed on an
increase of the interest, but had not agreed
upon a definite amount. We have no doubt
as to the correctness of defendant's assertion that, in order to warrant specific performance, the essential terms of the contract must be sufficiently definite to enable
the parties to understand what their obligations are.8 But the proper application of
that rule is as a shield to protect from
injustice, and not as a weapon with which
to work an injustice.9 In regard to the
defendant's claim of uncertainty: We think
the trial court was also justified in finding
that the agreement that interest would be
paid for the time it took to complete the
transaction did not result in any such uncertainty as to prevent specific performance. Whatever else may be said about
uncertainty as to the payment of interest,
we observe that this claim of error is also
governed by the rule alluded to above: that
the parties are duty bound to cooperate in
good faith to carry out their original intent.
In the light of what has been said herein,
we see no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff is
entitled to specific ^performance of the contract upon payment of the purchase price
and the accrued interest thereon.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respondent).
MAUGHAN, WILKINS,
STEWART, JJ., concur.

HALL and

5. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 506(b). See statements
. That the law does not generally favor forfeiin Fuhriman v. Bissegger, 13 Utah 2d 379, 375
tures, see Fullmer v. Blood, Utah, 546 P.2d 606
P.2d 27 (1962); Hansen v. Christensen, Utah,
(1976) and cases therein cited.
545 P.2d 1152 (1976); Harrison v. Puga, 4
Wash.App. 52, 480 P.2d 247 (1971); Angus 8. 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 36(b); PitchHunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., Wvo., 577 P.2d
er v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491
645 (1978).
(1967); Eckard v. Smith, Utah, 527 P.2d 660
(1974).
6. Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 P.2d 857 (1979).
9. Kier v. Condrack, supra, note 3.
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13 Utah 2d 370
Fcstus M. FUHRIMAN, Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
Alfred BISSEGGER and LnRene Bissegger
Carlsen, formerly LaRene Bissegger,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 9590.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 15, 11MV2.

Suit by vendor to recover realty sold
under a real estate contract wherein the
vendee counterclaimed for specific performance. The First District Court, Cache
County, Lewis Jones, J., granted specific
performance, and the vendor appealed. The
Supreme Court, Wade, C. J., held that contractual provision giving the vendor the
option to forfeit rights of vendee if he
failed to make payments within 30 days
after they became due was not self-executory, and it was incumbent upon vendor to
give sufikicnt notice of election to terminate
contract and forfeit vendee's rights therein.
Affirmed.

1. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I0I
Provision in real estate contract giving
vendor option to forfeit rights of vendee if
he failed to make payments within 30 days
after they became due was not self-executory, and it was incumbent upon vendor to
give sufficient notice of election to terminate
contract and forfeit vendee's rights therein.
2. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I04
Evidence sustained finding that vendor
led vendee to believe that strict performance with respect to making of payments
was not required, and that vendor had not
given vendee, who was of sub-normal intelligence, sufficient notice of intent to forfeit the agreement.

Daines & Thomas, Logan, for appellant.

Olson & Caldcrwood, Logan, for respondents.
WADE, Chief Justice.
Fcstus M. Fuhriman, appellant herein,
brought this suit to recover real property
he was selling under a real estate contract
entered into in 19-16 between him and Alfred
Bissegger and his then wife, LaRene Bissegger, now LaRene Bissegger Carlsen, respondents herein, on the ground that their
rights in the contract had been forfeited.
Respondents counterclaimed for specific
performance. After trial of the case before
the court, sitting without a jury, the court
found the issues in favor of the respondents
and granted the counterclaim, provided that
all amounts due under the contract were
deposited with the court within 60 days.
[1] The contract provided that if the
buyers failed to make payments as they
became due, or within 30 days thereafter,
the seller at his option could forfeit their
rights and retake possession. This type of
forfeiture provision not being self-executory, it was incumbent upon Fuhriman to
have exercised his option to forfeit their
rights by giving Alfred Bissegger, who had
succeeded to his divorced wife's interest,
sufficient notice of his election to terminate
the contract and forfeit his rights therein. 1
[2] From the record it is clear that almost from the inception respondents failed
to make the required payments, and the
decisive question to be determined is whether Fuhriman, before the commencement of
this suit, had given Alfred Bissegger sufficient notice of forfeiture.
It appears that Alfred Bissegger is of
sufficiently low intelligence to be classed as
feeble-minded and has been a recipient of
welfare since 1955. In 1956, Fuhriman told
Bissegger that he "figured" the contract
"wasn't any good anymore" and suggested
that Bissegger could probably get the Welfare Department to pay rent. Mr. Bissegger thereupon informed the welfare worker
in charge of his case that he no longer

I. Leone v. Zuniga, S4 Utah 417. 34 P.2d 099. 94 A.L.R. 1232,
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owned the real property in question because
the owner had "uppcd the price" on him and
asked that he be allowed $10.00 a month to
pay rent. This was the exact amount due
for monthly payments provided in the contract. He was given $10.00 a month to pay
for rent, but he never paid this to Mr.
Fuhriman. Mr. Fuhriman, during the next
four years before the commencement of this
action, allowed Mr. Bissegger to remain
on the property, and on occasions when he
would see him would ask him when he would
pay something. In the meantime Mr. Fuhriman was making some effort to sell the
property to others. In 1960, he commenced
this action to evict Mr. Bissegger. When
Mr. Bissegger received the summons he
consulted his attorney and immediately
thereafter a tender was made to Mr. Fuhriman of all moneys due under the contract.
This tender was refused.
The court found that Fuhriman's conversations with Bissegger about the delinquent payments and their effect on the
contract were of an uncertain nature as to
what he might do in the vague future, and
were also uncertain as to what he would
require Bissegger to do to avoid termination
of the contract; and that this behavior led
Bissegger to believe that strict performance
was not required. The court further found
that Bissegger "is an adult of sub-normal
intelligence, having the intelligence of
a child of approximately 7 years old and
although reasonably capable of caring for
his physical needs is not of sufficient intelligence to transact business affairs such as
the agreement with plaintiff without being
furnished with emphatic, clear, definite and
detailed instructions." The court then
found that Fuhriman had, from the beginning, waived strict or substantial compliance
with the agreement, and that he had failed
to notify Bissegger that unless payments
were made within a reasonable time, there
would be a forfeiture of the agreement.
We are of the opinion that the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the court's findings
that no actual and sufficient notice of intent

to forfeit the agreement was given Bissegger before the suit was commenced and
therefore the court did not err in granting
specific performance on respondents* counterclaim.
Affirmed.

Costs to respondents.

HENRIOD, MCDONOUGH, CALLISTER and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

O ! M l NUMttR SYSTCM.

13 Utah 2d 3S2
Norman W. KETTNER, Administrator of the
Estate of Elizabeth Herdman, deceased, and
Howard Herdman, Plaintiffs,
v.
Hon. Marcellus K. SNOW, Judge; The District Court Of The Third Judicial District
In And For Salt Lake County, State of
Utah; Alvln Keddlngton, Clerk of the District Court of Salt Lake County; Leona
A. Watklns and John Watklns, Defendants*
No. 9659.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 5, 1902.

Original proceeding by defendants to
prohibit a district court from further proceeding after it had granted a new trial.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that
a motion for new trial was improperly
granted where motion therefor was not
served within 10 days after entry of judgment and there was no showing of diligence
or likelihood that claimed newly discovered
evidence would produce a different result.
Alternative writ made permanent.

I. Courts C=>l 14
A court has power to act nunc pro tunc
in proper circumstances, but such device
cannot be used to revive time for taking a
required step in a legal proceeding after
statutory time for doing it has elapsed.
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scope is limited to a determination of
whether or not the action uf the Hoard of
County Commissioners as a legislative body
is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. Xo contention is made that the
county did not act within its grant of powers from the legislature in its adoption of
the original zoning ordinance. The prior
decisions of this court without exception
have laid down the rule that the exercise
of the zoning power is a legislative function to he exercised by the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of
the zoning plan, its necessity, the nature
and boundaries of the district to be zoned
are matters which lie solely within that
discretion. It is the policy of this court as
enunciated in its prior decisions11 that it
will avoid substituting its judgment for
that of the legislative body of the municipality. We are of the opinion that the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County acted within the scope of its legislative powers, and that the reclassification
ordinance was adopted pursuant to a planning scheme developed for that portion of
the county we are here concerned with. A
careful review of the evidence leads us to
the conclusion that the plaintiffs have
failed to sustain their burden that the action of the county was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.

Collln L. HANSEN, the duly appointed, acting and qualified administrator of the Estate of Bernard Hansen, Deceased, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Delia A. CHRISTENSEN, the duly appointed and acting and qualified administratrix
of the Estate of Arnold Chrlstensen, Deceased, and Delia A. Chrlstensen, Individually, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 14112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 29, 1976.

Administrator of estate of purchaser
brought action against administrator of estate of vendor, in her representative capacity and individually, seeking specific performance of written contract for sale and
purchase of realty. The First District
Court, Box Elder County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., entered judgment enforcing conveyance, and vendor's administrator appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J.,
held, inter alia, that purchaser's tender of
balance due under contract was sufficient.
Affirmed.

HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT,
CROCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

I. Vendor and Purchaser €=101
Contract for purchase of realty providing that after continuance of default for
90 days vendor had right to accelerate and
foreclose, or enter, take possession and forfeit purchaser's interest, or take advantage
of any other remedy provided by law, required some affirmative act on part of
vendor and therefore contractual relations
between vendor and purchaser were in ex-

2. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111,
141 P.2d 704; Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity
v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d
177; Dowse r. Salt Lake City Corp., 123
Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723; Naylor t\ Salt Lake

City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764.
See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303, 54
A.L.R. 1016; Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md.
136, 96 A.2d 27.

The decision of the court below is reversed and the matter is remanded directing the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. Xo costs awarded.
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istcnce until such time as vendor chose to Wc affirm the judgment. Parties to bear
notify defaulting purchaser of its election their own costs.
to proceed under one or all of its options;
This is an action for specific performhaving decided to so proceed, vendor was ance, initiated by the administrator of the
required to give defaulting purchaser rea- estate of the buyer (hereafter plaintiff or
sonable time within which to cure default buyer) against the administrator of the essince purchaser could otherwise assume tate of the seller (hereafter defendant or
that vendor had \vai\cd default, or had seller) in her representative capacity, and
elected to enforce contract rather than for- individually. The contract was engaged in
feit it, or that purchaser would be permit- in January of 1958. The contract price
ted to perform.
was $4,000; the buyer paid $1,200 down
and took possession. Annual installments
2. Tender C=>\i
Tender of. balance due under sales of $900 were to be made January 1st, in
contract for purchase of certain property the years 1959 and I960, with a final inby defaulting purchaser, who, having re- stallment of $1,000, to be made January 1,
ceived no notice that vendor had elected to 1961—all with interest. All taxes and asproceed under any of its options under sessments, after January 1, 1958, were to
sales contract upon such default, had de- be paid by buyer. In July of 1958, defendant's joint seller died. The annual
cided to proceed with contract by placing
payment
due January 1, 1958, together
on deposit to vendor's order cashier's check
with
$168
interest, was tended to and
in total amount due under contract constiaccepted
by
defendant, Delia Christensen,
tuted sufficient tender where vendor had
on
September
8, 1959.
refused purchaser's "present physical offer."
3. Tender OI6(2)
Where unreasonable conduct of obligee would make actual tender fruitless gesture, offer to comply with terms of contract by obligor is sufficient.
4. Tender C=>I5(3)
Where vendor did not object to
amount of purchaser's tender of balance
due under sales contract and place of delivery at time tender was made, those
objections were deemed waived. U.C.A.
1953, 78-27-3.

Omer J. Call, Brigham City, for defendant-appellant.
Walter G. Mann, of Mann, Hadfield &
Thorne, Brigham City, for plaintiff-respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
The seller under a written contract for
the sale 'and purchase of realty appeals
from a judgment enforcing conveyance.
345 P.2d—73

In October, 1960, the buyer died, and
there was no contact or communication between the parties, until plaintiff went to
the home of defendant on October 31,
1962, and offered to make full payment.
Defendant refused payment, informed
plaintiff the contract was in default and
she was repossessing the land. The next
day plaintiff left a cashier's check, in the
amount of $2,422.02, with First Security
Bank, in Brigham City; and defendant received notice the money was available to
her, in exchange for a deed.
The trial court found the amount of the
cashier's check represented the balance due
under the contract, together with taxes and
interest, up to November 1, 1962; and
since that time, the money had remained
available for defendant. The court also
found plaintiff to have been in possession
of the realty, since the inception of the
contract in 1958. Defendants were reimbursed in the amount of $115.47, plus $6.70
interest, for the taxes defendant had paid
from 1962 to 1974. Pursuant to stipulation
of counsel, the court was to determine a
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reasonable attorney's fee if one were to be
awarded. Plaintiff was awarded an attorney's fee determined by the court.
Although the contract was not what is
known in this jurisdiction as a Uniform
Real Estate Contract, it provided that after
the continuance of a default for ninety
days the seller had a right to exercise
three options. The seller could accelerate
and foreclose; or enter, take possession,
and forfeit the buyer's interest; or take
advantage of any other remedy provided
by law. All remedies were cumulative.
[1] It can be seen that the provisions
of the contract, designed to terminate contractual relations, are not self-executing.
They require some affirmative act on the
part of the seller. Therefore, the contractual relations between seller and buyer are
in existence until such time as the seller
chooses to notify the defaulting buyer of
its election to proceed under one, or all, of
its options. In so doing, seller must give
the defaulting buyer a reasonable time
within which to cure the default. Without
this notice the defaulting buyer would not
know what to do. He would not have certain knowledge his tenancy was at an end.
He could assume that the seller may have
waived default, or would elect to enforce
the contract rather than forfeit it; or he
could assume he would be permitted to
perform. 1

that case dealt with a Uniform Real Estate
Contract, a contract which contains provisions significantly different from those in
the contract before us.
[2,3] Here plaintiff made a tender of
all sums due under the contract, prior to
the exercise of any option by the seller. I
Seller challenges this tender on the ground <
it did not meet the requirements of a j
"present physical offer." The court found i
a "present physical offer" to pay was j
refused by seller, and buyer did the next
best thing, viz. place on deposit to seller's i
order a cashier's check, in the total amount
due under the contract. After defendant's •
refusal, it would have been fruitless for
the buyer to have included a cashier's ,
check in the letter sent to the seller informing her the money was available.
Where the unreasonable conduct of the obligee would make an actual tender a fruitless gesture, an offer to comply with the
terms of the contract by the obligor is
sufficient. 3
[4] After trial there were some objections to the amount of the tender and the
place of delivery. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that these objections to
the tender were made at the time the tender was made. Our law is that the person
to whom a tender is made must, at the
time, specify the objections to it, or they
are waived. 4

At trial the matter of Lamont v. Evjen*
was cited and considerable reliance placed
on the holding in that matter. However,

H E N R I O D , C. J., and ELLETT,
CROCKETT and T U C K E T T , JJ., concur.

1. Leone et al. v. Zuniga et al, 84 Utah 417, 34
P.2d G09 (1935).
2. 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532 (1973).

3. Romero r. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P.
2d 37 (in04).
4. 78-27-5, U.C.A.1953; 74 Am.Jur.2d, Tender, Sec. 10.
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The foregoing is consistent with cases of
other jurisdictions which hold that a true
lease can only l>e negated where there is an
explicit obligation on the part of the lessee
to pay an amount substantially equal to the
purchase price.8 In the instant case, both
parties had the right to cancel the lease at
any time after June 30, 1978. The lease
provided that the lease would run "for a
minimum period of six months and thereafter until the equipment is returned or
until lessor terminates the lease." After
the initial period, the lease therefore became a month-to-month rental.
[1,2] The trial court interpreted the
lease provision (quoted supra) as meaning
that the lessor could terminate the lease
only "according to the terms and provisions
hereinafter stated," i. e., for cause. It is
our considered opinion9 that said phrase
refers not to the right of termination by the
lessor but to the agreement itself—to wit,
"Arnold Machinery . . . hereby leases to
Utah Excavating . . . the equipment hereinafter described, according to the terms
and provisions hereinafter stated . . . "
Any other interpretation of the disputed
phrase would render the lease perpetual in
duration, which was clearly not intended by
the parties.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude
that the lease was not intended as a security interest and that plaintiff is entitled to
recover the unpaid rentals. The lower
court's judgment is reversed and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff.
STEWART, HOWE, and CROCKETT/
JJ., and MAURICE HARDING, Retired
District Judge, concur.
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
herein; HARDING, District Judge, sat.
8. See Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service, Secured Transactions, Volume 1,
§ 4A.06[9][d], and cases cited therein.
9. In reviewing the interpretation of a written
document, we need not defer to the views of

Melville L. MORRIS, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
Dwane J. SYKES and Patricia Sykes,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 16838.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 21, 1981.

Purchaser sued for specific performance of a contract to purchase undeveloped
land in Alaska by compelling vendors to
accept balance thereon or, in alternative, to
relieve purchaser from unjust and inequitable forfeiture of amount he had paid on
contract. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., found against
purchaser on issue of requiring defendants
to convey property, but decreed an equitable reimbursement to purchaser. Vendors
appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J.,
held that: (1) in view of fact that parties
were negotiating a reinstatement of contract up to time of unilateral termination
by vendors, fairness would require definite
notice to purchaser that he must pay up or
forfeit payments he had made and his
rights under contract, and of vendors' intention to sell property to someone else, and
(2) trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding for vendors but decreeing equitable
reimbursement.
Affirmed.
Hall, J., filed concurring statement.
„ n
1. Contracts e=»325
Where a contract is entered into and is
to be performed in a foreign jurisdiction,
the trial court. Ephraim Theater Company v.
Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958).
* CROCKETT, Justice, concurred in this case before his retirement.
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law of such jurisdiction should he applied,
particularly when contract deals with land
in such jurisdiction.
2. Contracts c=*325
Matters of procedure in a contract action arc governed by law of forum.
3. Vendor and Purchaser e=>2
Where, in action for specific performance of contract for sale of realty, there
was no significant difference between law
of Alaska, which was situs of property, and
law of Utah in regard to enforceability of
contract and forfeiture clause therein, court
could properly apply Utah law in absence of
any affirmative showing that law of Alaska
was different.
4. Damages c=>81
Where parties to a land-sale contract
stipulate to a forfeiture and liquidated
damages, such stipulation will generally be
enforceable.
5. Damages <s=»81
Where a forfeiture under literal terms
of a contract results in awarding to a party
a sum so entirely disproportionate to any
damages he may have suffered that it
shocks the conscience of the court, a court
of equity will neither approve nor enforce
such a penalty.
6. Vendor and Purchaser <£=>1G1
In view of fact that parties to contract
for sale of realty were negotiating a reinstatement up to time of unilateral termination of contract by vendors, fairness would
require definite notice to purchaser in default that he must pay up or forfeit payments he had made and his rights under
contract, and of vendors' intention to sell
property to someone else.
7. Appeal and Error <s=>949
Specific Performance <s=»l, 8
Specific performance is a remedy of
equity which is addressed to sense of justice
and good conscience of court, and, accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is
allowed in court's determination as to
whether it shall be granted and what judg-

ment should be entered in respect thereto;
court's ruling thereon should not be upset
on appeal unless it clearly appears that
court has abused its discretion.
8. Specific Performance G=> 127(1)
In action for specific performance of
contract for sale of realty, trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding against
purchaser on issue of requiring vendors to
convey property but as a part of judgment
decreeing an equitable reimbursement to
purchaser.
M. Dayle Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs, Provo,
for defendants and appellants.
A. H. Boyce, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent.
CROCKETT, Justice: *
Plaintiff Morris sued for specific performance of a contract to purchase some
undeveloped land in Alaska by compelling
defendants Sykes to accept the balance
thereon and convey the land to the plaintiff, or in the alternative, to relieve the
plaintiff from an unjust and inequitable
forfeiture of the $23,216 plaintiff had paid
on the contract. Upon a trial to the court,
it found against the plaintiff on the issue of
requiring defendants to convey the property to the plaintiff, but as a part of that
judgment permitting the defendants to
keep their property, the court decreed an
equitable reimbursement of $14,121 to the
plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
On October 3, 1974, the plaintiff entered
into a contract to purchase from the defendant a vacant parcel of land of approximately 27 acres known as Tract B of the
Musk Ox Subdivision, located near Fairbanks, Alaska. The purchase price was
$40,000, to be paid $2,000 down, with
monthly payments of $350 beginning December 1, 1974. The contract further provided that plaintiff was to pay $1,000 on
November 1, 1974, $5,000 on February 1,
1975, $5,000 on August 1, 1975, and $3,000
on each succeeding February 1 and August

* Justice Crockett wrote this opinion prior to his
retirement.

A-265

MORRIS v. SYKES

Utah

683

Clip »5, Utah,,fl24l\2»l681

1 until November 1, 1979, when the contract
balance was to IKJ paid in full. The rate of
interest on the unpaid balance was ten percent.
The payments were to be made to the
First National Bank of Fairbanks, Alaska,
the same bank which held a trust deed on
the property previously executed by the
defendant. The bank was instructed by the
parties that all money received from plaintiff on the contract was to be applied on the
debt.
Plaintiff made the down payment, but
the monthly and periodic payments were
made sporadically, and in amounts different
than called for by the contract. As a result,
plaintiff was continually in default under
the contract. The defendant sent written
notices to the plaintiff advising him that as
of January 1, 1976, he would be five months
delinquent in the sum of $1,750. These
communications further advised the plaintiff that defendant was depending on the
payments to meet his obligations to the
First National Bank of Fairbanks on the
underlying mortgage.
During December, 1975, defendant offered to sell plaintiff two additional parcels
in the Musk Ox Subdivision. These negotiations, however, were not fruitful.
The defendant continued to accept late
and partial payments on the contract and
between the date of purchase and by August 2, 1976, plaintiff had made payments
totaling $23,216, $3,507 interest to August
2, 1976, and $19,709 principal. On September 2,1976, offered to prepay the remaining
principal if defendant would give him a
"good discount" for so doing. Defendant
refused and on November 11, 1976, pursuant to the terms of the contract, defendant
caused a notice of termination to be issued
and served upon the plaintiff. Defendant
then recorded the quitclaim deed from
plaintiff to defendant and retained all payments made by the plaintiff. Various offers of reinstatement were made by defendant to plaintiff but these offers were refused by plaintiff because they were conditioned on plaintiffs purchase of additional

property and the payment of a reinstatement fee.
On February 9, 1977, the bank informed
the defendant that unless he paid the $3,318
delinquency on the underlying mortgage
within 30 days, the entire unpaid balance on
the mortgage would be declared due.
Thereafter, on February 15, 1977, the defendant entered into a contract for the sale
of the property to Johnny M. Iverson, his
brother-in-law, for $20,663, approximately
the amount defendant would have received
had plaintiff performed on the contract.
Plaintiff was not given any advance notice
of the defendant's plan to sell the property
to Iverson. The parties are in agreement
that at that time it would have been quite
impractical to sell the property on the market because it was under heavy snows and
therefore inaccessible.
Upon its analysis of the total situation, it
was the judgment of the trial court that the
plaintiff should not be granted specific performance, but nevertheless, that to permit
the defendant to retain the entire $23,216
which plaintiff had paid would constitute a
forfeiture so unconscionable that the court
could not approve it; and therefore ordered
the defendant to return $14,121 as a condition to exonerating himself and his property from plaintiffs claim.
On appeal, the defendant urges enforcement of the forfeiture provision of the contract and seeks reversal of the judgment on
the grounds that the trial court: 1) misapplied the Alaska law on forfeiture and damages, 2) wrongfully held that there was an
unconscionable forfeiture which the court
would not enforce, 3) erroneously ruled that
the plaintiff should have been given definite notice, and opportunity to remedy any
defaults, before the sale to Iverson.
[1-3] Defendant's argument that the
trial court misapplied the law of Alaska in
regard to forfeitures gives us no grave concern here. We have no disagreement with
the proposition that where a contract is
entered into and is to be performed in a
foreign jurisdiction the law of that jurisdic-
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tion should he applied;' and this is particularly so when the contract deals with land
in that jurisdiction.2 Therefore, it is our
duty to apply the substantive law of Alaska
to this controversy.3 However, as correctly
stated by the trial court, we sec no significant difference between the law of Alaska
and our own in regard to the enforceability
of such a contract and the forfeiture clause
therein. Under such circumstances, the
court may properly apply Utah law in the
absence of an affirmative showing that the
law of Alaska is different.4
[4,5] Defendant's attack upon the requirement that he repay $14,121 of the $23,21G which plaintiff had paid him is
premised upon a forfeiture provision that
upon the buyer's default the seller may
retain all amounts paid on the contract and
terminate plaintiff's interest in the property. It is true that where the parties to a
contract stipulate to a forfeiture and liquidated damages, such stipulation will generally be enforceable.5 It is, however, well
established in Utah,6 as well as Alaska,7
that where a forfeiture under the literal
terms of a contract results in awarding to a
party a sum so entirely disproportionate to
any damages he may have suffered that it
shocks the conscience of the court, a court
of equity will neither approve nor enforce
such a penalty.
[6] Defendant's final contention is that
the court erroneously ruled that he should
have given more definite notice of his intent to forfeit the contract, and of his intended sale to Iverson. The decision of the
trial court indicates that he was not convinced that the defendant gave plaintiff
definite notice that he must pay up, or
1. See, e. g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of
Hartford, Conn. v. Gentry\ 191 Okl. 659, 132
P.2d 326 (1942); Catchpole v. Narramore, 102
Ariz. 248, 428 P.2d 105(1967).
2. Conant v. Deep Creek & Curlew Valley trr.
Co., 23 Utah 627, 66 P. 188 (1901).
3. Matters of procedure in a contract action are,
of course, governed by the law of the forum.
See, e. g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395
P.2d 543 (1964).

forfeit the payments he had made and his
rights under the contra
We agree with
the trial judge that fai ess would require
such a notice, and of thv defendant's intention to sell the properly to someone else.
He noted that the parties were negotiating
a reinstatement up to the time of the unilateral termination of the contract by the
defendant.
[7,8] Specific performance is a remedy
of equity which is addressed to the sense of
justice and good conscience of the court,
and accordingly, considerable latitude of
discretion is allowed in his determination as
to whether it shall be granted and what
judgment should be entered in respect
thereto; and his ruling thereon should not
be upset on appeal unless it clearly appears
that he has abused his discretion,8 a circumstance we have not perceived as being
present here.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
STEWART, J., and HENRIOD, Retired
Justice, concur.
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
herein; HENRIOD, Retired Justice, sat.
WILKINS, J., heard the arguments but
resigned before the opinion was filed.
HALL, Justice (concurring):
My review of the record does not disclose
the evidence, if any there was, of actual
damage which the trial court weighed in
reaching its determination that enforcement of the liquidated damage provision of
4. See Booth v. Crompton, Utah. 583 P.2d 82
(1978), and cases cited therein.
5. See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243
P.2d 446, 449 (1952), and cases cited therein.
6. See, e. g., Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59,
278 P.2d 294 (1954).
7. See, e. g., Moran v. Hoiman, Alaska, 501 P.2d
769(1972).
8. Ferris v. Jennings, Utah, 595 P.2d 857 (1979),
and cases cited therein.
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the contract would l»e unconscionable.1
Nevertheless, the issue was not raised below, nor on this appeal. Consequently, I
concur in affirming the judgment.
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Clarice DUPUIS (Heater), Plaintiff and
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Edwin Cyrill NIELSON, Defendant and
Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
No. 16865.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 21, 1981.
Driver of car, upon recovery against
driver of pickup in personal injury action
based on automobile accident, filed motion
for additur or new trial based on inadequate damages. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
J., denied motion, and driver of car appealed. Pickup driver cross-appealed claiming
right of setoff. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) evidence did not compel finding that reasonable persons would
have reached different measure of damages
which would have enabled court to grant
motion for additur, and (2) pickup driver
was not entitled to reduction of car driver's
award of general damages to offset nofault insurance payment for household service benefits.
Affirmed.
1. New Trial <s=» 161(1)
When damages are not so inadequate
as to indicate disregard of evidence by jury,
court is not empowered to entertain motion
for additur. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
59.
I. See Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243
P.2d 446 (1952).

2. New Trial c=>161(l)
Evidence, in |>ersonal injury action arising from automobile accident, including evidence that injured party was under stress
for reasons unrelated to accident, did not
compel finding that reasonable persons
would have reached different measure of
damages such as would empower court to
entertain motion for additur. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59.
3. Automobiles s=>251.12
Basic principle of No-Fault Act is to
prevent double recovery by no-fault insured. U.CA.1953, 31-41-1 et seq.
4. Automobiles c=>251.17
Where jury award to car driver in personal injury action based on automobile accident did not include award for household
service benefits, pickup driver involved in
accident was not entitled to reduction of car
driver's award of general damages to offset
no-fault insurance payments made for
household service benefits. U.C.A.1953, 3 1 41-11.

Samuel King and James E. Hawkes, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant and
cross-respondent.
Frank N. Karras, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent and cross-appellant.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff, upon recovering against defendant in a personal injury action, filed a
motion for an additur or new trial based on
inadequate damages. It is from the lower
court's denial of that motion that plaintiff
herein appeals.
The accident in which the alleged damages were sustained occurred when defendant was driving his pick-up truck and
struck the rear of plaintiff's car which had
stopped at an intersection for a red light.
A directed verdict on the issue of liability
was entered in favor of plaintiff at the
conclusion of all evidence.
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Robert E. CALL, Everett H. Call and
Ann I). Call, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
TIMBER LAKES CORPORATION,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 14839.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 29, 1977.

Suit was brought by purchaser for a
declaratory judgment to determine validity
of written contract for sale of three mountain lots calling for down payment and
monthly payments. The Fourth District
Court, Wasatch County, J. Robert Bullock,
J., entered decree holding contract to be
valid and in full force and the vendor appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, C. J.,
held that notwithstanding delinquency in
payment under contract allowing vendor to
declare all sums previously paid forfeited,
trial court did not abuse its discretion in
reinstating contract upon purchaser's
tender of all delinquent payments under
contract plus accrued interests and costs
within 15 days.
Affirmed.
Vendor and Purchaser <£»185
Although contract for sale of mountain
lots stated that time was of the essence and
that upon any default vendor could at its
option terminate all rights and retain all
moneys previously paid, where purchaser
had made a total payment of $3,181.07 toward the purchase of lots, the ten days
specified in vendor's letter by which contract was to be brought current was not a
reasonable time and 22 days was not an
unreasonable time for purchaser to tender
performance after notice, and there was no
abuse of discretion to provide that upon
purchaser's tender of all delinquent payments plus accrued interest and costs within 15 days contract would be reinstated.

John S. Adams of Adams, Kasting & Anderson, Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant.
Russell C. Harris, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs-respondents.
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
This is a suit for declaratory judgment to
determine the validity of a written contract, for the sale of real property, dated
November 6, 1971. The respondents, hereafter referred to as "Calls," were the purchasers and the appellant was the seller.
The trial court held the contract to be valid
and in full force and effect. This appeal is
from that ruling.
The contract provided for a down payment of $1,000 and the balance to be paid at
the rate of $155.89 per month. The Calls
made numerous late payments and missed
several but were permitted to make up the
missed payments.
On or about December 12, 1974, Timber
Lakes notified Calls in writing that they were
in arrears in their payments in the amount
of $1,558.90 and unless the same was paid
by December 22, 1974, the contract would
be terminated. The contract provided as
follows:
Time is of the essence of this contract,
and should the BUYER fail or make default in any of the payments to be made
hereunder, or fail to comply with each
and all of the covenants, conditions and
restrictions herein described, then, at the
option of the Seller, the whole sum of the
purchase price of said lots and all interest
thereon remaining unpaid shall immediately become due and payable to the Seller, or the SELLER may, at its option,
terminate all of the rights and privileges
of the BUYER hereunder, and all monies
therefor paid shall be retained by the
SELLER and no part of such money shall
be repaid to the BUYER. [Emphasis
added.]
The evidence is in dispute regarding the
efforts made to make the payments as demanded; but the court could find from the
testimony given: (1) that the Calls contact-
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cd Timber Lakes and were informed that
if they brought the delinquent interest
up-to-date, amounting to over $000, by January 3, 1975, the contract would not be
forfeited; (2) Calls took the check made out
for the delinquent interest to appellant's
office, but instead of tendering it, they
offered a check for the entire amount of
the arrearage demanded in the notice, to
wit: $1,558.90; (3) that the check was refused and demand made for payment of the
contract in full in the amount of some
$7,400 plus $1,800 for a water hookup; (4)
that there was no agreement to have a
water hookup included in the contract.
In its brief, Timber Lakes admits that in
addition to the down payment, the Calls
also made monthly payments totaling
$2,181.07. This makes a total of $3,181.07
paid towards the purchase of three mountain lots fit only for camping out or for
building a cabin. There was no income
from the ownership of the lots. The original contract price for the lots was $10,000
plus a finance charge of $4,095.
This Court has had occasion to consider
the question of forfeiture provisions in real
estate contracts, and as to such provisions
we held in Jacobson v. Swan : !
. The parties have a right to so
contract and such right should not be
lightly interfered with. It is only when
the forfeiture would be so grossly excessive as to be entirely disproportionate to
any possible loss that might have been
contemplated, so that to enforce it would
shock the conscience, that a court of equity will refuse to enforce the provision.
When the trial judge has made such determination, we will regard it as prima
facie correct and will not disturb it unless
it is plainly erroneous.
. It is now established in this
state that where a forfeiture provision
allows an unconscionable and exorbitant
benefit to be retained by the seller which
bears no relationship to the damages
which have been sustained or reasonably
could have been contemplated, it provides

for ;i penalty or punitive damages which
courts of equity will not enforce. .
After a full hearing of the matter, the
trial court found the following:
On January 3, 1975 plaintiff offered to
then bring the contract current by paying
all delinquent payments and accumulated
interest, and were ready and able to do
so, but such offer was refused by defendant.
By accepting different amounts and at
different times than called for by the
contract and permitting a delinquency to
exist for several months, plaintiff waived
strict performance of the contract.
Under all of the circumstances, the ten
days specified in the letter of December
12, 1974 on which the contract was to be
brought current was not a reasonable
time, and twenty-two days was not an
unreasonable time for defendant to
tender performance after notice.
The court ruled that upon tender to the
appellant of all delinquent payments under
the contract, plus accrued interest and
costs, within fifteen days from the date of
the judgment, "the contract will be and is
ordered reinstated."
We see no abuse of discretion or error in
the ruling made and, therefore, we affirm
the judgment. Costs are awarded to the
respondents on this appeal.
CROCKETT, MAUGHAN,
and HALL, JJ., concur.

I. 3 Utah 2d 59, 65, 278 P.2d 294 (1954).

WILKINS

532

Utsili

508 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

to the child Lonnic, but at the same time
she is not able to forecast for me that
a change in custody would necessarily be
beneficial to that child.
1 therefore conclude and hold that the
best interests of the children require me
to indulge in the statutory presumption
that children of young years are best off
in their mother's care, and the Petition
to Change Custody is denied.
Counsel for Mr. S. takes a personal,
philosophical and asserted moral exception
to two cases decided by this Court,—both
by unanimous opinions. These are Stuber
v. Stuber * and Dcardcn v. Dcardcn, 2 —
wherein the authors' bona fides are not at
all challenged,—but where it is suggested
that there is such a person as an attentive,
affectionate, fit and proper mother who
nonetheless might have done something
that comes naturally, but perhaps without
established legal sanction, but possibly born
of some kind of explainable emotion or influence or maybe even economics,—or other
reason about which an irate ex-husband,
or a child psychologist, or even a priest or
a lawyer might express some kind of compunction.
We are not unmindful of the apparent
sincerity of counsel's negative appraisal of
the Stuber and Dcardcn cases, nor his criticism of about 17 District Judges on the
Wasatch Front,—comprising four counties
out of 29, in which such judges serve about
80 per cent of the people in Utah, when
he volunteers the following gratuity which
we consider to be an inaccurate appraisal
and condemnation of those robed gentlemen:
The preoccupation of this trial court,
and indeed all other trial courts, along
the Wasatch Front, with the principles
enunciated in Stuber v. Stubcr, supra,
and Dcardcn v. Dearden, supra, is extremely unfortunate,—
' which commentary now may include the decision here,—with which quotation others,
I. 121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (19G2).

including us, may cxercis
disagree.

a prerogative to

CALLISTKR, C. J.
CROCKETT, and TUC1

and KLLFTT,
IT, JJ., concur.
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20 Utah 2d 260
James H. LAMONT and Lotte Lamont, his
wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Ivar Th. EVJEN and Aslaugh S. Evjen, his
wife, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 13077.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 5, 1073.

Action by vendors to foreclose a uniform real estate contract. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Gordon R.
Hall, J., entered judgment for purchasers
and vendors appealed.
The Supreme
Court, Ellett, J., held that where purchasers, who had missed payments on uniform
real estate contract, were advised by letter
from vendors on March 6, 1972, that all
past due payments should be made current
and on April 3, 1972, purchasers received
letter stating that vendors were electing to
treat contract as note and mortgage and
foreclose the same and on April 3, 1972,
purchasers tendered all past: due installments to vendors, purchasers were not given reasonable time in which to make good
the delinquent installment.
Affirmed.

1. Vendor and Purchaser C=>185
Before seller of land under a uniform
real estate contract can exercise any of the
options given him because of failure on
part of purchaser to pay an installment as
promised, he must give the purchaser no2. 15 Utah 2d 105, 388 P.2d 230 (1004).
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The contract was signed February 15,
tice of the default and a reasonable time in
which to bring the contract current.
196(1, and defendants made regular payments of $110.00 per month to the First
2. Vendor and Purchaser C=>299(2)
Where purchasers, who had missed Federal Savings & Loan Association as
payments on uniform real estate contract, collecting agent for the plaintiffs, the sellwere advised by letter from vendors on ers. The payment for December, 1970,
March 6, 1972, that all past due payments was not made until January 4, 1971, and
should be made current and on April 3, thereafter the defendants as buyers made
1972, purchasers received letter stating that regular monthly payments. Xeithcr the
vendors were electing to treat contract as First F'ederal Savings, the sellers (plainnote and mortgage and foreclose the same tiffs), nor the buyers (defendants) knew a
and on April 3, 1972, purchasers tendered payment had been missed for over one
all past due installments to vendors, pur- year. On February 2, 1972, the chief acchasers were not given reasonable time in countant of the collecting agency wrote a
which to make good the delinquent install- letter to the defendants stating that the
payment for December, 1970, had been
ment.
missed and that all payments subsequent
thereto were made late. The letter requested the defendants "to please see if
Morgan, Scalley, Lunt & Kesler, Grant
you cannot arrange to bring your contract
S. Kesler, Robert S. Howell, Salt Lake
payments up to date."
City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Under date of February 29, 1972, the
James A. Mclntyrc, Salt Lake City, for
lawyer
for the plaintiffs wrote a letter
defendants and respondents.
which was delivered to the defendants
March 6, 1972. The letter contained the
ELLETT, Justice:
following language:
This is an appeal from a judgment ren. [I]t is necessary at this time
dered in favor of the defendants in an acthat
you
bring
all past due payments curtion to foreclose a uniform real estate conrent
and
begin
making payments on the
tract by treating it as a mortgage pursuant
first
of
each
month
when they are due.
to paragraph 16(c), which reads:
No
further
periods
of
delinquincy [sic]
In the event of a failure to comply
will
be
tolerated.
with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or
upon failure of the Buyer to make any
payment or payments when the same
shall become due, or within thirty days
thereafter, the Seller, at his option shall
have the following alternative remedies:
A.

.

.

.

B.

.

.

.

C. The Seller shall have the right, at
his option, and upon written notice to
the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and
payable, and may elect to treat this
contract as a note and mortgage, and
pass title to the Buyer subject thereto,
and proceed immediately to foreclose
the same in accordance with the laws
of the State of Utah, . . .

On March 31, 1972, the plaintiffs mailed
a certified letter to the defendants stating
that they were electing to treat the uniform real estate contract "as a note and
mortgage and foreclose upon the same immediately, the entire unpaid balance becoming due and payable." In their briefs
both counsel state that this letter was receipted for by the defendants April 3, 1972.
On April 3, 1972, the defendants tendered all past due installments to the plaintiffs. The evidence docs not show whether
the tender was made before or after the
receipt of the letter by the defendants.
The trial court found as a fact:
1.
2.

.
.

.
.

.
.
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3.

Plaintiffs had never given defendants notice that a payment had been
missed in December of 11'70.
And then concluded as a matter of law:
1. Plaintiffs' failure to notify defendants of their default constitutes a material omission in the facts necessary to establish plaintiffs' claims and defendants
are entitled to an Order of Dismissal.
In the case of Romero v. Schmidt l the
question of the effect of a tender upon the
right of a plaintiff to foreclose pursuant to
the option in a uniform real estate contract
was before this court. We there held that
a valid tender prevented the plaintiff from
foreclosing on the contract as a note and
mortgage. See Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Washington, 108 Utah 469, 161
P.2d 355 (1945); also see 52 Am.Tur.,
Tender, § 41.

[2] It appears that the plaimiffs failed
to establish that they gave notice to the defendants of their election to treat the contract as a note and mortgage prior to a
full tender of the amount due. Besides, .
the defendants were not given a reasonable
time in which to make good the delinquent
installment.

[1] P>efore a seller of land under a uniform real estate contract can exercise any
of the options given him because of a failure on the part of the purchaser to pay an
installment as promised, he must give the
purchaser notice of the default and a reasonable time in which to bring the contract
current. The reason for the rule is set
forth in 52 Am.Jur., Tender, § 41, as follows :

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the respondents.
CALLfSTER, C. J., and CROCKETT,
HENRJOD and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

29 Utah 2d 269

. This is so because the debt
docs not become due on the mere default
in payment, but by affirmative action by
which the creditor makes it known to the
debtor that he intends to declare the
whole debt due. The creditor is entitled
to a reasonable time after default in
which to exercise the option, but the option itself does not outlive the default.
Such acceleration stipulations should be
so construed, if possible and consistent
with the language employed, as to give
the protection intended thereby to both
the debtor and the creditor. .
The rule is especially applicable in cases
like the instant one where the default was
overlooked by all parties for some fifteen
months.

v.
Tino Bill TORRES, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 13036.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 28, 1973.

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph
G. Jeppson, J., of robbery and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that
police officer who received radio report
that young man had robbed service station
and had run away from service station in
northwesterly direction acted lawfully in
stopping car occupied by two young men at
intersection three blocks northwest of robbery scene about ten minutes after robbery.
Affirmed.

Arrest C=>63.»

Police officer who received radio report that young man had robbed service
station and had run away from service sta-

I. 15 Utah 2d 300, 392 P.2d 37 (1904).
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ary. Stanley's present wife, Constance
Johnson, also occupies a seat on the hoard
of directors, though she personally does
not own any shares in the corporation.
The complaint alleges that she knew of and
acquiesced in the unauthorized appropriations by Stanley Johnson. As Stanley's
wife, Constance would stand to benefit by
any misappropriations by her husband. It
is doubtful that she would vigorously pursue any action on behalf of the corporation
to
seek
reimbursement
for
the
unauthorized payments. Finally, Sophie
Weiner, who owns over 10 percent of the
corporation, is the remaining director on
the board. Ms. Weiner, along with Stanley
Johnson, is an officer of another corporation which allegedly has been allowed to
use Steel Inc.'s equipment and property
without having to pay for that use. It is
apparent that Ms. Weiner's business relationships with Mr. Johnson and the competing corporation would prevent her from
fairly pursuing an action on behalf of the
minority shareholders.
[7] Since a quorum of disinterested directors or shareholders cannot be assembled to appraise the merits of Joyce Johnson's claims, notice upon the board of directors would be a futile and ritualistic act.
The district court's granting of a motion to
dismiss for failure to make such a demand
was therefore in error. Accordingly, the
district court's order is reversed and the
matter remanded with leave being granted
to Johnson to amend her complaint if she
so wishes.
MANOUKIAN, C.J., SPRINGER and
GUNDERSON, JJ., and FONDI,3 District
Judge, concur.
rvn
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lfl)EV( <), INC, a California corporation;
John Long; Long Construction Company; Dale Roe Development .Corporation, a Nevada corporation. Appellants
and Cross-Respondents,
v.
Rocky WAGNER, d/b/o Rocky Wagner
Excavating, Respondent,
and
Joe Wosser, d/b/a Wosserlaster
Enterprises, Respondent and
Cross-Appellant.
No. 14195.
Supreme Court of Nevada.
March 29, 1984.

Subcontractors brought actions on contract and equitable theories against developer and others to recover on perfected
liens. The Second Judicial District Court,
Washoe County, Roy L. Torvinen, J., entered judgments in favor of subcontractors
but denied one subcontractor's asserted
right to recover for extracontractual work
performed, and appeal and cross appeal
were taken. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) findings that subcontractor's rough
grading duties did not include drainage
swale construction, cost of which developer
and others sought to offset against amount
owing subcontractor, and that other subcontractor's billings for siding and trim
work were correct were supported by substantial evidence; (2) whether developer
made payments for extra work was not
controlling of whether it waived contractual written change order requirement; and
(3) parties mutually intended to waive written change order condition.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.

3. The Governor designated the Honorable Michael B. Fondi, Judge of the First Judicial Dis-

trict Court, to sit in the place of the Honorable
John Mowbray. Nev. Const., art. 6 § 4.
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1. Mechanics' Liens OiSHt)
In multiparty action to enforce perfected liens under construction contract, findings that one subcontractor's rough grading duty did not include drainage swale
construction, cost of which developer and
others sought to offset against amount owing subcontractor, and that second subcontractor's billings for siding and trim work
were correct were supported by substantial
evidence.
2. Contracts c=>316(l)
Waiver of contractual right can be implied from conduct such as making payments or accepting performance which
does not meet contract requirements and
can also be expressed verbally or in writing.
3. Contracts 0316(6)
Express waiver, when supported by reliance thereon, excuses nonperformance of
waived contractual condition.
4. Contracts 0=232(4)
Whether developer made payments for
extra work was not solely controlling of
whether it waived contractual requirement
of written change order for extra work.
5. Contracts e=>232(4)
Where developer made express oral
waiver of contractual written change order
requirement for extra work and subcontractor performed extra work in reliance
thereon, parties mutually intended to waive
written change order condition and subcontractor was entitled to recover for extra
work performed.

Hoy & Miller, McDonald & Kafchinski,
Reno, Stephen L. Rishoff, Wooland Hills,
Cal., for appellants and cross-respondents.
Robison, Lyle, Belaustegui & Robb, and
Bruce T. Beesley, Hale, Lane, Peek, Dennison & Howard, and Richard L. Elmore,
Reno, for respondents and cross-appellant.

OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Two subcontractors, who brought actions
under contract and equitable theories
against a developer and others to recover
on their perfected liens, received favorable
judgments in district court. The developer
and the others against whom judgments
were entered, now appeal. One subcontractor also cross-appeals from the district
court's denial of his asserted right to recover for extra-contractual work performed.
For the reasons set forth hereinafter, we
affirm the judgments in favor of the subcontractors and reverse the order denying
relief to cross-appellant for the performance of work unspecified in the subcontractor's contract.
The facts as they pertain to each subcontractor are as follows:
Wagner: Rocky Wagner Excavating
(Wagner) entered into a written agreement
with Udevco and John Long to perform
specific rough grading work on the appellants' condominium project. Common area
grading, drainage swale construction and
finish grading were not a part of the parties' agreement, according to the contract,
testimony and the district court's findings
of fact. The agreement provided that extra-contractual work would require a written change order. While performing his
contract work, Wagner also performed "extra work" without obtaining a written
change order, for which he was paid by
Udevco. Wagner's last invoice, totalling
$6,777.33 for contract and "extra work,"
was not paid by Udevco. Wagner recorded
and perfected a lien. The district court
found that the parties, by their past practices, had waived the written change order
provision and that $6,777.33 was the reasonable value of the work performed. As
a result, the district court entered judgment for Wagner and awarded him
$6,777.33 plus interest at 12% from the
date the invoice was due, costs and attorney's fees, according to NRS 108.237. Appellants appeal from that judgment.
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Wosser:
Wosser-Laster
Knterprises
(Wosser) entered into a second written
agreement with Udevco and John Long to
perform framing work, as well as future
siding and trim work, if required, on a cost
basis. The agreement, which settled differences relating to a prior contract, provided that extra-contractual work would require a written change order. Wosser did
perform and bill Udevco for siding and trim
work which was completed after the date
of the second agreement. After it was
discovered that Wosser also had billed for
some siding and trim work completed before the second contract date, Wosser's
next invoice contained a credit for the inadvertent billing.
Wosser also performed "extra work" related to the framing duties. Due to an
error in the appellants' plans and specifications, the prefabricated roof trusses did not
fit. Wosser, as a result, had to cut and
stack the roofs to complete the framing.
Wosser additionally was told to perform
"extra work," such as dropping ceilings to
meet cabinet tops and "furring down"
(framing in gaps above) door openings, because materials received such as cabinets
and doors did not match the plans and
specifications. Wosser also altered completed framing because appellants requested subsequent design changes. Wosser did
not obtain written change orders for this
"extra work," although Joe Wosser was
told by Udevco's superintendent to go
ahead with the work and was assured he
would be paid for it. Wosser sent Udevco
invoices totalling $13,195.00 for "extra
work" on three occasions. Udevco never
made any payments for the extra work
performed by Wosser after the date of the
second agreement. Udevco also refused to
pay for certain framing, siding and trim
work valued at $11,976.75.
Wosser recorded and perfected a lien and
brought an action against appellants as an
intervenor in Wagner's case. The district
court found that, because Udevco had never paid Wosser for extra work performed
without a written change order, appellants
had not waived that contract requirement.
As a result, the district court entered judg-

New

fJS 1

ment compensating Wosser only for the
framing, siding and trim work, and awarded him $11,970.75 plus interest at 12% from
the date the invoices were due, costs and
attorney's fees. Appellants appeal from
that judgment. Wosser cross-appeals the
district court's denial of any recovery for
the extra work performed.
[1] Appellants contend that the facts do
not support the trial court's awards in favor of respondents. As concerning Wagner, appellants primarily contend that industry standards define rough grading to
include construction of drainage swales.
Because Wagner did not perform such construction, appellants argue that they are
entitled to offset against the award the
amount spent to have other subcontractors
do the work. As concerning Wosser, appellants contend that they are entitled to offset against the award the amount they
were over-billed for siding and trim work
completed before the parties' second agreement was signed. The district court heard
these s-ime arguments below and made
findings of fact that: Wagner's duties did
not include drainage swate' construction;
and, Wosser's billings for siding and trim
work were correct. This Court's standard
for review is set forth in Pace v. Linton, 97
New 103, 625 P.2d 84 (1981).
Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses. NRCP 52. Our task
when reviewing the appropriateness of
findings and judgments rendered by district courts is to " . . . determine whether
there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the findings and judgment of the district court."
Id. at 103-04, 625 P.2d at 85 (emphasis
added and citations omitted). We conclude
that the record reflects substantial evidence supporting the district court's findings of fact and judgments. We have considered appellants' other contentions and
determined that they are without merit. In
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this regard we affirm the judgment i of the
district court.
As cross-appellant, Wosser's sole contention is that the district court improperly
denied any recovery from cross-respondents for extra work performed. It is undisputed that Wosser was required to cut
and stack roofs because the prefabricated
roof trusses would not fit the framing due
to incorrect plans and specifications. Our
review of the record also reveals that after
framing was completed according to original plans and specifications, cross-respondents orally requested that Wosser make
further alterations to accommodate subsequent design changes and incorrectly sized
cabinets and doors. The extra work was
necessary, properly performed, and accepted. The district court concluded as a matter of law that Wosser was not entitled to
judgment for extra work, reasoning that
Udevco did not waive its right to require
written change orders because it did not
pay for any such extra work after it had
been performed without written authorisation. We disagree.
[2-5] Waiver is usually defined as "the
voluntary and intentional relinquishment of
a known right" and may be either express
or implied. 5 Williston On Contracts
§ 678 (3d ed. 1961). Waiver can be implied
from conduct such as making payments for
or accepting performance which does not
meet contract requirements; waiver can
also be expressed verbally or in writing.
17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts §§ 393, 396 (1964).
Express waiver, when supported by reliance thereon, excuses nonperformance of
the waived condition. 5 Williston On Contracts § 679 (3d ed. 1961); 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts § 392 (1964); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 84(1) (1981). Whether
Udevco made payments or not for extra
work, therefore, is not solely controlling of
whether it waived the written change order
requirement. Presenting evidence of such
payments would have been merely one alternative for proving waiver, had those
facts occurred. Wosser, instead, chose to
1. Udevco's superintendent. Dick Clans, testified
thiil "I don't recall [telling Wosser personnel to

employ the instant facts to prove that express waiver and reliance occurred. After
Udevco's express oral waiver and Wosser's
reliance thereon, Udevco at that time was
bound to pay for the extra work, regardless of whether it later failed to pay.
Udevco apparently has not. controverted
the facts that express oral waiver was pronounced and extra work performed in reliance thereon.1 We conclude, under these
facts, as a matter of law, that the parties
mutually intended to waive the written
change order condition. Here, Wosser performed—after completing framing according to plans and specifications—extra work
of such character and magnitude that the
idea that the parties intended him to do so
without additional compensation would be
highly unreasonable. No witnesses testified for Udevco to controvert Wosser's testimony that $13,195.00 represented the reasonable value of the extra work performed.
The district court made no finding regarding such value. We therefore remand this
case for a determination and judgment that
$13,195.00 represents the reasonable value
of the extra work performed by Wosser,
unless the district court finds that the evidence justifies a lower sum.
The district court judgments awarding
respondents recovery for contractual work
is hereby affirmed. The district court's
judgment denying cross-appellant recovery
for extra work is hereby reversed. This
case is remanded for determination of the
value of extra work performed by Wosser
and judgment thereon consistent with this
opinion.

perform extra work), but that doesn't necessarily mean I didn't say it. 1 mean, I don't recall."
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ANGUS HUNT RANCH, INC., a Montana
Corporation, and Charles L. Carlson and
Jeanne H. Carlson, husband and wife,
Appellants (Plaintiffs below),
v.
REB, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, and
the First National Bank and Trust Company of Wyoming, a National Banking
Association, Appellees (Defendants be• low).
No. 4843.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
April 24, 1978.
After receiving notice by letter of vendor's election to declare a forfeiture under
terms of contract for sale of land, purchasers instituted action for declaratory judgment asking court to make certain declarations with respect to contract and for injunction against bank as escrow agent.
Vendor filed counterclaim for a declaration
of forfeiture. The District Court, Laramie
County, Vernon G. Bentley, J., granted vendor's motion to dismiss and sustained its
counterclaim and instructed bank to deliver
escrow papers to it. Purchasers appealed.
The Supreme Court, Rose, J., held that: (1)
presence of right of redemption provision,
without further evidence of parties' intention and without any further indications
arising from contract itself, was not sufficient, as matter of law, to convert installment land contract into equitable mortgage, and (2) vendor was entitled to declare
a forfeiture on basis of breach of material
condition of contract that purchasers
agreed to maintain an accredited swine
herd of not less than 170 sows and a total
animal population of not less than 750 animals, inasmuch as there was no evidence
that vendor had condoned animal reduction
or had prior knowledge thereof.
Affirmed.
1. Trial <s=»384
Under federal weighing of evidence
test, trial court in considering defendant's

motion to dismiss need not consider evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 41(b), 52(a).
2. Trial c=*384
If plaintiff has presented a prima facie
case based on unimpeached evidence, trial
judge should not grant defendant's motion
to dismiss, even though he is trier of fact
and may not himself feel at that point in
trial that plaintiff has sustained his burden
of proof; fact that applicable civil procedure rule was amended to follow federal
rule requiring findings was no reason to
depart from such prima facie test, since
such test was more likely to achieve justice
and reduce number of appeals resulting
from application of rule. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 41(b), 52(a).
3. Appeal and Error <s=>1177(8)
If properly raised, a remand may be
required because of failure to comply with
requirement in civil procedure rule governing motion to dismiss that trial court shall
make findings if it renders judgment on
merits against plaintiff. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 41(b)(1), 52(a).
4. Appeal and Error <£=>927(3)
In determining if plaintiff presented a
prima facie case based on unimpeached evidence which would have result that trial
court erred in granting defendant's motion
to dismiss, Supreme Court viewed evidence
in a light most favorable to plaintiff, just as
trial court should have done, and presumably did, in considering defendant's motion.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 41(b), 52(a).
5. Mortgages e=>27
In action arising out of vendor's attempted forfeiture and cancellation of a
contract for sale of land, purchasers, in
order to establish a prima facie case on
their equitable mortgage theory, were required to show that parties intended transaction to be a mortgage, rather than an
installment land contract, as construed
from their written agreement and surrounding circumstances; there must have
been an attempt to create a security or, in
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other words, there must he proof that maker intended property to be held, given or
transferred as security.
<>. Mortgages c=>32(l)
Vendor and Purchaser to95(1)
While it may be conceded, arguendo,
that a vendor may waive his right to declare an automatic forfeiture through conduct which had been characterized as acquiescence, it cannot be said that such acquiescence discloses an intention to treat transaction as creating a mortgage; primary effect of such conduct is to preclude vendor
from exercising its right to forfeiture until
purchaser is put on notice that future defaults will not be countenanced and strict
compliance will be required.
7. Mortgages to 33(1), 39
Presence of right of redemption provision, without further evidence of parties'
intention and without any further indications arising from contract itself, was not
sufficient, as matter of law, to convert installment land contract into an equitable
mortgage, inasmuch as, at most, such provision was a contingency placed in contract
for purchasers' benefit, aimed at lessening
harshness of a forfeiture; to provide for
such a revivor possibility did not mean that
purchasers were entitled to same or all the
protections afforded by a mortgage.
8. Vendor and Purchaser <3=>104
In actions arising out of attempted forfeiture and cancellation of an installment
land contract by vendor against purchaser,
fact that purchaser fails to establish a prima facie case with respect to his equitable
mortgage theory does not mean that, in
appropriate cases, purchaser will not be entitled to equitable remedies, such as restitution.
9. Vendor and Purchaser to95(l)
In order to establish a prima facie case
of waiver, purchaser must show that vendor
has condoned or assented to previous default and has not given notice of his intention to insist on strict compliance in future.

10. Vendor and Purchaw r to9!>(l)
Effect of vendor's conduct condoning
or assenting to previous defaults and not
giving notice of his intention to insist on
strict compliance in future is not a waiver
of such vendor's rights to declare a forfeiture for future defaults.
11. Vendor and Purchaser to>101
Vendor could not legally declare a forfeiture of installment land contract because
purchasers had not paid interest, taxes and
insurance without first giving purchasers
notice of its intention to insist on strict
compliance and additionally giving purchasers a reasonable time within which to perform or cure continuing defaults.
12. Vendor and Purchaser <3=>95(1)
In action arising out of an attempted
forfeiture and cancellation of installment
land contracts by vendor against purchasers, vendor was entitled to declare a forfeiture on basis of breach of material condition of such contract that purchasers maintain an accredited swine herd of not less
than 170 sows and a total animal population
of not less than 750 animals, inasmuch as
there was no evidence that vendor had authorized or had prior knowledge of drastic
animal reductions to only 114 animals of
which only 44 to 50 were sows, even though
vendor was aware that purchasers had
changed from farrow-to-finish operation to
a feeder-pig operation.
13. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»I04
In action arising out of an attempted
forfeiture and cancellation of an installment land contract by vendor against purchasers, it was appropriate to grant a sixmonth redemption period to defaulting purchasers since this was an agreed to provision of contract.
Bernard Q. Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellants.
Jerome F. Statkus, of Carmichael & Statkus, Cheyenne, for REB, Inc., appellee.
James 0. Wilson, of Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett, Cheyenne, for The First National Bank and Trust Company of Wyoming, appellee.
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Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLlNTOCK, KAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ.
ROSE, Justice.
This appeal arises out of an attempted
forfeiture and cancellation of a Contract for
Sale of land by appellee, REB, Inc., the
seller, against the appellants, Angus Hunt
Ranch, Inc., and Charles L. Carlson and
Jeanne H. Carlson, the buyers. After receiving notice by letter, dated March 3,
1977, of the seller's election to declare a
forfeiture under the terms of the contract,
appellants instituted an action for a declaratory judgment, asking the court to make
certain declarations with respect to the contract, and for an injunction against the
appellee-bank, as escrow agent. Appellants
subsequently moved and were allowed to
amend their complaint, adding a claim for
restitution in the event seller's counterclaim
for a declaration of forfeiture was granted.
A trial on the merits was held on April 4,
1977, before the district court, sitting without a jury. At the close of buyers'-appellants' evidence, the seller's motion to dismiss, for failure of appellants to sustain the
burden of proof required, was granted; its
counterclaim was sustained and the bank
was instructed to deliver the escrow papers
to the seller. We will affirm this disposition of the case.
On June 8, 1973, a Contract of Sale was
entered into between the seller and the
buyers. The contract generally provided
for the sale to the buyers of real property,
buildings, improvements, equipment and
animals, comprising the seller's swine operation, for a total purchase price of $215,000.00. Under the relevant contract provisions regarding payment, the buyers were
to: (1) make a down payment of $20,000.00;
(2) assume and pay a $95,448.39 note, secured by a mortgage executed by the sellers, to the First National Bank and Trust
Company of Wyoming; (3) assume and pay
an $8,837.66 note and mortgage to Capitol
Savings and Loan Association; (4) make
annual installment payments on principal
and interest at seven percent (7%) per annum on the unpaid balance of $83,623.75,
beginning on April 1, 1974, and continuing

thereafter on each April 1, until April 1,
1983, when the entire principal balance, together with interest, had been paid in full.
A "time is of the essence" clause was included in the contract. In addition, the
buyers agreed to: provide annual, audited
financial statements; maintain an accredited swine herd of not less than 170 sows, and
a total animal population of not less than
750 animals; furnish monthly animal inventories; maintain improvements in good order and repair; not further encumber the
property; pay all taxes and assessments;
and maintain adequate insurance on the
assets purchased.
The contract provides that if relevant
payments are not timely made, forfeiture
penalties may be imposed within 60 days of
due date. If any of the other material
covenants are not performed, the seller is,
by the contract, released from all obligations, whereupon buyers shall forfeit all
rights to the property, with seller's immediate right to take possession, and prior payments are to be retained a3 liquidated damages. In lieu of the seller's rights described
above, seller could declare due and payable
the then unpaid balance. The buyers were
given a "right of redemption," consisting of
an obligation to pay all remaining principal
and interest within six months in the event
forfeiture had been declared.
As part of its March 3, 1977, forfeiture
letter to the buyers, the seller alleged the
following acts of default: The contract had
been breached by the buyers in that the
interest, taxes and insurance had not been
paid. It was further alleged that financial
statements and animal inventories had not
been furnished and that the animal level
had, without authority, been permitted to
drop below the agreed-upon levels. Lastly,
it was further contended that the buyers
had permitted the property to run downall in violation of the contract provisions.
At trial, the buyers' own evidence disclosed that they had not complied with the
contract in several respects. Nevertheless,
it was the buyers' position in the trial court,
and now on appeal, that:

A
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The Contract of Sale should be construed to be an equitable mortgage,
and
The seller, by its conduct, has waived
its right to declare a forfeiture on the
basis of the alleged acts of default.
MOTION TO DISMISS

[1-41 Before we discuss these issues, it
is necessary to generally consider the propriety of granting a motion to dismiss and
the standards by which we will review such
a disposition. It is conceded by the parties
that the trial court treated the seller's motion to dismiss as a motion made pursuant
to Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P.1 Prior to the
amendment of this rule in 1970—at which
time the fourth sentence of the relevant
subsection was added—we considered the
quantum and quality of the evidence which
would justify a court's granting such a motion. In Arbenz v. Bebout, Wyo., 444 P.2d
317, we embraced the so-called Alaskan rule
by quoting from Rogge v. Weaver, Alaska,
368 P.2d 810, 813, as follows:
44

'Where plaintiff's proof has failed in
some aspect the motion should, of course,
be granted. Where plaintiff's proof is
overwhelming, application of the rule is
made easy and the motion should be denied. But where plaintiff has presented
a prima facie case based on unimpeached
evidence we are of the opinion that the
trial judge should not grant the motion

even though he is the trier of the facts
and may not himself feel at that point in
the trial that the plaintiff has sustained
his burden of proof. We believe that in
the latter situation the trial judge should
follow the alternative offered by the rule
wherein it is provided that he " * * *
may decline to render any judgment until
the close of all the evidence", and deny
the motion * * V " [Emphasis supplied]
In doing so, we said:
44

. . . Such disposition, undoubtedly meritorious in jurisdictions such as
Alaska, which follow exactly the federal
rule requiring findings, becomes particularly essential in Wyoming where findings are not obligatory. 0 444 P.2d at 319.
We went on to hold that in reviewing the
grant of such a motion, the entire evidence
must be viewed most favorably to plaintiff,
giving him the benefit of all reasonable
inferences which may be deduced therefrom. Arbenz v. Bebout, supra. Implicit in
adoption of the Alaskan rule was our recognition of the "prima facie" 2 test, as opposed
to the federal weighing-of-evidence standard 3 , which was to be applied by trial
judges seeking to resolve Rule 41(b) motions. We find no reason to depart from
the Rogge prima facie test, merely because
our rule now follows the federal rule requiring findings, since this test is "more

for in this rule, other than a dismissal for
1. Rule 41(b)(1), W.R.C.P., provides:
lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or
"For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
for failure to join a party under Rule 19,
to comply with these rules or any order of
operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
[Emphasis supplied]
an action or of any claim against him. After
the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court
The emphasized portion of the rule was added
without a jury, has completed the presentaby amendment in 1970.
tion of his evidence, the defendant, without 2. "Prima facie case" is defined by Black's Law
waiving his right to offer evidence in the
Dictionary 4th Ed.Rev. (1968), at 1353, as
event the motion is not granted, may move
"such as will suffice until contradicted and
for a dismissal on the ground that upon the
overcome
by other evidence (case cited)."
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts
may then determine them and render judg- 3. Under the federal test, the trial court need
not consider the evidence in a light most favorment against the plaintiff or may decline to
able to the plaintiff. Woods v. North American
render any judgment until the close of all the
Rockwell Corporation, 10 Cir., 480 F.2d 644.
evidence. If the court renders judgment on
See, generally, 5 Moore's Federal Practice,
the merits against the plaintiff, the court
shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a).
§ 41.13; 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
and Procedure: Civil § 2371; and 55 A.L.R.3d
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
272.
subdivision and any dismissal not provided
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likely to achieve justice and reduce the
number of appeals resulting from the application of Rule 41(b)." Trusty v. Jones,
Alaska, 369 P.2d 420, 422. Accord, Tillman
v. Baskin, Fla., 260 So.2d 509; and King v.
Alaska State Housing Authority, Alaska,
512 P.2d 887. As a result, if the appellantsplaintiffs in the instant case "presented a
prima facie case based on unimpeached evidence," then the trial court erred in dismissing their action under Rule 41(b).4 In making this determination, this court will view
the evidence in a light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, just as the trial court should
have done, and presumably did, in considering the seller's motion.
EQUITABLE-MORTGAGE THEORY
[5] In order to establish a prima facie
case on their equitable-mortgage theory,
the buyers were required to show that the
parties intended the transaction to be a
mortgage, rather than an installment land
contract, as construed from their written
agreement and the surrounding circumstances. Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo.
108, 156 P. 27; and 59 C.J.S. Mortgages
§ 10a. There must have been an intent to
create a security or, in other words, there
must be proof that the maker intended the
property to be held, given or transferred as
security. 1 Jones on Mortgages, § 225, at
262-263. It has been observed that there is
little possibility that a court will construe
an installment land contract as a mortgage,
assuming that it does not depart too far
from the usual contract terms and provisions. Rudolph, The Wyoming Law of Real
Mortgages, at 147.
[6-8] Appellants contend that they
made the requisite showing by virtue of the
contract provisions, which grant them a
"right of redemption" for a period of six
months after default, and the seller's con-

duct allegedly waiving its right to forfeiture. While it may be conceded, arguendo,
that a seller may waive his right to declare
an automatic forfeiture through conduct
which has been characterized as acquiescence, it cannot be said that such acquiescence discloses an intention to treat the
transaction as creating a mortgage. The
primary effect of such conduct, as pointed
out by appellants in their waiver argument,
is to preclude the vendor from exercising its
right to forfeiture until the vendee is put
on notice that future defaults will not be
countenanced and strict compliance will be
required. Baker v. Jones, 69 Wyo. 314, 240
P.2d 1165, 1171. Furthermore, we fail to
see how the language of this contract converts it into an equitable mortgage. See,
Bishop \\ Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d
277. The presence of the right-of-redemption provision, without further evidence of
the parties' intention and without any further indications arising from the contract
itself, is not sufficient—as a matter of
law—to convert this installment land contract into an equitable mortgage. At most,
this provision was a contingency placed in
the contract for the buyers' benefit, aimed
at lessening the harshness of a forfeiture.
To provide for such a revivor possibility
does not mean that the buyers are entitled
to the same or all of the protections afforded by a mortgage. We hold the buyers
failed to establish a prima facie case with
respect to their equitable-mortgage theory.
This does not mean that, in appropriate
cases, buyers will not be entitled to equitable remedies, such as restitution. Cf., Quinlan v. St John, 28 Wyo. 91, 201 P. 149, reh.
den. 28 Wryo. 91, 203 P. 1088; and Lawrence
v. Demos, 70 Wyo. 56, 244 P.2d 793.5
WAIVER THEORY
[9,10] We must also determine whether
the appellants established a prima facie

4. It is noted that our present Rule 41(b)(1) 5. While the buyers amended their complaint to
requires that in cases like the present, findings
seek such equitable relief, the trial court found
shall be made under Rule 52(a), W.R.C.P. Althat the seller was entitled to retain all sums
though not properly raised in this case, it is
paid by the buyers since such sums were reaapparent that, in appropriate cases, the failure
sonably related to the seller's actual damages.
to comply with this requirement may require a
The appellants did not challenge that finding on
remand. Denofre v. Transportation Ins. Rating
appeal.
Bureau, 7 Cir., 532 F.2d 43.
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case in support of their waiver theory.
Most litigation in this area concerns itself
with failure to make timely payments under a land contract, but we see no reason
why the pertinent rules are not equally
applicable to any failure to strictly comply
with other material contract provisions. In
order to establish u prima facie case of
waiver, the vendee must show that the vendor has condoned or assented to previous
defaults and has not given notice of his
intention to insist on strict compliance in
the future. See, Baker v. Jones, supra;
and Jones v. Clark, Wyo., 418 P.2d 792, 797.
See, also, Nclms v. Miliar, 56 N.M. 132, 241
P.2d 333, 348; 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and
Purchaser, § 588; and 17A C.J.S. Contracts
§ 409. The effect of such conduct is not,
however, a waiver of a vendor's right to
declare a forfeiture for future defaults.
Jones v. Clark, supra.
We said in Baker v. Jones, at 240 P.2d
1171-1172:
"It is now well established in law and
in equity that forfeitures are not favored.
Before one can declare a forfeiture it
must appear that he has a clear right and
then too he himself must be free from
blame in the premises. Every reasonable
presumption is against a forfeiture and
every intendment and presumption is
against a person seeking to enforce it. 17
C.J.S. Contracts, § 407 page 896. 'Provisions for forfeiture may be waived and
the courts are quick to take advantage of
circumstances indicating such an intention.' 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 409, page 897.
And, 4So where the time fixed by the
contract for performance is permitted to
pass, both parties concurring, the time of
performance thereafter becomes indefinite, and one party cannot rescind until
full notice and a reasonable time for performance is given/ 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§ 506, page 1081. . . .
"In line with the holdings of other
courts, this court has taken the opportunity to say that, 'Forfeitures are not favored, and it is said that slight evidence
of the lessor's intention to relinquish his
right is sufficient to warrant the finding
of waiver.'

"Investors Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson,
31 Wyo. 204-273, 225 P. 590, 592, 32
A.L.H. 1071; Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v.
Carter Oil Co.t 31 Wyo. 314-329, 226 P.
193, and in the late case of Larsen Sheep
Co. v. Sjogren, 67 Wyo. 447-465, 226 P.2d
177, 178, this court states, 'Forfeiture of
lease for breach of covenant or condition
therein may be waived and, forfeiture
not being favored, slight circumstances
will at times suffice to constitute a waiver.' "
[11] Viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the appellants-buyers, it
is apparent that buyers did establish a prima facie case of waiver concerning most of
the alleged acts of default. With respect to
the buyers' obligation to make interest payments to the seller, the evidence discloses
that the buyers made one interest payment,
of $5,853.66, on April 30, 1974, and, although no interest payments were made in
1975 or 1976, the seller gave no notices of
default until the letter of March 3, 1977.
Even then, the seller did not demand that
the buyers become current on or within a
reasonable time after the April, 1977, payment date. Rather, it demanded that buyers vacate the premises by March 18, 1977,
or be subject to eviction. Furthermore, the
evidence discloses that the seller made no
demands with respect to past due taxes, the
annual audits, the monthly inventories, or
the condition of the premises. The seller
could not legally declare a forfeiture on any
of these grounds without first giving the
buyers notice of its intention to insist on
strict compliance, and additionally giving
the buyers a reasonable time within which
to perform or cure continuing defaults.
[12,13] The matter of the reduction in
the number of animals is an entirely different fact situation. The buyers' evidence
disclosed that by February, 1977, there were
only 114 animals on the property, of which
only 44 to 50 were sows. There is no evidence that the seller had authorized or had
prior knowledge of these drastic animal reductions, even though seller and the bank
were aware that the buyers had changed
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from a farrow-to-finish oj>eration to a feeder-pig operation. Plaintiff, Charles L. Carlson, acknowledged the imjiortance of maintaining adequate numbers of animals.
There being no evidence that the seller had
condoned the animal reduction, or had prior
knowledge thereof, the seller was entitled
to declare a forfeiture on the basis of the
breach of this material condition of the
contract.
We hold, therefore, that the appellants
failed to establish a prima facie case of
waiver with respect to all of the alleged
acts of default, and particularly with respect to the reduction of the animal population without seller's knowledge or acquiescence. Failing this, the trial court correctly

found that the seller was entitled to rescind
the contract and to retake possession under
its provisions. There was no necessity for
the seller to put on further evidence in
order to sustain its counterclaim. Finally,
it was appropriate to grant a six-month
redemption period to the appellants since
this was an agreed-to provision of the contract.
Affirmed.
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TIMPANOGOS HIGHL/ NDS, INC. v. HARPER
Utah
481
riirnsr»» I'.IM 1M
chief concern of the trial judge was the
welfare of the minor child, whose custody
TIMPANOGOS H I G H L A N D S , INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
was decided by the court on conflicting evv.
idence.

j

Emily D. HARPER and Max D. Harper,

[6,7] The court had the hencfit of testimony of psychiatrists, who gave their expert opinions, based on the appraisals they
were able to make of the parties, the minor
child, and the situation in which they were
involved. Their opinions are worthy of
careful consideration by the court, but are
advisory only, and in no sense controlling.
The parties appeared and testified. The
court had the opportunity to observe their
appearance and demeanor and to evaluate to
a limited degree their personalities, attitudes and emotional stability, and to make
a judgment in reliance on all the evidence
produced at the trial as to what appeared
to be in the best interest of the minor
child. The ultimate decision was for the
trial judge, who was in a more favorable
position than we are to weigh the evidence
as it came from the mouths of the witnesses before him, and to make a proper determination of the issues presented.
In Johnson z\ Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263,
323 P.2d 16, our court said:
Due to the equitable nature of such
proceedings, the proper adjudication of
which is highly dependent upon personal
equations which the trial court is in an
advantaged position to appraise, he is allowed considerable latitude of discretion
and his orders will not be disturbed unless it appears that there has been a
plain abuse thereof.
We have carefully read the transcript
and hold that the trial judge's decision was
fairly sustained by the evidence and that
there was no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
JAMES S. S AWAY A, VcNOY CHRISTOFFERSON, EDWARD SHEYA, Jr.
and DON V. TIBBS, District Judges, concur.

Defendants and Respondents.
No. 13936.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Hoc. 3, 1975.

Assignee of contract for sale of real
estate brought action against vendors for
specific performance of contract and vendors counterclaimed, alleging that assignee
had slandered their title by recording abandoned contract.
The Fourth District
Court, Provo County, Allen B. Sorensen,
J., entered judgment in favor of vendors,
except that it dismissed defendants' counterclaim for slander of title, and parties
cross-appealed.
The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that evidence supported
trial court's conclusion that original contract had been abandoned; that dead man's
statute did not preclude admission of evidence of statement of original party to
contract for sale of real estate, now deceased, concerning abandonment of contract; and that assignee's partial tender of
amount due did not constitute a valid tender.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error C=>847(1)
In action for specific performance in
equity, appellate court may review law and
facts.
2. Appeal tnd Error C=»I009(4)

In action for specific performance in
equity appellate court will reverse only if
persuaded that evidence clearly preponderates against findings.
3. Contracts €=>256
Term "abandonment" means intentional relinquishment of one's rights in contract; and in order to nullify such rights,
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there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing of such abandonment.
Sec jMiblkfition Words ami Phrases
for otluT judicial roustructions and
definitions.
4. Contracts C=>352(6)
Dispute as to whether contract has
been abandoned is usually question of fact
to be determined from circumstances of
particular case, which circumstances include not only nonperformance, but also
expressions of intent and other actions of
parties.
5. Specific Performance 0121(11)
Evidence, in action for specific performance of contract for sale of real estate, including purchasers' delinquent and
erratic payments on contract and their failure to pay taxes or to take possession or in
any manner to improve or exercise dominion over real estate, supported findings of
trial court that contract had been abandoned.
6. Witnesses 0=126
Dead man's statute excluding otherwise proper evidence should be construed
and applied strictly according to its terms.
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3).
7. Witnesses 0159(8)
Dead man's statute did not preclude
admission of vendor's testimony, in action
for specific performance of contract, concerning fact that original purchaser under
contract for sale of real estate, now deceased, told him he would have to let property go due to financial difficulties. U.C.
A.1953, 78-24-2(3).
8. Tender 0=12(2)

To constitute a valid tender of money
for purposes of fulfilling obligations due
under contract, there must be actual and
bona fide offer to pay whole amount of
money dut. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-511.
9. Vendor and Purchaser C=I70
Real estate purchaser's tender of
$3(1,384.25 when amount of payment past
due under purchase contract, together with

unpaid taxes and water assessments, totaled $36,677.71, did not constitute valid
tender. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-511.
10. Tender C=>I5(I)
In usual circumstances, one who refuses to accept tender should state basis of his
refusal. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-5U.
11. Specific Performance 0=>I2I(I I)

Assignee in action for specific performance of contract for sale of real estate failed to meet burden of proving it
had live and viable contract by showing cither that it had performed its obligations
or had made valid tender to do so.
12. Libel and Slander C=>I3I
In action by assignee for specific performance of land sale contract, in which
vendors counterclaimed, alleging assignee
had slandered their title by recording abandoned contract, assignee had sufficient basis for believing it had rights under contract and thus did not willfully and knowingly record false or fraudulent instrument
for purpose of slandering title of those
ultimately found to be owners.

Gary A. Sargent, of Backman, Clark &
Marsh, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Jackson B. Howard, of Howard, Lewis
& Petersen, Provo, for defendants and respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice:
Plaintiff, Timpanogos Highlands, Inc.,
sued defendants, Max D. Harper and Emily D. Harper (now deceased), for specific
performance of a contract for the purchase
of a tract of 71 acres of unimproved property cast of Lindon in Utah County. Defendants acknowledged execution of the
contract, but averred that it had been
abandoned; and also counterclaimed, alleging plaintiff had slandered their title by recording the abandoned contract. The action for specific performance being in eq-

TIMPANOGOS HIGHLANDS, INC. v. HARPER
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uity, an advisory jury was used. Its findings were in favor of ihe defendants: that
the contract had been abandoned. The
trial court made findings accordingly and
entered judgment against the plaintiff and
in favor of the defendants, except that it
dismissed defendants' counterclaim for
slander of title. Plaintiff appeals. Defendant cross-appeals.
Plaintiff states its contentions: (1) That
the finding of abandonment ''is against a
fair preponderance of the evidence"; (2)
That a tender it made to reinstate the contract should have been accepted; (3) That
the court erred in admitting evidence of a
statement of Karl P». Hale, one of plaintiff's predecessors, who is now deceased,
concerning abandonment of the contract.
The original parties, Perry W. and Emily D. Harper, as sellers, and Karl H. Hale
and Roy A. Barrett, buyers (each predecessors to the parties to this action), used
a uniform real estate contract form. It
was dated September 18, 1957, and provided for a total price of $35,000 (about
$500 per acre) to be paid: $500 for the option to purchase; $2,500 on the exercise of
the option; and $3,000 per year, with five
per cent interest on the deferred balance,
until the total amount was paid. After the
initial payments, and the following year,
1959, the purchasers made sporadic but inadequate payments until November, 1968.
During that time they had paid a total of
$24,150, of which $14,650 had been applied
on interest, and $9,500 (thus a little more
than one-fourth of the total price) on principal.
Other significant facts are: that the
buyers never entered into the possession of
the property, or in any way used or exercised dominion over it. Nor did they pay
the taxes thereon. For several years prior
to 1968 the buyers had been making two
payments a year of $500 each. The last
such payment was made in November,
I. See Kcslcr t\ Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354
(1075).
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196K. A few days later, Max Harper
called Karl H. Hale on the telephone and
told him that the payment was not enough,
that it would not even cover the interest
and taxes. Whereupon Mr. Hale told him
that due to financial difficulties he could
not pay for the property and would have to
let it go. The evidence is further that
upon a subsequent occasion Mr. Hale made
a similar statement to Ruby Harper West,
Max's sister. Shortly after these occurrences, the defendants leased the property
for a term of ten years to a third party.
Karl P.. Hale died May 24, 1969. There
is some dispute as to what happened between that time and April, 1973, when the
events occurred which precipitated this
lawsuit. However, there was some contact
between the parties and conversations
about paying off the contract; but no
agreement was arrived at and no payments
were made. In late April, 1973, plaintiff
tendered the amount of $30,384.25 to defendants to pay off the contract. The
amount then owing, together with the sum
of unpaid taxes and water assessments, totalled
$36,677,71.
When
defendants
refused to accept the tender, this suit for
specific performance was initiated.
[1,2] In support of its attack upon the
findings and judgment, the plaintiff relies
on certain principles: The first, it correctly states: that this action for specific performance being in equity, this court may
review the law and the facts.* But its further contention: that "the finding of abandonment of the contract is against a fair
preponderance of the evidence," represents
a misconception of the nature of this review. Even though we may review the
facts, the well-established and long-followed rule is that due to the prerogative of
the trial court as the initial trier of the
facts, and his advantaged position to judge
the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence presented, we indulge the trial court
2. See Allen v. Allen, 109 Utah 09, !Ck5 P.2d
872, and see Stanley v. Stanley 97 Utah 520,
94 P.2d 4G5, particularly concurring opinion
of Wolfe and authorities therein cited.
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with considerable latitude in those matters.
Therefore, we do not review in the manner
plaintiff s u r e s t s : to determine whether
we would agree that "the evidence fairly
preponderates in favor of the findings."
But due to the tolerance indulged as just
stated, we do not reverse unless we are
persuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings.3
[3,4] The term "abandonment" in the
sense involved here means the intentional
relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights,
there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing of such abandonment.4 Where
there is dispute as to whether this has occurred, it is usually a question of fact,5 to
be determined from the circumstances of
the particular case, which include not only
nonperformance, but also expressions of
intent and other actions of the parties.
The facts which the plaintiff marshals to
demonstrate that the contract should be regarded as alive and subject to specific performance are: that the defendants did not
make demands about the inadequate and
delinquent payments, or the nonpayment of
taxes; and that they never gave any notice
of election to forfeit the contract. Further, that the defendants (sellers) had entered into a collateral oral agreement by
which the defendants were allowed to remain in possession of the property in consideration for which they would pay the
taxes; and that during that four and onehalf year period, plaintiff's "predecessor"
made several contacts with the defendants
for the purpose of ascertaining the contract
balance and negotiating a payment schedule, to which the defendants did not give a
definite response, so that it was the defendants' fault that nothing definite was
3. Ibid.
4. Grossman r. Liahhcr, Tex.Civ.App., 202
S.\V.2d 207. 271; Xorlh llenjen Tp. v.
Thomas S. Lee Enterprise*, Inc., 75 N..T.
Super. 17. 182 A.2d 137. 130; 1 Am.Jur.2ci
p. 14: GS A.L.R.2il 581.

not arrived at about reinstating and paying
out the contract.
In opposition to plaintiff's arguments,
the defendants point to the facts hereinabove recited as justifying the finding of
abandonment: the always delinquent and
erratic payments; the failure to pay taxes,
or to take possession or in any manner improve or exercise dominion over the property. They combine this with the fact that
both by the statements made and the subsequent conduct for four and a half years
indicate an intention to abandon the contract. The defendants' version of what
happened during that period was that on
two occasions when the matter was discussed, plaintiff made proposals to do
something less than the contract required,
neither of which they were willing to accept.
In addition to the other factors concerning abandonment hereinabove recited, there
is another one which the jury could well
regard as having caused a change of mind
by plaintiff as to abandoning the contract.
As is not uncommon in these days of inflation and rapidly increasing land values, especially in some suburban areas, there had
occurred a dramatic increase in the value
of the property. While it is not shown
just what the value was in 1968 when the
intention to abandon the contract was expressed, it is shown that by 1973 when this
plaintiff made the tender and desired to
reinstate the contract, the land had a value
of about $5,500 an acre, over ten times its
value when the original contract was entered into.
[5] It was the prerogative and the duty
of the jury and of the trial court to analyze the foregoing contentions of the parties and to arrive at their conclusions
5. Asher v. Hull, 207 Ok!. 478, 250 P.2d 8GG
(1952) ; Tucker v. Edwarth, 376 P.2d 253.
This is subject to tbc standard rule that if
the evidence is such that all reasonable minds
must necessarily so find one way or the other,
tbc court should rule as a matter of law.
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thereon in accordance with their views of
the evidence. In that regard and in support of the conclusion they reached, we
make these further observations: (1) Inasmuch as the plaintiff's obligations were
clearly set forth in the existing contract,
which the plaintiff insists was in force and
effect, all it had to do was to perform that
contract, and there would seem to have
been no particular need for negotiating
new terms. (2) Plaintiff's opposition to
the finding of abandonment is based upon
a claimed collateral agreement excusing it
from performance of the contract. This
would be in controversion of the expressed
terms of the written contract, and in order
to prevail thereon, it could only do so by
clear and convincing evidence.0 The jury
and the trial court not having been so convinced, we would not reverse unless the evidence was so clear and persuasive that all
reasonable minds must necessarily so find,7
a circumstance which we do not find
present here.
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construed in accordance with its general
purpose and thus include an assignee of
the deceased person. Conceding that such
an argument may have validity in some
statutory situations, it is not of concern
here. This is so for the reason that, as
this court has previously ruled, because this
statute is one of exclusion of otherwise
proper evidence, it should be construed and
applied strictly according to its terms.9
[7] In so doing the trial court correctly
ruled that it did not prohibit the testimony
concerning Mr. Hale's statement. In regard to that statement, it is further pertinent to observe that what was done about
the contract, as recited herein, or, perhaps
better stated, what was not done about the
contract, during the next four years, is in
harmony with the statement and perhaps
even more cogent indication of the intent
to abandon it.

[6] Plaintiff's claim of error in admitting evidence of the statement of Karl B.
Hale about abandonment of the contract is
based on the ground that it should be
barred by the so-called dead man's statute.8
That statute excludes testimony of persons
who "sue or defend, as . . . executor
or administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of
. . . a deceased person" and continues
the exclusion to a " . . . guardian, assignee or grantee . . .
of such heir,
legatee or devisee, . . . " Plaintiff
concedes that it is not the assignee nor
any of those three, but is an assignee of
the deceased person (Karl B. Hale) himself and that thus the terms of the statute
do not literally apply to its relationship to
Karl B. Hale. But it argues that in logic
and fairness the statute should be broadly

[8-11] Although it is not of controlling
importance to the decision in this case, it is
appropriate to make some observations
about the tender by which plaintiff sought
to reinstate the contract; and which may
also have been regarded as tending to justify the conclusion arrived at by the jury
and the trial court. To constitute a valid
tender, there must be an actual and bona
fide offer to pay the whole amount of
money due. 10 Applying this rule, the plaintiffs tender of $30,3&4.25 in April of 1973
when the amount of payments past due, together with unpaid taxes and water assessments, total $36,677.71, did not constitute a
valid tender. It is to be conceded that in
usual circumstances, one who refuses to accept a tender should state the basis of his
refusal. However, also to be considered are
these propositions: that the plaintiff had
the burden of proving that it had a live and

6. Sec Vagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454
(Utah, 1975), and Authorities therein cited.

and Trust Co.t 11 Utah 2d 416, 3G0 P.2d
1015 (1961).

7. Cf. Statement in Hotcarth r. Ostei'9aard, 30
Utah 2d 183, 515 P.2d 442.
8. See. 78-24-2(3), U.C.A.1953.
9. Maxficld v. Sainabury, 110 Utah 2S0, 172
P.2cl 122 (1946); Morrison r. Walker Dank

10. See 74 Am.Jur.2d, p. 545, Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 53S I\2d 1319 (Utah,
1975) ; Sec. 70A-2-5H, U.S.A.1953.
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viable contract which included either that
it had performed its obligations, or that it
had made a valid tender to do so, neither
of which the plaintiff had done here.
[121 In defendants' cross-appeal they
assail the trial court's dismissal of the asserted cause of action against the plaintiff
for slander of title by recording the contract and assignments relating thereto. It
is our opinion that the trial court was justified in concluding that plaintiff had sufficient basis for believing that it had rights
under the contract, that there is no foundation upon which it could be found that it
wilfully and knowingly recorded a false or
fraudulent instrument for the purpose of
slandering the defendants' title. 11 The
cross-appeal is without merit.
Affirmed. In view of the fact that both
parties appealed, each should bear his own
costs.
HEXRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, JJ., concur.

CONSOLIDATED SERVICES, INC., a Utah
Corporation, et at., Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
FMA LEASING COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, and Barbara Jensen Interiors, a Utah
Corporation, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 14039.
Supreme Court of Utnh.
Dec. 19, 1975.

The Second District Court, Weber
County, Jay E. Banks, J., dismissed action
brought by lessees of furniture, seeking to
recover lease payments to lessor on the
grounds of unjust enrichment and lack of

consideration, and the lessees appealed.
The Supreme Court, Ilenriod, C. J., held
that evidence was sufficient to -support
finding that plaintiffs breached the lease
contract.
Affirmed.
Bailment C=>3I(3)
Evidence was sufficient to support
finding that lessees of furniture breached
lease contract.

George B. 1 Tandy, Ogden, for plaintiffs
and appellants.
Robert C. Liljenquist, Picrcey, Bradford
& Marsden, Salt Lake City, for defendants
and respondents.
HENRIOD, Chief Justice:
Appeal from the dismissal of an action
brought by Campions, Lessees, involving a
furniture lease. Affirmed with no costs.
In October, 1970, Campions purchased
furniture from Barbara Jensen Interiors,
half the purchase price of which was being
financed by defendant Lessor, FMA Leasing. An argument ensued between Campions and Interiors. The former advised
FMA not to.make payments to Interiors
until further notice. Interiors sued Campions for the price, but the latter, nonetheless, paid FMA the commitment fee (the
first and last installments) anyway, in accordance with the terms of the lease.
Thereafter they also paid five more
monthly payments (totalling $4,156.36)
while the suit was pending. Interiors obtained a judgment against Campions who,
about three years later, in December, 1973,
on the ground of unjust enrichment and
lack of consideration, sued FMA to recover the payments theretofore made under
the contract.
Believable evidence indicated that FMA
already had paid a lending bank $1,600.00
interest for the finance money, incurred
$900.00 accrued handling charges and may

11. Pender v. Douse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2<1 044; 50 Am.Jur.2tl, Libel and Slander, Sec. 549.
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cfcccl." During the time Nordell had acquired the grazing rights from Jorgensens
lie paid taxes as stipulated in the deed.
During the years 1942, 1915, 1944 The Bothwell Corporation, then the owner of the
mining rights, accepted those payments
without any questions.
Certainly The
Bothwcll Corporation in accepting these
taxes was recognizing an interest under
the "Jorgenscn deed'' which had been transferred to Nordell.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that
there is ample evidence in the record to
support the findings and judgment of the
trial court.
Affirmed.

Costs to plaintiff.

CROCKETT, C. J., IIENRIOD, J., and
LEONARD ELTON, District Judge, concur.
TUCKETT, J., being disqualified did not
participate herein.
McDONOUGIJ, J., heard the arguments
but died before the opinion was filed.

Court of Cache County, Lewis Jones, J.,
rendered judgment for vendor, and purchaser appealed. The Supreme Court,
Ellctt, T., held that competent evidence,
including fact that nothing was done by
either party to earnest money agreement
and offer to purchase agreement prior to
date when final contract was to be entered
into and that no final contract was ever
entered into by the parties, supported finding
that parties had mutually abandoned their
contract.
Affirmed.

1. Contracts 0313(1)
"Repudiation" of contract by one party
is refusal to perform duty or obligation
owed to other party.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Contracts 0 2 5 6
"Abandonment'* of contract by one
party is giving up of right to benefit due
from another party.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

18 Utah 2d 308
Marcell PITCHER, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C. W. LAURITZEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 10563.
Supremo Court of Utah.
Feb. 7, 19C7.

After earnest money agreement and
offer to purchase land had been signed and
purchaser had deposited $100, and before
full payment was made on contract, purchaser took about $3,500 worth of hay and
straw from land, and vendor brought action for value of crops taken. Purchaser
counterclairncd for specific performance of
the contract to purchase. The First District

3. Vendor and Purchaser <£=*86
Competent evidence, including fact that
nothing was done by either party to preliminary earnest money agreement and
offer to purchase agreement prior to date
when final contract to convey real estate
was to be entered into, and that no final
contract was ever entered into by the
parties, supported finding that parties had
mutually abandoned their contract.
4. Appeal and Error <S»I0I0(I)
Where there is competent evidence to
support finding of abandonment of contract, Supreme Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of lower court even if
it disagrees with finding of lower court.
5. Specific Performance 0 2 8 ( 1 )
Specific performance cannot be required unless all terms of agreement arc
clear, since court cannot compel perform-
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anec of contract which parties did not
mutually agree upon.

and offer to purchase, containing, anion;;
other things, the following language:

G. Specific Performance 029(3), 30
Even if parties had not mutually abandoned their contract, specific performance
could not have been required of vendor of
realty, where earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase agreement failed to specify
which 30 acres of the 189 acres owned
by purchaser were to be conveyed to vendor
as part payment, and where contract ambiguously stated that final balance of
$25,000 was to be carried by vendor "on
contract or second mortgage."

The total purchase pticc of $100,0n().00
shall be payable as follows: $100.00
which represents the aforcdcscribcd deposit, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by you: on delivery of deed or
final contract of sale which shall be on
or before May 1, 1962, and bain nee of
purchase price to be paid as follows:
30 acres in North Logan as indicated
by map.valued at $50,000.00, $25,000.00
cash from loan on seller's farm and
seller to carry balance on contract or
second mortgage at 5% interest. * * *
All other taxes and all assessments,
mortgages, chattel liens and other liens,
encumbrances or charges against the
property of any nature shall be paid by
the seller except * * * none. (Emphasis added.)

7. Vendor and Purchaser C=>I9I
Where contract is silent as to when
possession of land is to be given to purchaser, vendor should have that possession
as means of compelling performance on
part of purchaser.
8. Vendor and Purchaser O I 9 I , 194
Purchaser of land is not entitled to
possession of land nor to crops growing
thereon, especially where purchaser has not
contributed to cultivation and harvesting
of such crops, until full payment is made
to vendor, or if terms are given by contract,
until compliance therewith is made by purchaser so as to entitle him to possession
of land.
9. Vendor and Purchaser O I 9 4
Party who signed earnest money agreement and offer to purchase agreement and
deposited $100 on contract to purchase,
which was later mutually abandoned, was
liable for $3,500 worth of hay and straw
which he took from the realty before making
any further payment and while vendor was
still entitled to possession.

There was no map in existence at the
time the parties signed the agreement. At
least it was not shown to the plaintiff if
any there was. The defendant had given
to the real estate salesman with whom
plaintiff had his land listed for sale a
rough sketch showing where a tract of
land containing 189 a/cres of land lay out
of which the 30 acres were to be taken.
This sketch was not shown to the plaintiff
either.
The plaintiff already had a mortgage
of $23,000.00 on his land, and the title to
one of the tracts being sold was in escrow
and would be his when he paid some $6,000.00 balance due on it.

Harris & Harris, Logan, for respondent.

No transfer of possession was ever made
as to cither tract of land, and the plaintiff
lost his enthusiasm for the deal when he
learned that he could not sell the North
Logan property for anything near $50,000.00
nor mortgage his own land for more than
$12,600.00.

ELLETT, Justice.
Between April 16 and 20, 1962, the
plaintiff as seller and the defendant as purchaser signed an earnest money receipt

The parties never talked to each other
about the deal prior to the signing of the
purported agreement, and it was the real
estate salesman who secured the signatures
of each party. It is quite apparent from

E. T. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
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reading the record that the plaintiff wanted
and needed money and that defendant
wanted and needed hay for his dairy operation. Numerous efforts on the part of the
real estate salesman to get the parties
together proved fruitless.
The real estate salesman was instrumental
in causing the defendant to go to the
plaintiff's land and get about $3500.00
worth of hay and straw during the late summer and fall of 1962. The plaintiff says
it was a sale, while the defendant claims
that he took the hay and straw as a
matter of right by reason of the earnest
money agreement which the parties had
signed.
No payment was ever made for the hay
or straw, and in March of 1964 plaintiff
sued the defendant for the value thereof.
The defendant apparently thinking his best
defense was a vigorous offense counterclaimed for specific performance of the
signed document entitled "Earnest Money
Agreement and Offer to Purchase" above
referred to.
A trial was had partly to the court and
partly to a jury. The jury found by a
special verdict the value of the hay and
straw, which defendant admits to be sustained by the evidence. The jury also
found that neither party had repudiated the
earnest money agreement and offer to
purchase. The court found the agreement
to be valid and binding at its inception but
that it had been abandoned by the parties.
[1,2] The finding of the court is not in
conflict with the finding of the jury.
Repudiation is the refusal to perform a duty
or obligation owed to the other party, while
abandonment is the giving up of the right
to a benefit due from another.
By his finding of abandonment the court
disposed of the issues raised by the defendant on his counterclaim for specific performance.
[3,4] It will be noted that nothing was
done by cither party prior to May 12, 1962,
the date when a -final contract was to be
entered into, and no final contract was ever

entered into by the parties. The trial court
found under disputed competent evidence
that the parties had mutually abandoned the
contract; and when there is competent
evidence to support such a finding, we are
not permitted to substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court even if we should
disagree with his finding.
But even if there had been no finding of
mutual abandonment, there were ample reasons why specific performance should not
have been required of the plaintiff.
[5] Specific performance cannot be
required unless all terms of the agreement
are clear. The court cannot compel the
performance of a contract which the parties
did not mutually agree upon. Sec Bowman
v. Rayburn, 115 Colo. 82, 170 P.2d 271.
In speaking of certain terms required
for specific performance, the author in 49
Am.Jur., Specific Performance, Section 22,
at page 35 uses this language:
The contract must be free from doubt,
vagueness, and ambiguity, so as to leave
nothing to conjecture or to be supplied
by the court. It must be sufficiently
certain and definite in its terms to leave
no reasonable doubt as to what the parties
intended, and no reasonable doubt of the
specific thing equity is called upon to
have performed, and it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the
court may enforce it as actually made by
the parties. A greater degree of certainty is required for specific performance in equity than is necessary to establish a contract as the basis of an action
at law for damages.
[6] We think the earnest money receipt
and offer to purchase lacks certainty in
two respects, either of which would prevent
the court from granting specific performance: First, it was not certain which 30
acres out of the 189 acres owned by the
defendant were to be conveyed to plaintiff.
The document says, "as indicated by map,"
but no map was ever shown to the plaintiff.
Second, the final balance of $25,000.00 was
to be carried by the seller on contract or
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second mortgage. Which would the court
require? A mortgage was already on the
plaintiff's land. He was to get another
loan on the land. Docs that become the second mortgage? If second mortgage means
third mortgage, what arc the terms: 10
years, 15 years, or 5 years? How are the
payments to be made: annually, semiannually, or lump sum at the end of the term?
How was interest to be paid: annually,
semiannually, or monthly? Should the
court require a contract for $25,000.00
balance instead of the mortgage, and if so,
would not the same problems arise as to its
terms as are indicated above for those of
the mortgage?
Since plaintiff needed money and believed
defendant's North Logan land could be sold
promptly for cash, the court could consider
the hardship which might ensue in determining what to do, and it docs not matter that
the defendant was not the one who made
plaintiff believe the land would sell for
$50,000.00. The court could consider the
fact that only $12,600.00 could be borrowed
on the plaintiff's land instead of the expected $25,000.00 in making his ruling
regarding specific performance.
But what about the hay and straw?
The findings of the court do not tell us
when the parties abandoned the purported
agreement. If we assume the hay and
straw were taken before the final abandonment, would the defendant then have to
pay for it?
[7,8] Where a contract is silent as to
when possession of land is to be given to
a purchaser, the seller should have that
possession as a means of compelling performance on the part of the purchaser.
Until payment is made, or if terms are
given by a contract, until compliance therewith so as to entitle the purchaser to the
possession of the land, the purchaser would
not be entitled to the possession nor to the
crops growing thereon, and especially is
this so where he has not contributed to the
cultivation and harvesting of such crops.

In the Idaho case of Nuquist v. Bauschcr,
71 Idaho 89, 227 I\2d 83, it is said at page
85:
The general rule is, subject to exceptions not herein necessary to discuss,
that if there is no agreement, expressed
or implied, in a contract for the sale of
real estate, the purchaser is not entitled
to possession until the full payment of the
purchase price has been made, and if the
purchaser complies * * * and receives
the deed to the premises, he is then,
and not until then, entitled to possession
of the property sold.
In 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser,
Section 385, at page 808, the following
statement is made:
While the vendee under such a contract
is considered to be the equitable owner,
the legal title is in the vendor until the
contract is performed and a conveyance
executed, and many cases support the
general rule that the right to possession
follows the legal title; that if there is
no agreement, express or implied, in a
contract for the sale of real estate, that
the vendor shall deliver possession of the
premises before the full payment of the
purchase price, the purchaser is not entitled to the possession; and that a mere
contract for the sale of real estate which
provides that if the purchaser complies
with his part of the contract and pays
the purchase price as agreed, the vendor
will then deed the property, raises no
legal inference that possession of the
property is to be given before the deed is
to be executed.
A specific statement is made relative to
growing crops in 15 Am.Jur., Crops, Section 11, at page 202:
The general rule that growing crops
pass with a transfer of the title to the
land ordinarily applies where the title
to the land is transferred by virtue of a
contract of sale. Thus, on the theory that
equity treats things agreed to be done as
actually performed, when real estate is
agreed to be conveyed by a valid contract
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of sale, without reservation, and the
vendee has the right to possession, the
equitable title passes at once to the
vendee and with it title to all crops
growing on the land. If, however, the
purchaser is given no right to the possession until the time for conveyance
arrives, he acquires no interest in the
growing crops which mature and are
harvested before the time for the conveyance and his right to possession arrives.

[9] It would seem that the court was
amply justified in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the value of the
hay and the straw and in refusing to order
the plaintiff to specifically perform the
contract. (See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah
2d 61, 362 P.2d 427.)
The judgment is affirmed with costs to
the plaintiff.
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER,
TUCKETT, and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.
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did not apply in this case.1 We arc of the
opinion that the trial court was correct in
that determination and the judgment of the
court is affirmed. The plaintiff is entitled
to costs.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HENRIOD,
CALLTSTER and ELLETT, JJ., concur.
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25 Utah 2d 202
Garth WHITNEY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Dave W A L K E R and Chanae Marie Walker,

Defendants and Appellants.
No. 11959.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 12, 1971.

Action for personal injuries suffered
as result of automobile accident. The District Court, Salt Lake County, Marcellus
K. Snow, J., found adversely to defendants, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that proceeding without appointing guardian ad litem for 15-year-old defendant motorist did
not entitle defendant to reversal where defendant had not been deprived of any meritorious defense, had not been misled, and
had not been denied any benefits which she
might have had through assistance of
guardian ad litem. The Court further held
that award of $1,351.40 special damages
and $37,500 general damages to plaintiff,
who was 40-year-old real estate salesman,
who suffered laceration of calf and painful
injuries to groin area, including six-inch
tear in scrotum and injury to penis that allegedly rendered him permanently partially
impotent, . who was hospitalized for 16
days, who was unable to work for six
I. Thomns v. Brnffef* Heirs. 0 Utnh 2d
57, 305 r.2il 507; Crump v. Gold Horse
Restaurants, Inc., (Fin.), 96 So.2d 215,

months, and who suffered loss of earnings
in sum of $7,536.66, was not excessive or
so disproportionately large as to indicate
that it had been given under influence of
passion or prejudice.
Judgment affirmed.
Callister, C. J., concurred in result.

1. Infants 0 7 7
Defendant and plaintiff have equal responsibility for having guardian ad litem
appointed for minor defendant. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 17(b, c).
2. Infants C=>87
In action for personal injuries suffered as result of automobile accident, proceeding without appointing guardian ad litem for 15-year-old defendant motorist did
not entitle defendant to reversal where defendant had not been deprived of any meritorious defense, had not been misled, and
had not been denied any benefit that she
might have had through assistance of
guardian ad litem. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 17(b, c ) ; U.CA.1953, 41-2-22.
3. Infants C=>94
Plea of infancy is personal privilege
which can be waived.
4. Infants €=>M0

Without showing of fraud, collusion,
or other substantial error going to merits
of case, minor defendant is not entitled to
be relieved of judgment against her on
plea of infancy.
5. Appeal and Error €=>I064(I)

Instruction that life expectancy of
plaintiff, who was 41 years of age, was
31.4 years was not prejudicial, though
plaintiff's injuries, for which recovery was
sought, were allegedly not shown to have
effect on plaintiff's future earnings.
6. Damages C=>I32(I)
Award of $1,351.40 special damages
and $37,500 general damages to plaintiff,
who was 40-year-old real estate salesman,
05 A.L.U.2d 037 Robertshow-Fulton
Controls Co. v. Noma Electric Co., 10
F.R.D. 32.
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who suffered laceration of calf and painful
injury to groin area, including six-inch
tear in scrotum and injury to penis that allegedly rendered him permanently partially
impotent, who was hospitalized for 16
days, who was unable to work for six
months, and who suffered loss of earnings
in sum of $7,536.66, was not excessive or
so disproportionately large as to indicate
that it had been given under influence of
passion or prejudice.

L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for defendants-appellants.
Armstrong, Rawlings, West & Schaerrer, David E. West and Neil D. Schacrrer,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-respondent.
TUCKETT, Justice:
The plaintiff, Garth Whitney, filed his
action in the court below to recover for
personal injuries suffered by him as a result of an automobile accident. On the
evening of September 19, 1968, the plaintiff had parked his automobile in a driveway adjacent to a church in Salt Lake
County. After parking the automobile, the
plaintiff was in the process of locking it
when he was struck by a vehicle being operated by Chanae Walker who was accompanied by her father, Dave Walker. Chanae was age 15 years and her driving experience had been very limited. The automobile had only just been purchased by the
defendant Dave Walker and it was the
first time that Chanae had operated it.
The facts would indicate that Chanae was
unable to control the movement of the car
or to stop the same prior to its collision
with the plaintiff.
The negligence of Chanae was admitted
and the issue of liability was submitted to
the jury solely upon the claimed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
The jury returned a verdict adverse to the
defendants and they have appealed to this
court.
As a result of the collision the plaintiff,
a 40-ycar-old real estate salesman, suffered

painful injuries to the groin area for
which he was hospitalized for a period of
16 days. The plaintiff was also unable to
work for a period of six months. lie received a laceration of the calf of his leg
and his other injuries were confined to the
pelvic region. His injuries included a sixinch tear in the scrotum and an injury to
the penis which has rendered him partially
impotent. In the opinion of a medical expert called by the plaintiff, the injury to
the penis is permanent and cannot be corrected by surgical or medical treatment.
The jury awarded the plaintiff special
damages in the sum of $1,351.40 and general damages in the sum of $37,500. The
evidence shows that the plaintiff suffered
loss of earnings in the sum of $7,536.66,
which were included in the award of general damages.
[1-4] The defendants on appeal seek a
reversal of the verdict and judgment found
against them in the court below on three
principal grounds. Firstly, the defendants
claim that it was error for the court to
proceed without first having appointed a
guardian ad litem for the defendant Chanae Walker. The defendants call our attention to the provisions of Rule 17(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
When an infant * * * is a party,
he must appear either by his general
guardian, or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the
court in which the action is pending.
Our attention is also directed to Rule
17(c), which provides:
When a guardian ad litem is appointed
by a court, he must be appointed as follows :
*
*
*
*
*
*
(2) When the infant is defendant,
upon the application of the infant if he
is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the service of
the summons, or if under that age or if
he neglects so to apply, then upon the
application of a relative or friend of the
infant, or of any other party to the action.
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It does not appear that the language of the
rules above quoted has been construed by
this court. However, similar language
contained in the rules and statutes of other
states have been before the appellate courts
in a number of jurisdictions.
In the case before us it appears that the
defendant Chanae Walker appeared and
filed her answer to the complaint of the
plaintiff, went to trial, and was defended
by able and experienced counsel, and it
would appear that it was only after the
verdict was returned against her that she
raised the matter of her minority as a defense. It should be noted that the rule
above referred to does not place the responsibility of having a guardian appointed
upon the plaintiff alone. It would seem
that the responsibility is equally upon the
defendant to have a guardian ad litem appointed at her own instance to render any
assistance which might be necessary in the
conduct of her defense. A survey of the
record fails to disclose that Chanae had
been deprived of any meritorious defense,
nor does it disclose that she has been misled or in any way deprived of any benefit
she might have had through the assistance
of a guardian ad litem. We are in accord
with the rule from other jurisdictions that
the plea of infancy is a personal privilege
which may be waived and without a showing of fraud, collusion, or other substantial
error going to the merits of the case the
minor defendant is not entitled to be relieved of the judgment against her.1 Under the statute the defendant Dave Walker
was responsible for the negligent operation
of the automobile.8
[5] Secondly, the defendants' claim
that the court's instructing the jury that
1. King v. Wilson, 110 Cnl.App. 191. 2
P.2d 833; Carver v. Donin, 139 Cal.App.
395, 33 P.2d 841; Trolinger v. Cluff,
56 Idaho 570, 57 P.2d 332.; *3/
2. Section 41-2-22, U.C.A.1953.
3. City of Okmulgee v. Clnrk (Okl.), 425
P.2d 457; Roberts Const. Co. v. Henrjr,
2G5 Ala. 008, 93 So.2d 498.

the life expectancy of one aged 41 years is
31.4 years was reversible error. The defendants contend that the record in this
case does not indicate that the plaintiff's
injuries will in any way affect his future
earnings. The defendants call our attention to prior decisions of this court which
have dealt with the subject, but it should
be noted in most cases that both mortality
tables and annuity tables or combinations
of the two were admitted for the purpose
of aiding the jury in determining probable
loss of future earnings. In the instant
case the court in its instruction only referred to life expectancy. While the giving of the instruction would appear to be
unnecessary, nevertheless, the jury would
in any event have some knowledge as to
life expectancy of persons in the age group
of the plaintiff. Cases from other jurisdictions follow the rule that life expectancy is pertinent in cases where there are
permanent injuries.3 We are of the opinion that the giving of the instruction was
not prejudicial.
[6] Thirdly, the defendants contend
that the verdict was excessive and appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. The defendants fail to direct our attention to anything
in the record except the size of the verdict
which would indicate passion or prejudice.
Courts in other jurisdictions have approved
awards similar to the award in this case. 4
Reasonable minds may differ on the
amount of compensation adequate to compensate the plaintiff in this case for the injuries he has sustained.
The amount
awarded here is not so disportionate as to
indicate that passion or prejudice influenced the jury's decision.8
4. Norton Company v. Hnrrelson, 278 Aln.
85, 176 So.2d 18; see nlso 12 A.L.R.3d
657.
5. Weber Bnsin Water Conservancy Dist.
v. Skcen, 8 Utnh 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730;
Schneider v. Suhrmnnn, 8 t'tnh 2d 35,
327 P.2d 822.
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The other points on appeal urged by the
defendants do not appear to justify reversal. The judgment of the court below is
affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs.
HENRIOD, ELLETT, and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs in result.
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25 Utah 2d 20G
Leo W. HOBBS, as Administrator with will
annexed of the Estate of Joseph Buhler,
Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Ethel Jeanne Buhler FENTON and James E.
Fenton, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 12105.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 12, 1971.

Action by administrator of decedent's
estate to recover stocks and checking account from decedent's daughter, who
claimed such property as surviving joint
tenant. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., rendered judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held that where father understood that by placing title to his stocks and
bank account in joint tenancy with his
daughter, with full rights of survivorship,
the same would automatically vest full title
in property in daughter on father's death,
father was shown to have desired and intended such result, and there was no claim
or evidence to indicate any fraud, mistake
or undue influence on part of daughter,
property passed to daughter on father's
death..
Affirmed.
Crockett, J., concurred specially and
filed opinion.

Joint Tenancy C=>6
Where father understood that by placing title to his stocks and bank account in
joint tenancy with his daughter with full
rights of survivorship, the same would automatically vest full title in daughter on
father's death, father was shown to have
desired and intended such result, and there
was no claim or evidence to indicate any
fraud, mistake or undue influence on part
of daughter, property passed to daughter
on father's death.
Richards & Richards, Edward F. Richards, Gary A. Frank, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Edward W. Clyde, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff, the duly qualified administrator of the estate of Joseph Buhler, who
died testate in March of 1968, initiated this
action to recover certain personal property,
namely, stocks and a checking account
from defendant, who claims the property
as the surviving joint tenant. Plaintiff alleged that the property was held in joint
tenancy with the decedent's daughter, the
defendant, for the purpose of convenience.
Plaintiff demanded that he, as administrator, be adjudged the owner of the personal
property and entitled to the possession
thereof, that defendant be declared to hold
the property in trust and be required to
make an accounting of all the transactions
which occurred from the time that Joseph
Buhler placed the first property in joint
tenancy, and that defendant be compelled
to execute such instruments as might be
necessary to pass legal title to plaintiff.
By answer, defendant asserted her ownership of the property and denied that plaintiff or the heirs of the estate possessed any
rights thereto.
At the conclusion of a trial upon the
merits, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and decreed that the properties which constituted the subject matter of
the complaint were defendant's sole property and that plaintiff had no right, title,
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BUDGE, Justice.
This action was brought by appellant
No. 6256.
seeking to cancel, annul, and set aside a
judgment entered against him, the sole reaSupreme Court of Idaho.
son urged being that when the judgment
April 21, 1030.
was entered appellant was a minor and did
not appear by general guardian and no
1. Infants 0 7 8 ( 1 )
guardian ad litem was appointed in the
Statute providing that infant party must action in which the judgment was entered.
appear either by general guardian or by
The findings of the court, which arc susguardian ad litem Is not applicable unless
court has acquired jurisdiction of Infant tained by the evidence, clearly relate the
situation: May 9, 1933, respondent herein
(Code 1932, §§ 5 300, 5-307, 5-507).
instituted an action against appellant to re2. Infants 0 8 7
cover damages. Summons was served upon
Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for appellant and he then appeared in said acinfant defendant, while irregular, does not of tion by demurrer, amendment to demurrer,
itself defeat jurisdiction of court (Code 1932, motion to require plaintiff to separately
state and number, amendment to motion
§§ 5-300, 5-307).
to require plaintiff to separately state and
3. Infants C=>87
number, motion to strike, motion to ekct,
Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for and demand for bill of particulars. On
infant defendant does not warrant setting August 2, 1933, appellant filed his answer in
aside, reversing, or vacating judgment unless said action, appearing by three members of
substantial rights of infant were affected by the bar, being the same attorneys who are
such failure (Code 1932, § 5-30G).
his counsel in the instant action. The damage action was tried before the court with
4. Infants 0 8 8
a jury and was concluded on October 11,
Infant aged twenty years and three 1933, the jury returning a verdict in favor
months at time of trial who was duly served of respondent herein. Appellant appeared
with process, who appeared In person and in the damage action in person; his father
by counsel and filed answer and other plead- was present at the trial and assisted him in
ings and went to trial without setting up in- the employment of counsel; appellant, his
fancy, could not upon reaching his majority father, and numerous other witnesses in
have judgment vacated for failure to appoint appellant's behalf were called, sworn, and
guardian ad litem as required by statute, in examined; the cause was vigorously conabsence of showing of fraud, collusion, or tested; instructions were requested by apduress, or that infant had meritorious de- pellant; the cause argued by appellant's
fense, or that he was not properly and ably counsel; and judgment was duly entered in
represented (Code 1932, §§ 5-306, 5-307, 5-507). favor of respondent. Thereafter appellant
filed his motion to retax costs, which said
MORGAN, J., dissenting.
motion was denied; the judgment was re,
»
corded; there was no motion for new trial
nor to vacate said judgment, and no appeal
Appeal from District Court, Twin Falls to this court. The judgment has not been
County, Eleventh District; William A. satisfied, and the same now appears as a
Babcock, Judge.
binding judgment and obligation against apAction to vacate judgment by Huston pellant. It was further found by the court
Trolinger against Conna Cluff. From a that in none of the pleadings filed by apjudgment for the defendant, the plaintiff pellant in said action was the age of appellant mentioned or alleged, that appellant
appeals.
did not in that action at any time make
Affirmed.
application for the appointment of a guardJames R. Bothwcll, Harry Povey, and ian ad litem. Likewise respondent made no
Andy Myers, all of Twin Falls, for appel- application for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and none was appointed in said
lant.
action at any time. The court further
Chapman & Chapman, of Twin Falls, for
found that appellant's counsel were and are
respondent.
TROLINGER v. C L U F R
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members of the bar of this court and that
appellant's defense was fully and ably presented both as to questions of law and fact
to said court and jury and was fully and
ably argued by his counsel to said jury and
that said judgment was and is the result of
a complete judicial investigation resulting
from a trial before a court and jury, extending over a period of six days. The
court found that during the progress of the
trial appellant testified he was under the
age of twenty-one years, and that his
twenty-first birthday would occur on July
2S, 1934, and that respondent testified upon
the trial that appellant had denied his said
age to her and had stated to her that he
was older.
The trial court entered judgment for respondent, upholding the former judgment,
and this appeal was taken.
The question presented is: Under the
foregoing facts, briefly, after a minor of
the age of more than fourteen years has
been duly served with process, appears in
person and by counsel, files an answer and
other pleadings, goes to trial, is represented
therein, awaits the return of the verdict and
judgment without setting up his infancy,
can he, after judgment against him, upon
reaching majority interpose his minority as
a sole ground for setting aside the verdict
and judgment?
The statutes indicate a distinction is to
be drawn between infants under the age
of fourteen years and those who have
reached the age of fourteen years or more,
I.C.A. § 5-307 providing: "When a guardian ad litem is appointed by the court or
judge he must be appointed as follows:
* * * When the infant is defendant;
upon the application of the infant if he be
of the age of fourteen years and apply within ten days after the service of the summons; if he be under the age of fourteen,
or neglect so to apply, then upon the application of any other party to the action,
or of a relative or friend of the infant.''
(Italics added.)
Probably the greatest distinction recognized between infants under and over the
age of fourteen years is with relation to
the manner of service of summons in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction,
I.C.A. § 5-507, providing that in order to
acquire jurisdiction of an infant under the
age of fourteen years, service must be had
on another person as provided in the statute in addition to the minor, while if the
minor be of the age of fourteen years or
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more, the court acquires jurisdiction by
personal service on such minor only, the
statute reciting in part:
"The summoiis must be served by delivering a copy thereof as follows: * * *
"4. If against a minor under the age of
fourteen years residing within this state,
to such minor personally and also to his
father, mother or guardian, or if there be
none in this state, then to any person having
the control or care of such minor or with
whom the minor resides, or in whose service he is employed. * * * In all other
cases to the defendant personally." (Italics
added.) Brown v. Lawson, 51 Cal. 615;
Boiling v. Campbell, 36 Okl. 671, 12S P.
1091; Boiling v. Gibson, 36 Okl. 67S, 123
P. 1093.
After jurisdiction has been acquired by
the court by service upon the minor of the
age of fourteen years or more, the further
question presents itself as to the effect of
the provisions of I.C.A. § 5-306, providing:
"When an infant
is a party, he
must appear either by his general guardian
or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the
court in which the action is pending in each
case, or by a judge thereof, or a probate
judge. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by
the court in which the action or proceeding
is prosecuted, or by a judge thereof, expedient, to represent the infant, * * *
in the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general guardian and
may have appeared by him."
[1] As will appear from a reading of the
foregoing section, it presupposes that there
be an action pending, i. e., the infant must
have been duly and regularly served with
process before the appointment of a guardian. The court must have acquired jurisdiction of the infant party before I.C.A.
§ 5-306 becomes applicable. The situation
thus presented in the instant action is,
what is the effect of a judgment rendered in
an action in which the defendant is a minor
over the age of fourteen years, has been duly and regularly served with process as provided by law in a pending action, but who
does not appear by a guardian or guardian
ad litem, but in which action the minor did
appear in his own behalf as heretofore set
forth? California Code Civ.Proc. § 372,
provides in the identical terms as the above
statute (I.C.A. § 5-306) that "When an infant * * * is a party, he must appear
cither by his general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed by the court in
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which the action is ponding, in cacli case."
It has been uniformly held by the courts of
California under the foregoing statute, and
by the overwhelming weight of authority
in other jurisdictions, tinder the identical
or similar provisions, that, notwithstanding
such provision, where the court has jurisdiction, a judgment or decree rendered
against an infant, in a case in which no
guardian was appointed for him and in
which he did not appear by his general
guardian or guardian ad litem, is not for
that reason void, and while it. may be erroneous, and subject to be reversed or set
aside, it is at most only voidable.
"The weight of authority is to the effect
that, where the court has otherwise jurisdiction, a . judgment or decree rendered
against an infant without the appointment
of a guardian ad litem, while it may be
erroneous, and subject to be reversed or
set aside, or to be ground for a new trial,
at most is only voidable, but not absolutely
void; and it may not be even necessarily
erroneous and subject to reversal; the
error may be amended or cured. It remains
in full force and effect until it is reversed
on appeal or error or set aside by direct
proceedings and is not subject to collateral
attack; and this rule applies to decrees in
equity as well as judgments at law. Where
it clearly appears that a decree is in favor
of the infant defendant, the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for him is not
reversible error. Where the court has not
obtained jurisdiction of the infant by service of process and no guardian ad litem
has been appointed for him then the judgment is void. It is not an absolute prerequisite to jurisdiction of an action by
an infant that he should sue by guardian
ad litem or next friend, and the suit or
action is not void on that ground alone;
it merely affects the regularity of the proceedings, and the defect is amendable, the
judgment or decree is not void.''* 31 C.J.
1121, § 266, citing many cases.
"The appointment of a guardian ad litem
for an infant defendant, like the appearance of a next friend for an infant plaintiff, is a matter of procedure and not of
jurisdiction. That either plaintiff or defendant was without such representative
makes the judgment erroneous, but not
void." 14 R.C.L. p. 286, § 54.
[2] Childs v. Lantcrman, 103 Cal. 387,
37 P. 382, 42 Am.St.Rcp. 121; Emeric v.
Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 2 P . 418; Foley v.

California Horseshoe Co., 115 Cal. 184, 47
P. 42, 56 Am.St.Rq>. 87; In re Cahill's Estate, 74 Cal. 52, 15 P. 364; Kemp v. Cook,
IS Md. 130, 79 Am.Dec. 8 1 ; Millard v.
Marmon, 116 111. 649, 7 N.E. 468; Drake
v. Ilanshaw, 47 Iowa, 291; Myers v. Davis,
47 Iowa, 325; Hoover v. Kinscy Plow Co.,
55 Iowa, 668, 8 N.W. 658; Rice v. Bolton,
126 Iowa, 654, 100 N.W. 634, 102 N.W. 509;
McBridc v. State, 130 Ind. 525, 30 N.E. 699;
Lcvvstcin v. O'Brien, 106 Ala. 352, 17 So.
550, 30 L.R.A. 707, 54 Am.St.Rcp. 56; Hollo way v. Mcintosh, 7 Kan.App. 34, 51 P.
963; Walkenhorst v. Lewis, 24 Kan. 420;
Baibridge v. Smith, 76 Old. 36, 184 P. 153;
Slemp v. City of Tulsa, 139 Okl. 76, 281 P.
280, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied
281 U.S. 703, 50 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed. 1127;
First Nat. Bank of Titonka v. Casev, 158
Iowa, 349, 138 N.W. 897; Rvan v. Fielder,
99 Ark. 374, 138 S.W. 973; "Kelly v. Kelly
(Tcx.Civ.App.) 17S S.W. 686; Austin v.
First State Bank & Trust Co. (Tex.Civ.
App.) 275 S.W. 156; Reynolds v. Steel, 170
Ky. 153, 185 S.W. 820; Harrod v. Harrod,
167 Ky. 30S, 180 S.W. 797; Parker v. Starr,
21 Neb. 680, 33 N.W. 424; Charley v. Kelley. 120 Mo. 134, 25 S.W. 571; Eubanks v.
McLeod, 105 Miss. 826, 63 So. 226; Eubanks v. McLeod (Miss.) 69 So. 289; Eiscnmenger v. Murphy, 42 Minn. S4, 43 N.W.
784, 18 Am.St.Rep. 493; Schimpf v. Rollnert, Wayne Circuit Judge, 129 Mich. 103,
88 N.W. 384; Linn v. Collins, 77 W.Va.
592, 87 S.E. 934, Ann.Cas.l918C, 86. It
appears that in this jurisdiction this court
has recognized the general rule and applied
it that while the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem is irregular if not erroneous,
it does not defeat the jurisdiction of the
court. In Trask v. Boise King Placers Co.,
26 Idaho, 290, 142 P. 1073, 1074, the mother
of W. E. Trask, a minor, sued upon the
theory that she was suing for herself and
the minor, the opinion reciting in part as
follows:
"A motion for a new trial was made, and
on the hearing of this motion, defendants
raised for the first time the proposition that
the minor was not bound by the judgment,
and that the defendants could not be bound.
At that time W. E. Trask applied to the
court for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem by an order nunc pro tunc, as of the
date of the beginning of the trial. Thereupon the court issued the order authorizing
the minor to appty for the appointment of
some suitable person as guardian ad litem,
which appointment was made. * * *
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"It must also be conceded that the action
of the court was irregular, if not erroneous, in appointing a guardian after the case
had been tried.
"In Ritna v. Rossic Iron Works, 120 N.Y.
433, 24 N.E. 940, it was held that the omission to appoint a guardian ad litem of an
infant plaintiff before the bringing of an
action is not a jurisdictional defect, but is
an irregularity merely. To the same effect;
see Clowcrs v. Wabash, etc., Ry. Co., 21
Mo.App. 213; Wolford v. Oaklev, 43 How.
Prac.(N.Y.) US. * * *
"Both the mother and the minor are
bound by the judgment as it comes here."
The recent case of Ilutton v. Davis (Idaho) 53 P.(2d) 345, 346, is not out of harmony with the foregoing cases. Therein the
minor was of the age of two years and with
relation to service of process is governed by
that part of I.C.A. § 5-507 relating to minors
under the age of fourteen in which case,
service must be made upon some one in
addition to the minor. The case in effect
recognizes the validity of the judgment secured by the minor, but hold that the appeal
must be dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction of the appeal, reciting:
"No effort appears to have been made to
conform to the statute requiring the infant
to appear by guardian. The stipulation
shows the probate court appointed his
mother guardian for him and that she qualified as such. This appointment was probably made pursuant to the provisions in
the award requiring that the money therein
mentioned be paid to a guardian for the
minor. It is the duty of the guardian to
collect and receive that money for -the
ward. Therefore she is, in her capacity as
guardian for her son, an indispensible party to this proceeding and is an adverse
party within the meaning of I.C.A. § 11202, above quoted. The notice of appeal was
not served on her, nor was it addressed to
her, nor is she therein named as respondent. * • *
"The notice of appeal not having been
served on the guardian for the infant respondent, and he not being represented here
by any one having authority to represent
him, we are without jurisdiction of the appeal and it is, therefore, dismissed."
It will
dismissed
guardian
represent

be observed that the appeal was
because of a failure to serve the
or any one haying authority to
the infant.

[3] While the judgment rendered in the
damage action may have been irregular and
erroneous, the rule supported by the great
weight of authority is that the failure to
appoint a guardian ad litem must affect
the substantial rights of the infant before
the judgment will be set aside, reversed, or
vacated. It must be made to appear that
substantial rights of the infant were affected by the failure to appoint a guardian
ad litem, such as that the infant had a valid
defense to the action, fraud, collusion,
duress, or the same grounds upon which an
adult might have disputed the judgment.
In King v. Wilson, 116 Cal.App. 191, 2 P.
(2d) 833, a judgment was rendered against
Ralph Wilson for damages and the opinion
therein recites in part:
"The first error assigned by appellant is
that at the time of the trial he was under
the age of 21 years and that no guardian ad
litem was appointed in said action in his
behalf. The minority of defendant Wilson
was not brought to the attention of the
court until the hearing of a motion for new
trial. The record in this case discloses that
the defendant was past 20 years of age
at the time of the trial and had no guardian
ad litem appointed as provided by the code.
"The first question which naturally arises
is: Does such failure to have a guardian ad
litem appointed go to the jurisdiction of
the court? * * "*
"The most that can be said is that the
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was
an irregularity. * • *
"The courts in many jurisdictions have
held that the failure to appoint a guardian
ad litem must affect the substantial rights
of the infant. Harris v. Bennett, 160 N.
C. 339, 76 S.E. 217; Grauman, etc., Co. v,
Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N.W. 50;
Martin v. Gwynn, 90 Ark. 44, 117 S.W. 754.
What loss of substantial rights did the defendant in this case suffer? He was ably
represented by counsel in every stage of
the proceedings. A trial was had by jury,
before whom he submitted his evidence, and
his case is ably presented on appeal.
Wherein are his rights affected and what
different judgment would have been rendered, had he been represented by a guardian ad litem? None is pointed out. It is
said in Childs v. Lanterman, 103 Cal. 387,
390, 37 P. 382, 383, 42 Am.St.Rep. 121:
'Although it is provided in section 372,
Code Civ.Proc, that, when an infant is a
party, he must appear either by his general
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guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, yet a judgment rendered
against an infant in which no guardian ad
litem has been appointed is not for that
reason void (citing cases); and a judgment
rendered against him in an action in which
he has appeared by an attorney will be
upheld as fully as though he had appeared
in person (Barber v. Graves, 18 Vt. 290;
Marshall v. Fisher, 1 Tones (46 N.C.) I l l ;
Town send v. Cox, 45 Mo. 401)/
"The failure to be represented by a guardian was no such error as would warrant
the court in reversing the trial court on
this ground."
In Smith v. Wagner, 137 Cal.App. 556,
30 P.(2d) 1020, 1021, the same proposition was again considered, the court saying^
"Appellant's first contention is that he
was a minor at the time the trial of the
action occurred and that thi. failure of the
trial court to appoint a guardian at litem
for him rendered the judgment voidable,
and that by reason of the failure to appoint a guardian appellant was entitled
to disaffirm the judgment, and that appeal
from the voidable judgment is a proper
method of disaffirmance.
"The record on appeal fails to disclose
that appellant applied to the trial court
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
It does disclose that through his counsel
he filed an answer verified by himself to
the amended complaint; that on the date
appointed for the trial of the action he
appeared in court and through his counsel
he announced that he was ready for trial;
that he proceeded to trial; that he testified as a witness in his own behalf and
that another witness testified for him;
that he did not specifically direct the
court's attention to the fact that he was
a minor; that the only information respecting appellant's age which was conveyed to the court during the trial of the
action was presented by appellant when
he was called by respondents as a witness under section 2055 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and during his cross-examination by respondents' counsel was
asked, 'How old are you?' to which he
replied, 'I am 19 now'; that at no time
during the proceedings did he make any
further reference to his minority; that after judgment was rendered against him
he then for the first time formally
advised the court of the fact of his
minority on his motion for a new trial.

"The above-narrated facts arc so similar to those which appc,,:* in King v. Wilson, 116 Cal.App. 191, .1 P.(2d) m, that
we consider the opinion therein decisive of
appellant's contention • this regard. / /
if be conceded that the failure to appoint
a guardian ad litem uvs an irregularity
it ivas not, under the circumstances dis~
closed by the record, such an irregularity
as affected the substantial rights of appellant and does not constitute an error of
such importance that of Itself requires
a reversal of the judgment."
(Italics
ours.)
In Carver v. Donin, 139 Cal.App. 395,
33 P.(2d) 841, the question again arose on
a motion to vacate a judgment:
"On January 11, appellant, Cirino, duly
and regularly filed in said action a document entitled disaffirmance of judgment,
wherein she stated that she thereby disaffirmed the judgment 'on the ground
that at the time of the trial of said action said defendant was a minor of the
age of twenty years, and that said defendant did not become of the age of
twenty-one years until December 25, 1933,
and that at the time of the trial of said
action said minor was not represented by
any guardian or guardian ad litem.' On
the same day, January 11, defendant served and filed notice of motion to vacate
the judgment on the same grounds above
stated. This motion was made upon the
records and files of the action and the
affidavit of appellant attached to the notice
of motion. In the affidavit appellant stated
that she was born on December 25, 1912;
that she was not represented at the trial of
the action by any guardian or guardian
ad litem; that at the time of the trial,
and also in a deposition given prior to the
trial, she testified that she was of the age
of 20 years; that plaintiff at all times had
knowledge of said facts through his attorney and took no steps to have any
guardian or guardian ad litem appointed
for said defendant; that for said reasons
affiant was desirous of having the judgment
set aside.
"The said motion having been * * *
heard * * *
without any counter affidavits on the part of the plaintiff, the
motion was denied. The present appeal
is from the order denying said motion.
* * * The plaintiff now moves that the
appeal be dismissed, or the order affirmed,
on the ground that the appeal is without
merit and that the questions on which
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the decision of the cause defends are so
unsubstantial that they need no further
argument.
[Italics added.]
"From the hill of exceptions it further appears that the action was brought
to trial on December 21, 1933, and was
submitted for decision on December 22,
and so remained until findings of fact
and conclusions of law were filed on January 5, 1934, followed by entry of judgment on January S; that the appellant was
not represented by any guardian or guardian ad litem; that after December 25,
1933, and before the decision of the court
or entry of judgment the attorneys of
record for appellant communicated additional points and authorities on behalf of
appellant to the court, and to counsel for
plaintiff, and at such time duly represented
the appellant as her attorneys in said action; that at all times up to and including
January 8, 1934, appellant did not raise
any question as to her minority; that the
only reference thereto was the statement of her age in response to a question propounded therefor; that she attended throughout the trial of said action,
and aided and assisted her said counsel,
both as a witness and in marshalirg other
witnesses.
"It is provided by section 372 of the
Code of Civil Procedure that, when an
infant is a party, he must appear either
by his general guardian or by a guardian
ad litem appointed by the court in which
the action is pending. Appellant relies
upon various decisions which establish
the rule that a judgment against an infant in an action in which no guardian
or guardian ad litem had ever been appointed may be disaffirmed by the infant
after reaching majority provided he acts
promptly and without laches, but that the
judgment is not void. * * * The subject is reviewed at some length in King
v. Wilson, 116 Cal.App. 192, 2 P. (2d)
833. * * * The court held that under the circumstances shown by the record appellant suffered no loss of substantial rights, and the judgment was
affirmed. The facts in that case were
very similar to those presented in the
case at bar, although we have here the
additional facts that the decision was not
filed and the judgment was not entered until after appellant attained her majority,
and that, after appellant became of age
and prior to the decision of the cause, attorneys properly representing her acted
in her behalf by presenting to the court
57 I\(2d)—22

additional points and authorities upon the
matters submitted, which matters did not
include any item relating to the minority
of appellant.
"From the foregoing it plainly appears
that the ground of appeal relied upon by
appellant is without merit, and that the
question presented required no further
argument.
"The order is affirmed."
In Sams v. Covington Buggy |Co., 10 Ga.
App. 191, 73 S.E. 18, 19, the court says
that the court very properly refused to
set aside such a judgment: "The minor
having brought or filed the suit by his
counter-affidavit
and made the issue
*. * * should have been represented
therein by his statutory guardian or guardian ad litem; and if the matter had been
called to the court's attention, or to the attention of the other party, this formal requirement of the statute would doubtless
have been complied with by proper amendment. But the minor, in his defense to the
suit originally, did not disclose his minority. He silently permitted a judgment to
be entered against him without disclosing
the fact, and therefore the irregularity was
cured by the verdict. For this reason we
think the court very properly refused to
set aside the judgment.1' (Our italics.)
"It is the generally accepted doctrine
that an infant cannot avoid a judgment
or decree against him merely on the
ground of infancy, and that he cannot impeach such a judgment or decree by an
original bill except upon grounds that
would be available to an adult, such as
fraud." Robison v. Floesch Const. Co.,
291 Mo. 34, 236 S.W. 332, 336, 20 A.L.R.
1239.
In Watson v. Wrightsman, 26 Ind.App.
437, 59 N.E. 1064, 1065, the appellate court
of Indiana considered a situation almost
identical with that herein and a portion
of the court's opinion appears to be particularly appropriate:
' T h e question thus presented is simply
this: After a minor has been duly served
with process, appears in person and by
counsel, files an answer, goes to trial, and
awaits the return of a verdict, without
setting up his infancy as a defense, can
he then interpose his minority as a ground
for setting aside the verdict? It is a familiar rule of law that the plea of infancy
is a personal privilege, and must be pleaded
by the defendant in case the record does
not disclose his infancy. Blake v. Doug-
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lass, 27 Ind. 416; Cohec v. Itai-r, 134
Ind. 375, 32 N.E. 920 [39 Am.St.Rcp. 270];
1 Black Tiul-m. § 196; Winer v. Mast,
146 Ind. \77f 45 N.E. 66; Frcem.Jmlgrn.
(3d.Ed.) §§ 151, 513. * * * In Winer
v. Mast, supra, it is said: 'It is true that
infancy may he pleaded either in abatement or in bar, depending on the facts
shown. In case the facts pleaded show,
or do not deny, a good cause of action,
but merely disclose that the party is a
minor, and therefore cannot maintain or
defend the action, then the plea, if made,
would be in abatement. Doubtless, however, the court, in such case, would appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor defendant, and the trial would proceed, and
even if judgment should be entered without
such appointment, if not attacked on its
merits, would stand.' In the same case
it was held that a meritorious
defense
must be shczi'n by the party who seeks
relief, and that the defense must be one
of substantial nature, affecting the merits
of the case,
"In the case we are considering, the appellant has not made any showing that he
had any meritorious defense to the action. He has not shown a substantial fact
affecting the merits of the case. He has
not shown fraud, collusion, or error, as
suggested by Freeman, supra. 1 Black,
Judgm. § 196, says: 'The general disposition of the authorities is to regard the plea
of infancy as a personal privilege, that may
be waived, and, if it is not pleaded,, a
judgment against the infant is binding upon him/ * * *

for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem? The guardian could have done no
more than to have filed an answer and conducted the defense. This, in fact, was
done by able counsel. After verdict, what
could such guardian have done other than
what was in fact done? Nothing; for a motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were duly made, and the appeal to this
court was properly prosecuted, and the questions raised fully and ably discussed. Wrc arc
unable to sec how appellant was injured.
In the case of Evans v. State, 58 Ind. 587,
it was held that the failure to appoint a
guardian ad litem for an infant defendant in a bastard suit, where such appointment had not been requested before the
trial of the cause, was not a cause for a
new trial. Sec, also, Rawlcs v. State,
:6 Ind. 433, and De Priest v. State, 68
Ind. 569. Judgment affirmed."
"While the evidence shows that appellant knew appellee was a minor, and it is
not shown that a guardian ad litem was
appointed for him, the record shows that
he appeared by attorney, filed a general
denial to each paragraph of the complaint,
and participated in the trial up to the
close of appellant's testimony when he
moved for and obtained a peremptory instruction in his favor. * * * Winer v.
Mast, 146 Ind. 177, on page 183, 45 N.E.
66. * * *

"We do not think the suggestion in the
motion of the minority of the defendant
and the failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem for him authorized the court to direct a verdict in his favor." (Daugherty
v.
Reveal, 54 Ind.App. 71, 102 N.E. 381,
"In this case, appellee founded her cause
of action upon the fact of an assault upon 384.)
her by appellant, in which he was charged
In Curtis v. Curtis, 250 Mich. 105, 229
with intending to carnally know her. This N.W. 622, the Supreme Court of Michigan
was a wrongful act, and for injuries re- announces the rule that when a decree is
sulting therefrom he was liable to respond voidable for error in procedure, it is a
in damages, as declared by the authorities. matter of judicial discretion whether it
The record does not disclose any fact that shall be vacated or not when questioned in
even tends to excuse him for the act, and, a direct proceeding: "The statute * * *
as we have seen, no defense whatever is provides that, after service of process upshown. Upon service of process, he came on an infant defendant the suit shall not
into court with counsel and his legal guard- be further prosecuted until a guardian ad
ian, filed an answer in denial, went to trial, litem is appointed. The court had jurisand not until after a verdict was re- diction of the subject-matter and of the
turned against him did he attempt to shield parties. Defendant, though an infant, was
himself behind his infancy. As the de- before the court by summons, duly served
fense of infancy is a personal privilege upon her. * * * Failure to do so [apit seems to us that appellant waived that point a guardian], however, did not oust
privilege by going to trial without plead- the court of jurisdiction, for the statute
ing it. But what would it have availed mentioned is procedural only, bat did renhim, in the first instance, if he had applied der the decree voidable if questioned in a
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direct proceeding such as this. When a dccrcc is voidable for error in procedure,
it is a matter of judicial discretion whether it shall be vacated. • * * That the
failure to appoint a guardian ad litem docs
not render the decree void is well settled.
* * * Wc find no abuse of discretion
in refusing to vacate the decree for want
of appointment of a guardian ad litem."
In 'Fiask v. Boise King Placers Co., supra, this court said:
"Section 4231, Rcv.Codcs [I.C.A. § 5907] provides that: 'The court must, in
every stage of an action, disregard any
error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.'
"It does not appear that any substantial
rights of the appellants have been materially affected by any error or defect that
occurred in the proceedings cr trial of
this case. [Citing cases.]"
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that the question of the minority of the
complainant was not raised before the
justice at all during the trial. It further
appeared * • * Willard Fuller, the
father of the complainant * * * was
present at the trial, and testified as a witness upon material points in the case, and
that he attended as such witness at the
suggestion of the counsel, for the complainant ; that he assisted his son and his
counsel in the impanneling of the jury, and
was present during the entire trial, and
'interested himself in the case to its close.
* * *
"The question presented is, whether, upon the above facts, the judgment sought
to be vacated is a valid, binding judgment, or whether it is voidable by the
complainant. * * * But
where
the
party who is legally competent to appear
in behalf of the infant has notice of the
pendency of the suit, and opportunity to
appear and defend the same, and actually
docs appear and participate in the defence, the infant has his day in court:,
and has opportunity to make defence by
one having legal capacity to make it.
Where a guardian ad litem is appointed
for an infant, the appointment should appear of record. But the appearance in,
and defence of, the suit by the natural
guardian, need not be made a matter of
record, and may be shown by parol. The
cases of Priest v. Hamilton, 2 Tyler, 44,
and Wrisley & Wrisley v. Kenyon, 28 Vt.
5, are full authorities in support of both
of these propositions. See also 1 Am.
Lead.Cas. 2§5, marginal paging, and cases
there cited. Judgment affirmed."

[4] It appears that at the time of the
trial of the damage action appellant was of
the age of approximately twenty years and
three months, and was before the .court
by summons duly served upon him. The
court had jurisdiction of the parties and of
the subject-matter. Appellant has made no
attempt to show, nor has he suggested,
that he had any meritorious defense, and
no fact is presented tending to show fraud,
collusion, duress, or that appellant was not
properly and ably represented, or any
single instance wherein his rights were
substantially affected by reason of the
procedural fact that no guardian ad litem
It seems to us that in a case such as the
was appointed for him, in fact, the record
one at bar, unless the minor, who has
negatives any such suggestion.
It will be remembered that appellant's reached his majority, makes some showing,
father, his natural guardian (I.C.A. § 15- to the effect that he has a meritorious de1805) was in constant attendance with ap- fense or that he has been misled, deceived,
pellant during the trial, participated there- or in some way deprived of some benefit
in, testified as a witness and assisted in of an independent and* unhampered dethe employment of counsel. It has been fense, he should not be allowed to disafheld that the appearance in, and defense firm a judgment obtained in the manner
of, a suit by the natural guardian need'not this judgment was obtained, or have the
be a matter of record and may be shown same vacated. After a most diligent inby parol. In Fuller v. Smith, 49 Vt. 253, vestigation of the authorities and a careit is said:
ful consideration of the record in this case,
"The case shows that at the time the * taking into consideration all of the facts
writ was served upon the complainant, and and circumstances, we have concluded that
the trial had which resulted in the judg- sufficient grounds were neither alleged nor
ment sought to be vacated, he was a minor; established to warrant vacating the judgthat no guardian ad litem was ment. No substantial rights of appellant
appointed by the justice on said trial; and were denied him.
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Judgment affirmed.
respondent.

Costs awarded to

GIVENS, C J., and IIOLDEN
AILSIIIE, JJ., coitcur.

and

MORGAN, J., dissents.

(p wK£T, **- '*aia &YSTt *\

JENSEN v. WOOTERS.
No. 6266.

Supreme Court of Idaho.
April 23, 1936.
1. Sales C=*4I7
Evidence held to sustain verdict for buyer
suing seller for breach of contract for sale of
restaurant in withdrawing service deposit
with utility companies contrary to agreement.
2. Trial C=>252 (20)
In buyer's action for seller's breach of
contract, refusal to instruct that buyer's failure to establish amount of damages in dollars
and cents limited recovery to nominal damages held proper, where there was evidence from
which actual damages could be computed.
3. Sales <£=>42l
In buyer's action for seller's breach of
contract, refusal to instruct that buyer could
recover only nominal damages' held proper,
where buyer established actual damages
which were natural and proximate consequences of breach of contract.
4. Damages €=>II7

In action for breach of contract, only such
damages will be allowed as fairly compensate
injured party for his loss.

Appeal from District Court,' Bannock
County, Fifth District; L. E. Glennon, Acting Judge.
Action by Marie Jensen against Otis
Wooters for damages for breach of oral
agreement. From a judgment for plaintiff,
defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
C. M. Jeffcry, of Pocatello, for appellant.
*
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F. E. Tydcman and B. W. Davis, both of
Pocatello, for respondent.
BUDGE, Justice.
This is an action brought by respondent
against appellant for damages upon an alleged breach of an oral agreement growing
out of the purchase of a certain restaurant
known as the Circle Shop owned by or held
in the name of Ora Ball, an employee of appellant.
From the facts it appears that appellant
offered to sell the restaurant to respond- I
cnt. Respondent was not financially able !
to place with the Idaho Power Company and j
the Public Utilities Consolidated Corpora- '<
tion, referred to in the proceedings as the i
gas company, the necessary and required |
deposits to secure the services rendered by !
said companies and which were necessary in
carrying on the restaurant business. The |
accounts of the Circle Shop with the gas
company and the Idaho Power Company !
were at the time carried in the name of ap- !
pcllant, and appellant had on deposit with
the Idaho Power Company, as required by
its rules and regulations, $100, and also had
a credit with the gas company to insure payment for service rendered to said restaurant. For the purpose of promoting and
inducing respondent to enter into an agreement of purchase of the furniture, fixtures,
and equipment of the Circle Shop, appel-'
lant agreed with respondent that he would i
permit the accounts to remain in his name,
permit the deposit to remain in the hands of
the Idaho Power Company, and permit the
credit to remain with the gas company, and
would also leave in the cash register $20 in
change, thereby making it possible for respondent to carry on the business. In pursuance to the agreement entered into between respondent and appellant and an
agreement of purchase thereafter entered
into between respondent and Ora Ball, appearing as the record owner of the restaurant, respondent delivered on the purchase;
price of the fixtures and equipment a notei
signed by one H. C. Nelson, which she then:
owned, and further agreed to pay the sum
of $S a day, $2 thereof to be applied on the,
purchase price and $6 a day to pay genera!
expenses such as gas, electricity, rent, etc.;
the aforementioned amounts to be paid each
day to Ora Ball-and by her distributed. Respondent went into possession of the restau-,
rant July 9, 1932, and continued in possession until November 3, 1932, during
which time she made the payments stipulat-j

•
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
Tony R. BARRUTIA et al., Defendants

and Appellants.
No. I33G0.

Supreme Court of I'tali.
AUK. LM>, 1!>74.

City Redevelopment Agency commenced condemnation suit to take defendants' land which was improved with a
three-story building. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., entered judgment on jury verdict
for defendants in the amount of $93,000,
and defendants appealed contending that
court committed prejudicial error in its
rulings on admissibility of certain evidence
and in giving certain jury instructions.
The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., held
that trial court properly excluded offered
testimony as to the value in use of property following testimony by same witness as
to fair market value of the property; that
trial court properly admitted into evidence
testimony by deposition of witness with
heart condition relating to comparable sale;
that defendants' objection to testimony on
comparable sale based on fact that sale had
been made under advice of property manager to sell so as to avoid costs of condemnation l e g a t i o n went to weight of the
evidence rather than competency; and that
instruction to jury not to consider interest,
attorney's fees or costs of proceedings in
assessing value of subject property was
properly given so as to direct attention of
jury to sole issue they were to decide.
Affirmed.

I. Eminent Domain €=>202(l)
Trial court properly excluded offered
testimony of appraisal witness in condemnation action as to the use value of subject
property to new owner following testimony
of same witness that present structure on
parcel had reached end of its economic life

and that highest and best use of the property would be to tear down the old building
and construct a new development. U.C.
A. 1953, 11-10-23.9.
2. Depositions 0107(10)

/

Where trial court in eminent domain
proceedings ordered taking of testimony of
witness with heart condition by deposition
and defendants objected to admission of
such deposition on grounds that they were
materially hampered in making objections
to testimony by sensitive health of witness,
defendants' asserted objections that testimony was highly prejudicial, based on
hearsay, and fraught with conclusions
without adequate foundation could have
been made at trial and were not waived by
failure to make them during course of deposition. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
32(a)(3)(C), (b), ( d ) ( 3 ) A ) .
3. Trial C=>83(l)

Defendants' asserted objections that
testimony was highly prejudicial, based on
hearsay, and fraught with conclusions
without adequate foundation failed to state
clearly specific ground of objection as required by rules of evidence. Rules of Evidence, rule 4(a).
4. Evidence 0=142(1)
In condemnation proceedings, landowners' objection to admission into evidence of testimony concerning alleged comparable sale based on fact that sellers were
nonresidents and had been advised to make
sale prior to condemnation to avoid costs
of litigation affected weight rather than
competency of evidence.
5. Eminent Domain €=3262(5)
Trial court's instruction to jury in eminent domain proceedings that jury was not
to consider interest, attorney's fees, or
costs of the proceedings in assessing value
of subject property was not prejudicial error since such instruction did not affect
substantial rights of parties and was wisely
given in case wherein landowners had emphasized costs of litigation involved in condemnation action in their objections to admission of comparable sale testimony.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61.

A
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6. Eminent Domain C=>255

Landowners' objection to jury instruction in condemnation action on grounds
that it was confusing, misleading, and did
not comport with evidence was not considered on appeal since it failed to point out
with a requisite degree of particularity
wherein the instruction was not supported
by the law. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
61.

scrimp that the trial court committed prejudicial error in regard to its rulings on the
admissibility of certain evidence and certain jury instructions.

j
i

The date of the taking of the subject
property was February 2, 1972. One of
the landowners testified that the fair market value on the date of the taking was
$165,On(.) to $170,000. Defendants' three
j
expert witnesses testified as to the follow- I
7. Appeal and Error C=»I032(I)
ing as the fair market value: Memory H.
Upon appeal, appellant had burden of
Cain, $165,000; Ray Williams, $149,000; j
showing that there was substantial and and Edward P. Westra, $87,140. Plain- j
prejudicial error which deprived him of
tiff's expert witness was of the opinion j
opportunity for full and fair presentation that the value of the property was $72,765. j
and consideration of disputed issues since
The experts were of the opinion that the !
there is a presumption in favor of the veribuilding situated on the premises was obsoty of the verdict and judgment, including lete and at the end of its economic life.
all aspects of the conduct of the proceedThe two upper stories of the building had I
ings and rulings of the trial court.
been utilized as a hotel but it had been va- ;
cant since January 1971, and would require j
remodeling to conform with fire regula-«, j
Brant H. Wall, Salt Lake City, for detions. The basement area had been last i
fendants and appellants.
rented in 1966. The main floor was divid- !
ed into two areas. The southern portion
B. Lloyd Poelman and II. Reese Hansen,
of Strong, Poelman & Fox, Salt Lake City, had been rented for $125 per month as a
secondhand furniture store; it had been
for plaintiff and respondent.
vacant since June, 1968. The northern porCALLISTER, Chief Justice:
tion had been extensively renovated in i
1967 and had been operated by the land- j
Plaintiff, pursuant to the power of eminent domain conferred by Sec. 11-19-23.9, owners as a tavern called the "Downtowner I
UX.A.1953, as amended 1971, initiated this Lounge"; it had a rental value of approxij
action of condemnation to take defendants' mately $300 per month.
property. Defendants' property was a parThe highest and best use of the property •
cel of land measuring 49 by 156 feet, situwas commercial and it was so zoned. The
ated on the east side of West Temple
neighborhood had undergone a dramatic j
Street between Second and Third South in
revitalization by the construction of the j
Salt Lake City. Located upon the property
Salt Palace Complex, which increased both
was a three story building with an impedestrian and vehicular traffic. Several
proved basement for storage facilities.
new motels were being constructed in the
The sole factual issue in dispute was the
area, and a shopping mall called "Arrow j
amount that would constitute just compenPress Square" was being completed. !
sation. Upon trial, the matter was submitThese new commercial enterprises stimuted to a jury, which rendered a verdict
lated an increment in the property values
finding that the fair market value for land
of the area.
and improvements was $93,000. The trial
court rendered judgment in accordance
[1] On appeal, defendants contend that
with the verdict and denied defendants'
the trial court erred in striking the testimotion for a new trial or a judgment notmony of witness Cain concerning the interwithstanding the verdict in the form of an
im value of the building on the land. The
additur. Defendants appeal therefrom aswitness testified that the structure had
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reached the end ot its <. conomie life and
the highest and best use of the property
would be to tear down the old building and
construct a new type of development, such
as, an office building or retail stores. The
witness testified that in appraising the subject property, he had rejected the cost and
income approaches and utilized the market
approach which involves locating comparable sales of similar property in the area.
He testified that the fair market value of
the land was $153,615; this opinion was
based on the sales of four parcels that he
considered comparable. All of these four
other properties had old buildings situated
thereon, but the witness ascribed no value
to the improvements; although the vendees
were presently utilizing the buildings—
some after extensive renovation. Witness
Cain further testified that in addition to
the value of the land, the willing buyer
would pay a nominal value for the building. He explained that even though the
building had reached the end of its economic life and was not producing sufficient income to pay the interest on the
land, a buyer would pay a nominal sum
since the building was producing some income to the owner, which could be collected while the plans and financing for a new
structure were being completed. To determine this interim use value, Mr. Cain utilized a formula he characterized as a modified income approach.
Mr. Cain testified that the property
could generate $685 per month rent, i. e.,
$300 for the tavern, $100 for the basement,
$160 for the hotel, and $125 for the store.
The ,sole expenses he deducted were for
taxes and insurance. He did not deduct
for management, vacancy and credit loss,
repairs and replacement and other standard
expenses. He determined a net income of
$6,275 for each of the two years interim
use of the building. He used the Inwood
Tables to find the present use of future income. He testified that the building had a
nominal value of $11;200 interim use. He
explained that he could not use the stand1. Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California v. Adams, 110 P/Jil 7, ](M7 (Oal.
W-H) ; 4 Xiehols on Kmincnt Domain CM
526 P.2d—4

aid income approach, i. e., capitalized net
income to determine the fair market value
because the property was not being pv.t to
its highest and best use.
While the jury was not present in the
courtroom, plaintiff made a motion that
the testimony of witness Cain concerning
the $11,200 interim use of the building be
stricken. The court granted the motion
and ruled that the jury would be limited to
a maximum finding of value of $153,615,
the amount to which witness Cain testified
as to the fair market value of the property.
Subsequently, the jury was never so informed or so instructed by the court.
However, defendants claim the ruling of
the court precluded counsel from arguing
this point to the jury or from presenting
further testimony concerning the value of
this interim use.
The trial court did not err in its ruling.
Market value is not a multiple, for the value in use of property for a particular purpose is not market value but merely a factor in determining such value. It is generally improper to express an opinion of value in use in terms of so much money.
There is a clear distinction between value
in use and market value; a given piece of
land has only one market value and not a
certain market value for one purpose and a
different market value for another purpose. The market value of land is determined by considering the highest possible
use to which the land is or reasonably may
be adapted and the price which the willing
purchaser would be willing to offer in
view of such highest possible use. While
there is a clear distinction between evidence of the value in use of land in terms
of money for a particular purpose and
opinions of market value in terms of money, based upon a consideration of the highest available use of the land of which the
witness has knowledge, the evidence must
be scrutinized to determine whether the
testimony falls within the first or inadmissible category or the second or admissible
category.1 The testimony of witness Cain
Ed.), See. 12.2(2), pp. 12-80, and See. 12.312,
pp. 12-140 to 12-110.
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was inadmissible since he stated the monetary value of the land for a particular purpose; the effect thereof was not to aid in
determining the market value of the property, but to add a separate item of damage. 2
[2,3] Defendants contend that the trial
court erred in admitting the testimony by
means of a deposition of witness Kdwin
Whitney. During the course of the trial
defendants' expert witness, Cain, was interrogated about the sale of a parcel of
land identified as the "Weir Sale." Mr.
Cain testified that he had conferred with
Edwin Whitney, the manager of the property, who had advised him that the owners
of the property were uninformed as to its
value and didn't receive market value. Mr.
Cain concluded that the Weir sale was not
comparable. The Weir transaction was a
key sale in plaintiff's case to establish fair
market value. Mr. Whitney had suffered
a serious heart attack and had been recently released from the hospital. Plaintiff
moved for an order permitting the deposition of Mr. Whitney for use at trial to impeach the testimony of Mr. Cain. Mr.
Whitney was advised by his doctor that he
could be interviewed in the office but
could not make a court appearance. Defendants objected to the deposition being
taken on the ground that the Weir sale
was not comparable to the subject property.
Thereafter the deposition of witness
Whitney was taken and recorded simultaneously by the court reporter and a cassette recorder. Defendants had ample opportunity to conduct cross-examination.
The deposition of Mr. Whitney was admitted at the trial under Rule 32(a)(3)(C),
U.R.CP., as amended 1972. The tape
recording was played to the jury. The
record indicates that prior to playing the
cassette, counsel argued their objections to
the content of the recording, that the court
ruled thereon, and that it was agreed between counsel that exceptions could be dictated to the reporter while the jury was

deliberating. Thereafter, defendants excepted to the ruling of the court on the
ground that the admission of the testimony
was highly prejudicial, was largely based
on hearsay, was fraught with conclusions
without adequate foundation. Defendants
further claimed that the testimony as elicited did not afford or give to the landowners the opportunity to interpose appropriately the objections that would have been
so interposed but for the fact that the witness was in delicate health and that their
cross-examination and objections were substantially and materially hampered by the
sensitive health of the witness.
There is nothing in the record to indicate
that defendants were inhibited in their
cross-examination of Mr. Whitney. Under
Rule 32(b) and (d)(3)(A), U.R.C.P., as
nmcndcd 1972, defendants asserted objections could have been made at the trial and
they were not waived by failure to make
them during the course of the deposition.
The record docs not indicate that defendants objected to the use of the cassette record, which would undoubtedly interfere
with the assertion of an objection. Defendants' generalized objections directed to the
entire deposition do not comport with the
requirements of Rule 4(a), U.R.E., that
there appear of record an objection to the
evidence timely interposed and so stated as
to make clear the specific ground of objec- j
tion.
:
[4] Defendants further contend that
the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of the "Weir Sale" on the ground that it
was not a comparable sale. Defendants
urge that the Weirs were acting under duress, in that they were nonresidents and
had been advised by their property manager to make the sale prior to condemnation
to avoid costs of litigation. Under such
circumstances, defendants claim that the
trial court abused its discretion in admit-j
ting such highly prejudicial evidence.
j
A review of the instant record indicates'
that there was a substantial basis in the!
evidence for the trial court to rule that the;

2. State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495 (1057).

!
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test of "reasonable comparability" had been
met, and the evidence was properly admitted. The differences urged and emphasized by defendants affected the weight of
the evidence more than its competency and
were properly submitted to the jury.3
[5] Defendants contend that the trial
court erred in giving Instruction No. 8,
wherein the jury was instructed that they
were not to consider interest, attorney's
fees, or costs of the proceedings in assessing the value of the subject property; that
these items would be dealt with by the
court in accordance with the law. Defendants claim that the instruction went beyond
the scope of the issues presented in the
trial and constituted prejudicial error.
This instruction properly directed the attention of the jury to the sole issue they
were to decide and that they were not at
liberty to enhance the award by calculating
any other costs. Within the context of the
record of this case, this admonition to the
jury was wise since defendants had emphasized the "Weir Sale" was not comparable
but under duress to avoid the costs of litigation involved in a condemnation action.
Furthermore, the instruction could not be
considered a defect which affected the substantial rights of the parties and must
therefore be considered harmless error under Rule 61, U.R.C.P.
[6] Finally, defendants contend that
the trial court erred by its Instruction No.
22. The record indicates that defendants
excepted thereto as being contrary to the
law and on the grounds that it is confusing, misleading, and does not comport with
the evidence and testimony in the trial.
3. State Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah
2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1909).
4. Employers Mutual Liability Insur. Co. of
Wis. v. Allen Oil Company, 123 Utah 253,
203. 258 i\2d 445 (1953).

Rule 51, l'.R.C.r., provides that in objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. The purpose of this rule is to
direct the attention of the court to the
claimed errors in the instruction so that he
might have an opportunity to correct them
if he deems it proper. The objection must
be sufficiently specific to give the trial
court notice of the claimed error in the instruction. An objection that an instruction
is not supported by, and is contrary to the
law lacks that degree of specificity so as to
direct the court's attention to a particular
matter. Since defendants failed to point
out with the requisite degree of particularity wherein the instruction was not supported by the law, this court will not consider
the instruction on its merits.4
[7] A survey of the entire record
clearly reveals that the parties had a fair
opportunity to present their respective
claims to the court and jury for determination. Thereafter, there is a presumption in
favor of the verity of the verdict and
judgment, including all aspects of the conduct of the proceedings and rulings of the
court. Upon appeal, appellant has the burden of showing that there was substantial
and prejudicial error which had the effect
of depriving him of the opportunity of a
full and fair presentation and consideration
of the disputed issues.5 No such error
emerges in the instant record.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to plaintiff.
HENRIOD, ELLETT,
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

CROCKETT

5. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
v. Mitsui Investment, Iu<\ (Utah), 522 P.2d
1370, 1374 (1974).
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In addition to the foregoing, and even
more important, is the fact that I cannot
sec any basis whatsoever in the evidence to
justify submitting the question of plaintiff's negligence to the jury. It is my
opinion that in observing his older brother,
who preceded him under the wire, and in
making inquiry before he attempted to
pass, he exercised at least the degree of
care which a boy ten years of age should
be expected to observe. (The main opinion makes no suggestion to the contrary).
It was therefore error for the defendant to
request, and for the trial court to submit,
the issue of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence to the jury.
In fairness to the decision of this court,
I must concede that the main opinion is
correct as to these aspects of procedure:
(1) that plaintiff's requested instruction
No. 12 did deal with the duty of care imposed upon a child, which would seem to
indicate an assumption on the part of
plaintiff's counsel that the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence would be submitted; (2) that he did not make a motion
for a directed verdict on that issue; (3)
nor did he ask for a new trial. Nevertheless, under the particular circumstances of
this case, I do not think that the trial court
and this court should consider themselves
powerless to rectify an injustice.
My conclusion is consistent with the
spirit and purpose of our rules of procedure.
Rule 1(a), U.R.C.P., provides in part
that:
* * * they shall be liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action;
I. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error $ 332, p.
1077, noting exception to the peneral rule,
stating that, "notwithstanding the absence of exceptions in the trial court, alleged errors in submitting issues to a
jury may be considered on appeal when
required in the interest of justice." Citing, X. Y. Con. U. It. Co. v. Mass.
bonding A Ins. Co., 1*4 N.Y.S. 243, 103
App.Div. 438. affirmed 135 N.E. 012,
233 N.Y. 547, wherein the court states
that "if it was error to submit to a

and Rule 51 states that:
* * * Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, [stating objections and
the grounds therefor] the appellate court,
in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving or failure to give an instructon.
There is both text and case law supporting
this practical view of doing justice. 1
For the reasons discussed above: (1)
there was an obvious impropriety in giving
the instruction and in submitting the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence where there was no evidence to justify doing so; (2) the special verdicts arrived at were themselves inconsistent;
which (3) seem to indicate that the jury
was confused by the verdicts, it is my
opinion that the interests of justice would
best be served by remanding this case for a
retrial upon all issues.
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24 Utah 2d 301
Stephen SIMPSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 11630.

Supremo Court of Utah.
Juno 5, 1970.

Action by automobile body painter
against automobile mantifacturer for injuries received while painter was struck in
forehead by torque tension rod which rejury a question of the defendant insurer's
liability * • • the appellate court
way reverse under it* plenary potcer, although no exception vrn% taken below,
* * • because a fair trial was not
had." And of. Sutton v. Otis Elevator
Co., as Utah M, 249 F. 437, where the
court held that in special circumstances
in the interest of justice failure to give
proper instructions was reviewable nn npI>ealf though no such instructions were
requested.
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leased while lie was conditioning tail gate
assembly on station wagon for painting.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, D. Frank Wilkins, J., entered judgment
on verdict of no cause of action in favor
of manufacturer, and painter appealed.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held
that testimony that job in question did not
ordinarily involve disassembly of tail gate,
together with fact that reasonable minds
may well have believed that one who relies
on his own judgment to deviate from ordinary and usual procedure should take into
consideration possibility of any increased
risk in doing so, justified submission to jury
of question as to whether painter was contributorily negligent in disassembling tail
gate, thereby allowing torque tension rod
to release and strike him in forehead.
Affirmed.

t. Appeal and Error C=»I72(I)
Plaintiff's contention relating to strict
liability would not be considered by Supreme Court where it was raised for first
time on appeal.
2. Negligence C^136(9)
Issue of contributory negligence may
be submitted to jury if there is basis in evidence upon which reasonable minds could
conclude that plaintiff was negligent in
that he failed to exercise that degree of
care which an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent person would have observed under
the circumstances.
3. Automobile* C=>I6
Testimony that station wagon paint
job did not ordinarily involve disassembly
of tail gate, together with fact that reasonable minds may well have believed that one
who relies on his own judgment to deviate
from the ordinary and usual procedure
should take into consideration possibility of
any increased risk in doing so, justified
submission to jury of question as to whether painter was contributorily negligent in
disassembling tail gate for purposes of
painting it, thereby allowing torque tension

rod of tail gate to release and strike him in
forehead.
4. Automobiles C=>I6
Admission in cvk nee of service manual showing proccdm involved in removing tail gate was r.ot error, in action
against automobile manufacturer by automobile body painter for injury sustained
when torque tension rod released and
struck painter in forehead while he was
disassembling station wagon tail gate for
painting, where facts of existence of service manual, its availability to painter if he
had asked for it, and its contents, could be
considered as having some bearing both
upon issue whether manufacturer had taken reasonable precautions for safety of
those who would be concerned with that
assembly and whether painter observed
reasonable care for his own safety in
connection with its removal.

i

;
|
!
;

!
j
!
j

5. Trial C=>295(l)
Specific jury instruction should be
considered in its entirety along with all
other instructions.
6. Trial <3=>296(4)
Phrase "against misuse by careless
persons" in instruction of defendant manufacturer's standard of care was not an imputation of carelessness to plaintiff where
jury was properly instructed that they
should consider all instructions together,
and another instruction adequately safeguarded plaintiff's interests as to standard
of care imposed upon him.

i
\
j
\
|
!

7. Appeal and Error C=>930(l), 1032(1)
All presumptions favor validity of ver- i
diet and judgment and they will not be I
overturned unless attacker shows that j
there is error which is substantial and
prejudicial in sense that there is reasonable
likelihood that in its absence, result would
have been different.
i
i

Woodrow D. White, Salt Lake City, for j
plaintiff and appellant.
|
Harold G. Christensen, Salt Lake City, j
for defendant and respondent.
j
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Huh
4Q1
cite n« 470. v::<\ uw
attempt to keep in motion a merry-goCKOCKKTT, Chief Justice.
round of litigation.1
The plaintiff Stephen Simpson, an auto
body painter for Capital Chevrolet CompaContributory
Ncyliycncc
ny in Salt Lake City, sues for injuries he
received on being struck in the forehead by
[2] Consideration of the justification
for submitting the issue of contributory
a torque tension rod which released while
negligence is analogous to making the
he was conditioning the tail gate assembly
same determination as to primary neglion a Chevrolet station wagon for painting.
Mis complaint charged negligence against gence: whether there is a basis in the evidefendant General Motors in the design of dence upon which reasonable minds could
the tail gate assembly, particularly that as conclude that the plaintiff was negligent \\\
it was lowered an apparently harmless ten- that he failed to exercise that degree of
sion rod slipped out of its holder and care which an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent person would have observed under
struck him; and that the construction con2
stituted a hidden danger which the defend- the circumstances.
ant should have foreseen and guarded
[3] The evidence is to the effect that
against, and/or given warning about. The
the usual procedure in doing the job ascase was submitted to a jury upon the issigned plaintiff did not involve any taking
sues of defendant's negligence and the
apart of the tail gate, but that he elected to
plaintiff's contributory negligence. They
do so upon his own initiative, believing it
returned a verdict of no cause of action in
would be easier to do a more thorough and
favor of the defendant.
better job. That doing the paint job in
On appeal plaintiff contends that the isquestion did not ordinarily involve undoing
sue of contributory negligence should not the tail gate assembly was supported by the
have been submitted (a) because of the
testimony of three other auto body paintdoctrine of strict liability where an inherers. This testimony, together with the fact
ently dangerous instrumentality is involved,
that reasonable minds may well believe
and (b) that the evidence would not justify
that one who relies on his own judgment
a finding of contributory negligence. He to deviate from the ordinary and usual
also assigns error in rulings on evidence procedure should take into consideration
and the giving of instructions.
the possibility of any increased risk in
doing so, justified the trial court in sub[1] The contention relating to strict
mitting to the jury the question as to
liability is an attempt to inject that doc- whether the plaintiff was contributorily
trine into this case for the first time on negligent under the standard above set
appeal. It was dealt with neither in the
forth.3
plaintiff's complaint, nor in the pretrial
conference, nor at the trial. It is therefore
Rutiny on Evidence
not appropriate to address such a contention to this court. Orderly procedure,
[4] Defendant assigns as error the adwhose proper purpose is the final settlemission in evidence of a service manual of
ment of controversies, requires that a party the defendant which showed the procedure
must present his entire case and his theory
involved in removing the tail gate when
or theories of recovery to the trial court; necessary. An essential part of the plainand having done so, he cannot thereafter tiff's case was his contention that he had
change to some different theory and thus no knowledge and no warning of danger
1. That mutter* r.iised for the first time on
nppc:tl will notfoeconsidered sec Hamilton,
ct nl. v. Suit Lake County Sewernjrc Imp.
!>«**., et nl.. 15 Ttnli 2d 210, 302 I\2d
235, and eases therein cited.
470 P.2d—26

2. See Stickle v. t'nion Viwtf'u- U. Co., 122
Ctnli 477. 251 l\2d 8u7.
3. Ibid.
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hidden in the tail gate assembly. The
facts of the existence of the service manual, its availability to the plaintiff if he
asked for it, and its contents, could well be
considered as having some bearing both
upon the issue whether the defendant had
taken reasonable precautions for the safety
of those who would be concerned with that
assembly, and whether the plaintiff observed reasonable care for his own safety
in connection with its removal. Inasmuch
as the service manual had some logical relevancy as proof on an essential issue, we
do not see any impropriety in admitting it
in evidence. 4
Instructions
[5,6] Plaintiff's complaint about instructions to the jury includes one about a
portion of Instruction No. 16:
* * * A manufacturer is not required to foresee all possible ways in
which a person may injure himself nor
to protect against all such possibilities or
against misuse by careless
persons.
[Emphasis added.]
It is urged that the emphasized phrase is
an imputation of carelessness to the plaintiff. It is neither fair nor realistic to excerpt a single phrase from an instruction,
nor one instruction from the rest, and assume that the jury regarded it in isolation.
They were properly instructed that they
should not do so, but that they should consider all of the instructions together. 5 In
addition, Instruction No. 19 adequately
4. As to the admissibility of evidence depending on logical relevancy to prove an
issue, see 31A C.J.S. Evidence 426 et
seq.; see Foster v. Keating, 120 Cal.
App.2d 435, 261 P.2d 529 (1953) ; and
Sumrall v. Butler, 102 Cal.App.2d 515,
227 P.2d 881 (1951).

safeguarded the plaintiff's interests as to
the standard of care imposed upon him:
* * * A person is not required to
guard against danger in places where it
is not expected to be, and if you shall
find that the plaintiff exercised ordinary
care in the performance of such work,
and in the exercise of such ordinary care
was unaware of the function of the
torque rod assembly and any danger inherent therein, then the plaintiff could
not be charged with contributory negligence.
[7] The parties have had a full and
fair opportunity to present their evidence
and arguments upon the issues to the court
and the jury, who after due consideration
and deliberation have made their determinations thereon. This is the objective of a
trial. When it has been accomplished the
administering of evenhanded justice to
both sides demands that there should be
some solidarity in the result so that it can
be relied upon. Accordingly, the established rule is that all presumptions favor
the validity of the verdict and judgment;
and they will not be overturned unless the
attacker shows that there is error which is
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence the result would have been different. We have found no such error here.
Affirmed.
dent).

Costs to defendant (respon-

CALLISTER, T U C K E T T ,
and E L L E T T , JJ., concur.

HENRIOD

5. That an instruction should be considered
in its entirety, and along with all of the
other instructions, sec Badger v. Clayson,
18 Utah 2d 329, 422 P.2d 065; and see
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67
T.2d 654.
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Carol K. RAKER, Personal Representative, In the Matter of the Estate of Lcda
K. Wickel Little, aka Leda K. Wickel,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Dwight G. PATTEE and Vella M. Pattce,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18277.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 1, 1984.
Personal representative of grantor's
estate brought action to cancel warranty
deed and to quiet title to property described in deed. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered
judgment for grantees, and personal representative appealed. The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that: (1) actions based on
lack of consideration and undue influence
are equitable actions governed by four-year
statute of limitations; (2) date of delivery
of date set period of limitations in motion
and those actions were therefore barred
years before grantor's death; (3) consideration paid by grantees in 1964 was adequate
and fully performed; (4) no confidential
relationship existed between grantees and
grantor so burden remained upon personal
representative to prove by clear and convincing evidence that conveyance should be
set aside; and (5) no resulting trust was
shown where personal representative did
not prove that grantor intended anything
but unconditional conveyance of her property.
Affirmed.

3. Appeal and Error 01009(1)
Supreme Court is not bound to substitute its judgment for that of a trial court in
equity cases and because of trial court's
advantaged position, Supreme Court gives
considerable deference to its findings and
judgment.
4. Deeds <3=>68(1)
Where deed is executed with no intent
to transfer present interest, it will be invalidated by court in equity.
5. Deeds ®=>194(5)
Presumption of valid delivery arises
where deed has been executed and recorded but this presumption may be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.
6. Trusts 0 6 2
Essential element of resulting trust is
intent of creator that res be held in trust.
7. Limitation of Actions e^GOtS)
Where there was testimony that grantor knew that she had conveyed her property to grantees with full understanding that
she had no further claim to it, where liens
she executed encumbering the property
were discharged by her repayment of all
sums received through welfare assistance,
and where in 14 years that she lived after
conveying property she never once attempted to obtain property's return nor
told anyone that she still owned property,
requisite statute of limitations began to
run no later than date deed was delivered
and thus grantor's personal representative's claim of a trust was barred. U.C.A.
1953, 78-12-25(2).

1. Deeds <s==>211
Party attacking validity of written instrument such as a deed must do so by
clear and convincing evidence.

8. Deeds e=>17(4)
Grantees, who paid property taxes and
assessments over period of 14 years, provided grantor a home for the remainder of
her life and fully performed terms of their
agreement with grantor, gave adequate
and substantial consideration for property.

2. Appeal and Error e»1009(4)
Supreme Court will disturb findings of
fact in equity cases only where evidence
clearly preponderates against them.

9. Cancellation of Instruments &*32,
34(4)
An action demanding cancellation of
deed for failure of consideration is an equi-
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table action and governed by four-year
statute of limitations for actions for relief
not otherwise provided by law. U.C.A.
1953, 78-12-25(2).
10. Limitation of Actions c=>60(5)
Regardless of whether deed was delivered when executed in 1964 or when it was
recorded in 1965, the four-year statute of
limitations for actions for relief not otherwise provided by law had expired before
action demanding cancellation of deed for
failure of consideration was brought by
grantor's estate following her death in
1978. U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-25(2).
11. Limitation of Actions <2>97
In cases of undue influence and duress, limitation period begins with termination of influence.
'
12. Fraud <e=>50
Confidential relationship is presumed
between parent and child, attorney and
client and trustee and cestui que trust;
same holds true between spiritual advisor
and a dying man.
13. Fraud <s=>50
Where confidential relationship exists,
presumption of unfairness arises which
must be overcome by countervailing evidence, and burden shifts to defendant to
prove absence of unfairness by preponderance of the evidence; in all other relationships, existence of confidential relationship
becomes question of fact.
14. Trusts <B=>110
Where trial court found that no confidential relationship existed between grantor and one grantee and that grantee, a real
estate agent, was not serving as her agent
at time of conveyance, burden was on
grantor's personal representative to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
grantor conveyed her property as result of
grantee's undue influence and that influence continued until time of grantor's
death.

15. Deeds e=>211(4)
Trusts C=*110
Where grantees recorded deed in 1964
and grantor took no action against them in
14 years she lived thereafter, and where
grantor validated and acknowledged original transaction through subsequent inaction for well over a decade after initiating
conveyance, no undue influence was proven
in execution of deed, and thus no constructive trust could be impressed upon property.
Robert M. Anderson, Danny C. Kelly,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Richard A. Rappaport, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiff, personal representative of the
estate of Leda K. Wickel Little, deceased,
brought this action against defendants to
cancel a warranty deed executed by the
deceased in 1964 and to quiet title to the
real property described in the deed. She
alleged lack of intent to deliver the deed,
conveyance in trust, undue influence by
one in a confidential relationship and failure of consideration or grossly inadequate,
unconscionable and unfair consideration.
Defendants counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title in themselves, generally denying
the allegations of the complaint and further defending on the grounds that the
action was barred by applicable statutes of
limitation. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants and plaintiff appeals.
Leda Little and her first husband were
the owners of three homes, No. 1909, No.
1911 and No. 1915 East 4500 South in Salt
Lake County, Utah, on property roughly
IV2 acres in size. They moved into No.
1909 in 1940 and built No. 1915 in 1957, but
he died before she moved into it in 1958.
No. 1911 was a modular home moved onto
the property in 1950.
Little had met Clyde Bradshaw, a realtor, through her first husband. Both she
and Bradshaw were from Minersville,
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Utah, and became good friends. Three
years after her husband died, Little asked
Bradshaw to sell the property, as there
were delinquent property taxes owing and
she was having difficulty maintaining it.
When Bradshaw was unable to sell it for
cash as she requested, she offered to convey the property to him in return for his
paying the taxes and providing her a place
to live for the rest of her life. Bradshaw
did not want to shoulder that responsibility
but put her in touch with his daughter and
her husband, Dwight and Vella Pattee, the
defendants herein. Mr. Pattee, also a realtor, attempted to sell Nos. 1909 and 1911
over a period of six months, but was unable
to find purchasers for cash. The listing
agreement expired in January of 1964. At
about that time, Little extended the same
proposal to Pattee that she had earlier
made to Bradshaw. Pattee was reluctant
at first, thinking that it was too much
responsibility for him and his wife. Little
was 59 years old and wanted defendants'
assurance that she would always have a
place to live in comfort in return for deeding the property to them. Both parties
consulted a lawyer for advice, but did not
transact any business through him. Instead, Pattee prepared a warranty deed
and on September 30, 1964, went to Little's
home with his brother-in-law, a notary public, where Little executed the deed conveying the three homes to defendants. Pattee
took the deed with him and thenceforth
assumed and paid the taxes on the property. Little continued to live in No. 1915 and
to receive $50 a month rent from one of the
other houses until her death in 1978.
On February 17 and April 21, 1965, Little
executed two separate public welfare lien
agreements with the Salt Lake County
Public Welfare Department, pledging the
property as collateral. Defendants had no
knowledge of that transaction. They recorded their deed on March 22, 1965. Some
time later, Little remarried and continued
to live in the home at No. 1915 with her
second husband. :Both of them repaid the
amounts received from the Department of
Public Welfare and the lien on the property
was fully discharged in December of 1971.

In early October 1978, Little and her husband were admitted to a nursing home,
where she died later that month, never
having by word or action attempted to repudiate the conveyance. She had no children and both her parents and siblings had
predeceased her. Plaintiff is Little's niece
and her closest surviving relative.
[1-3] Plaintiff urges us to conduct a
new and independent review of both questions of law and questions of fact. A party
attacking the validity of a written instrument must do so by clear and convincing
evidence. Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539
P.2d 452 (1975) (joint bank account); First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Hall, 29
Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1972) (stock
certificates); Controlled Receivables, Inc.
v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d 807
(1966) (deed); Haywood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d
299, 400 P.2d 16 (1965) (joint bank account);
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952)
(deed). This Court will disturb the findings
1
of fact in equity cases only where the evidence clearly preponderates against them.
Sown v. Loveland, Utah, 678 P.2d 292
(1984); Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d
286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972); First Security
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Hall, supra. We
are not bound to substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court, and because of
its advantaged position, we give considerable deference to its findings and judgment.
Gillmor v. Gillmor, Utah, 657 P.2d 736
(1982); Jensen v. Brown, Utah, 639 P.2d
150 (1981); Pagano v. Walker, supra. The
trial court, after addressing the substantive issues, found all of plaintiffs claims to
be barred by U.C.A., 1953, §§ 78-12-25,
78-12-26, 78-12-5 and/or -6. We shall
address the pertinent statutes of limitation
in conjunction with the respective claims on
appeal before us.
I.
[4,5] Plaintiff contends that the deed
was not delivered and accepted with the
requisite legal intent and that at best it
must be viewed to be a conveyance in trust.
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Where a deed is executed with no intent to
transfer a present interest, it will be invalidated by a court in equity. Curtiss v.
Ferris, 168 Colo. 480, 452 I\2d 38 (1%9).
This Court has held that a conveyance is
valid only upon delivery of a deed with
present intent to transfer, Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 (1960).
A presumption of valid delivery arises
where the deed has been executed and recorded, Kresser v. Peterson, Utah, 675
P.2d 1193 (1984); Controlled Receivables,
Inc. i\ Harman, supra, but such a presumption may be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Gold
Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis,
Utah, 611 P.2d 711 (1980).
The recording of a deed and placing the
names of others on the property is somewhat in the nature of a public declaration
that [the grantor] intended the instrument to become effective immediately.
People as a rule do not deliberately put a
flaw in the title to their property, thereby handicapping its later disposal, unless
they really intend to transfer some interest to the person whose name is thus
placed in the record.
Allen v. Allen, 115 Utah 303, 204 P.2d 458
(1949).
[6,71 Plaintiff contends that Little did
not deliver the deed with the requisite intent to divest herself of all right, title and
interest in the property, and that her estate
should therefore be permitted to enforce a
resulting trust. An essential element of a
resulting trust is the intent of the creator
that the res be held in trust. Parks v.
Zions First National Bank, Utah, 673
P.2d 590 (1983); Jones v. Jones, Okla., 459
P.2d 603 (1969). Had that been the finding
in the instant case, the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the trustees affirmatively repudiated the trust.
Therefore, this action would not be barred.
Parks, supra. Plaintiff attempted to show
that about the time Little conveyed the
property to Pattee she was the defendant
in a suit for alienation of affections and
that she wanted to remove her assets from
the reach of a potential judgment creditor.
However, the trial court found the convey-

ance to have been absolute and unconditional and not in trust. That finding was
supported by testimony that Little knew
that she had conveyed her property to defendants with the full understanding that
she had no further claim to it. There was
evidence that she may not have understood
the nature of the lien agreements she executed encumbering the property. Documents proved that she repaid all sums received through welfare assistance and that
the liens were subsequently discharged.
In the 14 years Little lived after conveying
her property, she never once attempted to
obtain its return or told anyone that she
still owned what she had conveyed away.
Under those circumstances, we are disinclined to upset the trial court's finding in
the absence of any clear weight of evidence
to the contrary. Plaintiffs claim of a trust
was thus barred as the requisite statute of
limitations, U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-25(2) (actions for relief not otherwise provided for
by law), began to run no later than the date
the deed was delivered.
II.
[8] Plaintiff also claims that there was
failure of consideration for the deed, or to
the extent consideration was given, the
same was grossly unfair and inadequate.
Specifically, plaintiff relies upon a letter
written by Pattee to Little two years after
the conveyance. The letter confirmed that
an agreement had been reached at the time
of the conveyance and then continued:
I will permit you to live at 1915 East
4500 South for as long as the property is
in my possession. I will try to sell [the
other homes on the property], but you
may stay in your present home as long
as you wish, provided only that you pay
the expenses thereto, i.e., all utilities,
water, gas, electricity, taxes, etc. as may
become due thereon.
Pattee testified that he wrote that letter
at Little's request at a time when he was
piloting planes to Southeast Asia and all
over the world. Little was concerned lest
his family should fail to follow through on
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the agreement if something happened to
him. He stated that he wrote the proviso
on expenses because he was afraid that in
the event of his death, his wife would not
have the income to pay them. Nonetheless, the evidence is undisputed that he
continued to pay taxes on the property
throughout Little's remaining years. At
the time of her death he had paid a total of
$12,581.33. In addition, Little received a
monthly income of $50 from one of the
other homes through the period at issue
here, approximately 15 years. Furthermore, she lived rent-free in her home until
a month before she died.
Plaintiff claims that the value of the
property was stated to be $35,000 in 1957
in the probate proceedings of the estate of
Little's first husband. The record is totally
barren of any support for that assertion.
The present value of the property is
claimed to be far in excess of that amount.
We are here concerned, of course, only
with what the value of the property was in
1964 at the time of conveyance. The trial
court found that defendants gave adequate
and substantial consideration for the subject property. They paid property taxes
and assessments over a period of 14 years,
provided Little a home for the remainder of
her life, and fully performed the terms of
their agreement with her. The weight of
the evidence does not clearly preponderate
against that finding, and we will not disturb it.
[9,10] An action demanding cancellation of a deed for failure of consideration is
an equitable action and governed by § 7812-25(2). Without deciding here whether
the deed was delivered when signed by
Little or when recorded by Pattee, an issue
not before us, we hold that the period of
limitations had run long before this action
was instituted.
III.
[11] Plaintiff's position with respect to
the issue of undufe influence is essentially
two-fold: (1) a confidential relationship existed between Pattee and Little, and the
burden shifted to him to prove that he did

not procure the deed by undue influence;
and (2) even in the absence of a confidential
relationship, the evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's finding
that the conveyance was not procured by
undue influence. In cases of undue influence and duress the limitation period begins with the termination of the influence.
Developments in the law—Statute of Limitations (1950) 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177. See
also Baker v. Masscy, Okla., 569 P.2d 987
(1977) for a discussion of the applicable
statute of limitations for equitable actions
based on undue influence.
[12,13] A confidential relationship is
presumed between parent and child, attorney and client, and trustee and cestui que
trust. Blodgctt v. Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d
298 (1978). The same holds true between a
spiritual advisor and a dying man. Corporation of the Members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Watson, 25 Utah 45, 69 P. 531 (1902). Where a
confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be
overcome by countervailing evidence, and
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
absence of unfairness by a preponderance
of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbell,
Utah, 674 P.2d 1226 (1983) (finding of undue influence in execution of trust shifted
burden to defendant to prove absence of
undue influence in a subsequent alleged
ratification of the trust); Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959); In
re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d
682 (1956). In all other relationships the
existence of a confidential relationship becomes a question of fact. Blodgett v.
Martsch, supra.
[14] The plaintiff contends that Pattee
received the deed as Little's real estate
agent while in a confidential relationship
with her. In support, plaintiff cites cases
showing a breach of fiduciary duty where
real estate agents failed to disclose to their
principals that they had ownership interests as buyers. M.S.R., Inc. v. Lish, 34
Colo.App. 320, 527 P.2d 912 (1974). See
also Ornamental and Structural Steel,
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Inc. v. BBG, Inc., 20 Ariz.App. 1(5, 50!) P.2d
1053 (1973); Batson v. Strchlow, 68 Cal.2d
662, 68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101 (19G8).
Under those circumstances a court will not
uphold a transaction between a principal
and his agent. No such failure to disclose
has been claimed here. "The doctrine of
confidential relationship rests upon the
principle of inequality between the parties,
and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over the other.
Mere confidence in one person by another
is not sufficient alone to constitute such a
relationship." Bradbury v. Rasmussen,
16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965). The
trial court found that no confidential relationship existed between Little and Pattee
and that Pattee was not serving as her
agent at the time of the conveyance. The
burden thus was plaintiffs to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that Little
conveyed her property as a result of Pattee's undue influence and that that influence continued until the time of her death.
To buttress her claim that Little acted
under the undue influence of Pattee, plaintiff points to Little's commitment to a mental hospital and attendant emotional disorders some ten years before she executed
the deed. She emphasizes that Little never
went to school until she was 16 years of
age. Countervailing evidence was submitted at trial that Little remarried subsequent to the execution of the deed, continued occupying her home, managed her own
financial affairs and never concealed the
fact that she had deeded away her property. Though she had bouts with physical
illness, no evidence was adduced that Pattee at any time overpowered her volition to
the extent that she was impelled to do—or
refrain from undoing—that which she
would not have done had she been free
from such controlling influence so that the
conveyance represented the desire of Pattee rather than that of Little. See undue
influence defined in In re LaVelle's Estate,
122 Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372 (1952). There
was no such dominance shown in any of the
evidence before the trial court, and particularly no evidence that in the execution of
the deed, Little acted under the undue in-

fluence of Pattee. In In re Woodward,
Okla., 519 P.2d 1207 (1976), the nieces of a
decedent attempted to set aside a joint tenancy deed in favor of their brothers on
grounds of fraud, undue influence and lack
of mental capacity. In holding that the
statute of limitations had expired on the
claims of fraud and undue influence, the
court stated that the means of discovering
fraud and undue influence came into the
hands of the plaintiffs when the deed was
filed of record and that they failed to exercise ordinary diligence in discovering it.
See also Mollendorf v. Derry, 95 Idaho 1,
501 P.2d 199 (1972) (upholding transfer of
property made by a man of little education
to his niece, an experienced businesswoman); Haywood v. Gill, 16 Utah 2d 299, 400
P.2d 16 (1965) (upholding a joint bank account created by decedent five years before
his death in favor of his daughter).
[15] Pattee recorded the deed on March
22, 1965. Little took no action against him
in the 14 years she lived thereafter. This
case is distinguishable from Robertson v.
Campbell, supra. There the father conveyed property into a trust that the court
found had been earlier created by him under the undue influence of his daughter,
who was the principal beneficiary. As a
result, any ratification of the trust by the
subsequent conveyance of property into the
trust was held to be presumptively tainted.
Here, by contrast, no further transaction
took place, and Little validated and acknowledged the original transaction
through subsequent inaction for well over
a decade. The trial court found that Little
initiated the conveyance and that the evidence was insufficient to show any undue
influence on the part of Pattee in the execution of the deed, let alone subsequent to
the transaction. The weight of the evidence does not clearly preponderate
against that finding, and we will not disturb it.
In conclusion, we summarize our holdings on the various issues before us. No
confidential relationship existed between
Pattee and Little, so the burden remained
upon the plaintiff to prove by clear and
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convincing evidence that the conveyance
should be set aside. That burden was not
met. No resulting trust could come into
being, as the plaintiff did not prove that
Little intended anything but an unconditional conveyance of her property. No constructive trust could be impressed upon the
property by the Court, as no lack of consideration or undue influence was proven in
the execution of the deed. The consideration paid by plaintiffs in 1964 was adequate
and fully performed. Actions based on
lack of consideration and undue influence
are equitable actions governed by the fouryear statute of limitations. The date of
delivery of the deed set the period of limitations in motion and those actions were
barred years before Little's death.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs to defendants.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
OAKS, J., having resigned, does not participate herein.
J*<\
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UPLAND INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
PACIFIC GAMBLE ROBINSON COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 18850.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 20, 1984.
Lessor brought action requesting adjudication of respective rights and duties of
parties under lease, and lessee counterclaimed for specific performance of option
to purchase. The Third District Court, Salt

Lake County, David B. Dee, J., found lessor in breach of agreement and ordered it
to convey property to lessee, and lessor
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
held that: (1) lessee's notice letter constituted effective and timely exercise of option to extend lease, and (2) lessor's assertion in 1970, as well as that in 1971 with
respect to expiration of purchase option,
was at most anticipatory breach or repudiation of lease agreement, and lessee therefore had right to elect either to treat repudiation as effective and bring suit at once
or continue to treat repudiation as ineffective and bring suit if and when actual
breach occurred.
Affirmed.
1. Landlord and Tenant «>86(2)
Where lessee's intention to exercise option to extend lease without any reservation or condition was evident in language
used in notice letter, where lessor's correspondence demonstrated that it understood
cancellation proposal to be nothing more
than request and recognized notice letter to
be effective exercise of option, and where
both parties continued to perform under
terms of lease for nearly two and one-half
years, lessee's notice letter constituted effective and timely exercise of option to
extend lease.

j

j
j
j
I
|

2. Limitation of Actions <*=>46(6)
Cause of action on contract accrues, j
thus causing statute of limitations to com- j
mence, only upon breach of contract
i

3. Limitation of Actions e=>46(6)
Lessor's mere assertion in 1970 and
1971 with respect to status of lessee's tenancy did not constitute actual breach of
lease agreement but, rather, breach did not
occur until 1978 when lessor actually refus- |
ed to convey property to lessee as required
under purchase option provision of lease. I
4. Limitation of Actions ®=»46(6)
Lessor did not commit actual or j
present breach by merely asserting invalid- I
ity of lease, especially considering its continuing performance under lease terms, !
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CALLISTKK, C. J., and CROCKKTT,
) . , concur.
IIKNRIOD,
herein.

J.,

docs

not

participate

TUCKETT, Justice (concurring and dissenting) :
I concur in the decision of the majority
insofar as it affirms the judgment of the
lower court on the question of damages
sustained by the plaintiff on his claim for
the loss of certain sheep. I respectfully
dissent to that portion of the majority decision which reverses the lower court on
its determination that the Grass Creek
road was not a public way. I particularly
object to that portion of the decision which
states that:
Due to a landslide in the early 1950's
and the failure of the county to keep the
road in repair, the public departed from
the road in places and traveled along an
old abandoned railroad right of way.
There was no objection by the railroad
company to the use being made, and
since this deviation continued for more
than ten years, that part of the railroad
right of way which was used by the public became the Grass Creek road.
The record shows and the court found that
for approximately 40 years the defendants
and their predecessors in interest had
leased the right of way from the railroad
company, and it thus appears that the railroad had no right to object nor to concur
in the use of the right of way by members
of the public. The record further shows
that segments of the railroad right of way
had been improved by defendants and their
predecessors to enable them to use it as a
private way. Defendants had the right to
exclude the public from those segments of
the right of way. Even though the defendant Ralph Judd and his father before
him permitted others owning property in
the area to use that portion of the right of
way this does not support the majority's
determination that the entire way was public. It should be noted that the majority
opinion deals with rights of the railway
company even though it was not made a
party.

James W. SEEQUIST and Joan W. Secqulst, his wife, Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

I

v.
Gladys R. SEEQUIST et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 13569.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 11, 1074.

Appeal to review a judgment of the |
Second District Court, Davis County, John
I\ Wahlquist, J., dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint and defendants' counterclaim
and quieting title to the properties involved •
in defendant mother. The Supreme Court, i
Ilcnriod, J., held that the finding that \
mother, who first executed a warranty j
deed on property to her son and daughter- j
in-law and then, a few days later, executed
a warranty deed on the same property to |
her daughter by a second marriage, did not
have the mental capacity to comprehend I
the effect of the transactions was support- '
ed by the evidence; furthermore, the
Court correctly found that the son, as a fiduciary and a person having a confidential ;
relationship with his mother, had a duty to ]
act fairly, disclose material information, j
and take no unfair advantage of his supe- J
rior position, but that he breached such
duty in view of, inter alia, the extreme disparity between the market value of the |
property and the amount he paid his moth- :
!
er for it.
Affirmed.

j

Deeds e»68(M/2), 72(7)
Finding that mother, who first executcd a warranty deed on property to her son
and daughter-in-law and then, a few days
later, executed a warranty deed on the
same property to her daughter by a second
marriage, did not have the mental capacity
to comprehend the effect of the transactions was supported by the evidence; furthermorc, the court correctly found that
the son, as a fiduciary and a person having
a confidential relationship with his mother,

!
!
;
j

i

^
j
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had a duty to act fairly, disclose material
information, and take no unfair advantage
of his superior position, hut that he
breached such duty in view of, inter alia,
the extreme disparity between the market
value of the property and the amount he
paid his mother for it.

P. Keith Nelson, of Brandt, Miller, Nelson & Christophcrson, Salt Lake City, for
appellants.
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for respondents.
I1ENRIOD, Justice:
Appeal to review the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint and defendants' counterclaim and quieting title to the properties
involved in defendant Gladys R. Secquist.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
Plaintiffs James W. and Joan \V. Secquist are husband and wife. James is the
son of defendants A. W. Seequist and
Gladys R. Seequist and the half-brother of
Jean M. King. On March 27, 1973, Gladys
executed a warranty deed on property to
James and Joan Seequist. The deed was
properly recorded April 6, 1973. On April
2, 1973, Gladys executed a warranty deed
on the same property to Jean M. King,
which deed was properly recorded the
same day.
The trial court found that Gladys did
not have the mental capacity to comprehend the effect of the transactions. We
think appellants have failed to show an
abuse of discretion of the court absent a
clear showing of such an abuse.
Based on Gladys* testimony, the trial
court found that the requirements necessary to show the existence of a confidential relationship between James and Gladys
R. Seequist * were present when the transactions took place. Counsel for appellants
argue that no evidence was presented which
would show a -.reposal of confidence by
Gladys in James, but we think her testimo-

ny which was relied upon by the trial court
clearly reflects such confidence.
The court found that, as fiduciary and a
person having confidential relationship
with Gladys, James had a duty to act fairly, make a disclosure of material information, and to take no unfair advantage of
his superior position. We think it was
correct in finding that James breached his
duty and also in its reliance upon both the
extreme disparity between the market value of the property, somewhere between
$62,500 and $91,250, and the amount paid
by the plaintiff, $28,000, and the fact that
plaintiff made no attempt to secure for defendant Gladys any independent advice or
representation even though he was aware
that she had no independent knowledge of
the value of the property involved.
CALLISTER, C. J., and ELLETT,
CROCKETT and TUCKETT, JJ., concur.

Grace BERGERA, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
IDEAL NATIONAL L I F E INSURANCE

COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 13525.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 10, 1974.

Suit by beneficiary of life policy, containing a double indemnity provision in
case of accidental death of insured and
containing an exclusionary clause if death
resulted directly or indirectly from war, to
recover on the policy for death of insured
soldier who was fatally injured when he
accidentally detonated a mechanical ambush device while returning to a night defensive position in Vietnam. The Seventh
District Court, Carbon County, Edward

I. See Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 10 Utah 2d 378. 401 P.2d 710 (1905).
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Devar C. PACK and Carolyn Pack,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v

HULL DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a
Utah corporation, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18136.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 30, 1983.

.

forfeiture for late
notice of forfeiture
ger vendor's right
purchasers' rights

payment and that the
was ineffective to trigto foreclose all of the
under the agreement.

2. Interest <a=>39(l), 50
Vendor and Purchaser <s=>172
Where purchasers took possession of
property in July 1977 and real estate contract provided that purchasers were liable
to pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum
after that date, and parties stipulated that
as of July 12, 1979, the total sum owed by
purchasers under the agreement, including interest, was $11,392.93, and in July
1981, trial court ordered purchasers to pay
vendor that amount, purchasers were liable
to vendor for interest on that amount for
the additional two years, and vendor's refusal to accept the tender of two checks at
about the time of vendor's attempted rescission did not preclude its recovery of interest.

Purchasers brought action against vendor seeking specific performance of real
estate contracts. The Fourth District
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J.,
entered judgment for purchasers and vendor appealed. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) evidence of the receipt and retention of purchasers' late payments by vendor
sustained finding that vendor had effectively waived the right of forfeiture for late
payment and that the notice of forfeiture
was ineffective to trigger vendor's right to
Robert D. Lamoreaux, Payson, for deforeclose all of the purchasers' rights under fendant and appellant.
the agreement, and (2) where purchasers
John G. Mulliner, El Ray F. Baird, Provo,
took possession of property in July 1977 and
for plaintiffs and respondents.
real estate contract provided that purchasers were liable to pay interest at the rate of
PER CURIAM:
9% per annum after that date, and parties
On July 25, 1977, an Earnest Money Restipulated that as of July 12, 1979, the total
sum owed by the purchasers under the ceipt and Offer to Purchase a lot was exeagreement, including interest, was $11,- cuted between the parties, which included a
892.93, and in July 1981, trial court ordered provision that if the purchasers, Packs, did
purchasers to pay vendor that amount, pur- not make payments or complete the purchasers were liable to vendor for interest on chase as required, the defendant, Hull, at
that amount for the additional two years, its option could retain payments theretofore
and vendor's refusal to accept the tender of made as "liquidated and agreed" damages.
two checks at about the time of vendor's
The Earnest Money agreement called for
attempted rescission did not preclude its a purchase price of $17,500 at 9%, with
$2,000 down and $250 per month. The final
recovery of interest.
contract
to incorporate the terms of the
Affirmed in part and remanded.
Earnest Money agreement was prepared by
Hull, the seller, and presented to the Packs
for execution. They refused to sign it since
1. Specific Performance <&=> 121(11)
In purchasers' suit for specific perform- the Earnest Money agreement provided
ance of real estate contract, evidence of the that Hull would install the sewer, while the
receipt and retention of purchasers' late proposed final contract required the Packs
payments by vendor sustained finding that to assume the obligation for the installation
vendor had effectively waived the right of of the sewer. No further offer to finalize
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has been made. Irrespective of this attempted switch of obligation, the Packs,
nonetheless, made numerous payments, but
at times were delinquent according to the
terms of the agreement.
Hull warned the Packs of the delinquencies, and threatened action to assert its
rights under the contract. By letter dated
February 28, 1979, Hull gave the Packs
until March 25, 1979, to bring the payments
current. Payments were made in response
thereto apparently to Hull's satisfaction.
On October 23, 1979, Hull again wrote the
Packs, enclosing a check for $5,666.42
"which represents all the money which you
paid toward the purchase [less interest]."
The letter continued by saying that Hull
"hereby exercises the right it has under the
terms of its agreement to cancel the transaction for your failure to carry out its
terms." The agreement had no term for
"cancellation" or any other right to rescind,
but only a right to retain payments already
made if the buyers did not complete the
payments and purchase of the lot.
Packs brought this suit for specific performance. Hull bases its defense on the
October 23, 1979, letter hereinabove mentioned. At that time it appeared that there
were two payments delinquent. Hull contends that the court's findings as to waiver
and notice were in error.
[1] The receipt and retention of late
payments by Hull on a number of occasions
are clearly reflected in the record, and the
form of the notice of "cancellation" fully
justifies affirmance of the trial court's findings. The court specifically found that
there had been an effective waiver of the
right of forfeiture for late payment, and
that the notice of forfeiture was ineffective
to trigger Hull's right to foreclose all of
Packs' rights under the agreement.
Hull urges that the court should have set
aside the judgment and granted a new trial
1. Blomquist v. Bingham, Utah, 652 P.2d 900
(1982); Atnoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456
P.2d 172 (1969).
2. Farnworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d
571 (1950).

under Rule 00(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, IKCAUSC "many errors of law and
fact were made by lx>th the court and the
attorneys." Assuming without deciding
that Rule 60(b)(7) can be invoked in such
instance, on the facts presented, we are not
convinced that the trial court abused its
discretion.
[2] Hull also contends that it should be
awarded interest on all sums remaining unpaid on the Earnest Money agreement.
The award of interest in a case such as this
depends on who has possession of the property. If the seller has in some way prohibited the buyer from taking possession, no
interest is allowed on the unpaid balance.1
If, however, the buyer has possession, interest will generally be awarded.2 In the instant case, by the terms of the parties'
agreement as interpreted by the court, the
Packs took possession of the property in
July, 1977. They were therefore liable to
pay interest at the rate of 9% per annum
after that date, as specified in the agreement. The parties stipulated at trial that
as of July 12, 1979, the total sum owed
under the agreement (including interest)
was $11,392.93. This was the amount the
trial court ordered the Packs to pay when
judgment was rendered in July, 1981. The
court therefore erred in failing to award
interest for those additional two years.
The Packs seem to rely on the fact that
Hull refused to accept the tender of two
checks at about the time of the attempted
rescission. Where the buyer has possession
of the property, such tender is insufficient
to avoid payment of interest. In such a
case, the only legitimate way of avoiding
interest would be for the buyer to tender
into court or otherwise set aside the full
amount due under the contract so that the
buyer is excluded from all benefits and use
of the funds.3
3. Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2
(1910). See also Justice Wolfe's concurring
opinion in Farnworth v. Jensen, supra.
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Affirmed except as to the interest issue.
For the limited purpose of awarding interest as explained in this opinion, the case is
remanded. No costs awarded.
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Gam L BAUM, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Harley GILLMAN, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 17755.Supreme Court of Utah.

order to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted the statements attributed
to defendant had to constitute defamation
per se.
2. Libel and Slander c=>33
In order to constitute defamation per
se, the defamatory words must charge criminal conduct, loathsome disease, conduct
that is incompatible with the exercise of a
lawful business, trade, profession, or office,
or the unchastity of a woman.
3. Libel and Slander o=>33
Whether defamatory words are actionable per se is to be determined from their
injurious character; the words must be of
such common notoriety that damage can be
presumed from the words alone.

June 30, 1983.

4. Libel and Slander <e=»80
Slander complaint did not allege defamation
per se, where none of the allegaCauses of action for slander were distions
contained
therein were such that the
missed by the Fourth District Court, Utah
court
could
legally
presume that plaintiff
County, J. Robert Bullock, J., and plaintiff
had
been
damaged;
the allegations clearly
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J.,
did
not
impute
criminal
conduct, loathsome
held that slander complaint did not allege
disease,
conduct
incompatible
with the exerdefamation per se, where none of the allecise
of
a
lawful
business,
or
unchastity;
gations contained therein were such that
while
the
statements
imputed
poor
business
the court could legally presume that plainpractices
in
the
past,
such
had
to
be
viewed
tiff had been damaged; the allegations
and
considered
in
light
of
the
fact
that
clearly did not impute criminal conduct,
plaintiff
had
been
out
of
the
subject
busiloathsome disease, conduct incompatible
with the exercise of a lawful business, or ness since 1974 and the allegedly defamatounchastity; while the statements imputed ry incident did not appear until 1979, five
poor business practices in the past, such had years later; furthermore, the complaint
to be viewed and considered in light of the contained no allegation that defendant's
fact that plaintiff had been out of the sub- statements damaged plaintiff in any curject business since 1974 and the allegedly rent business endeavor or pursuit.
defamatory incident did not appear until 5. Libel and Slander <&=>33
1979, five years later; furthermore, the
Statements which may be injurious
complaint contained no allegation that deonly
to some future happening do not give
fendant's statements damaged plaintiff in
rise
to
a cause of action for either per se or
any current business endeavor or pursuit.
per quod defamation.
Judgment affirmed.
Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
1. Libel and Slander <*=»89(1)
Inasmuch as complaint for slander contained no allegation of special damages, in

Robert Macri, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Jerry L. Reynolds, Dallas H. Young, Jr.,
Provo, for defendant and respondent.
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Idaho

102 Idaho 588

J. Sandy SINGLETON and Cay Singlcton, Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
Mary PICHON, Defendant-Appellant,
and

Anita Foster, individually and heir or devisee of the Ned Foster Estate; and the
Ned Foster Estate, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 13270.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Oct. 5, 1981.
Vendees brought specific performance
action on title retaining land sale contract.
Upon remand, 98 Idaho 149, 559 P.2d 765,
the District Court, Fifth Judicial District,
Blaine County, James M. Cunningham, J.,
entered judgment in favor of vendees, and
vendors' successor in interest appealed.
The Supreme Court, Shepard, J., held that:
(1) trial court's refusal to relieve counsel of
stipulation agreeing to submit matter to
court without trial and upon then existing
record was within exercise of his discretion;
(2) trial court did not err in vacating pretrial order, execution of which served no
purpose whatsoever; (3) findings, conclusions and decision of trial court were supported by evidence; (4) cause of action did
not accrue in vendees until tender of performance and successor's refusal of such
tender; and (5) there was no evidence upon
which trial court could have found vendees
guilty of laches.
Affirmed.
Bakes, C. J., concurred in result.
1. Stipulations $=>13
Where stipulation agreeing to submit
matter to court for its decision without trial
and upon then existing record was clear and
without equivocation, trial court's refusal to
relieve counsel of such stipulation was within exercise of his discretion.

2. Pretrial Procedure c=»l
Where, pursuant to stipulation, matter
had l>een submitted to and decided by trial
court, trial court did not err in vacating
pretrial order, execution of which at such
point in proceeding served no purpse whatsoever.
3. Specific Performance c=> 121(11)
Findings, conclusions and decision of
trial court in favor of vendees in action for
specific performance brought by them on
title retaining land sale contract were supported by evidence that neither vendors nor
vendors' successor in interest ever prepared
written notice of default and intention to
terminate contract or mailed any such notices to vendees pursuant to terms of contract.
4. Limitation of Actions c=>43
Statute of limitations only begins to
run following accrual of cause of action and
statute of limitations may only be asserted
as bar after expiration of statutory period
following accrual of cause of action.
5. Specific Performance o=> 105(1)
Cause of action did not accrue in
vendees who brought action for specific
performance on title retaining land sale
contract until their tender of performance
and refusal of such tender by vendors' successor in interest.
6. Specific Performance c=>l21(ll)
There was no evidence in record of
specific performance action brought by
vendees on title retaining land sale contract
upon which trial court could have found
vendees guilty of laches.
Stanley Crow, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
E. Lee Schlender, Ketchum, for plaintiffs-respondents.
David B. Lincoln, Boise, for defendantsrespondents.
SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in
favor of plaintiffs-respondents in an action
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for specific performance brought by them
as vendees in a title retaining land sale
contract. We affirm.
The salient facts of the case are recited in
the previous opinion of this Court in an
earlier appeal, Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho
149, 559 P.2d 765 (1977). There the Court
reversed the trial court which had, on the
basis of the statute of limitations, dismissed
the action.
Upon remand depositions of the various
parties were taken and, following a pre-trial conference at which various exhibits
were admitted, the matter was submitted
for the decision of the court on the basis of
the then existing record. The trial court
made its findings of fact, conclusions of law
and decision in favor of plaintiffs ordering
and decreeing specific performance of the
contract. Thereafter counsel for appellant
Pichon submitted a form of pre-trial order
to the court which was evidently inadvertently signed by the trial judge. Singleton
moved to vacate the "pre-trial** order. Appellant Pichon moved to set aside the findings, conclusions and judgment and to be
relieved from her stipulation which submitted the matter for the decision of the
court without trial and further moved that
the cause be set for trial upon its merits.
The court granted respondent Singleton's
motion to vacate the pre-trial order and
denied all motions of appellant Pichon.
[1] Appellant Pichon asserts that the
court erred in failing and refusing to grant
Pichon's request for a trial of the cause.
We find such assertion to be totally without
merit. The stipulation agreeing to submit
the matter to the court for its decision
without trial and upon the then existing
record is clear and without equivocation.
The trial court's refusal to relieve counsel
of that stipulation was within the exercise
of his discretion and we find no abuse of
that discretion. Thompson v. Turner, 98
Idaho 110, 558 P.2d 1071 (1977); Loughrcy
v. Weitzel, 94 Idaho 833, 498 P.2d 1306
(1972).
[2] Similarly, we find no merit to Pichon's assertion that the trial court erred in

vacating the pre-trial order. At that point
in the proceeding the execution of such a
pretrial order served no purpose whatsoever. Pursuant to stipulation the matter had
been submitted to and decided by the trial
court.
[3] Appellant Pichon next contends that
the findings, conclusions and the decision of
the trial court are not supported by the
evidence. We disagree. The contract instrument between the Singletons and the
Fosters provided that:
"Before purchaser's interest may be terminated or cancelled, vendor shall give
purchaser written notice specifying the
particulars in which purchaser is in default * * * if purchaser fails to comply
with the then due terms of this contract
as required by said notice within such
thirty day period, then this contract will
be subject to final and complete termination and cancellation by vendor. * * *
Advice of cancellation may be given in
the same manner as written notices.*'
At the heart of the findings of the trial
court are those which found that neither
the Fosters nor Pichon ever prepared a
written notice of default and intention to
terminate the contract, much less mailed
any such notices to the Singletons.
The Singletons at all times lived in Hawaii and during the eleven years in question maintained various residences and/or
business addresses at from three to six locations. It appears to be the principal contention of Pichon that the Singletons were
somehow obligated to furnish their then
current addresses to the Fosters and/or Pichon. It is sufficient to note that no such
obligation is contained in the contract.
Rather, if the Fosters or their assignee desired to exercise the default provisions of
the contract, they needed only to mail such
notices by certified mail to that address of
the Singletons as stated in the contract.
This the trial court found they did not do
and that finding is clearly sustained by the
evidence. Hence, we hold that since the
Fosters and Pichon failed to comply or even
attempt to comply with the express provisions of the contract, their contentions re-
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garding post office regulations, changes of
the Singletons' address and the Singletons'
failure to give the vendors notice of the
change of address are all irrelevant.
[4,5] Although the issue before this
Court in Singleton v. Foster, supra, involved the statute of limitations, such was
not ruled upon by the court below and that
issue is raised only peripherally on this appeal. A statute of limitations only begins
to run following the accrual of a cause of
action and a statute of limitations may only
be asserted as a bar after the expiration of
the statutory period following the accrual
of the cause of action. City of St. Anthony
v. Mason, 49 Idaho 717, 291 P. 1067 (1930);
Little v. Emmett Irr. DisL, 45 Idaho 485,
263 P. 40 (1928). See 54 C.J.S. Limitations
of Action § 108 (1948). Here there is no
indication that the cause of action accrued
in the Singletons until their tender of performance and Pichon's refusal of such
tender. See Stockmen's Supply Co. v. Jenne, 72 Idaho 57, 237 P.2d 613 (1951).

es and we find no indication in the record of
a request, motion or demami by Pichon that
the trial court consider and rule ujK>n laches. Nevertheless, on the basis of the record
before the trial court and here, we find no
evidence upon which the trial court could
have found the Singletons guilty of laches
in the instant circumstances. Pichon was
aware of the contract interest of the Singletons in and to the proj>erty since the quitclaim deed issued to Pichon was made specifically subject to the interest of the Singletons in the property.
We have considered appellant's remaining
assignments of error and find them to be
without merit. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
McFADDEN, BISTL1NE and DONALDSON, J J., concur.
BAKES, C. J., concurs in the result.

[6] Likewise, Pichon only asserts peripherally that the trial court failed to give
consideration to the doctrine of laches. The
trial court made no finding regarding lach-

A-

710

Utah

401 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

10 Utah 2d 378
R. Gcoroe BRADBURY, Administrator of the
Estate of George R. Bradbury, deceased,
and Althea Bradbury, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Gordon L. RASMUSSEN and Yora Gene Rasmussen, tils wife, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 10055.

Supreme Court of Utah.
May 7, 1905.

Action by husband and wife to have
declared null and void a warranty deed, a
lease agreement, and a transfer of water
stock certificates to a niece and her husband. The husband died during the course
of the litigation and his administrator was
substituted as a party plaintiff. The Sixth
District Court, Sevier County, Ferdinand
Erickson, J., entered a judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, J., held
that the evidence failed to establish undue
influence on the part of niece and her husband and that the plaintiffs failed to sustain
their burden of proving that they thought
that the documents they had signed were for
a contract of sale rather than a deed reserving life estate.
Reversed.

1. Jury 3=^28(5)

Defendants in action to declare null
and void a warranty deed, lease agreement
and a transfer of water stock certificates
were not entitled to a jury trial where jurytrial which was originally demanded by
plaintiffs was waived by them at pretrial.
2. Deeds C=>I96(3)
Landlord and Tenant C=>22(4)
Waters and Water Courses C=>234
Undisputed evidence that there existed
among the parties sincere affection, trust
and confidence was not legally sufficient to
constitute a confidential relationship giving
rise to presumption of unfairness of transaction involving a warranty deed, a lease

agreement and a transfer of water stock
certificates from a husband and wife to a
niece, whom they had reared as their own
daughter, and her husband.
3. Deeds C=>I96(3)
Gifts C=>47(3)
If a confidential relationship is shown
to exist and a gift or conveyance is made
to a party in a superior position, a presumption arises that the transaction was unfair;
this presumption has the force of evidence
and will itself support a finding, if not overcome by countervailing evidence.
4. Deeds 0=196(3)
Where a confidential relationship is
shown to exist, burden is upon superior
party to convince court by preponderance
of evidence that transaction was fair.

,
'
|
j
j
•
j

5. Deeds 0196(2, 3)
Mere relationship of a parent and child
does not constitute evidence of such confidential relationship as to create a presumption of fraud or undue influence.
6. Deeds C=211(4)
While kinship may be a factor in determining existence of a legally significant
confidential relationship, there must be a
showing, in addition to kinship, of a reposal
of confidence by one party and resulting
superiority and influence on other party.
7. Deeds <§=>72(3)
A relationship to constitute a confiden- i
tial relationship must be such as would lead
an ordinarily prudent person in management of his business affairs to repose that
degree of confidence in other party which
largely results in substitution of the will of j
latter for that of former in material matters
involved in transaction.
8. Deeds C=>72(3)
Doctrine of confidential relationship
rests upon principle of inequality between j
the parties and implies a position of supe* j
riority occupied by one of parties over th*
other.
9. Deeds 0 7 2 ( 3 )
Mere confidence in one person by **•
other is not sufficient alone to constitute*

V]
,,l
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confidential relationship; the confidence
must be reposed by one under such circumstances as to create a corresponding duty,
either legal or moral, upon part of other to
observe confidence and it must result in a
situation where as a matter of fact there is
superior influence on one side and dependence on the other.

of sale rather than a deed reserving a life
estate.

Nielsen, Conder & Hansen, Salt Lake
City, for appellants.
Dan S. Bushnell, Little America, Wyo.,
for respondents.

10. Deeds C=>211(4)

Landlord and Tenant 0 2 2 ( 4 )
Waters and Water Courses 0=234
Evidence in proceedings to set aside a
warranty deed, a lease agreement, and a
transfer of water stock certificates by a
husband and wife failed to establish undue
influence on part of a niece, whom husband
and wife had reared as their own daughter,
and her husband.
11. Deeds 0 2 1 1 ( 4 )

Undue influence must be established
by clear and convincing evidence.
12. Deeds @=>2II(2)

Landlord and Tenant €=322(4)
Waters and Water Courses C=>234
Evidence in action by husband and wife
to have declared null and void a warranty
deed, a lease agreement and a transfer of
water stock certificates to a niece and her
husband failed to establish that transfer of
property was made subject to a mistake of
fact on part of husband and wife who claimed that they thought the documents they
had signed were for a contract of sale rather than a deed reserving a life estate.
13. Deeds C=>l06(t«/2)
Landlord and Tenant <§»22(4)
Waters and Water Courses C=>234

Husband and wife who brought an action to have declared null and void a warranty deed, a lease agreement and a transfer of water stock certificates to a niece and
Her husband had burden of proving that
transfer of property wras made subject to
mistake of fact on part of husband and wife
*ho claimed that they thought the documents they had signed were for a contract
'• Goorge It. Brndbury was originally a
Party plaintiff along with his wife, Althca,
but died daring the course of the litiga-

CALLISTER, Justice:
Defendants appeal from a judgment in
favor of plaintiffs wherein the lower court
declared null and void a warranty deed, a
lease agreement, and a transfer of water
stock certificates.
PlaintiiTs, George R.1 and his wife, Althea Bradbury, were the owners of farm
land and appurtenant water rights in Sevier
County, Utah. They had only one child,
R. George Bradbury. However, they had
reared as their daughter, defendant Yora
Rasmussen, who was the natural child of a
niece, whom they had also reared. After
Yora's marriage to defendant Gordon Rasmussen, she moved away, but the close
familial relationship continued.
For several years prior to 1960, the farm
had been leased to other individuals. The
son, R. George, at one time operated the
farm but left to seek employment elsewhere.
From 1957 through 1959, M. D. Foreman,
a brother of Mrs. Bradbury, operated the
farm. He advised the Bradburys that he
could not continue and advised them to sell
their holdings. They declined this suggestion.
In October of 1959, the Rasmussens visited the Bradburys at the farm, and there was
a discussion about a possible sale of the
farm to the Rasmussens for $300 per acre.
Mr. Rasmussen stated that he would have
to think the matter over. From here on the
testimony of the parties as to what transpired differs substantially.
However, in the early part of 1960, the
parties consulted Mr. Tex R. Olsen, an attion, nnd his son, R. Georgo Bradbury,
as administrator of his father's estate,
was substituted as a party plaintiff.

712

Utah

401 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

torney, at his office in Rich field, Utah.
What took place at this consultation is in
dispute as between the parties. After meeting with the attorney, the Rasmussens returned to their home in Orem, Utah and the
Bradburys to their farm. On a subsequent
date, Mrs. Bradbury delivered to the attorney some tax notices which contained a
description of the property. She had a discussion at this time with Mr. Olscn. On
February 18, 1960, the Bradburys went to
the office of Mr. Olsen and executed the
papers which he had prepared. The Bradburys testified that the attorney merely read
the papers to them and they signed the same
without realizing their significance.
The papers executed by the Bradburys
consisted of a warranty deed conveying
their real property to the Rasmussens, but
reserving a life estate to them, and a farm
lease agreement wherein the Bradburys
leased the property to the Rasmussens for
the term of the life of the survivor of the
lessors unless sooner terminated by mutual
agreement.
The following day the deed and lease, together with copies thereof, were mailed to
the Rasmussens. They signed the original
lease and mailed it back to the attorney.
About two weeks later, the Rasmussens gave
the Bradburys a check for the one dollar
consideration which was recited in the deed.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rasmussen moved
to the farm and undertook its operation.
His wife and family joined him at the close
of the school term, and the family moved
into one of the homes on the farm. The
Rasmussens terminated their employment
and disposed of their home in Orem.
Later, the Bradburys gave the Rasmussens three water stock certificates, together
with assignments thereto which were taken
by Gordon Rasmussen to the secretary of
the water company who issued new certificates in the name of the Rasmussens.
2. A jury trial was originally demanded by
tlio Bradburys but waived by tbem at pretrial.* However, defendants refused to
agree and insisted upon the case being
tried to a jury. Defendants cite this as

These certificates wc«
Bradburys and held 1

turned over to the
them.

The trial court mad- findings of fact substantially in accord w h the facts outlined
up to this point. It :adc additional findings which will be discussed subsequently.
The parties evidently lived side by side
in harmony during I960, cooperating with
and assisting one another. The Bradburys
financed the purchase of some cattle by the
Rasmussens.
Sometime in 1961 a conflict arose between
the parties. According to the Rasmussens
it was in the spring that the son, R. George,
learned of the transaction and shortly thereafter his parents informed the Rasmussens
that there would have to be some changes
made. According to the Bradburys, the dispute arose in August when a man from the
bank came to check the property and they
became aware of the import of the papers
which they had signed. However, M. D.
Foreman testified that ih July he had driven
the Bradburys to St. George, Utah to visit
their son, and that he had heard the son tell
his parents that they should "fight it all the
way" to get the property back.
[1] It was the contention of the Bradburys that they thought the documents they
had signed were for a contract of sale rather than a deed reserving a life estate. The
case was tried before the lower court without a jury.2 It made, among others, a finding of fact that the deed, lease and transfer
of water stock were null and void for the
following reasons:
(a) A confidential relationship existed
between the parties thereto.
(b) The plaintiff, Althea Bradbury, and
her husband, George R. Bradbury, deceased,
were elderly people, with infirmities incident to age. 3
(c) The defendants represented the
transaction as being one for the sale of the
error. Ilowever, sec Johnson v. Johnson,
9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959).
3. George It. was 83 years of age, with failing eyesight, and Althea was 73 at the
time the documents were executed.
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farm and water stock, when, in fact, the
ie
documents purported to make a gift of such
h
property.
j
(d) The transferors at no time intended
to make a gift of said property.
(c) The alleged transfer of the above
mentioned property was made subject to a
a
mistake of fact on the part of the plaintiffs
fs
as to the nature of the transaction and the
le
transfers involved.
(f) The plaintiffs were of the opinion
)n
and understanding that said transactions
ls
were for the purpose of consummating the
ie
negotiations for the sale of the property.
>'•
(g) That the transferors did not have
re
the benefit of independent advice in conanection with said transaction.
(h) By virtue of the alleged transfers
rs
of the property mentioned above, the transs.
ferors has substantially disinherited their
,j r
natural born heir, being their only son, R.
R
George Bradbury.
(i) The defendants failed to prove by
.
clear and convincing evidence that the all_
leged gifts were fair, equitable, valid and
J
free from any fraud or undue influence
arising from the faith and trust reposed in
•
them because of the confidential relationship.
Based upon the foregoing findings, the
ne
court concluded as a matter of law that the
h<»
defendants in their confidential relationship,
"e
exerted undue influence upon the Bradburys
!
P»
and eutered judgment accordingly.
}s
[2-4] The first question to be resolved
e(l
is whether the lower court erred in its de|e_
termination that a confidential relationship
lip
existed between the parties, as that term
rm
4. If a confidential relationship is shown to
exist, and a gift or conveyance is made
to a party in a superior position, n presumption arises that the transaction was
unfair; this presumption has the force of
evidence and will itself support a finding
if not overcome by countervailing evidence. The burden is.upon the superior
party to convince the court by n preponderance (not clear and convincing) of
the evidence that the transaction was
fair. Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d
401 P.2d—45Va

is considered in its legal significance. The
evidence is undisputed that there existed
among the parties sincere affection, trust
and confidence, but is this legally sufficient
to constitute a confidential relationship
6* vnl £ r » s e to a presumption that the transaction was unfair? 4 We think not.
[5-9] The mere relationship of parent
and child does not constitute evidence of
such confidential relationship as to create a
presumption of fraud or undue influence.5
While kinship may be a factor in determining the existence of a legally significant
confidential relationship, there must be a
showing, in addition to the kinship, a reposal
of confidence by one party and the resulting
superiority and influence on the other
party.0 The relationship must be such as
would lead an ordinarily prudent person in
the management of his business affairs to
repose that degree of confidence in the other
party which largely results in the substitution of the will of the latter for that of the
former in the material matters involved in
the transaction. The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of
inequality between the parties, and implies
a position of superiority occupied by one of
the parties over the other. Mere confidence
in one person by another is not sufficient
alone to constitute such a relationship. The
confidence must be reposed by one under
such circumstances as to create a corre-

sponding duty, either legal or moral, upon
the part of the other to observe the confidence, and it must result in a situation
where as a matter of fact there is superior
influence on one side and dependence on the
other. 7

40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959) ; In re Swan's
Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d G82
(1950).
5. Froyd v. Barnhurst, S3 Utah 271, 2S P.
2d 135 (1934).
6. Newell v. Holloran, 08 Utah 407, 250 P.
9SC (192G).
7. Itenshaw v. Tracy
Utah 304, 49 P.2d
(1934).
See also
Trustees, 2d Ed., 5

Loan & Tr. Co., 87
403, 100 A.L.R. 872
Bogert, Trusts and
482, pp. 135-139.
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The extensive testimony of the attorney,
Tex R. Olsen, contributes significantly to
the determinative question as to whether
there was a superior influence exerted by
the Rasmusscnf and a corresponding dependence by the Bradburys.

heir, to which he replied in the negative.
She then remarked that the other property
which they might have in their names would
go to their son. Mr. Olscn told Mrs. Bradbury that he would call her when the papers
were ready.

The first consultation with Mr. Olscn
was arranged by Gordon Rasmusscn and
held in Olscn's office on a Sunday afternoon. It lasted one and a half to two hours
and both parties were present. According
to Olscn, the following transpired:

At a later date, the attorney notified the
Bradburys that the papers were ready to
be signed. They came to his office and
went over the documents with him. After
telling him what they had in mind, they
signed the deed and lease agreement and
received copies. On this occasion, according to Mr. Olsen, the papers were discussed
in detail prior to the signing with particular
emphasis on the provisions concerning the
life estate which the Bradburys again requested an explanation of its meaning.

Gordon Rasmussen told him that he and
his family were going to move down to the
farm to operate it, and that they wanted an
arrangement whereby they would be assured
that the farm would not go to anyone else
upon the death of the Bradburys. The Rasmussens both emphasized their desire for
security if they made the move and undertook to operate the farm. The Bradburys
stated that they had a general plan in mind,
but nothing specific. The attorney suggested several alternatives to accomplish the
desired result; one of which was a testamentary disposition, which was rejected by
the parties because of its ambulatory nature.
Mrs. Bradbury stated that she wanted to
give "these kids" some security if they made
the move. Mr. Olsen suggested the giving
of a deed, reserving a life estate to the
Bradburys so that the latter would be entitled to the use and income from the property so long as they lived. The attorney
explained to the parties the meaning and
effect of such a transaction. The "Bradburys thought this would be agreeable with
them because they wanted the property to
go to the Rasmussens and they wanted some
assurance that they would get something
out of it during their lifetime." The consultation concluded with Mr. Olsen agreeing
to prepare the papers and mail them to the
Rasmussens after they were signed by the
Bradburys.
About two days later Mrs. Bradbury came
to Mr. Olscn's office and delivered to him
some tax notices which contained the legal
descriptions of the farm property. At that
time she asked the attorney if Yora were an

Mr. Olsen also testified as to the general
health and alertness of the Bradburys. He
stated that Mrs. Bradbury was very alert,
but that Mr. Bradbury was advanced in
years and limited in his ability to move
about. Both of them participated in the
discussions and advised Mr. Olsen what
they desired to accomplish. Mr. Bradbury
responded readily with information when
so requested and helped make the decision
on the instruments to be prepared.
Mr. Olsen testified that at no time during
his discussion with the parties was mention
made of a sale of the property for $300 per
acre.
In the instant case there is no fact or circumstance to indicate a situation of trust
or confidence wherein one of the parties had
a commanding influence over the other;
nothing indicating dominance, either personal, social, or moral. On the contrary,
the evidence indicates that there was no inequality of influence in the circumstances of
the transaction. Each party was free to act,
and did act, upon his independent volition
and will. The terms of the deed and lease
appear to have been fixed and agreed upon
by the Bradburys upon their independent
judgment after complete apprizal by Mr.
Olsen of their legal significance and the coilsequences thereof. The insistence by tfe*
Rasmussens that they be protected is W*^
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indicative of any weakness or dependence
on the part of the Bradburys.
The fact that both parties testified that
the Bradburys had confidence and trust in
the Rasmussens is not sufficient to establish
such a confidential relationship as to raise
a presumption of unfairness in the transaction. The parties lived in distant towns
and visited only occasionally. There is no
evidence that the Rasmussens ever participated in the conduct of the Bradburys* business affairs prior to the transaction here in
question, or in any way exerted a dominant
influence in their lives.
[10,11] From the facts heretofore outlined it is evident that a finding of undue
influence cannot be sustained. Undue influence must be established by clear and

convincing evidence.* On the contrary,
such a finding is against the clear weight of
the evidence.
[12,13] It also follows from the evidence that the finding that the transfer of
the property was made subject to a mistake
of fact on the part of the Bradburys as to
the nature of the transaction cannot be sustained. The burden of proving such a mistake was upon the Bradburys. The testimony of Mr. Olsen and the conduct of the
Bradburys completely negative the possibility of a mistake.
Reversed. Costs to defendants.
HENRIOD, C. J., and McDONOUGH,
CROCKETT and WADE, JJ., concur.

8. Richmond v. Ballard, 7 Utah 2d 341, 325 P.2d 839 (195S).
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HOWK, .Justice (concurring):
1 concur except that in Part IV of the
opinion of the Court, I cannot subscribe to
the conclusion that Provo's objection to Instruction No. 23 failed to meet the requirements of Rule 51, Utah R.Civ.P. In my
opinion, the objection adequately alerted
the trial court to Provo's claim that Instruction No. 23 did not follow U.C.A.,
1953, § 58A-3-20(2) which adopts by reference the provisions of the National Electric
Safety Code.
In the pre-trial order prepared by plaintiff's counsel, one of plaintiff's contentions
was that provisions of the NESC and
§ 58A-3-20 had been violated rendering
Provo negligent. One of Provo's defenses
enumerated in that pre-trial order was that
it had complied with all applicable standards of the NESC and with the provisions
of § 58A-3-20. Compliance and noncompliance with NESC were again the subjects
of requested jury instructions submitted by
both plaintiff and Provo. Consequently, it
appears to me that the trial court was
readily aware of what Provo was referring
to in its objection to Instruction No. 23.
Provo made its objection during the stress
and pressure of the trial and should not be
held to the standard of a textbook model.
The objection went to the whole of the
instruction and not just to the third paragraph.
However, I do not believe that it was
prejudicial error to fail to instruct the jury
that compliance with the NESC was prima
facie evidence that an installation was reasonably safe. Since compliance does not
create a substantive presumption, as the
majority opinion correctly points out, the
failure of the instruction to mention "prima
facie" was harmless. The instruction informed the jury that compliance was "evidence which would support a finding" that
the installations were reasonably safe. It
would have added nothing to have instructed the jury that compliance was "prima
facie evidence." Either way, the plaintiff
was entitled to present evidence of noncompliance to be weighed by the jury.

Kvona Ilanna CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff.
Respondent and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Franklin E. CUNNINGHAM and Lola
M. Cunningham, Defendants,
Appellants and Cross-Respondents.
No. 19212.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 19, 1984.

Sister-in-law brought action against
brother-in-law to void two deeds to property given to brother-in-law. The Second District Court, Weber County, Calvin Gould,
J., entered judgment that found that brother-in-law was in confidential relationship
with sister-in-law and had overreached, and
voided deed to one property, but allowed
brother-in-law to keep property in which he
lived and awarded money judgment to sister-in-law. Brother-in-law appealed, and
sister-in-law cross-appealed award of money judgment instead of voiding the transaction. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.,
held that: (1) evidence supported finding
one deed was void for nondelivery; (2) evidence was sufficient to support findings
that brother-in-law was in confidential relationship and was guilty of abuse of that
relationship in other transaction; (3) voiding deed as to latter property was the
correct remedy; and (4) trial court abused
its discretion in fashioning an equitable
remedy of money judgment rather than
voiding of the second deed given its finding
that brother-in-law had overreached.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.

1. Appeal and Error C=>179(1)
Supreme Court could not reach issue
as to whether property transaction violated
statute of frauds where issue was first
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raised bolow in posttrial memorandum and
there was no indication that trii»l court
reached or ruled on issue. 11.C. A. 11153, 255-1 et seq.

fidence reposed in brother-in-law by sisterin-law and was properly remedied by voiding the deed, even though transaction was
carried out in "somewhat good faith."

2. Deeds 0208(1)
In action brought by sister-in-law
against brother-in-law seeking to void a
deed transferring property to brother-inlaw, evidence was sufficient to support
finding that deed was void due to nondelivery.

8. Deeds G=»72<3)
Mere fact that two individuals were
brother-in-law and sister-in-law was not
enough to prove that confidential relationship existed between them.

3. Reformation of Instruments c=>4
Court does not have carte blanche to
reform any transaction to include terms
that it believes are fair; its discretion is
narrowly bounded.
4. Reformation of Instruments <*>16
Reformation may be appropriate if
both parties were mistaken as to a term of
contract, or if one party is mistaken and
other party is guilty of inequitable conduct,
but it is not available to rewrite contract to
include terms never contemplated by parties.
5. Deeds ®=>211(4)
Voiding of deed to real property was
required, rather than reformation of contract for transaction, due to overreaching
and a violation of trust and confidence reposed in grantee of deed by grantor, where
there was no evidence that parties had
agreed to sale for fair market value at time
of transaction and evidence did not show
mistake about any term of the sale.
6. Deeds e=>196(3)
When confidential relationship exists
between the parties, and the transaction
occurred that benefits one in whom confidence is placed, presumption arises that
transaction is unfair and shifts burden to
benefiting party to persuade court that
there was no fraud or undue influence exercised toward the other.
7. Deeds c=>72(3)
Transaction in which brother-in-law of
grantor received deed to property for less
than fair market value was a result of
overreaching and violation of trust and con-

9. Deeds e=>72<3)
Confidential relationship existed between brother-in-law and sister-in-law, thus
warranting voiding of deed from sister-inlaw to brother-in-law for less than fair market value, where sister-in-law actually reposed a great trust and confidence in brother-in-law, was an alcoholic, and 64 years
old.
10. Cancellation of Instruments ©»57
In action seeking to void deed on
grounds of confidential relationships and
exercise of undue influence by purchaser,
trial court was not empowered to affirm
sale of residence on modified terms, rather
than voiding deed or enforcing original contract, because laches was almost, but not
quite, proven by purchaser, where vendor
was otherwise entitled to have the transaction voided.
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for defendants,
appellants and cross-respondents.
C. DeMont Judd, Jr., Ogden, for plaintiff,
respondent and cross-appellant.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendants appeal from an order of the
district court adjudicating interests of the
parties in several parcels of real property
located in Ogden, Utah. We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.
In 1975, the plaintiff, who was then 64
years old, owned a savings account and two
pieces of real property in Ogden—a home
on 34th Street and a home on Polk Avenue.
Although she was married, her husband
was in very poor health and in a rest home.
(He died in October of 1975.) Sometime
prior to the fall of 1975, defendant Franklin
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Cunningham, plaintiffs brother-in-law, and
his wife, Lola Cunningham, expressed a
desire to help the plaintiff with her affairs.
They induced her to place her savings account in joint tenancy with Franklin.
Franklin then withdrew $13,000 and placed
it in his own account.1 Thereafter, defendants caused the plaintiff to be hospitalized
for chronic alcoholism.
On September 9, 1075, immediately after
plaintiff was released from the hospital,
Franklin took plaintiff to a friend who was
a realtor to effect a "sale" of the Polk
Avenue property. The realtor prepared a
warranty deed that purported to convey
the property to defendants. The deed did
not describe any terms of the "sale." And
other than the deed, no writing was prepared to reflect the terms of the transaction.
At the time plaintiff signed the deed,
Franklin Cunningham orally informed her
that he would pay her $1,000 immediately
and $100 per month until her death. This
is the only evidence that related to the
terms of the transaction.
A little over a year later, on November
17, 1976, Franklin once again took plaintiff
to the same realtor's office where she
signed a deed conveying the 34th Street
house to defendants. Plaintiff testified
that she kept this deed in a drawer in her
home and that she intended the title to vest
in defendants at the time of her death.
Defendant Franklin conceded that this was
the understanding, but admitted that he
took the deed and recorded it approximately three years later because he was concerned that she might deed the property to
someone else.
Defendants have paid plaintiff $100 per
month on the Polk Avenue property since
1975 and, in addition, have expended some
time and effort fixing up the property.
Defendants have been living in the Polk
Avenue dwelling.
In 1982, plaintiff sued defendants claiming no delivery on the 34th Street deed and
undue influence .on the Polk Avenue deed
1.

In 1982, after this suit was filed, the $13,000
was returned to plaintiff. This transaction is

and seeking reconveyance of both properties to plaintiff or invalidation of both
deeds. After a bench trial, the court issued its memorandum decision. It found
that the deed for the 31th Street property
was void for nondelivery and ordered it
vacated. With respect to the Polk Avenue
property, the court found that plaintiff reposed great trust and confidence in Franklin and a confidential relationship existed
between plaintiff and defendant Franklin,
that for this reason she did not question
the transaction or seek independent advice,
that there were no negotiations regarding
purchase price or terms, only Franklin's
statement of what he would pay plaintiff,
and that he substituted his will for hers in
the transaction. The court noted the general rule that under such circumstances a
presumption of undue influence arises and
found it not to be rebutted; therefore,
"this transaction must . . . fail." However,
it also found that Franklin did not "fully
appreciate that his actions were wrongful
... and has made some improvements to
the Polk property." The court stated that
it was "unclear as to its authority" with
respect to the proper remedy and asked for
further briefs by the parties.
After further briefing, the court filed a
supplemental memorandum decision. The
findings reflected in the earlier memorandum wrere not disturbed. The court found
that in 1975, the Polk Avenue property was
worth approximately $42,000 and had a fair
rental value of $300 per month. It also
found that since 1975 defendants had paid
plaintiff approximately $10,000 in the form
of a down payment and monthly payments
and that plaintiff had "sat on her rights for
a period of time and accepted payments
from defendants." The court stated that
while plaintiff was not guilty of laches,
these circumstances could be taken into
account in fashioning a remedy. It concluded that:
the equitable resolution of this case
would be to leave defendants in possesnot at issue in this appeal,
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sion and award plaintiff a money judgment for the approximate actual value
[of the property] at the time of the deed
and not credit payments made [by defendants] because [the] payments did not
exceed reasonable rental value.
It summarized by stating the defendants
were left in possession for three reasons:
(i) plaintiff's delay in asserting her rights;
(ii) defendants' having put much time and
effort into improvement and upkeep of the
property, "which cannot reasonably be accounted for;" and (iii) defendants' "somewhat good faith" belief in the validity of
the transaction. Judgment was entered
vesting title in defendants and granting
plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $42,000.
[1] Both parties appealed, plaintiff
seeking to void the Polk Avenue deed and
defendants seeking to confirm the 34th
Street deed and overturn the $42,000 judgment. Plaintiff asserts that since the trial
court found her not barred by laches, it
should not have considered the post-transaction delay in fashioning a remedy and
should have voided the Polk Avenue deed
both as violative of the statute of frauds
and because of defendants' undue influence. Defendants contend that the statute
of frauds is avoided by part performance;2
that the trial court's finding of undue influence is based on the finding of a confidential relationship which, in turn, is founded
largely on the brother/sister-in-law relationship between Franklin and plaintiff,
and that this is not sufficient to support
the finding of a confidential relationship;
and, finally, that the court's equity powers
do not permit it to fashion a remedy without reference to the terms of the underlying transaction.

supported by the record evidence. We
therefore affirm the judgment voiding the
84th Street deed.
As for the Polk Avenue property, the
judgment must be reversed. Rather than
void the deed based on the finding of a
confidential relationship and an unrebutted
presumption of undue influence, as well as
actual evidence of overreaching, the trial
court appears to have attempted to use its
equitable powers to recast the "sale" in
terms that it thought would reflect an
arm's-length transaction. Although we
sympathize with the trial judge's effort to
do equity, that effort must fail for several
reasons.
First, the final judgment of the court
conflicts with its findings. In its initial
memorandum decision, the court specifically found that the "sale" of the Polk Avenue
property was the result of undue influence
by defendants, and therefore, it must fail.
These findings were not disturbed by the
supplemental memorandum. Yet in the final judgment, the sale was affirmed.

[2] As to the 34th Street property, we
reject defendants' contentions and find that
the conclusion of the trial court that the
deed is invalid for nondelivery is amply

[3-5] Second, we are aware of no authority that can support the trial court's
attempted exercise of its equitable powers
under the circumstances of this case. A
court does not have carte blanche to reform
any transaction to include terms that it
believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly
bounded. Reformation may be appropriate
where both parties were mistaken as to a
term of the contract, or where one party is
mistaken and the other party is guilty of
inequitable conduct, see Bourn v. Loveland,
678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984), but it is not
available to rewrite a contract to Include
terms never contemplated by the parties.
Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life Insurance Co., 127 Ariz. 581, 584, 623 P.2d
11, 14 (1981). Here the record does not
reflect that the parties agreed to a sale for
fair market value at the time of the transaction, nor does it show that plaintiff was

2. In their arguments to this Court, both parties focus principally on whether our Statute
of Frauds, U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1, ct seg., invalidates the sale of the Polk Avenue property. We
do not reach the issue because the record indi-

catcs plaintiff first raised this issue below in a
post-trial memorandum. There is no indication
that the trial court reached or ruled on the
issue. Cf. In re Estate of FMer, 19 Utah 2d 414,
432 P.2d 45(1967).
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mistaken about any term of the sale; rathor, it supports the trial court's initial finding that defendant Franklin overreached
and violated the trust and confidence reposed in him by plaintiff. Under Utah law,
this required a voiding of the deed.
[6,7] When a confidential relationship
exists between parties, and a transaction
occurs that benefits the one in whom confidence is placed, a presumption arises that
the transaction is unfair. E.g., Bradbury
v. Rasmusscn, 16 Utah 2d 378, 383, 401
P.2d 710, 713 (1965). This shifts to the
benefiting party the burden to persuade
the court that there was no fraud or undue
influence exercised toward the other. In
re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293, 293
P.2d 682, 693 (1956). From the findings of
the trial court, which are amply supported
by the evidence, the burden was properly
shifted to defendants, and they wholly
failed to carry it. The fact that they were
in "somewhat good faith" is not enough to
free them from the consequences of their
actions. The deed should have been voided. Seequist v. Secquist, 524 P.2d 598
(Utah 1974); Albright v. Medoff, 54 Or.
App. 143, 634 P.2d 479 (1981).
[8,9] Defendants are correct in arguing
that the mere fact that plaintiff and defendant Franklin were brother and sisterin-law is not enough to prove that a confidential relationship existed. See Nelson v.
Nelson, 30 Utah 2d 80, 83, 513 P.2d 1011,
1013 (1973); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16
Utah 2d at 383, 401 P.2d at 713. However,
the trial court did not rely on that fact
alone; rather, it specifically found that
plaintiff actually reposed great trust and
confidence in Franklin, that because of this
she did not question the terms of the transaction or seek outside advice, that there
were no negotiations over the terms of the
transaction, and that Franklin substituted
his will for that of the alcoholic plaintiff.
Plaintiff, then 64 years old, conveyed away
a $42,000 piece of property with a rental
value of $300 per month for $1,000 plus an
expectation of $100 per month for the remainder of her life. To realize the 1975
fair market value of her property, plaintiff
would have had to live an additional 34
years, and this does not take into account

the substantial ulditional amount in interest that would have been due had plaintiff's financing of defendants' "purchase"
been at fair market interest rates.
[10] A final problem with the trial
court's ruling is that it specifically found
that plaintiff's conduct did not amount to
laches, but it refused to void the deed because the plaintiff "sat on her rights for a
period of time and accepted payments from
defendants." If the plaintiff was not
guilty of laches, then that defense failed,
and the trial court should not have affirmed the sale. If plaintiff was guilty of
laches, or was estopped from denying the
transaction, or if she somehow ratified the
sale on defendants' original terms, the
court should have enforced the original
contract as dictated by Franklin. It was
not free to affirm the sale on modified
terms because laches was almost, but not
quite, proven.
In sum, on the record and findings we
have before us, the judgment of the trial
court as to the Polk Avenue property cannot stand. We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment and remand for entry
of a judgment voiding the Polk Avenue
deed.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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